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A HISTORY OF PALESTINE
FROM 135 A.D. TO MODERN TIMES

by

JAMES PARKES

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TO

I.M.S.

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PREFACE

THE STORY OF PALESTINE presents several peculiar qualities. Some of these it shares with certain other countries; some are unique. Some are due to its geographic position; some, and the more important, to the activities of the peoples who have inhabited it.

The geographical position of the land on the Mediterranean sea-coast ~~between Asia and Africa, between the river valleys~~ of the Nile and the Euphrates, has meant that when these valleys were in the possession of different empires Palestine was the bridge between them, along which passed the influences of culture, the wealth of caravans, or the armies of war and occupation. Such was its situation in the ancient world, until Rome came and reduced it to an unimportant minor province; for Rome possessed both the Nile valley and the western approaches to Mesopotamia. Such was its situation again when the unity of Islam was broken and rival caliphs and princes ruled from Baghdad, Cairo or Damascus, until the Osmanli Turks conquered both the Euphrates and the Nile, and it again lost its cultural and strategic importance. But for substantial periods in its long story, it has not belonged to the East, but has been part of the European-mediterranean world, whether as an insignificant, if turbulent, province of Rome, an uncertain Latin kingdom under the crusaders, or a modern Mandate of Great Britain.

Its geographical peculiarity Palestine shares with such countries as Belgium, the bridge between the Mediterranean and the Rhine, between the Latin and Teutonic civilisations of Europe, or Panama, the highway between two great ocean systems. In all such cases the result is that the story of the country is never merely the story of the men and women who actually dwell in it. Its history cannot be understood without reference to the imperialisms and ambitions, the conquests and defeats of wider empires, and the influence of cultures which did not arise from the experience of those born within its borders.

But one peculiarity of Palestine it would be difficult, if not impossible, to equate with the situation of any other land.

Palestine is the mother of two world religions, Judaism and Christianity; and though the immense majority of Jews and Christians have long ceased to dwell within its narrow frontiers, yet to neither has it become a matter of indifference, interesting only those concerned with historical research. But the interests of Jews and Christians in the country are themselves very different.

Christianity has become indigenous in many parts of the world; it is represented by powerful Christian states. There is nowhere a desire of homeless Christians to return to the original land of their religion. Yet the Holy Places in Palestine have been a constant attraction for Christian pilgrims, and their protection and maintenance has been a religio-political interest of Christian powers at many periods of history. For two centuries there were efforts of Christendom, again half-religious and half-economic or political, to regain the Holy Land by force, and the crusades have left a permanent mark *on the country*.

The Jewish interest has been both more intense, and more productive of complications. For Jewry has nowhere established another independent national centre; and, as is natural, the Land of Israel is intertwined far more intimately into the religious and historic memories of the people; for their connection with the country has been of much longer duration—in fact, as we shall see, it has been continuous to modern times—and their religious literature is more intimately connected with its history, its climate and its soil. Palestine therefore has provided an emotional centre which has endured through the whole of their period of exile, and has led to constant returns or attempted returns, culminating in our own day in the Zionist Movement.

Palestine is not in the same sense the homeland of the third religion with whose history its own is intertwined. The homeland of Islam is Arabia. But for many centuries Islam has been the religion of the majority of Palestine's inhabitants; and in Jerusalem stands the third holiest shrine for Muslims throughout the world.

The Biblical and Roman periods of its history are more or less familiar. In this volume I attempt to present the much less known story from the final war with Rome to the present day, in other words the period in which the history of the country has aspects which are unique.

During all this period of nearly two thousand years, Palestine was not even a name on the political map of the world. It was a portion of a larger province, whether Roman, Byzantine, Arab or Turkish; and its people were never conscious of themselves as a national unit, nor did they ever attempt, as they had done in early and later Israelite days, to form an independent kingdom. During the long period of Islamic rule, with its kaleidoscopic changes of dynasty, no claimant to the throne of the caliphs, or even to a separate identity, ever emerged from the Palestinian population. It was the alternative prey of dynasties ruling from Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo or Istambul. Only in the twentieth century has it resumed a separate identity, and that by the will of outsiders rather than of the majority of its own population; and the result has been conflict, uncertainty and one of the most delicate and difficult problems of modern international politics. To set this modern problem in its historical perspective is the aim of this book.

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It remains only to add certain special points.

A book such as this is inevitably built largely on the labours of other scholars. Apart from the fact that I cannot myself read any of the oriental languages in which a large section of the original sources is contained, the length of the period covered would of itself necessitate dependence on others. For this reason I have avoided footnotes, but I have done my best in a classified and annotated bibliography to help those who wish to make a deeper study on any period or subject to see the material used.

As to the spelling of Arabic and Hebrew names, I have adopted a compromise; trying (where a name is not so well known as to make the conventional spelling inevitable) to approximate to the present use of scholars. But I have refused all dots, accents and breathings, believing that those familiar with Arabic and Hebrew do not need them, and that those who (like myself) are not, pronounce names according to the written letters and have not the slightest idea what to do with the impedimental aids with which it is the present fashion to encumber them. I must, however, add that no system will guarantee that references in the index will be found under the letter where individual readers expect them; there is too much variety in contemporary use. I can only recommend

further search between C, K and Q, between P and F, and between O and U, A and E, when first efforts are unsuccessful.

Finally, it is a pleasure to record my gratitude to the many scholars in England and in Palestine who have most generously answered questions and made comments. They are too numerous to mention individually, but I would like them to realise that their help was very sincerely appreciated.

JAMES PARKES.

BARLEY.

June, 1948.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF PALESTINE

TWO GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES determine the character of the region which stretches more than a thousand miles east and south of the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The one is the great Arabian desert; the other is the presence of two river valleys, those of the Euphrates and the Nile, which lie, one to the north-east and the other to the south-west of the desert area, and are joined by a crescent of fertile land, stretching along the upper course of the Euphrates, and thence below the mountains of eastern Anatolia to the Mediterranean. Palestine lies at the southern end of this crescent, and thus forms the land bridge between Asia and Africa, between the Euphrates and the Nile. Its western frontier is the Mediterranean, the central highway of the shipping of the ancient world, its eastern the desert, rarely more than a hundred miles from the coast. This narrow strip consists of a maritime plain, varying in width from twenty miles to a few hundred yards, backed by high, rounded, limestone hills, whose western slopes catch the rainfall, and whose eastern boundaries sink imperceptibly, with ever increasing dryness, into the desert wastes.

These hills are divided from north to south by the deep rift of the Jordan, rising in the slopes of Hermon, and losing itself in the chemically charged waters of the Dead Sea, more than a thousand feet below sea-level, the lowest land area on the earth's surface. From east to west they are divided by a narrow plain from the bay of Acre to the Sea of Galilee. To-day these hills are largely barren, their rocky skeleton showing everywhere through the thin coating of soil. In ancient times, before destruction and neglect had led to the continuous erosion of the soil, large areas were fertile or covered with scrub or forest.

From the earliest times the two river valleys have been the scene of rich civilisations based on irrigation, and growing to wide empires; the crescent of land fringing the desert has been the breeding ground of hardy nomadic peoples, whose

wealth consisted in the flocks nourished by the sparse herbage of its hills and plains; and the coastal strip and its narrow hinterland have been the home of small and ever fluctuating states, living insecurely between the river valley empires on the one hand and the desert nomads on the other. It is among these states that the history of Palestine develops.

The country has been inhabited since paleolithic times. Traces have been found of the presence of paleolithic man two hundred thousand years ago, but it is only with his neolithic successors, dwelling in caves or mud-built houses and practising primitive agriculture as well as pastoral occupations, that its present history begins. For there is not only no known link between paleolithic man and his successors, but the remains of animals which have been discovered show that in paleolithic days the country enjoyed a very different climate from that which it has known for the past ten thousand years.

It is probable that remnants of the neolithic population form part of the ancestry of the indigenous inhabitants and of the Jewish people of today. For they were still there when the Semites first appeared in the land, although they inspired a certain fear and superstitious horror among these later settlers, as the names which they gave them suggest. They called them 'the ghosts', 'the horrors', 'the howlers', or 'the long-necked ones'. In exactly the same way the ancestors of present-day Europeans embodied the older inhabitants in their folk-lore as giants and goblins, ghosts and evil spirits, whose power and hostility filled the night and the solitary place with danger. These earlier people were of unknown origin, but they apparently came from the north, and not from the desert.

It is only with the migrations into the country of Semitic peoples of desert origin that its recorded history begins. But from then on there is a continual dual thread running through its story which forms an essential part of its peculiarity. On the one side is the life of its actual inhabitants; on the other is their relation to the powerful empires of the river valleys between whom their land formed a barrier or bridge, or to those who possessed these valleys in later days. The story of Palestine is never exclusively the story of the men and women who actually dwelt within its borders. In the fourth millennium, the earliest period of which we have records, the contact of external empires was naturally light and transient. For they

were not yet organised to exercise regular supervision over areas through which their armies passed, and from which their kings claimed tribute. The external interest during this time is provided by migrations into and through the country.

The first of these migrants were Semites, coming from the north-east. The original home of the Semitic peoples seems to have been the southern end of the Arabian desert. From that not too hospitable area have come four successive waves of emigration, all of which have in one way or another vitally affected the peoples of Palestine. The first, in the fourth millennium B.C., spread eastwards into the Euphrates valley, and westwards to the Nile. The Semites mixed with the older Sumerian peoples of the former valley, and the Hamitic peoples of the latter, to form the Assyrian and Egyptian peoples. In the third millennium there followed another wave of nomads, moving from east to west around the fertile crescent. They are known as the Amorites, and those of them who adopted a settled life did so in various parts of the crescent. Early Babylonian names suggest Amorite ancestry, and later there is mention of an Amorite kingdom with its centre at Damascus; but many of them seem to have remained nomads and to have occupied the general area east of the Jordan valley. A thousand years later, in the middle of the second millennium B.C., there followed along the same route yet a third wave of nomads, the Arameans, among whom were the ancestors of Israel. Finally, in the seventh century of the Christian era, there came along both the eastern and the western routes the armies of Islam. But with this last migration we are not, in this chapter, concerned.

The second millennium witnessed also movements into Palestine of a number of non-Semitic peoples, coming from the north and north-west. The first of these were the Hyksos, a people of uncertain origin, who actually succeeded in penetrating into the Nile Valley, and in maintaining for some centuries a kingdom in the Lower Nile. They were expelled from Egypt between 1600 and 1500 B.C., and disappear from history. Their place in Palestine was taken by Hittites who moved into the country from the north at about the same time as Arameans were appearing on its eastern frontiers. Their earlier home was in Asia Minor, whence, presumably under pressure from the movements of more northerly peoples, they began to spread southward about 1500 B.C. As they were

not by nature a nomadic people, they settled down all along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, where their physical type can still be seen to-day. For it is from a Hittite ancestry that many Turks, Jews and Syrians get the fleshy noses, full lips and heavy build which contrast with the more aquiline features and lighter build of the Semites.

Their domination of the country lasted for but a short time; for there followed in their wake other migrants from the north-west, the Philistines. Though the latest arrivals, and though they only exercised control over the whole country for a few uncertain decades, they have given it its present name of Palestine. These Philistines were an Aegean people, driven out of Greece and the Aegean islands round about 1300 B.C. They moved southwards along the Asiatic coast, and in about 1200 attempted to invade Egypt. Turned back, they settled in the maritime plain of southern Palestine, where they founded a series of city states. At the end of the period of Hebrew 'judges', their combined power extended over the greater part of the country.

The Hyksos had managed to get control of the lower Nile valley through the weakness of the native Egyptian dynasties. But round about 1600 B.C. they were expelled, and Egypt began to assert herself once more along her frontiers. For a hundred years she contented herself with the possession of a few strategic garrisons, and with periodic military operations which prevented any local power from becoming too strong. Then in 1479 B.C. Tutmose III, or Thotmes, a strong and powerful ruler of the 18th Dynasty, undertook more serious operations against a Semitic kingdom which was centred in Kadesh on the Orontes in northern Syria. Their complete defeat ensured an unchallenged Egyptian occupation of the country for several centuries. Later a weakening of Egyptian power coincided with the movements southwards of the Hittites and westward of the Arameans; and from 1150-850 B.C. Palestine was in the unusual position of being almost free from foreign control. That period coincides with the settlement of the country by the Israelites, as well as with the short period of their imperial expansion as a united kingdom.

To trace the connection of Israel with Palestine, we must, however, go somewhat farther back, to the movement of a group of Aramean nomads towards the beginning of the second millennium B.C. It is impossible to fix the actual date of the

removal of Terah and his son Abraham from Haran or from Ur of the Chaldees, nor does it matter that we cannot. For this uncertainty does not throw doubt on the belief that in the saga of Abraham are contained actual memories of a real person who, for real reasons, was regarded as the founder of the Israelite people. The stories of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, are in their main elements consistent with what we know of the lives of the nomadic peoples moving from east to west around the fertile crescent during this period. They were not the only "Arameans", and they may already have been distinguished from others by the tribal appellation of 'Hebrews' from a reputed ancestor, Eber. What distinguished them from other Aramean nomads were their religious beliefs and practices. The origin of this distinction might lie in the fact that the group was not of nomadic origin. It had taken to the nomadic life after experiencing that of settled city-dwellers. Whether it was some internal compulsion, or the downfall of their city, or both, which persuaded them to return to the more primitive ways of their remote ancestors does not matter. For one reason or the other they did so; but they brought with them relics of their urban experience, which showed itself in the religion, the folklore and the legal system which they bequeathed to their descendants.

What may have been the origin of Abraham's peculiar religion has been suggested by Sir Leonard Woolley, the discoverer of Ur, the city whence Abraham probably came. He points out that, in leaving the city, Abraham inevitably left behind the civic deities, whose jurisdiction did not extend beyond the area controlled by their worshippers. But just at this period the worship of a family, or private, tutelary deity had become common among the inhabitants of Ur, and this family god would accompany its worshippers, even though they left the city. In the absence of the other territorially limited, though more important, deities this one faithful guardian came to be regarded by Abraham and his people as the only god for them to worship. The idea fell far short of conscious monotheism, of the belief that there is only one God of the whole universe, and it was many centuries before the descendants of Abraham reached so lofty a conception. But it contained the germ of the idea, and preserved the Hebrews from following the normal habit of nomads and adopting in each locality the gods whom that locality worshipped. Around

their one God clustered other memories Abraham had brought with him from Ur, the folklore of creation and the flood, and the earliest code of laws.

The patriarchal and nomadic period lasted for several centuries. By this time the migrants of the previous, Amorite, wave had largely settled down, occupying an area east of Jordan and stretching northward to Damascus. Others had possibly settled west of Jordan, being known to us in the Bible as Canaanites. At a later stage they intermingled considerably with the Aramean Hebrews, and memories of this Canaanite-Amorite ancestry persisted for many centuries. The Hittites were likewise settled in the land, and it was from a Hittite that Abraham is recorded to have purchased the cave at Hebron where the graves of the patriarchs are still believed to exist. (Gen. xxiii.) After some centuries the descendants of Abraham had grown into a group of tribes related not only by their common ancestry, but by their common worship. At some time in the middle of the second millennium B.C. a series of droughts and crop failures led them to follow the example of other nomads of the district and seek permission to pasture their flocks in the western fringes of the Nile estuary. Whether all the tribes together went down to Egypt it is difficult to establish, for there are suggestions in the Biblical narrative that the group of whom Judah later became the leader remained in the southern part of Palestine, or at least returned to it separately and before the group of "Joseph" tribes, led by Ephraim. Some, at any rate, made a prolonged sojourn in Egypt, and were reduced to a state of semi-servitude from which they were rescued by a national leader, Moses. This period made a profound impression, which was never forgotten in their subsequent history.

Scholars differ considerably as to the date of the Exodus. Some throw the whole of the period already described further back, and believe that the Exodus took place between 1600 and 1480 B.C. Others place it between 1380 and 1300 B.C. But there can be no doubt as to the fact that it was a historical event, and that during the generation which separated the slave life of Egypt from the conquest of the hill country of central Palestine, some experience took place in the mountainous region of Sinai—and scholars differ even as to where it is to be found—of vital importance to the religious and national future of that group of Aramean tribes, and through

them gave to the subsequent history of Palestine a significance in the story of mankind far greater than that of its more powerful contemporaries in the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile.

The events associated with Sinai were a creative focussing point of all the previous experiences of those who received them, not an unrelated and inexplicable irruption into the normal tenor of their development. In the words of Browning: "out of three sounds was made, not a fourth sound, but a star". But the three sounds were 'real' sounds, even though the rôles of historian and theologian differ as to the interpretation of the making of the 'star' therefrom. The 'sounds' were their loyalty to the God worshipped by their group of tribes, the ethical traditions of the codes of Babylon, the wisdom of Egypt, the customs of their Aramean ancestors which formed the background of their corporate experience, and the spiritual purging which the desert freedom and stringency brought to them after the slavery and 'fleshpots' of Egypt. And the historical significance of the 'star' was the establishment of belief in a link between the ethical conduct of a community and divine guidance and approval, which marks the religious development of Israel during all her subsequent history.

No 'miraculous' or sudden change in conduct followed from the events of Sinai. To outward appearances the conduct of this group of Aramean tribes differed in nothing from that of others of their kind. The seed implanted in them grew slowly and naturally. The succeeding invasion of Palestine was often accompanied by the same savagery and ruthlessness that characterised the activities of their neighbours. History records that Moses, the desert leader, died before the tribes reached the Jordan, and it was under the leadership of Joshua, of the 'Joseph' tribe of Ephraim, that the invasion of the central hill country was successfully undertaken.

The moment was auspicious from an external point of view. The hold which Egypt exercised over the country was extremely weak, as we know from the revealing collection of letters discovered at Tel el-Amarna in Egypt at the end of the 19th century. Among these letters are reports from the Egyptian officers in Palestine as to the state of the country. Towards the end of the 14th century B.C. they tell of the invasion across the Jordan of a people called the Khabiru, and it is quite possible that in this there is the earliest reference to

the Hebrew people, although—as usual—scholars quarrel as to whether Khabiru could be the same as Ibri, which is apparently the name by which the Hebrews would have known themselves. In any case it is a quite possible date for the Hebrew entry into the country.

The conquest was a slow affair, and involved a much greater intermingling with the existing population—known by the general term of Canaanites—than the Biblical narrative in the very composite and stylised Book of Judges would often suggest. There was nothing which corresponded to a central government, and it was only the menace of external pressure which normally drew the separate tribes into temporary, and often unwilling, co-operation. But the confused records of the Book of Judges tell of only one instance of internal war between the tribes. The ‘judges’ otherwise appeared in order to answer the summons of an external danger—often from a nomadic people attempting to copy what the Hebrew tribes had successfully done before them. So long as the main issue was resistance to what amounted to but temporary raids, such a method of action might suffice. What compelled closer unity and organisation was the need to meet the menace of the growing power of the Philistines who, from their position on the southern maritime plain, had gradually acquired a predominant position in the central hill country, and even established a stronghold at Bethshan overlooking the Jordan valley.

After initial successes the first attempt at united action ended disastrously. Somewhere about the year 1000 B.C. the Israelites, under the leadership of Saul of the little tribe of Benjamin, met the Philistines in battle on Mount Gilboa above Bethshan, and were totally defeated. Saul was killed, and the Philistines remained masters of the country for a number of years.

After the death of Saul the mantle of kingship fell on his far greater successor, David, who remained for all subsequent history the ideal of a Hebrew king. More legends may have clustered round his son Solomon; but it was David who remained the ideal of a king and the prototype of the expected Messiah. Moreover, it is in the time of David that we first find two most important developments firmly established: the writing of history, as expressed, for example, in the record of the revolt of Absalom, and the literature of personal religion expressed in the early Psalms.

Unlike Saul, David was a southerner, and he enjoyed good relations with some at least of the Philistine cities. When exiled by Saul, it was to the land of the Philistines that he fled, and when he became king it was of Philistines that he formed his personal bodyguard. Nevertheless, he brought the war against this people to a successful conclusion, expelling them from their conquests and leaving them only the strip of coastland in the south where their original cities had been founded. Having dealt with the menace of the Philistines, David proceeded to secure himself against the other neighbours of Israel. While the kingdom of Saul had consisted only of the hill country south of the Vale of Esdraelon, excluding Jerusalem and the area round about it, together with the central portion of the hills east of Jordan, David extended these boundaries in every direction. His capture of Jerusalem gave him a strong fortress capital, traditionally belonging neither to the northern nor the southern group of tribes, and so an excellent centre for their new unity. Allowing the Philistines to remain in the south, he added to his kingdom all the coast north of Ashdod as far as the frontiers of Tyre. Inland he conquered the southern parts of the Lebanon, extended his authority as far as the Euphrates, and reduced Damascus to a dependent position under a governor of his own appointment. He did the same with Edom in the extreme south, and made Moab and Ammon into vassal principalities. These were the widest boundaries Israel ever possessed, and were only made possible by the fact that both Assyria and Egypt were so occupied with home affairs that they had no strength to spare for the extension or even maintenance of their frontiers.

This new and extensive kingdom was given an elementary centralised administration, replacing the old tribal units; and the king both organised a system of national levies and maintained a standing mercenary army. His revenue came in part from taxation in kind of the traditional sort, and in part from his control of the important trade routes from the coast to Damascus and from Tyre to the south. While Israel itself had little to export, the control of the trade routes enabled him to levy tolls on international trade in return for the security of the caravan routes within his borders.

The stability and prosperity of his work were both alike destroyed by his son, Solomon. Solomon was one of his younger sons, born after the hardships of David's earlier days had

passed, and unfamiliar with any background save that of an oriental palace and a respected monarchy. Though in his building of the Temple he provided an invaluable symbol of religio-national unity, and by developing the copper mines of the Araba he increased the wealth of the country, yet his passion for building led him first into the dissipation of all the treasure accumulated by David and thereafter into the laying of intolerable burdens on his subjects. The wisdom for which he was famous did not save him from political folly or personal vanity until, revolted by his tyranny, both Damascus in the north and Edom in the south regained their independence and so cut him off from control of his two most important trade routes. With his death still worse was to come.

The personality and prestige of David had united under his sceptre the northern and the southern groups of tribes, and this unity had just survived his son's reign. But no sooner was Solomon dead than his son, Rehoboam, proceeded by his conduct to break the kingdom into two. Himself a southerner, he announced to the northern tribes that he intended to make his exactions even greater than those of his father Solomon: "my father chastised you with whips: I will chastise you with scorpions." The result was instant rebellion. The northern tribes, announcing that they had no interest in the house of David, invited to be their king a certain Jeroboam, who, after being governor of the northern tribes under Solomon, had rebelled and fled to Egypt. The breach thus created was never healed. The two kingdoms of Israel and Judah were sometimes enemies, sometimes allies; sometimes the disparity in power was such that one was tributary to the other. But in the few centuries before their destruction, and in spite of a few men of ability on one throne or the other, there was never again a chance, such as had existed at the death of David, of creating a kingdom in Palestine which should be able to maintain its prosperity and independence in the face of Egypt or Assyria.

The length of their survival depended, not on their own strength, but on the preoccupations of the neighbouring empires. Symbolic of the future was the course of the conflict between Rehoboam and Jeroboam. The latter had spent his exile in Egypt, where he had won friends. When Rehoboam (who had the advantage of a permanent mercenary military

force) succeeded in driving him out of the greater part of his domain, the Egyptian Pharaoh, Shishak (Sheshonk), founder of the 22nd Dynasty, attacked Rehoboam in the rear, and not only deprived him of all his conquests, but exacted from him a heavy sum by way of tribute. It was, however, not from the south but from the north that final destruction came to both kingdoms.

After a long period of decline, the Assyrian monarchy began to gain new vigour about 900 B.C. and, order restored at home, set out on the path of conquest. In 853 Shalmaneser III moved westwards and attempted the subjugation of the Aramean kingdoms on his frontier. For some years there was sufficient unity to hold the Assyrians at bay, and Shalmaneser was even defeated in a pitched battle at Karkar. But in 841 Assyria returned; Damascus was captured, and Israel agreed to pay tribute. Then Assyria grew weak for a time, and the tributaries lifted up their heads. But the weakness was only temporary. In 805 Damascus was finally subdued. Fifty years later all northern Israel, as far down as Esdraelon, was incorporated into an Assyrian province. In 721 Samaria shared the fate of Damascus, and the leaders of the people were, following the Assyrian system, deported into other and distant Assyrian provinces. Israel and Damascus destroyed, Judah became a tributary and Assyria pressed on into Egypt. But these too extended frontiers led to fresh internal weakness, and in her turn Assyria fell a prey to a new power.

In 612 the Assyrian capital of Nineveh was taken by Nabopolassar, King of Babylon, and the Babylonian empire succeeded to the wide lands of the Assyrians. In 605 the power of Egypt was broken in the battle of Carchemish, and the possibility of Egyptian succour against Babylonian advances was seriously weakened—although the belief of the kings of Judah that Egypt would save them from their fate remained one of their articles of political belief. Judah survived only another twenty years. In 586 Jerusalem was taken and destroyed, and the leaders of Judah followed the leaders of Israel into captivity.

The independent kingdoms were finished; the work of the religious and social upbuilding of Israel had only just begun.

In the period from Saul to the fall of Jerusalem, there had been a remarkable development in every aspect of the religious

life of the Hebrew community. Even the conception of kingship which had grown with Saul and David was different from that of their Aramean or other neighbours. David was no absolute oriental monarch. He was king by 'covenant' with his people, and so were the righteous among his successors. The absolutist conception of Solomon and his son had no place in Hebrew ideas. The king was king by a contract with his people which left them free men and his brethren. He was not above the common law: his function was to see to its just administration—and the community had a kind of representative, not under royal control, whose business it was to denounce, openly, and in the royal presence, any infringement of this royal duty.

These representatives were not, like the tribunes of republican Rome, officers elected by the community to supervise the executive, but the order of prophets, whose beginnings appear to lie towards the end of the period of judges. Eastern religions have constantly brought into existence bodies of ecstatic fanatics, similar to the dervishes of mediæval and modern Islam. It seems that such were known in pre-Israelite Canaan; and it is not surprising if the worshippers of Jahweh developed a group of such men in opposition to the devotees of the local Baal. All that could be said of them in early days was, perhaps, that they were devotees of Jahweh, and kept his religion alive. They seem to have had little political or ethical interest. They lived in communities, supported by popular gifts and, presumably, by tilling the soil. Saul, the first king of Israel, was at least closely connected with such a group.

With the establishment of the monarchy and an ordered administration the king took the place of these ecstasies as the guardian of the national worship. But in the meantime a change was taking place within the body of 'prophets'. They began to produce men who were concerned with the fulfilment of Jahweh's will by the king and people, and with the ethical laws of which Jahweh was believed to be at once the author and the sanction. The functions of 'prophet' and 'priest' separated, and the concern of the prophets turned from the worship of the altar to the life of sovereign and people. It was in this way that they became a unique series of censors of royal and national conduct, representing unafraid the religious and popular opinion at their highest. At times they interfered in the political life of the kingdom, making

and unmaking kings, and giving advice on the highest policies of the state.

All this is well illustrated in two of the earlier members of the group. The first is Nathan, a prophet of the time of David. When David took to himself Bathsheba, Uriah's wife, and arranged for the death of Uriah in battle, he was doing what would have been regarded as perfectly normal and unexceptionable by any of his royal contemporaries outside Palestine. But not only did Nathan dare to rebuke him to his face; but David recognised the justness of his rebuke. Even more striking was the career of Elijah in the northern kingdom. Dealing with a king and queen, Ahab and Jezebel, to whom the repentance of David would be entirely foreign, he not only denounced the sovereigns for their personal immoralities, but intervened on behalf of Jahweh in their public policy and action. In his challenge to the priests of Baal, he was challenging, and subsequently massacring, the protégés of the Queen and King. Elisha, his successor, followed in his path and openly advocated policies which involved the overthrow of the royal house.

It would appear that this individualising of prophecy was not to the liking of the prophetic communities, but that as it drew off the real spiritual leaders of the movement, the bands of prophets became little more than ecstatic sycophants, supporting and dependent on the royal house. Such seems to be the implication of the story of Micaiah the son of Imlah and his conflict with the 'official' prophets over the issue of a campaign proposed by Ahab. And the scorn with which Amos, a few generations later, declared that he was 'neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet' equally suggests that the old order had fallen into complete disrepute.

The new prophets were individuals of the highest spiritual development of their time. They belonged to no order or succession, but appeared in every rank of society, from the royal family to the peasantry, and in both the northern and southern kingdom. The religious development for which they were responsible in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. has been a permanent enrichment of the spiritual understanding of mankind. Their teaching as to the holiness and love of God, and as to moral responsibility in public as well as private life, form the background of both Jewish and Christian theology and social teaching.

Parallel with the development of prophecy was an equally important development of law. As with prophecy, it is possible to trace the beginnings of written codes of law to the predecessors of Israel, both in Mesopotamia and in the land of Canaan. But also, as with prophecy, Israelite law took on a development which had no parallel in the codes of the neighbouring peoples. In some ways the codes which are embodied in the first five books of the Bible represent a more primitive stage of development than those of which we have knowledge from Mesopotamia or elsewhere. They reflect the life of a more primitive and agricultural society, still possessing some nomadic features; they make very little reference to monarchy, to trade or industry. On the other hand, they reflect a much greater concern with persons than with property, and a sensitivity to the unfortunate which has no parallel. The fatherless, the widow and the stranger are the objects of constant solicitude to the lawgivers. The laws are also unique in their constant association of human and divine sanction in their enactments. The whole basis of their ethics is ascribed to the will of God; need for obedience to them is ascribed to religious motives, and in some cases the only sanction of an order or prohibition is divine disapproval.

All this formed a natural complement to the work of the prophets. But it is necessary to recognise in relation to both that they formulated ideals which were very far from being realised in the actions and customs of the people to whom they were proclaimed. There was still idolatry in Jerusalem when it fell into the hands of Babylon, and the denunciations of social corruption in such prophets as Amos show how far his people fell short of the ideal society which his prophecies and the codes of law proclaimed.

In any estimate of religious conditions during the monarchy, we must abandon the attempt to deduce either conformity with any one type at any one period, or a logical and orderly development from a lower to a higher. All stages of development existed side by side, both in the cities and in the countryside. Ancient shrines continued to carry out their ancient ritual to the ancient gods, sometimes with the addition of Jahweh; while Jahweh-worship itself assumed very different forms in different places. The high lights of legal and prophetic development were there; but many centuries of work lay before the religious leaders before they were truly interwoven into

the tissue of the life of the people. And indeed, there was much work to be done before the prophetic and legal developments could be fully reconciled with each other. While Jeremiah denounced all shrines and ritual in worship, Ezekiel was building up a new ritual. While the makers of the Deuteronomic code were trying to wean the people away from ancient tabus, the makers of the priestly code were giving these tabus new significance. Some prophets freely accepted altars to Jahweh in all parts of the country; others saw sacrificial worship rightly carried out only in Jerusalem. These stages existed simultaneously side by side. They did not follow each other in orderly development.

The end of the two kingdoms of Judah and Israel was more than merely the temporary or permanent loss of independence. A large proportion of the population of the two kingdoms was transported to various spots in Mesopotamia and in the mountains east of it, and never returned. Between the years 734 and 581 B.C. no less than six separate deportations of the population took place; and in addition there was the devastation of war, and the flight of refugees in all directions including Egypt. The first of these deportations took its victims from the northern areas of the northern kingdom. It covered the regions north of the Vale of Esdraelon. The fall of the capital, Samaria, in 721 involved the deportation of many thousand persons, and the introduction of substantial numbers from other parts of the Assyrian empire to take their place. The new settlers came from as far apart as Babylon and Arabia. During the campaign of Sennacherib against Egypt in 701, Assyrian records say that over 200,000 captives were taken away from the whole land; and even though the figures be exaggerated, and include many who were not worshippers of Jahweh, it must have meant a further considerable loss for the remaining kingdom of Judah. The final destruction of Judah took place in three stages, in 597, 586 and 581 B.C., and involved the deportation of 4,600. But in addition to this an unspecified number fled to Egypt, fearing vengeance for the murder of Gedaliah, the first governor appointed by the Babylonians. While there was no formal introduction of settlers from other provinces to take the place of the Judæan deportees, the emptiness of the land tempted the Edomites from the south-east (who were themselves pressed by an Arab tribe, the Nabateans), and others, to move into the empty spaces. The

population which remained in the country, much enfeebled in numbers and deprived both of political and social leaders and of skilled craftsmen, might well have been expected to disappear, while the widely scattered exiles might equally have been expected to lose themselves gradually in the surrounding population. It is the fact that neither of these things happened that gives to Jewish history its peculiar character.

Of the exiles themselves, there is no record that of those from the northern kingdom, who were settled by the Assyrians in various parts of the Mesopotamian valley and in the mountains east of it, any organised or corporate return took place. It is at least possible that in the main they remained where they were and that their descendants are to be found to-day among the Jews of Kurdistan and the Caucasus. The majority of the later deportees likewise remained in Mesopotamia, where Babylonian Jewry was to have a very distinguished future. For some centuries, during the first millennium A.D., Babylon and its academies were the heart of the Jewish people.

The worshippers of Jahweh who remained, whether they belonged to the northern or southern kingdom, slowly rebuilt their life in what was left to them of the land of Israel. At Jerusalem, though the Temple was a ruin, or at least in a ruined condition, an altar for sacrifice seems still to have existed. But in the first years after the Babylonian deportations the central shrine came again to be at Bethel in the hills of southern Ephraim, and the political centre at Mizpah on the hills north of Jerusalem. At first it looked as though the old division between Judah and Ephraim, between the northern and southern kingdoms, might be forgotten, and the tiny remnant unite itself into a single people. This unhappily did not happen. There was too much difference between the religious developments which had taken place among groups of exiles who later returned from Babylon, and that of the very mixed population of the hills of Ephraim, some of whom were Israelites, and some the settlers imported by the Assyrians who had adopted the local worship of Jahweh.

Our evidence for the history of the Persian period (538-330) is both confusing and scanty. Babylon survived a bare half-century after its destruction of Jerusalem, and the successor to the kings of Babylon, Cyrus, King of the Persians and Medes, followed a very different policy towards the subject peoples of

his empire. He allowed all those deported from various provinces by the Babylonians to return to their homes, did they so wish. Taking advantage of this opportunity, a small company of Jews, under the leadership of a scion of the royal house, Sheshbazzar, returned to Jerusalem in 538. In 520 a further company arrived, led by Zerubbabel, and including Joshua the priest, and, in all probability, Haggai and Zechariah the prophets. It was this group which set about the restoration of the Temple with the aid of gifts from the Babylonian Jewish communities, for the Jews of Jerusalem were too poor to be able to contribute much themselves. The Temple was completed in 516, and thereafter there is silence about the Jerusalem community for some seventy years. The Jews presumably lived a tranquil life, which one must imagine was somewhat narrow both in economic circumstances and in religious development. For when we next have information, the community appears to have decayed both economically and morally. Our new information is connected with the return of a further company of Babylonians under the leadership of Nehemiah, a Jew who had received a high appointment at the court of the Persian king, and who came armed with royal letters appointing him governor of Judaea. Nehemiah rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem, in spite of a good deal of opposition, and set himself to secure a stricter enforcement of the Law, as understood by the Babylonian Jews. This involved an attack on the friendship existing between the local community and its Samaritan neighbours, and for some time, the question of mixed marriages was violently disputed between Nehemiah and local elements. After twelve years Nehemiah returned to Babylon for a period, but at some unspecified date he returned again to Jerusalem to continue the fight for strict conformity to the Law. When he finally left Jerusalem, or when he died there, we do not know, but in 397 yet another group came from Babylon to help to build up Jewish life. This was led by a religious, not a political, officer, Ezra, and he brought with him the text of the Law as codified by the scholars of Babylon. The whole, or sections, of this he solemnly read to an assembly of the people, who thus had their first opportunity of getting a general picture of the scope of their religious law. The result was a good deal of eager work of reformation, the problem of mixed marriages being still to the fore. How far the reform went we cannot say, for again the sources fail, and

the community passed into obscurity. But it is in that obscurity that the foundations of essential forms and lines of development for subsequent Judaism were laid. It was during the Persian period that the theocratic state, ruled by high priests, was established. But the centre of influence was still Babylon rather than Jerusalem, for what we know of the period suggests that it was from Babylon that both the religious ideas and the financial contributions came.

The exiled community of Babylon must have led a vigorous intellectual life, singularly free from restrictions or interruptions of their activity. It is possible that the formulation of the Deuteronomic Code, which is an attempt to combine prophetic and institutional religion, actually belongs to the period of the exile, or to the work of Babylonian Jews during the first decades after the return, and not (as is usually assumed) to the earlier reforms of the southern kingdom under Josiah. In any case the 'priestly' code, the other great codification of the laws of Israel, belongs to the period of the Babylonian exile and the return. It is usually supposed to have resulted from the literary activity of exiles, who, conscious of their distance from the homeland, exercised themselves in the editing of its history and the recollection of its traditions. Ezekiel, prophesying during the last days of the Jewish kingdom, had been more concerned with ritual and ceremonial matters than any of the earlier prophets. He was both prophet and priest; and it is among the followers of Ezekiel that the inspiration to bring all the traditions together into a new edition of the laws of Israel originated. There was, however, likewise a background among the exiles for the work of the editor of Deuteronomy. For the greatest prophet of the exile was the author of the second portion of the book of Isaiah (chs. xl-lvi), the great prophet of universalism, the author of the 'servant poems' in which the vocation of a people which suffers for the redemption of mankind is most movingly expressed.

The moment of decision between a new institutionalism which, in its very nature, was bound to be separatist, and a new universalism, which could begin by welding into one the heterogeneous elements which then inhabited the territories of Israel and Judah, came with the re-establishment under Babylonian influence and leadership of the little Jewish community in Jerusalem and the surrounding villages. There is ample evidence that at first it lived on very friendly terms

with the Samaritan community, and it is doubtful whether the traditional view, that it was over the rebuilding of the Temple that the break came, can be sustained. It seems rather to have been the personal policy of Nehemiah, backed by the exclusivism of the exiles of Babylon, which rejected the offer of friendship extended by the Samaritans. The idea that there was any great 'racial' difference between the two groups, based on the foreign elements imported in the 8th century, must anyhow be abandoned. The bulk of the 'Samaritans' were as much 'Jews' as the inhabitants of Judah, and racial origin, though a useful basis for abuse, was not at that time a determinant factor. They were moreover equally loyal to the Law, and it is interesting to find that the reforms of Nehemiah-Ezra and of the later Pharisees were echoed in similar reforms among the Samaritans. But the schism between them and the Jews of Judaea was never healed. For while they followed the development of the Jewish understanding of the Law, their religion was made narrow by the fact that the Pentateuch was the only part of the Bible which they recognised as divinely ordained, so that they could take no part in later Pharisaic-rabbinic developments in Judaism.

The decision between universalism and particularism was not taken without opposition. To this period belong two of the most 'universalistic' of the books of the Old Testament—the exquisite story of Ruth the Moabitess and ancestress of the Davidic house, and the book of Jonah, preaching God's willingness to forgive all men, including the enemies of Israel, when they repented. Nor can it be said that the decision, unfortunate as were some of its consequences, was taken unreasonably. The Jewish community was living not merely in the midst of potentially destructive enemies, but even more in the midst of potentially seductive friends, and this became even truer when the Persian hegemony was succeeded by that of the Greeks. Life in Judaea must have been relatively hard and uninteresting; the temptation to merge with the environing nations must have been strong; it needed the unbroken 'fence' of the moral and ceremonial discipline of the Law to retain the unity and loyalty of the people.

Two developments helped to this end: the growth of synagogue worship and the increase of apocalyptic literature. The origin of the synagogue is veiled in silence. We know that it existed a couple of hundred years later; but we have no

definite evidence when it made its first appearance. But the whole policy of the exilic formulations of the Law, which centralised sacrifice in the one Temple at Jerusalem, becomes incomprehensible unless there was something to take the place of sacrificial worship in the local communities, whether of Judaea or of Babylon. The synagogue is almost certainly one of those institutions which arose naturally in the new circumstances of exile and spread with the returning exiles into all centres of Jewish life.

Apocalyptic served a different end. It compensated men for the strains and disciplines of their present life by the double explanation, that this distress was part of the times of disorder which would precede the resettling of the world's affairs by God Himself, and that their fidelity would be copiously rewarded in the Messianic Age which would follow. The conception of a divine judgment, a "Day of the Lord", is found in the earliest prophets. It passed through various stages during the period of the monarchy; but it was under Persian influence that it developed into the tremendous drama of the End of the Age, ushered in by supernatural activity on every plane, which characterises Jewish apocalyptic literature of this and of succeeding periods.

So far as Jewish life was concerned the Persian Empire passed away almost unnoticed, overthrown by the Macedonian soldiers of Alexander the Great. Babylon fell in 331, but Alexander himself died eight years later, before he had had time to organise his vast conquests stretching from Greece to India. The new shape of Asia only emerged gradually out of the subsequent contests and rivalries of his generals. Palestine fell to Ptolemy, who had been wise enough to concentrate his energies on the possession of Egypt, even before Alexander's death, and to remain satisfied with a compact and manageable acquisition. It remained under the rule of the Ptolemics for a hundred and thirty years, and during this period the returned community maintained, though with some difficulty, its organisation as half church half nation, ruled by a high priest. Though inevitably the country suffered from the passage of armies, yet these hundred and thirty years were relatively tranquil.

The main beneficiaries of the politico-religious system under which the Jews were living were certain priestly families, who received substantial portions of the taxes and offerings

paid by the Jews. In their wealth they began to resent the narrowness of Jewish life, and, more and more, to adopt the habits and ideas of the Greek civilisation around them. This was regarded by the lower orders of the priesthood and by the mass of the population as disloyalty; but right up to the last days of Jerusalem there existed a powerful element in the Jewish plutocracy which sought the friendship and aped the ways of their Greek, or later, Roman masters. They came later to be known as the Sadducees.

Matters first came to a head when a change of régime brought a change in the policy of their masters. After long conflict, the hegemony over Palestine passed in 199 B.C. from Ptolemaic Egypt to Seleucid Syria. Apart from the brief period when the Maccabees were able to assert complete independence, Syria remained the master—or claimed to be the master—of the country until it passed in turn to the Romans in 64-63. In 175 there came to the throne of Syria Antiochus IV, Epiphanes, a man who had a passionate admiration for all things Greek. In the first year of his reign he was solicited by a member of one of the wealthy and hellenising priestly families to grant him the high-priesthood. Antiochus, considering the high priest to be nothing more than the governor of one of the dependencies of his crown, made the appointment, and subsequently unmade his candidate and substituted another—all this in violation of the Law, by which the selection was made for life, and could only be made from a single family.

The result of his action was a rebellion of the more orthodox section of the population, which was suppressed with violence, and punished by the plundering of the Temple. When that had no effect, Antiochus proceeded to the deliberate suppression of Judaism. All Jewish observances, including the rite of circumcision, were forbidden, and the Temple was desecrated by a heathen altar. But the carrying of this policy from Jerusalem into the rural districts in 166 provoked an act of rebellion which had momentous consequences. When the emissaries of Antiochus came to the town of Modin, in the foothills between the mountains of Judaea and the maritime plain, a member of a priestly family living in the town, Mattathias of the house of Hashmon, killed the official, as well as a Jew who began to offer heathen sacrifice. This act was the beginning of a flare-up of religious enthusiasm

throughout the country. Mattathias had five sons, three of whom in turn came to the leadership of the national and religious revival. Though only one of them, Judas, actually had the title of the Maccabee, this name, as well as Hasmonean, is usually attached to the whole family.

A brief period of guerrilla warfare, in which the Jews were led by Judas Maccabeus, and in which the "pious" (Chassidic, later Pharisaic) party supported the rising, restored the Temple into Jewish hands and led the Syrians to abandon their anti-religious campaign. Four years after its desecration Judas saw the Temple cleansed and the true sacrifices re-established. The Feast of Hanukkah still commemorates the event. With this success the religious objective of the Maccabees was secured, and the Chassidic party was satisfied. But not so the nationalists. In addition to religious they desired to achieve national independence. They were aided by the incredible confusion of Syrian affairs during the next hundred years. There were nearly always at least two candidates to the throne and civil war was almost continuous. During the brief periods when a strong ruler held undisputed sway the Maccabees could do nothing, but such periods were of rare occurrence. Judas himself was killed shortly after the cleansing of the Temple, but he was succeeded by two of his brothers in turn, Jonathan and Simon. The latter was the most beloved of all the Maccabees, and in his time the high-priesthood was by popular acclamation made hereditary in his house. Simon succeeded in freeing Judaea entirely from the payment of tribute, and took this as equivalent to independence. His son John Hyrcanus, who may have assumed the kingship as well as the high-priesthood, ruled for thirty years (135-104).

John considerably extended the borders of his kingdom. He conquered the Idumaeans in the south, and compelled them to accept Judaism. Northwards he took Samaria, Bethshan, and the Vale of Jezreel, destroying the Samaritan Temple in his progress. But he was never accepted by the more orthodox of his subjects, and was in constant conflict with the Pharisees, whose ordinances he abrogated. He left his dominions to his wife, but in 103 her son, Aristobulus I, proclaimed himself king and is said by Josephus to have starved her to death. Though an ardent hellenist, yet when he conquered Galilee he compelled the Galileans to accept circumcision or emigrate. He ruled only one year, and was

succeeded by his brother Alexander Jannaeus (102-76) a successful despot, but with little else to commend him. He extended his dominions to the sea coast, the Greek cities across the Jordan and the rest of Galilee; but he could neither secure the affection of his subjects, nor maintain order in the territories he had conquered. On his death-bed he left the throne to his wife, Alexandra, with the advice that she should make peace with the Pharisees. Alexandra (76-67) turned out to be a pacific, pious and capable ruler, and later Pharisaism looked back to her rule as a golden age. The laws abrogated by Alexander Jannaeus were restored, the Temple worship made correct in every detail, and the Pharisaic party ruled the country according to its will. Her elder son, Hyrcanus, was made high priest. But the reign of Alexandra was but a brief interlude in the story of the decline of the Maccabees, who ended in a state of division, corruption and incompetence parallel to that of their Seleucid neighbours. Both alike were swept away by the advance of the new world power of Rome.

Yet this decline was really only a matter of secondary importance. Even at their greatest the Maccabean kings were of less significance for the future than were the often unknown leaders of the religious developments of the period. Though the roots of these developments go back to the exile or even further it was during the Greek period that they assumed that maturity which enabled them to survive with undiminished vigour the loss both of political independence and even of a geographical centre. Synagogal Judaism, founded on the interpretation of the Law, Christianity, rooted in the apocalyptic movement whose centre was in Galilee, Jewish mysticism, and hellenistic Judaism, all owe an incalculable debt to the work of men living in the three centuries following the conquests of Alexander the Great.

The centre of the stage was occupied by the Law, which was indeed paramount in all four movements mentioned, even though it was differently interpreted in each of them. Under the influence of the makers of the priestly code, Pharisaic Judaism developed still further its principles of interpretation, and its insistence on the line of separation between those who observed its tenets and those who did not. In many quarters this separation led to narrowness and to a fanatical nationalism, emphasised by the ease with which the Sadducaic opponents of Pharisaic interpretation had

adjusted their Judaism to a prosperous compromise with Greek civilisation. It was this compromise of the Sadducaic party during both the hellenistic and Roman periods which led many loyal Jews to identify genuine religious loyalty, on the one hand with a political nationalism as fanatical as it was foolish and, on the other, with a narrow sectarianism which did permanent harm to the developments of rabbinic religion. Yet neither the one feeling nor the other must blind us to the immense significance of Pharisaic Judaism in the story of mankind's religious pilgrimage. The doctrine of interpretation made possible the only creative relationship between a written document, limited in both time and quantity, with the ever-changing needs of a developing human society; and the institution of the synagogue which accompanied its elaboration provided the transition from primitive sacrificial worship, at which the layman was merely a spectator, to the corporate worship of spirit and intellect in which he was a full participant. When in a later generation there was added the third foot of the rabbinic tripod, development of interpretation by discussion in regular academies and its acceptance on the basis of the moral authority of the interpreters, historic Judaism stood equipped with the threefold arm which enabled it to survive the constant dangers and dilemmas of a scattered national existence in three continents and a dozen different civilisations.

While Jerusalem was the natural centre of Pharisaic development Galilee provided a considerable number of the anonymous writers of the apocalyptic works comprised in the writings we know as the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. Two of the most famous, as well as the most profound, undoubtedly emanate from northern Israel. The one is the *Book of Enoch* (or its central portion, for it is a composite work) and the other is the most beautiful of all apocalyptic writings, the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, which is a product of the Maccabean period and a call to the northern population in particular to return to the religious worship and ethical traditions of their ancestors—for we may assume that many of the Galileans forcibly converted by Alexander Jannaeus were in fact the descendants of the 'ten tribes' of the northern kingdom, even if they had forgotten the worship of Jahweh in the centuries since that kingdom's destruction. Messianic ideas, whether concentrated in a personal Messiah or on a national messianic vocation, formed an essential part of

apocalyptic writings. It is therefore not surprising that it was from Galilee that Jesus of Nazareth and eleven of his twelve chief followers should come. A movement such as that which Jesus initiated, and missions such as he conducted among the towns and villages of Israel, were more assured of a welcome in the north than in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. Mysticism too, though a slow and uncertain growth in Judaism, found its roots in the visions and gnostical imaginings of the apocalyptists.

The only movement of the four which was to prove sterile—or relatively sterile—was that of hellenistic Judaism. Though its centre lay in Alexandria rather than Palestine, we are apt to forget that during the Maccabean and Herodian periods there were many Greek cities in Palestine itself. Some had been settled by soldiers of the armies of Alexander; some grew up in subsequent centuries. Along the coast was a chain of such cities, and east of Jordan a further group was built at convenient points on the great trade routes which passed west and south from Damascus. These latter cities, once freed from the yoke of the Maccabees by the Romans, formed the League of the Ten Cities, the Decapolis. From Nazareth it was almost possible to see the Greek cities of Ptolemais to the west on the sea coast, and Hippos, one of the members of the Decapolis, to the east on the cliffs above the lake of Tiberias, so closely did Greek culture hem in the lands of Judaism.

The hellenistic movement led to the translation of the Old Testament into Greek, and to the writing of a number of Greek works, of which the Wisdom literature is at once the centre and the crown. It remained essentially Jewish for all its Greek dress and for some centuries exerted considerable influence. But when Judaism, under the double pressure of persecution within the Roman Empire and the advancing strides of Christianity, in the third century C.E. moved its centre eastwards into Babylonia, Greek influence became suspect. It is the Church and not the Synagogue which has preserved the writings alike of the apocalyptists and the hellenists; and the last writings of Judaism in the Greek language are almost contemporary with the first effective Apologies of the Christian Church to the Greco-Roman world.

All, therefore, that Rome destroyed when she wiped out the independence of the Maccabees was an oriental kingdom already corrupt and impotent. The house of Herod, which

succeeded the house of the Hasmoneans, ruled only by the most complete subservience to Rome. The Herodians were appointed and dismissed at the whim of the Roman Emperor, and not even that Herod whom we call the "Great" made any significant contribution to either the cultural or religious life of his people. He may be 'Great' by the standards whereby we judge an Amir of Arabia or a medieval count, but had the writers of the historical books of the Bible survived to chronicle his reign and the reigns of his successors, they would have had nothing to record save that 'he did evil in the sight of the Lord', and it is doubtful whether they would even have waxed enthusiastic over the pompous hellenistic shrine which he erected on the site of the Temple of Solomon and Zerubbabel.

The stages by which Rome had come to a direct government of Palestine faithfully reflect the traditional methods of her imperial expansion. She had first become interested in 162 B.C. when she received a deputation from Judas Maccabeus asking for support against the Seleucids of Syria. To support a rebel against any independent sovereign whose territory neighboured on Roman interests was usually a good policy, and it is therefore possible—though the evidence is uncertain—that Rome in 142 formed an alliance with Simon, brother of Judas, and recognised his independence of Syria. When in 65 the Roman general Pompey turned Syria into a Roman province he arranged a balance of forces to the south of the newly acquired territory which would leave no single group powerful enough to threaten the Roman peace. The Hasmonean high-priest was left with autonomy only over Judaea, Peraea across the Jordan, Idumaea and a detached area of Galilee. Samaria, the Greek cities and the whole coast were made autonomous governments and all were placed under the general rule of the Roman legate of Syria. The subservience of Herod the Great (31-4 B.C.) to Rome was rewarded by a restoration of all except most of the cities of the Decapolis to the Jewish king. But after his death and the failure of his son Archelaus to prove himself fit for sovereignty, Rome took into direct control the central portions of the land, including Jerusalem and its wealthy Temple treasury, and Samaria. In 42 this territory was returned by the Emperor Claudius to his favourite Agrippa I, grandson of Herod the Great. When he died in 44, it again came under direct Roman rule, but this time with

frontiers extended to include Galilee in the north and Peraea across the Jordan.

During all this period there was a certain amount of unrest, arising from the messianic expectations of the people. Galilee was its centre, and it was in Galilee that, during the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate, the public ministry of Jesus of Nazareth took place. In the general atmosphere of tension, in the conflict between the parties which demanded an armed resistance to Rome and those which leaned on Roman support, the quiet ministry and tragic death of this young Galilean prophet passed almost unnoticed. For some decades his followers were also unnoticed, and the first records which mention the name of Christian refer to events outside the country.

The hand of Rome was far heavier, as well as far more efficient, than had been that of any of the previous imperial rulers of the country. With Judaism, and its exclusive monotheism, the wisdom of Julius Caesar found it possible to make an intelligent accommodation. It was made easy for the Jewish communities scattered throughout the Greek and Italian cities to practise their religion and at the same time to be loyal to the empire. But in Palestine itself the temper of both sides made such an accommodation difficult. The Palestinian community had too recently known independence, and this independence had been accompanied by too many bitter internal feuds, always likely to disturb the peace. Local governors did not possess the wisdom or tolerance of a Caesar, and the result was a constant series of explosions between Rome and some section of the Jewish populace. At one time it was the Pharisees intent on rejecting some insult to their religious scruples; at another the nationalists, fired with messianic enthusiasms and foolishly convinced of divine assistance in a war with Rome. The situation deteriorated steadily, and in 66 A.D. Rome found herself engaged in full scale war with the nationalists. Too late the Pharisaic leaders realised the rashness of some elements of their teaching and withdrew from the doomed Jerusalem. They saved Judaism but were unable to save the Jewish commonwealth. For three years the Romans were kept at bay. But the end was inevitable. In 70 A.D. Jerusalem was laid waste after months of siege, and the Temple was destroyed, never again to be rebuilt. The ruins of the unwallled city provided little more than accommodation

for the camp of the Roman garrison, though as the years went on some of the population, Jews and Judeo-Christians, crept back and settled in the south-west corner round the hill of Zion. Hundreds of thousands of Jews either perished or were taken away to be scattered as slaves through the empire, even to the Rhineland.

Even after this bitter lesson the land had but an uneasy peace. Sixty-two years later, under a pseudo-Messiah Bar-Cochba, and with the support of the greatest of the Pharisaic leaders, Akiba, revolt flared up again, only to end in 135 with the destruction of the city and the prohibition to any Jew to set foot within its boundaries. But the interval between the two destructions had allowed both religions of the country, Judaism and Christianity, to become independent of geography, while at the same time a new and unique relationship with the country itself was slowly built up by the former, and to a lesser extent by the latter also.

PALESTINE FROM 70 TO 135

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACT in these sixty years which mark the end of the Jewish commonwealth is that they mark also the development of Judaism and Christianity into world religions. For Christianity the break was complete. In all its subsequent history it never again regarded the Holy Land as either its intellectual or geographical centre. No bishop of Jerusalem ever contested the primacy of the Pope of Rome or the Patriarch of Constantinople; no special authority ever attached to the opinions of the scholars of the Holy Land; and no permanent centres of learning came into existence in the country. Only as a centre of pilgrimage did it enjoy an unquestioned pre-eminence. With the Jews and Judaism the development was quite different. The destruction of the Temple only confirmed an alteration in Jewish religious practice which had been built up through several centuries and had grown naturally out of the geographical dispersion of Jewish communities. Every synagogue in every city was already equally a centre of Jewish teaching and worship. There was no religious papacy to compare with that of Rome for the Christians, just as there was no hierarchically and geographically organised priesthood to compare with that of the Christian tradition. Judaism had no provinces or dioceses; and spiritual primacy passed freely from centre to centre according to the actual merits of the spiritual leaders existing in any generation. But Palestine was much too closely interwoven into the whole fabric of the Jewish religious tradition to require either Temple or hierarchy to maintain its uniqueness. When Judaism realised itself to be a world religion, it did so primarily in a geographical, not in a missionary, sense; it was still the religion of the Jewish people and of such individuals or groups as associated themselves by conversion with the peculiar fate and destiny of the Jews; and these, relative to the numbers who came to profess the Christian religion, were few, and made still fewer when Christian legislation

attached the death penalty to both convert and converter. It was therefore impossible to forget that it was within the land of Israel that the religious formation of the Jewish people had taken place; certain formal acts, such as the fixing of the calendar, were for a long time exclusively associated with the Palestinian rabbinate; a certain sanctity remained inherent in the Palestinian soil. The conception of a 'return' was never absent from Jewish thought, and there was no alternative but the holy soil of Palestine to which a 'return' could be envisaged. Jews did not forget that once before there had been an exile and a restoration. Finally, though the concept of a Messiah did not occupy the central place in Judaism that Jesus Christ had come to occupy in Christianity, yet there was no doubt in Jewish minds but that at some period a Messiah should come and there was no land to which he would lead the Jewish people but to Palestine. What happened to the two religions, therefore, as a result of the events of 70 and 135 was that Christianity's centre moved away from Jerusalem and never looked back to its first home, while Judaism, deprived of the Temple and the priesthood, evolved a new and more spiritualised relationship to a centre which had not changed.

The agency of this evolution was Pharisaism. A change of emphasis from Temple to Torah had been taking place during the centuries of voluntary migration. When, therefore, just before 70 A.D., Jochanan ben Zakkai and the other Pharisaic leaders came to the conclusion that the nationalist resistance to the Roman armies of Vespasian and Titus carried no divine sanction or religious obligation they retired, with the permission of the Roman authorities, to Jabne (Jamnia). Jabne was originally a Philistine city; then it had acquired a Greek population; it had fallen to Alexander Jannaeus in the Maccabean period, and had later become a private appanage of the Empress Livia, whence it passed to Tibcrius. Its population was mixed, but at the time when the Pharisees made it their headquarters it was predominantly Jewish, and Jews possessed equal civic rights with its non-Jewish inhabitants. It would seem that it was because it already possessed a seat of Jewish learning that Jochanan asked to be allowed to transfer the Sanhedrin thither, and it remained the centre of Jewish life until after the deaths of Jochanan and his successor, Gamaliel II. At some date after the revolt of Bar-Cochba the

centre moved from Jabne and Judaea to Usha, a town in western Galilee, and it was there that the new arrangement took definite shape. The president of the rabbinical school received the title of Nasi, or Prince, and came to be recognised by the Roman authorities as the spiritual head of Jewry with the Greek title of Patriarch. This recognition did not take place in a day, and the same is true of the acceptance by the Jewish population of the authority of the religious courts and ordinances of the rabbis.

The two wars seriously diminished the numbers of the Jewish population, and modified its distribution; but they did not alter its character. The Jews remained a people of peasants and landed proprietors, dwelling in the hills rather than in the plains of the country. We have from Josephus a fairly clear idea of the destruction wrought after the victory of Titus; for he gives us lists of the towns, villages and districts ravaged and left deserted by the Roman conqueror. Jerusalem itself was left empty; and in Judaea the main losses were in the Hebron area and around Thamna, a town founded in the Hasmonean period some twenty miles north-west of Jerusalem. In Transjordan the land was ravaged around Machaerus east of the Dead Sea and around Bethennabris, a place whose site has not been identified. In Galilee parts of the plain of Esdraelon were destroyed, and villages around Jotapata and Gamala. After 135 most of the destruction was in Judaea where the revolt originated. The result was that the centre of Jewish population shifted from the south to the north, and this was further accentuated by voluntary migrations, for example of the priestly families who had lived around Jerusalem, and of the rabbinical scholars who had been in residence in Jabne.

After the war of 70 the Romans may have been satisfied that the destruction of the Temple, and the confiscation and dedication to Jupiter Capitolinus of the tax previously paid by all Jews to the Temple, would be sufficient punishment. After 135 they proceeded to more serious measures. For this second war we are much less well-informed. It found no Josephus to chronicle its tragedies. Even its cause is somewhat uncertain, though it seems most likely that it was partly due to the intention of Hadrian to build a new city on the site of Jerusalem, and partly to an edict of the same emperor forbidding mutilation which was interpreted by, or to, the Jews as

a prohibition of circumcision. Their sudden uprising took the Romans by surprise, which certainly suggests that Hadrian's actions were not intended to be anti-Jewish; otherwise he would have taken precautions against their reactions. But after the war definite attempts were made to suppress Judaism. Jews were not permitted to enter the new city of Aelia Capitolina which rose with all the usual accompaniment of temples, theatres and baths on the site of Jerusalem; they were definitely forbidden to practise any Jewish customs, and their rabbinic seminaries were broken up. But these measures were impossible to enforce rigorously, and all except the exclusion from Jerusalem were revoked by Hadrian's successor, Antoninus Pius.

The Christian situation was different. On the whole it would seem that Christianity had grown more in the cities than in the countryside, and that it had thus become hellenised to some extent even before it left Palestine. We know of Christian communities in the first century at Joppa and Caesarea, at Lydda and Samaria and other cities of the plain and the sea coast. That the Christians of Jerusalem fled to Pella during the war with Vespasian and Titus suggests that there were similar urban Christian communities in Transjordan. The one area which seems to have been an exception was the southern (Idumaeon) Shephelah, between Lydda and Beit Jibrin, where there were many Christians in the villages. The inhabitants of this region had been forcibly converted to Judaism two centuries earlier by John Hyrcanus, and were still scarcely treated as equals by the stricter Jews. This may have disposed them to listen to the Christian message, and it is interesting that Idumaeans are expressly mentioned among the earliest followers of Jesus (Mark 3, 8). On the whole the Church seems to have grown mostly in the less Jewish districts of the country, and in this there is nothing surprising.

It is the period from 70 to 135 which marks the development of the characteristic Christian institution of episcopacy, though this took place more naturally in the Gentile Churches of Asia and Greece than in Palestine. While local organisation was coming to take definite shape, no generally recognised pre-eminence yet belonged to any one church. So long as Christians were compelled to live under cover and exposed to periodic persecution, a localised and decentralised institution

linked by travelling 'apostles' was almost inevitable. But as a central authority came into existence its seat was not Jerusalem but Rome. Even when eastern and western theology came into conflict the centres of interpretation in the east were Antioch and Alexandria. The Christians of Palestine never provided a third competitor.

The two developments in which Palestine played the predominant rôle, in one case as actor and in the other as victim, were the break with Judaism and the condemnation of the Judeo-Christian Church as heretical. The break between the two religions was a gradual process taking about a century to complete. Judaism was accustomed to a variety of sects and tolerant of great differences of belief; while Christians, so long as their beliefs were not interfered with, had no reason to refuse the protection which membership of the synagogue gave them. They needed as much as did other Jews exemption from any act which involved idolatry, and they could obtain it only through synagogue membership. But the mixed Jewish-Gentile membership of the new sect inevitably precipitated a crisis. Even apart from the antagonism of members of a synagogue who did not believe that Jesus was the Messiah, and so did not accept the idea of admitting Gentiles to the privilege of Judaism, a break could not have been long delayed. For the Jews enjoyed their privileges on the tacit agreement with the Roman authorities that they would not accept proselytes—in other words, would not act as an agency to withdraw non-Jews from participation in civic activities based on paganism. Just as in later centuries there were many 'converts' from Judaism to Christianity whose motives were purely economic, so there might have been many converts to Judaism at this period among the wealthy merchants and landowners of the Roman world whose only motive would have been to secure exemption from the heavy financial burden of holding public office within a system which expected a magistrate to provide at his own expense games to amuse the public and festivals to maintain the dignity of the city and its temples. The Roman authorities would not have taken long to notice such accretions to the Jewish population; and, especially after 70 when the continuation of Jewish privileges was in any case a little doubtful, they would certainly not have regarded them with indifference. It would seem, moreover, that the religious leaders of the Jewish community as well as their civic heads

had their own reasons for wishing to have done with any direct connection with the new and rapidly growing sect. It is a fair assumption that one of the objectives of the rabbinical group in Jabne, faced with the task of providing an alternative to the Temple as a centre of Jewish religious life, was to bring some order out of the multiplicity of beliefs of the Greek and Maccabean periods. The codification of the Law, which culminated in the production of the Mishnah in the following century, was begun at this time; and its effect was to define more precisely what was and what was not tolerable as Jewish belief and practice.

As a result of this dual situation, at some period round about 100 the rabbinical leaders of Jabne drew up a formal indictment of the new sect and its tenets, formally rejected the claims of Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah, and sent copies of this letter to all the synagogues of the diaspora. Such a letter would give the local synagogues powers to act in excluding 'Christians' from membership, especially when the Christians in question were identifiable as being of Greek or other non-Jewish origin. Further action, however, was required, especially in Palestine, where many of the Christians were Jews who had been life members of their synagogues, and whose adherence to the new heresy may well have been in doubt or wholly unknown to their fellows in the congregation. In order to detect these a new benediction (or rather malediction) was introduced into the series of benedictions recited thrice daily in the synagogue, which invoked a curse on the Nazarenes as these Judeo-Christians were called. A suspected member could be detected by his refusal to say this particular clause. Later, at the time of the second revolt, the most formal prohibitions of any close intercourse with Christians were published; and we can well believe that there were angry and ugly conflicts within the mixed centres of Palestine. For each religion has retained memories of a time when the adherents of the other were its bitterest enemies. Traditions about the Christians who were martyred during the period before 135 are full of statements of Jewish hostility and betrayal; and the same is true on the Jewish side during the brief period after 135 when Judaism was itself proscribed, and death followed betrayal by an informer.


In the break between the Gentile and Jewish wings within the Church Palestine was the main victim. It was natural that

it should have been in Palestine that Christian congregations should have had the largest proportion of Jewish members; and when these members were excluded from communion, first with the Synagogue, then with the Gentile Church, an almost fatal blow was struck at the development of Palestinian Christianity. This is the natural explanation of why the original home of the religion so early lost all importance in the affairs of the growing Church. The Judeo-Christians, excluded from synagogue by the Jews and looked at with suspicion in church by the Gentile Christians, were also excluded from Jerusalem by the Romans. In Aelia Capitolina arose a wholly Gentile church, and the last home of the Judeo-Christians seems to have been in Transjordan. Justin Martyr (c. 114-c. 165), himself a Palestinian from Flavia Neapolis (Nablus), prided himself on his own willingness to accept Judeo-Christians into communion, but he implied that he was already in a minority in doing so. By the third century the group was proscribed as heretical, and its literature was so completely destroyed that we have but the most meagre knowledge of its developments. A couple of hundred years later it had vanished.

Between the two sections of the Jewish population in Judaea and Galilee the land of the Samaritans stretched from the mountains of Ephraim down to the maritime plain in the neighbourhood of Caesarea. In the centre of the region was the ancient political capital of Samaria, which had been refounded by Alexander the Great and settled with a colony of Macedonian veterans in punishment for the murder by the Samaritans of his governor of southern Syria. It remained a pagan city when Herod the Great rebuilt and extended it, and made it one of his favourite residences. A few miles south-east of Samaria was the more ancient city of Shechem, which was the centre of the Samaritans as a religious group. Here also a pagan city was built by Vespasian, and named Flavia Neapolis (Nablus), but it seems gradually to have returned to Samaritan hands.

The possibility of a reconciliation between the two religious communities scarcely existed. Although modern scholarship has shown that the Samaritans were basically a Hebrew people, practising the Hebrew religion, they had taken no direct part in the post-exilic developments of Judaism. So long as the Sadducaic party remained some reconciliation

HELLENISTIC AND HERODIAN CITIES



generalisations about them; each had its individual life and privileges.

Another product of the existence of the great caravan routes passing east of Palestine was the emergence along the eastern frontier of an organised and settled community of Nabatean Arabs, which had moved up gradually from the south during the preceding centuries. We meet it first in the time of Alexander the Great; during the period when the Seleucids or Ptolemies were strong enough to control their borders and protect their commerce, there is little information about these Arab settlers; but as the power of Syria and Egypt weakened in the century before the whole area fell under Roman domination, the Nabateans were able to carve out a kingdom for themselves covering an extensive area east of the Jordan. Their capital was the inaccessible city of Petra, and their authority at one time extended beyond Damascus in the north and to the sea at Gaza in the west. Pompey accepted them as a vassal state and the Romans apparently did not mind how matters went between the Nabateans and their neighbours; for in the time of Saint Paul there was a Nabatean governor in Damascus. The Nabateans had friendly relations with the Maccabees, but less so with the Herodians. In the war of 70 they helped Vespasian with troops. In 106 Trajan brought their kingdom to an end by establishing a Roman province of Arabia Petraea stretching east of the Jordan.

To what extent the kingdom of the Nabateans was an organised commercial state and to what extent it existed by various forms of depredation on the caravan routes from Damascus southwards, scholars disagree. Probably both views are true of different periods. Certainly brigandage is mentioned in almost every complaint about conditions in these regions in the days before the establishment of Roman rule; and the evidence of monuments suggests that the greatest period of prosperity followed and did not precede the establishment of the Roman province. That the Arabs of that day prided themselves on their independence would appear to be indicated by the pleasant title adopted by many of their kings. While in flattery of the West it was common for an eastern princeling to call himself 'friend of the Greeks', 'friend of the Romans', or 'friend of the Emperor', the Nabatean kings called themselves 'friends of the people'. Another Arab people, the Itureans, had

created a kingdom in the southern Lebanon and extended their interests into northern Galilee. Finally, there was always a certain bedouin element in the Jordan valley and the south; but there is little record of the bedouins at this time, apart from the references to brigandage at any period at which the central or local government was weak.

Over this heterogeneous population a Roman governor presided from Caesarea. The province of Judaea was an 'imperial' as distinct from a 'senatorial' province, and was governed by a procurator, who at first was subject to the governor of Syria. Later the province was extended, raised to consular rank, and brought under the direct control of the emperor. This was in part due to the policy of preventing any governor from becoming too powerful, and in part to the turbulence of its population. When in 106 the Nabatean kingdom was turned into the Roman province of Arabia, the frontiers of Judaea were again extended slightly. Until 135 the province was known by the name of "Judaea". But as part of the policy of the suppression of Jewry after the Bar-Cochba rebellion, the name of Jerusalem was changed to Aelia Capitolina, and the name of the province became Syria Palestina. It is therefore from 135 that it gets its modern name of 'Palestine'.

The picture of the country given in this chapter is typical of the story to be told in the rest of the book. Throughout there has been a foreign government presiding over the destinies of inhabitants united only by the accident of geographical propinquity; politically there has always been a dependence on the movements of world forces with which the inhabitants themselves have little contact; the diversity of the population, or its affiliations with elements similar to itself in neighbouring countries, has always been such that the emergence of a united national movement, or a desire for the political independence of the geographical area with which we are concerned, would be unthinkable. Even the frontiers change and vary according to external pressure. And yet somewhere within the pattern to be traced through nearly two thousand years of history there has always been an identifiable kernel, giving continuity and significance to what would otherwise be increasingly nothing but a record of trifles and pigmies. Sometimes this significance is itself born outside the country; sometimes it affects only one section of

the population. It may express itself in the most varied terms from a mystical romanticism to an agricultural programme. For always behind the little stage on which the pigmies play out their little parts looms the question mark of things eternal written across the time and space of the Holy Land.

CHAPTER THREE

PALESTINE UNDER ROMAN AND BYZANTINE RULE

DURING THE FIVE HUNDRED years of Roman rule from the end of the revolt of Bar-Cochba to the Muslim conquest the peoples of Palestine enjoyed an unusual measure of security from external pressure or invasion. None of their frontiers were frontiers of the empire, and to the east they had no dangerous enemy menacing them as did Parthians and Persians the neighbouring province of Syria. In 211, in common with all other provincials, they received from Caracalla the privileges of Roman citizenship without discrimination. Both Jews and Christians benefited from the friendly feelings towards their religions of two of the best emperors of the third century, Septimius Severus (193-211) and Alexander Severus (222-235). The latter is said to have placed statues of both Moses and Christ in his palace chapel. Yet, in spite of these local favours, the third century was a period of general political and economic decline; and the incompetence of the emperors came to a climax in 260 when the Persians overran Syria, captured Antioch, and took the Emperor Valerian prisoner. In the north and west also the frontiers of the empire were breached, and its end appeared near. The Persians were only driven back by the skill of Odenathus, prince of Palmyra and nominally "Dux Orientis" for the young Emperor Gallienus, son of Valerian. But it was in his own interest that he extended his authority as far as Egypt; and when he was murdered in 266, his famous widow Zenobia succeeded him, nominally on behalf of his son, and ruled an independent state comprising parts of Asia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt. But in 270 the soldiers, who made and unmade emperors at will, conferred the purple on one who was also a skilful general, Aurelian (270-275); and in the brief space of five years he restored the frontiers and gave to the whole a specious appearance of restored prosperity and unity. But military victories could not arrest the economic decline which a long period of oppression and misrule had rendered inevitable. Nor was the

political restoration solid; the old belief in the 'pax romana' was shaken, and Aurelian showed himself no stranger to the prevailing feeling that the old order was passing, when he fortified Rome itself against possible invaders.

Ten years later the army raised to the throne an even greater leader, Diocletian (284-305), and the empire really took a new lease of life. Diocletian undertook a thorough reorganisation of the whole imperial administration and provincial system; and, though the result was a somewhat top-heavy bureaucracy, it at least gave the western empire another hundred and fifty years of life, and the eastern more than a thousand. Diocletian was the first emperor to assume the power and dress of an eastern autocrat, wearing a diadem and robes of silk and jewels such as the most wealthy and powerful of his subjects might not copy. His successor, Constantine, completed the process of orientalising when he transferred his capital to Byzantium, rebuilt as the imperial city of Constantinople.

The Roman empire had grown piecemeal over half a millennium, and it was Diocletian who first produced a standard organisation and administration for all its parts. Four great prefectures were created, of Gaul, Italy, Illyricum and the East, and each was presided over by one of a college of four sovereigns, two Emperors, Diocletian and Maximian, and two juniors with the titles of Caesar, Constantius Chlorus, father of Constantine the Great, and Galerius. Diocletian himself took the East. This Prefecture consisted of three 'dioceses'. Two of them, Asia and Pontus, occupied approximately the territory of modern Turkey. Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Egypt formed one vast diocese, made up of many provinces. Up to the time of Diocletian Palestine had contained: *Galilee*, with the exceptions of the sea coast northwards from Dora (which belonged to Syria) and the more westerly cities of the Decapolis, *Samaria*, *Judaea*, *Idumaea*, and a narrow strip of *Peraea* across the Jordan. It was bordered on the east and south by Arabia. Diocletian gave it further parts of the Decapolis, but removed Idumaea, in order to divide Arabia into two provinces, Arabia Libanensis, whose capital was Bostra, on the east, and Arabia Petraea, whose capital was Petra, on the south. At some stage Dora also was added to the province of Palestine.

The division of the empire into four equal sovereignties

broke down on the abdication of Diocletian (305). Almost twenty years of civil war followed until Constantine reunited the whole under a single prince, and retained sole power until his death in 337, when it broke up again. The reputation of Constantine, however, does not rest on his being the last successful emperor of the whole empire, but on the fact that at long last an emperor accepted Christianity as his own personal faith. During the reign of Constantine recognition still meant equality with all other religions; the exemptions which were given to Christian clergy were given, for example, also to Jewish rabbis. But Christianity could ill brook a rival. Recognition was quickly followed by the demand for a position of privilege and before the end of the century Theodosius the Great (378-395) had made the orthodox Christian creed promulgated at the Council of Nicæa the sole belief which his subjects were entitled to hold.

Either Constantine or one of his immediate successors made a further revision of the frontiers of Palestine, dividing it into two parts. *Palestina Prima* took Judæa, Samaria and the northern parts of Idumæa; Galilee and Decapolis formed the province of *Palestina Secunda*. At the same time Arabia Petraea was given the name of *Palestina Salutaris* or *Palestina Tertia*. Such remained the administrative division of the country until the Muslim conquest.

It was in the disorder which preceded the recognition that a separation of the empire into western and eastern parts was inevitable, that the political peace of Palestine was broken for the first time since 135. The affair appears to have had less importance than it was given by the Christian historians of the period. About 350 there appeared in *Palestina Secunda* a certain Patricius as pretender to the throne. He was defeated and executed, and his fate was shared by many Jews of Sepphoris who had, voluntarily or involuntarily, supported him. This has been reported as a Jewish rising, resulting in the destruction of Sepphoris itself and even of Tiberias and other cities of Galilee. If the incident had been as serious as this we would have expected some echoes in contemporary Palestinian rabbinic sources, but though this literature is extensive, there is no mention of it, and no suggestion of any such dislocation of Jewish life as the destruction of Tiberias and Sepphoris would involve. In 364 the two brothers Valens and Valentinian divided the empire into east and west; and

for the next 250 years Palestine's destiny was bound up with that of the eastern empire ruled from Constantinople. It was a period of much diminished prosperity and tranquillity. Burdened with the huge bureaucracy of Diocletian, society could not, even with long periods of peace, recover from the century of economic distress which had preceded his reorganisation; the population dwindled, a ferocious caste system tied men to the place and occupation of their parents, and the oppression of the masses steadily increased. To crown all, the recognition granted to the Christian Church led to continual and even bloody disorder between the various sects, alternating with equally bloody violence against Jews, Samaritans and pagans. When in the beginning of the seventh century the eastern provinces were overrun by Persia, there were many, Christians as well as Jews and Samaritans, who welcomed the invader, and twenty years later almost as wide a welcome was given to Islam. The disappearance of the tyranny of Byzantine orthodoxy was by no means a subject of sorrow to the population as a whole.

The gradual increase in the uniformity of provincial administration which we can trace in the work of successive emperors has its parallel in the internal life and organisation of the provinces. By the second century subject princes of the type of the Herods, flattered with the titles of ally or friend of the Romans, were universally giving way to Roman governors. Within their provinces administration based on a devolution of direct responsibility to a multiplicity of cities was taking the place of the centralised administration the princes had preferred. The city state was a familiar political form in the Mediterranean world; and Rome found it convenient to recognise the cities or to create new ones, as it might suit her purpose, until by the fourth century almost the whole of the territory of the provinces was partitioned out among city administrations functioning on the widest variety of privileges. In Palestine Ascalon was from the first recognised by Rome as a free city (her freedom dated from 104 B.C.) Caesarea, Jerusalem, Lydda (Diospolis), Beit Jibrin (Eleutheropolis) Neapolis and Sebaste acquired at various dates the privileges of *coloniae*, which meant certain judicial powers and freedom from certain taxes. In almost every century we find evidence of the foundation of new cities and the rebuilding and renaming of old ones. The city civilisation penetrated even

into the Negeb south of Beersheba, where the Nabateans had originally built a few forts to protect the routes from Akaba and Petra westwards to Gaza. In the later empire there were settled garrisons living at such places as Auja Hafir, Sbaita and Kurnub, and managing to support themselves by terraced cultivation and water carefully gathered in cisterns.

The population of the country was undoubtedly much larger in the days of the Roman empire than it has ever been since, except possibly in completely modern times; but many of the cities must have been little more than market towns for the neighbouring agriculture; they had no special reason for existence, commercial, industrial or strategic. Most of them had the privilege of minting, and it is from their coins that we are able to trace much of their history, or even their existence. The cities paid their taxes in a lump sum; their distribution between the citizens lay in their own hands. In the few districts directly administered by the Roman government there was an official in each village responsible for producing the taxes, either by collecting them himself or by farming them out. The main taxes were four. The *tributum soli*, or land tax, after the reforms of Diocletian was levied on the basis of a *jugum*. This varied from five to sixty acres, according to the productivity of the land, but was supposed to represent a single taxable value. The *tributum capitis* was a poll tax, and was relatively light. But there was also the *annona*, a heavy tax in kind on all crops, and the *angaria* or forced labour. But in addition to the taxes, the population was submitted to various exactions depending on the rapacity of the governors or the emptiness of the imperial or provincial treasuries. The billeting of soldiers was one of the most deeply resented of these exactions.

Of the occupations of the inhabitants during these five hundred years there is little to add to the picture we receive from the New Testament, or, indeed, from the prophets. As has already been said, the province shared the general distress of the empire in the third century, and laboured under the burden of Byzantine taxation from the fourth century onwards; but in the last period before the Muslim invasion it enjoyed a certain prosperity from the mass of Christian pilgrims attracted to Jerusalem, and the number of Christian communities in the country. Jerusalem itself became one of the richest cities of the East. But, on the whole, it remained a land of

peasants and landlords, owners of vineyards, corn lands or flocks of sheep and goats. There was a certain amount of local industry in or near the caravan cities. We hear of glass factories, of linen weaving, of purple dyeing, and of pottery manufacture; and the wincs and olive oil of the land were famous. All alike, merchant and peasant, benefited from the suppression of brigandage, and from the excellent roads which the Romans built and policed.

While the political history of the period is relatively unimportant, these centuries gain their significance from the developments which they witnessed in Judaism and Christianity. During the first period it is the Jews who present the more interesting picture; during the second it is the Christians. The years from 135 to 400 witnessed the creation of the patriarchate and the completion of the Mishna and the greater part of the Talmud of Jerusalem; while the period between 300 and 640 witnessed the Arian and Monophysite controversies, the emergence of separate eastern Churches which still survive, the growth of eastern monasticism, and the new attraction of Palestine as a centre for Christian pilgrimage.

Undoubtedly the Jewish community took some time to recover the confidence of the Roman authorities after the violence of the revolt of 135. For a generation or more the coinage of the two cities, Sepphoris and Tiberias, which were to be centres of Jewish life in the succeeding centuries, and which certainly retained a substantial Jewish population all through the second century, showed openly pagan emblems on their coinage, indicating that the Jews were at that time disfranchised. By the end of the century Tiberias had reverted to the neutral emblems used on Jewish coinage; and literary evidence tells of Jewish town-councillors in Sepphoris. The main centre of the Jewish population shifted during this period to Galilee. Some Jews remained in the villages of Judaea, especially in the southern hills; but there were none resident in Jerusalem until the Empress Eudocia (394-460), widow of Theodosius II, secured permission for them to return. Jewish travellers passed through the city; a few lived in villages overlooking it, and in the fourth century they were allowed to enter it on the 9th of Ab, the day of the destruction of the Temple, to mourn over its ruins. There were Jewish communities in many of the maritime cities, and in the caravan cities and villages of Peraea. But the bulk lived in

Galilee. Thither the rabbinical schools had moved from Jabne, and many of the priestly families which had formerly lived for convenience in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem had also moved northwards. The first centre of the community was at Usha, a short distance inland from the bay of Haifa; then it moved to Shefar Am, a village a few miles north-east of Usha, thence to Sepphoris and finally to Tiberias. The population remained as it had been before the loss of independence, primarily peasants and landowners; and the rabbinical descriptions of the wealth and selfishness of the landowners of this period exactly parallel the prophetic denunciations of their predecessors a thousand years earlier. Jewish villages were thickly scattered in the hills and valleys of the region; there is one, Peki-in (Buqcia), in the wildest hill country, which claims a continuous Jewish settlement from Biblical to modern times.

At the time of the destruction of the Temple in 70, the president of the Sanhedrin had been Simeon II, the great-grandson of the famous rabbi Hillel. Simeon did not survive the fall of Jerusalem; but his son, Gamaliel II, is said to have been spared by Vespasian at the request of Jochanan ben Zakkai, the Pharisaic leader who had received his permission to retire to Jabne when Jerusalem was invested. Gamaliel II followed Jochanan as president of the rabbinical assembly, and was confirmed in his office by the Romans. It is not known when he died, but it was probably before the second war. His son, Simeon III, was a young man when he took part with Bar-Cochba in the last desperate resistance at Bettar, but managed to escape, and was with the rabbis who moved from Jabne to Usha. In spite of his youth he was made president of the assembly, and did much to organise the office, which then became the recognised head of the Jewish community. Simeon's life was passed in the difficult days of punishment and oppression which followed the war, and his leadership did much to help the Jews to regain their position. He was succeeded by his son Judah, who was the first whose political office is known to have been recognised by the Romans, and to have borne the Jewish title of Nasi, or prince (i.e. patriarch). The patriarchate continued in his family until its extinction in the time of Theodosius II (425).

The Roman recognition of the patriarchate was of the utmost importance for the Jewish community. It not only

gave them a large measure of political autonomy in Palestine; but secured two other results. The Romans accepted the patriarch as the supreme authority for the whole Jewish community within the empire, and so provided it with a centre in place of the Temple and Jerusalem; and the patriarchate itself was a religious as much as a political office, so that it retained in existence the theocratic conception of the Jewish people, and the intimate association between their political survival and their religious loyalty.

This must not be taken to imply that the community of these centuries was particularly pious, or that the activities of the rabbinical assemblies were a matter of general interest to all Jews. That there was in every Jewish settlement a synagogue and a school we can assume; in fact, many of the communities can to-day be identified only by the discovery of the ruins of a synagogue dating from Roman times—the famous synagogue at Capernaum dates from this period. But there is ample evidence from the rabbinical texts themselves that the lay leaders of the community were the wealthy landowners, as they would have been in any of the Greek cities of the country, and that these were by no means eager to accept the authority of the rabbis, or to lead their lives and administer justice according to the increasingly complicated stipulations of rabbinic interpretations. They appreciated the respect in which the patriarch was held by the Romans, and accepted the protection of his authority; but his rabbinic activities they viewed with indifference or even dislike.

It was these activities, however, which were to have a lasting effect on the Jewish people, and to provide them with the foundation on which they have survived. Judah the Prince (c. 135-c. 220) was responsible for the collection and codification of the interpretations of the Law and the judgments handed down by his predecessors in the Pharisaic tradition. This collection is known as the Mishna, or 'Instruction', and became the standard basis of Jewish orthodoxy for the future. It was also the text on which the vast commentaries of the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds were built. Although a number of the rabbis of the period were men of wealth, drawn from commerce or landowning, one problem which had to be solved during this period was the support of the poor student who wished to give his life to religious study. The monastic solution, with its celibacy and exaggerated

asceticism, was wholly alien to Jewish thought, and the tradition had to be gradually created that it was an honour to a man of wealth to support such a student. The men of wealth at first certainly did not take kindly to the suggestion, and we may assume that it was only as the rabbinical courts and the rabbinical method of judgment gradually came to supersede the Roman or local tradition that the rabbinical schools came to receive the honour which was theirs in later times.

Although the patriarch was recognised by the Romans as the legal head of the Jewish community, and was able to receive an income from all the synagogues of the diaspora, actually the effective leadership in Jewry passed in the fourth century from Palestine to Babylon, where the Jewish communities were far more numerous than in Palestine and enjoyed from their Persian rulers even greater local autonomy. This process was accelerated by the anti-Jewish legislation which began to appear once the Christian Church had the power to express its theological views in the laws of the state; and there were even migrations of scholars and others from Palestine to the more congenial freedom of Sura, Pumbeditha and the great Mesopotamian academies. Here was observed for the first time the feature of all subsequent Jewish life, that the religious centre moved spontaneously to the place in which the outstanding Jewish scholars and interpreters were to be found, and quitted it and moved elsewhere when it declined. During the first two hundred years after the loss of Jerusalem that centre was undoubtedly Palestine; it was not to return to the country for nearly seven hundred years.

The last three centuries of Roman rule were centuries of increasing tragedy for the Jews. Though in his hatred of Christianity the Emperor Julian (361-363) was prepared to favour them, and even wanted them to rebuild the Temple, his reign was much too short to have any real effect. Legislative action was followed by popular violence, conversions to Christianity doubtless took place in small numbers, and the community dwindled in both numbers and wealth. Though the evidence is not conclusive, for the material available is not extensive, less than a tenth of the towns and villages which certainly possessed a Jewish population in the third century can be shown by contemporary evidence to have still been inhabited by Jews at the time of the Muslim invasion. In the

fourth century it is probable that Jews still formed a majority of the population of Galilee, but only a minority in the south where they had not recovered from the losses of 135. We cannot establish the fact statistically, but several Christian writers of the period, especially Jerome who lived in Bethlehem, reported that there were few Christians and that most of the people in the country were Jews. This evidence might have appeared conclusive, did we not know how easily men magnify numbers when stating that a district is full of people they dislike! By the seventh century the Jewish population of the whole country had probably dwindled to well under a quarter of a million and possibly much less. It depends on the accuracy of the statement that 20,000 Jews joined the Persians in 614. If the figure is correct it would imply a population of 200,000 or more, but ancient figures are notoriously difficult to check.

The legislation which was the basic reason for this decline came gradually to impose on the Jews a second class citizenship; it went far beyond religious intolerance. Not only were synagogues forbidden to be built; not only was a synagogue, seized by a Christian mob and consecrated in haste, irrecoverable, but public offices and professions were forbidden to them; and the language in which these prohibitions were expressed was an invitation to popular violence; in the heyday of eastern monasticism that invitation met a quick response.

The centuries which witnessed the decline of Jewry witnessed the increasing prominence of the country as the Holy Land of Christianity. Unhappily this was not accompanied by a creative Christian activity parallel to that of the Jewish rabbinical seminaries of Galilee. Though there were a few eminent scholars of Palestinian origin, and doubtless many tens of thousands of sincere Christians living out their lives in its towns and villages, that which history has to record is mainly continual religious controversy leading even to bloodshed; physical violence against Jews and pagans; and a profitable traffic in Holy Places, often wholly imaginary.

For two hundred years after the apostolic age the story of Christianity in Palestine is relatively obscure. It is easy to understand that the pagan city of Aelia Capitolina had none of the spontaneous associations of Jerusalem, and there seems to have been no objection to the transference of the organisational centre of the Church to Caesarea. The bishop of Jerusalem

was, until the fifth century, merely a suffragan of the metropolitan of Caesarea, in the patriarchate of Antioch, though from at least the third century he began to enjoy a courtesy eminence outside the metropolitan diocese. Thus we find him at the council of Antioch (about 270), sitting among the patriarchs; at Nicaea (325) he signed before his metropolitan, and was granted precedence within the diocese next to the metropolitan, to the great indignation of the latter. Only in 451 did he become himself a patriarch, with authority over all the Holy Land, and later over Arabia.

In the early conflicts with heresy there is little reference to Palestinian figures. Though there were forms of gnosticism in the second century which appear to have been judaistic in their origin, it was from Jews of the diaspora, not from the strongly rabbinic Jews of Palestine, that the influence came. The most interesting figure in the third century is the great Egyptian scholar and theologian, Origen (c. 185-c. 254), who visited Palestine on various occasions. He had many friends and supporters in the country, and was protected and encouraged by the Palestinian bishops when attacked in other parts of the Church. In the controversies about the nature of Christ which preceded the Arian conflict, Arab bishops of the diocese of Bostra, led by the metropolitan Beryllus, sought his advice and followed his opinion. When, in 232, the hostility of his bishop led him to leave Alexandria, he established himself at Caesarea, and quickly gathered round himself pupils and scholars, and caused the school of the latter city to rival that of the former in eminence. But the Caesarean period was only an interlude in a life spent mainly in Egypt, varied with stays of long or short duration in most of the great centres of Christianity in the east.

It is in the persecution initiated by Decius (249-251) and carried on by Valerian (253-260) that we first get evidence of the vitality of the Palestinian Christians. By this time the Church had made such strides that the empire could no longer ignore the mass of citizens of all ranks who would not participate in the ordinary demonstrations of loyalty and solidarity which (rather than any religious emotion) characterised the official sacrifices and religious ceremonies of the court, the army, and the municipalities. In spite of their genuine protestations of loyalty the Christians were suspect, largely because they were incomprehensible. Much of their

activity must still have seemed to the authorities to identify them as a secret society, and autocrats and bureaucrats alike fear what they cannot keep wholly under their eyes. Moreover the empire was going through a severe political and economic crisis, and in such times men are exceptionally apt to resent a minority which will not conform. The edicts of Decius and Valerian were directed against those who would not take part in a national supplication to the gods of Rome to avert the dangers which surrounded the state. They were designed to secure apostates, not martyrs. They did not ask the Christian to abjure his own faith, but to recognise also the faith of the empire. If he would do that, his private beliefs were not enquired into. But most Christians would not accept the compromise and there were many martyrs.

In this persecution Alexander, the aged bishop of Jerusalem, who had already spent nine years in prison for his faith in an earlier persecution in Cappadocia, was so ill-treated that he died in prison in Caesarea. Many others were tortured and imprisoned, but none seems to have been executed until three youths from the countryside near Caesarea, seeing the sufferings of their fellows in the city, boldly came before the governor and proclaimed themselves Christians. They were given to the beasts in the amphitheatre. When Gallienus succeeded to the empire in 261 he called a halt, but Palestine had yet one more martyr, a predecessor to St. George of Lydda and perhaps more historical than that more famous saint. An officer, Marinus, had been appointed centurion; a rival denounced him as ineligible because he was a Christian. Marinus admitted the charge, and after being given three hours to change his mind, was executed.

In the profound peace which followed these ten years the Church evidently thought that such times had passed for ever. Church buildings of considerable architectural dignity began to rise openly in the cities of the bishops; high officials and members of the imperial family had no hesitation in avowing their Christian faith. In everything the Church acted as though the danger was over for good and all.

It would be interesting if we were able to say what proportion of the empire was Christian at this time; but the estimates of different scholars vary enormously. Somewhere between five and ten per cent may be as near as we can get; but the distribution was uneven. In Palestine the proportion was probably

smaller, possibly much smaller. In the regions where Jews were numerous it is unlikely that there were many opportunities for the development of Christian communities. The Jewish authorities were both hostile and powerful and frowned on any contact with Christians. There must have been such contacts in the economic field, for the country is too small for the inhabitants to remain rigidly segregated, but it is doubtful if they went beyond the social-economic sphere. In any case there is little record of prominent Christian buildings in Palestine when the persecution of Diocletian fell on the unsuspecting Church.

Diocletian at the beginning of his reign was favourably disposed towards the Christians. His wife and daughter both professed the faith, and he permitted a large church to be built on a prominent hill opposite the imperial palace in Nicomedia. As his age increased, and with it the difficulties of the empire, he was persuaded by his junior colleague, Galerius, to sanction a different policy. At a public sacrifice offered for the safety of the empire in the presence of the two rulers, the augurs claimed that the lack of propitious results was due to the presence of Christians. The emperor, angered by this, ordered all Christian soldiers to offer sacrifices or be dismissed. The incident was local and temporary. But Galerius was not content to leave the matter thus, and he finally persuaded Diocletian to a general attack on the Christians, by agreeing that there should be no bloodshed. Galerius first demanded that all soldiers should participate in the normal sacrifices for success; and he was at first content to dismiss those who refused. Finding that this had no effect, in 303 he extended his action to the clergy; and, like his predecessors, he tried to create apostates rather than martyrs. In many cases he was successful; for the forty years of peace had weakened their fibre, and many, even among the bishops, saved themselves by offering sacrifice. The problem caused by these 'lapsed' Christians troubled the Church for a generation after the danger of persecution had passed. Finally, during an illness of Diocletian, Galerius offered all Christians the alternative of sacrifice or death. Of the events which followed in Palestine Eusebius, the most prominent church historian of his time and resident at Caesarea through much of this period, has left an invaluable record. He himself escaped martyrdom, but his great friend and teacher, Pamphilus, a presbyter of the

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church in Caesarea, died in prison. The struggle lasted for six years; when the attack on the bishops and clergy failed, new edicts were directed either by Diocletian or Galerius against the laity, as well as against all Christian buildings, property and sacred writings. Many yielded, but still more stood firm, and endured horrible tortures at Caesarea, at Gaza and at Scythopolis. The number who gave their lives was relatively small; but the number who were imprisoned, mutilated and sent for long periods to work in the mines was very large. The last executions took place in the spring of 310; but by that time it was evident to all that the persecution had failed; there remained nothing for the empire to do but to make peace with this new force which had grown up within the citizenry; and in 311 Galerius, after a serious illness, took the inevitable step of proclaiming religious toleration throughout the empire.

The end of external persecution was but the signal for the outbreak of internal violence and disorder. For nearly half a century the Church was rent over the Arian controversy, which was itself but a phase in the long drawn out effort to reconcile the divinity and humanity of Christ. The dilemma can be easily stated. Any attribution of a sort of junior or inferior divinity to Christ did, however defined, imply two Gods, and was intolerable to Christian opinion, which was no less monotheistic than that of the Jews. Any diminution of the humanity of Christ imperilled the whole Christian doctrine of salvation, which was based on the real conquest of sin and death by Christ as man. If His manhood were not real, what it achieved was irrelevant to other men; if His Godhead was not real, then the Church believed in a greater and lesser God—in two Gods. The philosophic categories of the day really made no provision for the solution of the problem; the theologians had clear ideas of what they meant by the words 'God' and 'man'; but they had inherited from Greece and Judaea a belief in the existence of so complete a gulf between the divine and human natures that there was really no place in it for 'incarnation' in the Christian sense. Instead of realising this and building new categories for themselves, based directly on the belief in the possibility of incarnation, the theologians hesitated between those definitions which sacrificed some of the humanity of Christ in order not to fall into the trap of ascribing to Him an inferior divinity, and those which

sacrificed some of His divinity in order to assert the reality of His human nature.

In the Church of Alexandria there was at the beginning of the fourth century a highly respected and learned presbyter of the name of Arius. He was a pupil of Lucian of Antioch, and his views were thus linked to the two great eastern schools of Antioch and Alexandria. Arius denied that Christ was of the same 'substance' (*ousia*, essence, or being) as God the Father. This view was violently attacked by his bishop, Alexander; but Arius refused to yield or be silent, and took refuge with his friend Eusebius, then bishop of Caesarea. Many Palestinian clergy supported him; but Macarius, bishop of Jerusalem, took the side of Alexander. The leading figure on this side was, however, neither of the bishops, but a young deacon of Alexandria, Athanasius, whose whole life was to be spent in the passionate fight for the recognition of the doctrine that Christ was 'homo-ousios' (of the same substance) with God the Father. The controversy became so violent and widespread that in 325 Constantine summoned a council of the whole Church to deal with the issue, and 318 bishops met in the imperial city of Nicaea to settle the matter. One of the leading figures at the council was Eusebius of Caesarea, who had become the trusted friend of the emperor; and the creed of Caesarea, as brought forward by Eusebius, formed the basis of the famous creed of Nicaea, but with the addition of the words demanded by the Alexandrians and, possibly, the emperor "of one substance (*homo-ousios*) with the Father".

The Nicene condemnation of Arius did not end the conflict. There were many who shied at the word 'homo-ousios' without wholly following Arius, and they formed a party around the 'semi-Arian' Eusebius of Caesarea. The death of Constantine complicated the issue, for his successor in the East, Constantius, was himself a semi-Arian, who willingly reversed the decision of Nicaea. Politics and theology continued to play ball with each other, and many of the bishops played ball equally successfully. Acacius, the successor of Eusebius, was a semi-Arian under Constantius, an advocate of Nicaea under his orthodox successor, Jovian, and an Arian under Valens. In the same way council succeeded council alternately condemning Arius and Athanasius to exile; one such, held in Jerusalem under Maximus the successor of Macarius, wholly

sided with Arius (335); but Cyril the successor to Maximus wholly sided with the Athanasians. There must have been few bishops who did not spend part of their episcopate excommunicated and exiled by one side or the other. The Arian controversy was the first struggle in which the Church engaged after the empire had made its peace with her. The use which she made of this friendship was, therefore, a precedent for the future. Unhappily, she succumbed entirely to the idea that theological questions can be settled by the short cut of imperial legislation and civil punishment—aided by violence which the side supported by the imperial court could be sure would be overlooked. It was only a step from the follies of the Arian controversy to the decision of Theodosius the Great (379-395) (under whose auspices the controversy was finally settled at the council of Constantinople in 381), that it was an imperial prerogative to proclaim by law what should be the orthodoxy of his subjects, and to treat those who disagreed as enemies of society to be proscribed, banished, robbed of their property and, if the situation seemed to warrant it, killed. Within a couple of centuries the Emperor Zeno could write of the effects of another controversy on the same issue that "thousands have perished in the massacres and not only the earth but the air is red with blood", while Christians attacked each other with a ferocity "such as a savage would not dare to use to a pagan or a Jew".


In the fifth century Palestine was to realise to the full the significance of the moral disaster which had befallen the Church; for the protagonists of intolerance and violence were the eastern monks, and Palestine had become their main centre. The two attractions which the land provided were Holy Places and deserts; at Sinai and in the region of the wilderness of Judaea both were combined in unique measure. The cult of the Holy Places spread side by side with that of relics. The Church of the first three centuries grew up in the Jewish belief that a dead body was unclean; and there is little trace of any veneration being paid to bodies, even the bodies of saints and martyrs, until the fourth century. The remains of martyrs were collected and reverently buried where they had died; to do so was indeed a pious duty linked to the belief in a bodily resurrection; but that their bodies should be divided into bits in order to give special sanctity to other places, this was the distortion of a later age, but a distortion


THE PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM

Archbishopric: CAESAREA

Bishopric: Dora

Monastery: S. Saba





that, once admitted, spread like fire. By the eighth century it was impossible to consecrate an altar which did not contain the relics of a saint, and the collection of heads, arms, legs and other single bones became the natural ambition of a pious prince or churchman. Naturally relics connected with Biblical events, and with the life and person of Jesus and of Mary, were worthy of the highest veneration; and there was no place where they could be so convincingly produced as in Palestine. The real beginning was made by the determination of Constantine himself to recover the 'true cross', and to build a suitable shrine on the sites of the crucifixion and the resurrection. The present church of the Holy Sepulchre covers but a small part of the ground occupied by the magnificent buildings of Constantine; though what was the evidence on which Macarius, bishop of Jerusalem, decided that this was the actual site of those events has never been known. The only church built by Constantine which retains, partially at least, the form in which he built it, is the church of the Nativity at Bethlehem. By the end of the Byzantine period magnificent churches had been built in many parts of Palestine; and relics of every instrument mentioned in the gospel narrative of the Passion had been provided, together with many other similar marvels from the Old and New Testaments. As early as the end of the fourth century an important lady on pilgrimage from Gaul, visiting Jerusalem and Sinai, saw the site of every incident of the Exodus, including such details as the stone on which Moses broke the tables of the Law. And around all such relics clustered the monks, whether in monasteries, when the relics were in towns, or in hermitages when they were in the deserts.

The origins of monasticism (or rather monachism, from the Latin *monachus*, monk) can be found in the pre-Christian asceticism which was a recurrent expression of the eastern belief that matter is inherently evil. It appeared in the Judaism of the Greek period as Essenism; it reappeared in the Judco-Christian sect of Ebionites; and it had a rational basis in reaction against the corruption and sexual indulgence of many oriental cults. In an organised form monachism first appeared in the Christian Church in Egypt towards the end of the third century, when Anthony, who had retired to the desert at the age of twenty and had attracted many followers, consented to organise them under a loose rule of life. He was

followed by Pachomius, who produced a much more careful rule, based on a common life, and on the performance of useful work, both for the community and for society in general. The ideas of Anthony were early transferred to Palestine by a young man named Hilarion, who, at the age of 15, established himself near Gaza and likewise drew many followers. Simultaneously, but independently, a similar movement began to appear in Syria, and the Syrian monks and hermits exceeded the Egyptians by adding artificial austerities to the natural asceticism already practised. Not content with abstinence from food or cleanliness, they began to carry large stones strapped on to them, to wear clothes made of iron, or, finally, to live on the tops of pillars like the famous Simeon Stylites. A better element was, however, introduced in the middle of the century by Basil (330-379), son of a wealthy Cappadocian family who, after visiting the monks of Syria, Egypt and Palestine, introduced a new tradition—it was not a formal rule—in Asia Minor. Basil's monks followed a strictly ascetic discipline but they were forbidden to allow asceticism to weaken them to the extent of being unable to do useful work for their own community, or charitable and educational work for those around them. These works made the monks beloved of the local population, and many of them were rightly admired for their useful lives and genuine piety.

Among the Palestinian monks of the fifth century were to be found examples of all the types so far described, and two of the writers who tell us most of these early monks, Cyril of Seythopolis and John Moscus, were both Palestinian. Both lived at the end of the sixth century, one stayed at Mar Saba and the other began his career in Jerusalem and died at Rome. There were hermits, and followers of extravagant asceticisms; there were 'lauras' or houses following roughly the discipline of Pachomius which was regulated in Palestine by St. Sabas (439-531), founder of the still existing monastery of Mar Saba by the Dead Sea; and there were many regular monasteries, especially in and around Jerusalem, following the tradition of St. Basil. The presence in Bethlehem from 386 till his death in 420 of St. Jerome brought added lustre to the monasticism of the country. But it also provides an early example of the other side of monasticism—the consequences to be expected from theological disagreement. Jerome took a vigorous part in the controversy raging at that time over the

views of the first recorded British puritan, Pelagius (c. 360-c. 420), on the basis of salvation, and so enraged the supporters of the latter that they fell on his monastery at Bethlehem, murdered one of the deacons, burned down the buildings, and would unquestionably have killed Jerome himself had he not managed to escape to a neighbouring military post.

A few years later there appeared in the country a Syrian monk, Barsauma, with forty companions, who terrorised whole districts, especially Jewish districts, burning down synagogues, and laying waste towns and villages. When in 449 one of the periodical attempts was made at a council at Ephesus to settle the question of the nature of Christ, Barsauma and his gangster monks terrorised his opponents to the extent of so misusing Flavian, the patriarch of Constantinople, that he succumbed to his injuries. To the rage of the monks the decisions of Ephesus were reversed two years later by the council of Chalcedon (451); and when they learnt that its decisions had been supported by Juvenal, bishop of Jerusalem, whom the council had elevated to the dignity of patriarch, they raised a riot, prevented Juvenal from entering Jerusalem, consecrated one of their number to take his place, and others to replace all the suffragans who supported him, and were only reduced to obedience by the action of both the emperor and the pope, aided, if the chronicler Zechariah of Mitylene be correct, by Juvenal himself, who, with a mixed force of Roman soldiers and Samaritans, massacred all the monks he could find.

While such was the spirit in which religious disagreement might be conducted, it is not surprising that the different interpretations of the nature of Christ which were put forward in the fifth and sixth centuries (and go under the name of the monophysite controversy, from those who held that the divine and human elements made one nature—*mono-phusis*) should have led to permanent schisms. With one exception, those eastern Churches which still reject the authority of both Rome and Constantinople grew out of the bloody persecutions and vile abuse which marked the conduct of the disputants.

The exception is the Church of Persia, which asserted its entire institutional independence of Constantinople as a political necessity of its acceptance by the Persians. The Christians in that country had undergone persecutions as long drawn out and as painful as those endured by their brethren in the Roman empire. As they began to win toleration

it was in the highest measure desirable that they should be able to assure the Persian sovereign that they owed no political or other allegiance to the Byzantine emperor, and in view of the intimate association of Church and State, this involved owing no allegiance to the patriarch of Constantinople. It was thus on political and not doctrinal grounds that the Church of the East became separate, acknowledging only its catholicus, the bishop of Seleucia. But the Byzantine system of securing religious uniformity inevitably created refugees; and such refugees naturally fled to Christians outside the reach of Byzantine governor or bishop. The defeated party of the fifth century were the followers of Nestorius, ex-patriarch of Constantinople, who had so distinguished the divine and human natures of Christ that he considered Mary should be called 'mother of Christ' but not 'mother of God'. The Nestorians fled to Persia and were there accepted; and so, almost inadvertently, the Persian Church came to be considered, and ultimately to be, Nestorian in its doctrine, and is so to this day.

Those who went to the other extreme proclaimed a complete assumption of the human nature into the divine nature, so that in the union Christ had only one nature (*mono-phusis*). This view was held by almost all the Christians of the eastern provinces, except in the patriarchate of Jerusalem, whose bishops, apart from brief periods, were firm 'Chalcedonians', i.e. accepted the formula of the council of Chalcedon which avoided the two extremes, and declared Christ to be one person in two natures. In the issue undoubtedly a certain Syrian and Egyptian nationalism and dislike of the heavy hand of Greek bureaucracy came into play; and the result was that the Church of Egypt (the Coptic Church) with its Abyssinian daughter, became and remain monophysite, while they coined the word 'Melkite' (semitic, *Malk*: king) for those who adhered to the "royal" view of Chalcedon-Constantinople. Such was the strength of monophysitism in the east that at the beginning of the sixth century it caused a complete, if temporary, breach between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople.

The conflict reached another peak of bitterness and violence when Justinian (527-565) became emperor. A brilliant ruler and no mean thinker, Justinian possessed to the full the narrowness and intolerance which was a feature of the Christianity

of his age. He was determined that every subject of his should be absolutely faithful to the Chalcedonian formula, and the ferocity with which he persecuted heretics (as well as Samaritans and Jews) surpassed that of his predecessors. As his particular cnemics were the monophysites, one result of his action was to create a monophysite Church in Armenia for exactly the same reasons that had produced a hundred years earlier a Nestorian Church in Persia. The kingdom of Armenia, uneasily wedged between the two great empires, with its loyalty suspect by each, had to make the difficult decision as to which represented the greater danger. Having decided for Persia, they took the easiest step to reassure the Persians that they were not secret allies of Constantinople; they adopted the monophysitism detested by the Byzantine emperors. But the situation had a comic side. While Justinian ruthlessly enforced his Chalcedonian orthodoxy, his empress, the beloved and brilliant Theodora, secretly sympathised with monophysitism. She took advantage of the fact that her husband had locked up a large number of monophysite bishops in Constantinople to get them, in their prison, to consecrate a certain Jacob Baradai bishop, with secret authority over all the eastern provinces, where the population much preferred monophysitism to Chalcedonianism (or, as the emperor called it, orthodoxy). This intrepid man travelled in disguise as a beggar for thirty-five years (543-578) through the eastern provinces, secretly consecrating bishops, maintaining the courage of the faithful, and leaving behind him a fully organised monophysite Church. An interesting fact is that this Church included not only the Romanised Nabatean Arabs, but also the Arabs on the fringe of the empire, especially the great clan of the Abu Ghassan whose territories stretched round the desert fringe of the fertile crescent between the Byzantine and Persian territories. From Jacob Baradai, this Church appropriately took the title of "Jacobite".

The intolerance which the Christian Churches showed to each other they all showed equally to those who were outside the Christian fold. The lot of a provincial in the Byzantine empire was rarely an easy one, for the burden of taxation was usually exceedingly heavy and the exactions of personal avarice, whether in governor, subordinate or soldier, had to be added to the load. When to this economic extortion were added the special burdens of religious non-conformity, the

time was ripe for revolt; and neither Samaritan nor Jew was so humbled that the possibility of revolt had become unthinkable. Only the pagans had in themselves no special bond of union which might have enabled them to make common cause against Christianity when, in the fourth century, the brief reign of Julian gave them the opportunity. In fact we hear little of the Greek cities, which were the centres of pagan worship, in this later period. Temples certainly existed in Palestine at the beginning of the sixth century, but whether any survived the attacks of Justinian on paganism is doubtful. It was in remote corners of the vast territories of the empire that it was still practised, and by this time Palestine was so covered with churches and monasteries that it would have had little chance of escaping notice. Moreover, the prosperity of the cities was declining, as business and commerce collapsed under the burdens of imperial exactions, and the centre of gravity was shifting from trade and the trading cities back to Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Justinian's exclusion of pagans from citizenship—which could only be obtained by baptism—must have been the last straw.

The Samaritans had never possessed the express privileges which had given some protection to the Jews; concentrated more closely in a single geographical area, they probably felt less need for them, and lived their own life undisturbed in the region stretching inland from Caesarea to the Jordan, with one or two outlying settlements in great centres like Damascus and Alexandria. In their homeland were few pagan cities apart from Sebaste (Samaria), for no important route passed through their mountains. Moreover, simultaneously with the increased Christian pressure on the country as the raw material for Holy Places, they themselves experienced something in the nature of a religious revival in the fourth century. Baba Rabba, a son of their high-priest, was the leader of this movement which led to the building of eight new synagogues, a renewal of forms of worship, a literary renaissance and a general feeling of life and vigour.

The legislation against Jews was explicitly extended to include Samaritans by Theodosius II. In 438 he excluded them from all honorary office; prohibited the building of new synagogues and all but essential repairs to existing buildings, and forbade conversions among slaves and freedmen. But a good deal of oppression probably went on in addition to these

formal laws, and in 484 the Samaritans rose, raided Caesarea, and both massacred a considerable number of Christians and destroyed a number of churches before they were overpowered by the garrison. In consequence they were expelled from their sanctuary on Gerizim, and it was turned into a church of the Blessed Virgin. Some years later the Samaritans rose again, expelled the small garrison in Neapolis (Nablus) and seized the church; but they were quickly expelled by the governor. They rose once more in 529, following still more oppressive legislation from Justinian which, addressing them (together with Jews and various brands of heretics) in the most insulting language, promised them all the sweat of office and none of the sweets, dismissed them from any honourable offices they had already received, excluded them from the bar, and confirmed all previous laws against them. The previous laws may have fallen into desuetude or been ignored; Justinian's were meant to be enforced. The Samaritans rose in desperation, but the forces of Justinian were too strong; they were completely crushed; many thousands were forced into the Church; they were deprived of all administrative autonomy; their synagogues were destroyed, and their property confiscated by their being only allowed to will it to an heir who was a member of the orthodox Christian Church. Two years later they were excluded from pleading in a lawsuit, or even from giving evidence, except in favour of an orthodox suitor. This was the end of the Samaritans as a national, or political, unit. What their numbers were at that time we have, as usual, no means of knowing; but the belt of country which they inhabited was extensive and more fertile than it is to-day, and it may well have supported a population of some hundreds of thousands. There survived for many centuries Samaritan communities in various parts of Palestine, Syria and Egypt; but as a national community they never recovered from the catastrophe of 529. There was another rising in 556, but it was easily suppressed.

The hopes of the Samaritans had to some extent been based on the possibility of indirect help from the Persians; the eyes of the Jewish community were often fixed on the same region. There was little doubt in the minds of Jewish leaders that in the long duel between Rome and Persia Jewish interests lay with the latter. But it is doubtful if there was any serious Jewish rising during the sixth century. Some chroniclers

imply that the Jews rose with the Samaritans, but this is doubtful. In any case their power was substantially diminished; their political autonomy, their civil rights, and even their religious freedom had all been reduced by the bullying orthodoxy of the Byzantine emperors, and in particular by Justinian, who added insult to injury by constantly empowering their chief enemies, the orthodox bishops, to assist the civil government in the enforcement of the humiliating burdens imposed upon them. In the fourth century Cyril of Jerusalem had complained that "Jewish serpents and Samaritan imbeciles" had attended his addresses to Christian converts "like wolves surrounding the flock of Christ." Neither Jew nor Samaritan would have dared to exercise such freedom in the time of Justinian and his successors.

The day of a brief relief and revenge was, however, approaching. Justinian's grandiose dreams of imperial magnificence, and his passion for building—including several churches in Palestine—had heavily overstrained the empire's weak economic resources. His successors could not possibly maintain what he had so rashly conquered; and the empire fell a prey to disorder. Then occurred a repetition of the superstitious fears which had led Valerian and Diocletian to persecute the Christians, only this time the infidels who were said to be angering the Almighty were the Jews. Phocas (602-610) and his successor Heraclius (610-641) were said to have been warned that the empire was menaced by 'the circumcised', and both in consequence ordered the Jews of the empire to accept baptism. What numbers submitted we have no means of knowing. In any case their submission was probably of short duration, for in 611 the Persians swept through the eastern provinces, and in 614 they took Jerusalem after a siege lasting only twenty days. There is no doubt that the Persians received substantial help from the Jews of Galilee. One chronicler mentions a figure of 20,000 Jewish soldiers, another 26,000. While the actual figures are as unreliable as all ancient figures, there is no reason to question the fact that the Jews aided the Persians with all the men they could muster, and that the help they gave was considerable. Once Jerusalem was in Persian hands a terrible massacre of Christians took place, and the Jews are accused of having taken the lead in this massacre. It would not be surprising if the accusation were true, even though the fantastic stories told of Jewish

revenge by Christian chroniclers are certainly exaggerated. The Jews seem to have hoped that the Persians would allow them the full possession of Jerusalem, and even the re-establishment of an autonomous state. But the Persian occupation was too short for such plans to develop. It lasted only fifteen years.

In those fifteen years, however, changes occurred which centuries were not to repair. The country had been desolated by the Persian armies; agriculture had come to a standstill; cities were empty, while their inhabitants had fled to the mountains; churches and monasteries were in ruins, and much of Jerusalem itself was burnt. All the treasures collected in its shrines, including the 'true cross' itself, had been taken away, and the patriarch Zacharias sent with thousands of others as prisoners to Persia. It was a half empty country filled with ruins which, by a supreme effort, Heraclius managed to reoccupy in 629. Though he himself seems to have been inclined to spare the Jews for the part they had played as allies of the Persians, the clergy of Jerusalem thought only of revenge; and as bloody a massacre took place of Jews as had previously taken place of Christians. But that—and the recovery of the 'true cross'—was all the satisfaction that the Christians got. A far more powerful enemy was approaching. In the year in which Heraclius regained Palestine, Muhammad was completing his conquest of Mecca. In 636 his followers entered the country; in 640 Caesarea surrendered and Byzantine rule was at an end.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ARAB CONQUEST AND THE ISLAMISATION OF THE POPULATION

THE PERSIANS IN 614 were the first foreign invaders to cross the frontiers of Palestine for more than six hundred years. Twenty years later the victory of the Arabs over the Byzantines at the battle of Jarmuk in August, 636, finally brought that long period of political peace to an end, and for nearly a thousand years Palestine was to know once again the continual passage of armies in foreign and civil wars with many of which the inhabitants had no direct concern; and, for much longer than that, to realise the insecurity of her eastern and southern frontiers whence raiding bedouins descended to devastate her fields, destroy her trees and often massacre her people.

The primary motive which inspired the Arab conquest was economic. It was made possible by the weakness of the Mediterranean-Middle Eastern world in which the great empires of Rome and Persia had wasted too often their strength in internecine strife. Everywhere on their fringes the barbarians were on the move, from the scanty pastures of the north and east as well as from the sandy deserts of the south; and everywhere the motive was the same, the desire for booty, for the control of the rich lands which centuries of peasant industry under stable, if exacting, governments had raised to a level of productivity which Palestine itself, and many other lands as well, have never known since. Those who find it a subject of congratulation that among the Arab peasants of to-day are to be found unchanged the economy and costume of the Bible, ignore the fact that this is only possible because of the regression which has resulted from centuries of Muslim rule. It is only the most backward and impoverished parts of the Holy Land of Jesus and the apostles which are recalled by the fellaheen of to-day. The busy cities, the caravans of merchants, the thriving forests, the prosperous estates, and the rural industries with which Jesus or the apostles would have been

familiar, have perished beneath the combined assaults of the bedouin, the goat and the tax collector.

So little was the first wave of the Arab conquest an exclusive product of religious fanaticism, offering the conquered Islam or the sword, that many of the bedouin bands who formed the armies of Islam were in all probability still pagans when they took part in the first great surge out of the peninsula. Moreover their whole economy was so completely based on the payment of tribute by their non-muslim subjects that when later the subject populations tended to accept Islam in large numbers, there was a severe crisis in the finances of the state, and the whole system of taxation had to be revised. There is no doubt that within a very short time a religious élan was developed; but it was akin to that of the Puritans of Cromwell. It made magnificent warriors, but not missionaries.

The ease with which the Arabs advanced was certainly due in large measure to the exhaustion of the Byzantine and Persian empires. But another factor was the religious intolerance of Orthodox Christianity* and Persian Zoroastrianism, both of which had created in their respective empires large and dissatisfied elements in the population only too willing to accept a change of masters. Here again a correction of traditional views is necessary. If the motive of Arab expansion was not religious neither was its conduct characterised by fanaticism. The conquerors were looking for tribute rather than converts, and their attitude to those who did not resist them was characterised by generosity rather than arrogance. Among the instructions which the first caliph, Abu Bakr (632-634) is said to have given the army when it first marched out of the peninsula are the following: "Be just, for the unjust never prosper. Be valiant: die rather than retreat. Keep your word, even to your enemies. Be merciful: slay neither the old, nor the young, nor the women. Destroy no fruit trees, no crops, no beasts. Kill neither sheep, nor oxen nor camels, except it be for food." So also most of the stories which later ages told of his successor, Umar (634-644), deal with his simplicity, his generosity and his lack of pomp; and if the stories about both these caliphs be partly apocryphal, they reflect what later ages knew of them, and they are borne out by the ready

* In this and succeeding chapters the word 'Orthodox' is used to denote those Christians in communion with, or sharing the doctrines of, the ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. From the doctrinal standpoint every Church naturally claims orthodoxy for its views—otherwise it would scarcely hold them.

obedience which the conquerors found among the conquered. Jews and non-Orthodox Christians in Byzantine territory, or Orthodox Christians in Persian, all alike found the change of ruler a benefit, once the sufferings endured in the years of the conquest had been overcome. For once they had paid their tribute—and it was no more onerous than the previous taxes—they were free to manage their own affairs, and their new masters were indifferent to their religious beliefs.

Muhammad died in 632. His successor, Abu Bakr, was fully occupied in extending his authority over the Arabian peninsula, for not more than a third had accepted the political or religious leadership of the Prophet in his lifetime. Only raiding parties went further. It was under the second caliph, Umar, that the conquest of both Byzantium and Persia was undertaken. The occupation of Palestine was a minor incident of that conquest. The Arabs advanced along both borders of the desert, up the western banks of the Euphrates and along the Mediterranean coast. When it became evident that the forces of Heraclius would be in the field before the Persians, those advancing along the Euphrates, by a brilliant forced march, crossed the desert, joined up with the western Arabs north-east of Palestine, and completely routed the Byzantine army in 636 on the river Jarmuk. The fall of Damascus took place in the following year, and the rest of the cities of Syria and Palestine fell like ripe plums into the conqueror's mouth. Jerusalem, after a short siege, surrendered in 640. The year 641 saw both the final defeat of Persia and the conquest of Egypt. Any attempt to organise this vast empire was of the slightest. The main, almost the only, interest was to assure the regular payment of the tribute, and governors were appointed not as administrators but as soldiers or as tax-collectors. So long as the centre remained in distant Medina there could, indeed, be no question of a full administration: the caliph lived too far away; and it was only after the murder of the aged Uthman (644-656) that his successor Ali (656-661) moved the capital to al-Kufah on the Euphrates.

Ali was the last of the 'orthodox' caliphs who had been companions of the Prophet and succeeded by some sort of election. But his tenure of power, short though it was, was a tragic presage for the future. He came to the caliphate through the murder of his predecessor, not by the enemies of Islam, but by those in his own household; and he only secured his

position by civil war. By civil war he lost it, and he was himself murdered by one of the dissenters in his own army. He was the unintentional cause of a schism which has endured to this day; for his followers refused to accept the religious supremacy of his successor, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, and founded the Shiite sect (the sectaries) in opposition to the Sunnis (the followers of tradition, or orthodox) who accepted Muawiyah.


Announcing that Ali had forfeited his rights through complicity in the murder of Uthman, Muawiyah (661-680), who was descended from Umayyah, nephew of the great-grandfather of Muhammad, announced himself caliph at Jerusalem, and made his capital Damascus. He introduced the principle of hereditary succession, but his Umayyad descendants ruled the empire for less than a century. Yet in this period, under the caliph Walid (705-715), it reached its greatest extent, and stretched from Spain to India. The Umayyads were the only dynasty which could be called purely Arab. For when they fell and power passed to the Abbasids, it was Islam and not Arab blood which formed the basis of unity; and little more than another century saw the passage of effective power to successive usurpers who were wholly or largely of Turkish and not even of Semitic origin. But while the Arab control of the empire dwindled and passed, and the empire itself broke up into rival kingdoms, the unity of the Syrian, Arab, Egyptian and North African territories on the basis of Islam and of the Arabic language remained and became stronger with time, being scarcely affected by the two centuries of crusader rule in the Holy Land, by the growing power of Christian Europe, or by the secularism of the modern world.

There is another factor which remained constant until modern times and in all the territories once ruled by the caliphs. Government was personal government; elaborate written laws and constitutions played but little effective part, and nothing like an ordered development of political institutions is to be looked for. Action and attitude varied according either to the social traditions or religious ideas of the tribe, group, or sect in power, or, more simply, to the whim of a ruler, which might differ from evening to morning according to his mood. It is only on the widest canvas and over long periods of time that generalisations can be made which have

anything like universal validity. The many records of nineteenth century writers on Palestine, Syria and Arabia describe situations and behaviour identical with those of the earliest caliphs and their governors, in the sudden changes from kindness to oppression, from indifference to intolerance. Though there were many just and God-fearing rulers, bribery and personal predilection were too often the basic determinants of action and inaction, not laws, written privileges or to some extent even custom. This general consideration is of special importance in treating of a land like Palestine in which there were throughout important non-muslim elements to whom custom itself gave no equality with Muslims or rights against Muslims; but it is in fact equally true of the treatment of the general Muslim population by governors and tax collectors throughout the Islamic East.

During the first century after the Arab conquest the caliph and governors of Syria and Palestine ruled almost entirely over Christian and Jewish subjects. Apart from the bedouin, in the earliest days the only Arabs in western Palestine (not all of whom were themselves Muslims) were the garrisons of the capitals of the two provinces into which it was divided. Al-Urdunn, with capital at Tiberias (Tabariyah) occupied roughly the area of Palestina Secunda, and Filastin, with capital at Lydda (later Ramleh), occupied all the area south of that down to the frontiers of Egypt. Differences between the statements of Arab geographers make it difficult to be more precise. These garrisons were small, and two years after the capture of Jerusalem they were decimated by epidemics and only gradually replaced. At first they were not even allowed to own land, but this was rescinded by Uthman. Thereafter a good deal of the country passed into the hands of rich Arab landowners. Doubtless there were cases where the Christian owners had fled and others where they were dispossessed. But this change of owners did not involve any extensive change in the nature of the population. The land was still worked by the same peasants, for the Arabs were not only entirely inexperienced in agriculture, but heartily despised the tiller of the soil. We can, then, assume for at least a hundred years that the majority of the Palestinian population continued to be Christians, Orthodox or monophysite, and the minority Jews and Samaritans. The number of both of these latter must have diminished during three centuries of Byzantine intolerance

PALESTINE UNDER
THE
ARAB CALIPHS



and monastic excess, but they were still an important factor in the country. In view of the fact that the Muslims would have been in no position absolutely to prevent relations between their numerous Christian subjects and their fellow Christians in the Byzantine empire, it is interesting to discover that at Constantinople Islam was regarded for a considerable period as a Christian heretical sect akin to Arianism, and not as a rival religion. The Muslims on their side regarded both Christians and Jews as 'people of the Book' who were entitled to protection under Muslim rule, though never to full equality with Muslims. The extent of fair or ill treatment varied enormously from ruler to ruler and place to place; but Umar, the first caliph directly concerned with the question on a large scale, issued certain directives which formed the general basis for the policy of his successors, and his name has been associated by Muslim lawyers and codifiers with a 'constitution' or 'covenant' which is almost certainly much more complicated than anything which existed at so early a period.

The first essential was that the non-muslim should surrender to the Muslim without offering violent resistance. Cities and provinces taken by the sword possessed no rights. Cities like Jerusalem which surrendered received certain defined privileges, in return for the payment of a poll tax (*jizya*) on which, together with the land tax, the whole structure of Muslim finances rested. For the true believer only paid a tax for the relief of the poor. He paid nothing towards the expenses of the state, and even received some kind of salary or pension. Such a system was only possible while the non-muslims formed the majority of the population. As they decreased at the expense of converts to Islam, a new form of taxation had to be evolved, for the contribution of the dwindling number of non-muslims had become totally inadequate.

The tax once paid, the non-muslim subjects, known as *dhimmis*, more or less continued their life as before. Their communal existence was accepted, and they became 'millets' within the Muslim society. They retained their private property; and religious communities, Jewish or Christian, retained their churches and ecclesiastical laws and the administration of them, though they were not allowed to put up new buildings. Their religious activities, however, had to remain unobtrusive, so as not to attract the attention of Muslims, and *dhimmis* had to avoid, either in dress or

conduct, appearing to be Muslims, or to be on an equality with Muslims. Dhimmis were gradually excluded from service in the army. As the first capital outside the peninsula was at al-Kufah in Iraq, it is possible that this general system owes something to the position already established in Persia for the Nestorian Christians. They were organised in a similar way as an autonomous religious community, dealing with the government corporately through their catholicus or patriarch. The 'millet' system, which continued up to the end of the period in which Turkey ruled the Arab world, thus antedated the Arab conquest.

The earliest Palestinian converts to Islam were probably Christian Arab tribes along the eastern frontiers. Among the many Christian monuments in the territory of the Hauran east of the Sea of Galilee, there are only two which can be dated after 640, which suggests that Christian leaders made a poor struggle for survival in this region. The twin facts that the new conquerors were themselves Arabs, and that the Christianity of the Nabateans and their successors had been monophysite and exposed to continuous persecution by the Byzantine government and the Orthodox patriarchs of Jerusalem, seems to have made them very ready to change their religion. That this attitude was not universal was discovered by Baldwin I, King of Jerusalem, when in 1100 he was able to repopulate Jerusalem with Syrian Christians from this region.

In the rest of the country a change in religion was a much slower business; but even while they made no attempt to force conversions the Arabs, from the very first, laid claim to the Temple area in Jerusalem. A medieval Arab story relates that when Umar entered the city with the patriarch Sophronius he demanded at once to be taken to that spot. Sophronius showed him first the church of the Holy Sepulchre, then the church on Mount Zion, but Umar would accept neither as the site of the Temple. Finally the Patriarch had to admit that the Christians had turned the whole area into a dunghill and midden, and that the archway by which it was entered was almost filled with filth. It was fitting punishment for such insolent impiety that the Patriarch had to crawl on hands and knees over the muck to lead the caliph to the site, and not surprising that the Muslims should never have forgotten this insult to a spot they venerated, and which was truly

venerable. In revenge they renamed the church of the Holy Sepulchre (al-Kiyamah, the Resurrection) the dung church (al-Kumamah).

A wooden mosque was built in the Temple area near where the Aksa mosque now stands. In the time of Abd al-Malik (685-705) was built the present glorious shrine, which stands upon the spot whence Muhammad made his legendary flight to heaven. It is the work of Byzantine architects and Greek, local and Egyptian craftsmen. Though the cupola itself had to be rebuilt some centuries later after an earthquake, and the outer wall had to be added for additional strength, the building still stands substantially as al-Malik left it in 691. He probably also built the Aksa Mosque at the southern end of the great enclosure or Noble Sanctuary (Haram ash-Sharif) but of the original building nothing remains to-day. It has often been said that the reason for building so splendid a shrine was at least as much political as religious. The authority of Abd al-Malik had for some time been challenged by a rival caliph, Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, who was in possession of Mecca and so able to draw a substantial revenue from the pilgrims who came from Abd al-Malik's dominions; and it was believed that pilgrimage to the Dome of the Rock was intended to provide an effective substitute for the pilgrimage to Mecca ordered by Muhammad himself. Recent research has cast grave doubt upon this theory, and has suggested instead that the motive of Abd al-Malik was the embellishment of a site possessing the most venerable Muslim association with a building which would rival the glory of the Christian churches. For Jerusalem occupied a position in the Muslim mind inferior only to that of Mecca and Medina.

The Umayyads built themselves palaces and hunting lodges in the Jordan valley and in Transjordan. Remains of them still exist at Qesir Amra, at Amman and at Khirbet Mefjer near Jericho; but the only caliph who made his permanent residence in Palestine was the second son of Abd al-Malik, Sulayman (715-717). He built himself a palace and a large mosque at Ramleh.

The period of Abd al-Malik and his successors saw a considerable increase in conversions to Islam. At the turn of the century the official registers were for the first time ordered to be kept in Arabic instead of Greek and Umar II (717-720), nephew of al-Malik, reintroduced and amplified the legislation con-

cerning the dhimmis. Though the majority of officials were still Christians, the time was coming when it was at last possible to challenge their monopoly—and the temptation to change religion was thereby increased. For an educated class of Arabic-speaking Muslims was coming into existence, and naturally expected priority in employment. Moreover the general temper was changing. At the highest level, at the court of the Abbasids as well as that of the Umayyads, a Christian or a Jew of intelligence and capacity could still live in a very tolerant atmosphere; but at the level of the street and the market place, it would seem that Muslim intolerance and even fanaticism were beginning to show, and were accentuated by the arrogance and display of those dhimmis, Christian or Jewish, who had obtained wealth and power by official protection. Nevertheless it must not be thought that the pressure was such as to make life intolerable for either the Christian or the Jewish community, or to justify apostasy. Both continued to enjoy the protection of the caliphs and the full control of their communal affairs.

Though the Christians still probably formed the majority of the population up to the beginning of the ninth century, and continued to be an important element right down to the period of the crusades, yet the Palestinian Christian community was by no means the most interesting of the period. Doubtless they needed time to recover from the devastation caused by the Persian invasion of 614, and also found it difficult to adjust themselves to the second class citizenship which had become their lot; a difficulty which the Jewish community would not have felt. But it remains true that little or nothing of the glory of Christianity during those centuries falls to the Church of Jerusalem. Islam cannot be blamed for this; for these centuries witnessed a missionary expansion led by the Nestorian Church from Persia as remarkable as the expansion (partly under the direction of popes who themselves came from Syria) of Christianity among the barbarians of Europe. In the whole eastern field, which stretched from China to South India, there are no prominent figures of Palestinian origin. And yet they were less isolated than their brethren in eastern Islam. For pilgrims still came from all parts of the Christian world to Palestine, and the Muslims did not interfere with them except for two brief periods in the eleventh century. Further, though they naturally favoured sects which had no connection

with Byzantium, there was no persecution of the Orthodox as such. It seems that at first the Nestorian catholicus in Iraq was recognised as the head of all the Christian Churches; and that when a separate head was accepted for Syria and Palestine, it was at first the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch. Sophronius died soon after the surrender of Jerusalem, and we know of no further Orthodox patriarch until the end of the century. But in the eighth century (726 and 763) two councils were called in Jerusalem by Orthodox patriarchs to deal with the iconoclastic controversy, and a third in 836 dealt with the same subject. As all pronounced in favour of images, it is evident that the councils had freedom of action from their Muslim masters.

Apart from these councils the story of the Palestinian Church continued to be one of monks and pilgrims. Neither class was officially interfered with by the new rulers, who, in fact, professed the greatest respect for both. The instructions given by Abu Bakr definitely forbade any interference with them; and the monasteries and *lauras* in Jerusalem and the western area of the country were relatively secure. But the same does not apply to those in the eastern deserts and mountains, which began to be subject to bedouin raids from the side of the erstwhile Christian Nabateans and Ghassanids. Actually Mar Saba was first sacked by bedouins during the Persian war; but it was attacked again, and many monks murdered and buildings burnt, at the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th centuries; and the same fate befell other desert monasteries, such as the convent of St. Theodosius (*Deir Dousi*) overlooking the Dead Sea. Pilgrims continued to come from the West, and the conversion of Hungary in the 10th century made it possible for them to come by the easier overland route. But this was balanced by the fact that the roads were often less secure than in Byzantine times, for the caliphs were rarely able to keep order in the provinces as effectively as the emperors. As time went on, conditions certainly worsened for all the non-muslim peoples, but it must be said of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods that life for a Christian was tolerable, and that many Christians were able to rise to important positions without having to conceal their faith.

For the Jewish community the new régime was entirely welcome. That they assisted the Arabs on various occasions

during their conquests is only to be expected; but their numbers must have been relatively small. They had suffered three centuries of Christian intolerance, and monkish violence had been spasmodic during at least half of that period. During the Persian invasion they may have been spared the losses which fell on the country as a whole, but many thousands fell victims to the vengeance of the Christians during the brief return of Heraclius. Nevertheless we have evidence that Jews lived in all parts of the country and on both sides of the Jordan, and that they dwelt in both the towns and the villages, practising both agriculture and various handicrafts. During the seventh and eighth centuries Tiberias continued to be their centre; but some Jews began to return to Jerusalem shortly after the Muslim conquest. At first they lived in the southern quarter near the Wailing Wall; as their numbers increased they began a new settlement in the north east between the Damascus and St. Stephen's Gates, where many names still recall them. At some period they purchased the slopes of the Mount of Olives facing the Temple, and there used to be a considerable pilgrimage to this spot at the chief festivals, especially at the Feast of Tabernacles. At these pilgrimages important events were proclaimed; contacts with the Dispersion maintained, and pilgrims from all parts of the world received. When the capital of Filastin moved from Lydda to Ramleh a considerable number of Jews, some of them from Lydda, settled in the new town. There were also large and important communities in such places as Ascalon, Caesarea and above all Gaza, which the Jews of southern Palestine made a kind of capital during the period in which they were excluded from Jerusalem.

The vigorous spiritual life of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods provoked a similar renaissance among the Jews of Palestine, which showed itself in various directions. The Jerusalem Talmud was by this time completed, but work was done on collecting and editing the mass of commentaries known as the Midrash. Moreover there remained much work to be done on the actual language of the Bible itself. This led not only to a revival of Hebrew, but also to a close study of the Biblical text, and to the development of a new and more efficient system of pointing and punctuation (Masorah). The seventh and eighth centuries covered the main work of the Masoretes, and Tiberias was their centre. The Masoretic text

of to-day is largely their work. There was likewise a considerable outpouring of Hebrew poetry, though this may be traced to Byzantine rather than Arab inspiration. For Byzantine hymns bear resemblance to the Hebrew, but most of the themes of the Muslim poets were secular. A number of hymns, still used in the synagogue, were the work of Palestinian poets of this period. The greatest of them was Eliezer b. Kalir, who flourished at the end of the seventh century. The influence of eastern Christians may, perhaps, also be traced in a revival of messianic and apocalyptic mysticism. The 8th century saw two pseudo-messiahs appear, Sercne of Syria and Abu-Isa of Ispahan; and various cabbalistic works probably belong to the same time.

Of the organisation of the community in the first period it is difficult to speak with certainty. From the 9th century onwards we have access to the mass of documents discovered in recent decades in the Cairo Genizah, but we have nothing comparable for the earlier period. At first the exilarch of Babylonia seems to have had the same authority with regard to all Jews in the caliphate that the catholicus exercised over all Christians. But a local Palestinian successor to the patriarch may have existed even in Byzantine times at Tiberias, and have obtained some recognition of his status from the Muslims. The gaon, or president, of the rabbinic academy in Tiberias was certainly recognised and given an official position later. His religious authority was, in certain matters, widely accepted by Jews; for it was the task of the Tiberias academy annually to fix the Jewish calendar for Jews throughout the world. Whether the Samaritans were regarded by the authorities as part of the Jewish community at this time we cannot say; later, when Palestine was ruled from Egypt, the Egyptian nagid or president certainly had authority over them.

The period during which the empire was ruled from Damascus, and can be called an 'Arab' empire, lasted less than a century, and even in that short time it had begun to decline. In the seventh century the frontiers were only violated once, in 678, by a raid of a Christian tribe known as the Mardaites who lived in the mountains of Lebanon. How much damage they did we do not know, though they seem to have penetrated as far as the walls of Jerusalem. But in the 8th century the old divisions between the Arab tribes began to reassert themselves, and civil war in Syria and Palestine left

the last Umayyad caliphs no troops to spare to repress a revolt in the east which was headed by Abu b. Abbas al-Saffah (750-754). Playing on the opposition of Iraqi to Syrian, Shiite to Sunni, and Persian to Arab, he overthrew the Umayyads and founded a new dynasty of the Abbasids. In these events Palestine had the melancholy distinction that it was at Antipatris that the last of the Syrian dynasty were treacherously murdered by the general of al-Saffah. The new capital was at first at al-Kufah, until the successor of al-Saffah, al-Mansur (754-775), built the new imperial city of Baghdad. Vast as were the territories of the Abbasid caliphs, they were no longer coterminous with Islam. In the extreme west the Umayyads reappeared as caliphs in Spain; and in the extreme east local dynasties arose.

The distance of Palestine from the new centre had an evil effect on the state of the country. It was now but a remote and unimportant province; and though strong rulers might suppress insurrection, tribal disorders and bedouin raids might at any time make life insecure for Muslims as well as Jews and Christians. Even in the days of Harun al-Rashid (786-809) such a war between the tribes of the Southern and Northern Arab federations devastated wide areas. Towns and villages were sacked; the roads became unsafe and even Jerusalem was threatened. It was in this conflict that Mar Saba and other monasteries were plundered and their inmates murdered. Further there was often civil war between one reign and the next; on the death of al-Rashid, for example, such a war swept over Palestine, leading to the burning of churches and the flight or massacre of Christians. Finally even in times of peace both Christians and Jews were discovering that the toleration of early days was beginning to wear thin, and unfortunately it was the stronger rulers who tended to be the sternest repressors of the dhimmis. At one moment al-Rashid, deceived by the malicious denunciation of the patriarch of Antioch as a Greek spy by some monks of Aleppo, broke his habitual tolerance to order the destruction of all new Jacobite churches; and al-Mutawakkil (847-861) re-introduced all the humiliating restrictions of Umar II together with new additions.

There is little to show that Palestine had much share in the magnificence of the court of Baghdad during the early days of the Abbasids; though Christian and Jewish scholars

were among its luminaries, none came from Palestine; the source of their inspiration was Persian rather than western, and in general it may be said that among the Muslims also the Arab and western influences were giving way to increasing orientalism, and to new strains from central Asia. Yet the high humane level of civilisation to which the early Abbasids raised the whole of western Asia naturally had repercussions in Palestine. Trade and industry flourished as well as agriculture, and the dying, weaving and glass work of the country found a ready market; Arab geographers describe it as one of the most fertile and prosperous regions of the empire. There still survived from Byzantine times the annual fair at Jerusalem on September 15, to which merchants from the commercial cities of Europe, Pisa, Genoa, Venice, Marseilles and elsewhere, came, half on pilgrimage and half for trade, and readily exchanged the spices and silks of the east for the wares of Europe. When the fair ceased to exist we do not know, but it could scarcely have been held regularly in the long period of intermittent disorder which marked the two centuries before the first crusade. That disorder had its origin at the beginning of the 9th century, when the caliphs began to rely on Turkish mercenaries, and it was not long before these mercenaries and their leaders were in effective control of the state. By the middle of the century the caliphs were little more than prisoners, with a nominally religious primacy, and the governors of provinces were making themselves hereditary and independent princes.

One such governor, Ahmad ibn-Tulun, a Turk from Farghanah on the furthest boundaries of Islam east of Samarkand, became lieutenant of the governor of Egypt in 868; but he quickly made himself first governor, then an independent ruler. In 877 he conquered Palestine and Syria, and from then until the crusades the destiny of Palestine was more often linked to that of Egypt than to that of Baghdad. Ibn-Tulun founded a powerful military state, with its own fleet and naval base at Acre; and his rule certainly increased the prosperity of Egypt, since revenues were no longer sent out of the country to a distant caliph. But Palestine had merely exchanged one master for another; and when ibn-Tulun died in 884 his death was followed by twenty years of disorder and misrule from which all the provinces suffered alike. In 905 Egypt and Syria reverted for thirty years to the Abbasids, or rather to

the mercenary captains who ruled in their name. They did little to keep order at a distance, and it was during this period that the local Muslim population in 923 destroyed the Orthodox churches in Ascalon, Ramleh and Caesarea. In 937 they again destroyed various Christian buildings and damaged the church of the Holy Sepulchre. But already another Turkish adventurer from Farghanah was in control of Egypt. Muhammad ibn-Tughj was a Turkish general who had been sent there in 935 to restore order. He had received the title of Ikhshid or prince, whence his immediate successors are known as the Ikhshidids. He restored order, but for his own benefit, and in 940 he added Palestine and Syria to his kingdom, which finally included Mecca and Medina also. After his death in 946, there was again a period of misrule; and since this coincided with an equal period of weakness at Baghdad, the Byzantines were, for the first time since the Arab conquest, able to make raids all through Syria. John Timisces penetrated in 975 as far as northern Palestine but these advances of the Byzantines led to bloody reprisals against the native Christians. The church of the Holy Sepulchre was again damaged and the patriarch was imprisoned and then burnt alive as a Byzantine spy. Palestine was at this time in the nominal possession of the Ikhshidids; actually it was ruled for twenty years after the death of Muhammad ibn-Tughj by an Abyssinian negro slave until a new conqueror arrived, this time from the west, Jawhar, the leading soldier of the Fatimid princes of North Africa.

The Fatimids claimed descent from Fatima, daughter of Muhammad, and the claim may have been genuine though it was, not unnaturally, denied by the Abbasids. They had set themselves up as caliphs in north-western Africa in 909 and established a caliphate of the Shiite sect; for it was through the plots of a vast Shiite secret society, the Ismailites, that they had obtained power. It was the Fatimids who built Cairo, and under al-Aziz (975-996) their rule was extended to the whole of Syria and Palestine. Al-Aziz was a beneficent and very tolerant ruler; and both Jews and Christians were readily employed by him in the highest offices of the state. His greatest vizir, Ibn Killis, was of Jewish origin, and his wife, the mother of the infamous al-Hakim, was the sister of the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem. On his death there was civil war in Palestine between rival generals of his successor, al-Hakim

(996-1021). Early in life this caliph began to develop signs of eccentricity, which finally developed into such complete insanity that he declared himself an incarnation of the god-head, and compelled his Muslim subjects to accept him as such. The sect of the Druzes survives from this strange period; they still accept him as an incarnation of the godhead, and expect his messianic return.

In 1009 al-Hakim forbade pilgrimages and ordered the destruction of all churches and synagogues throughout the empire, except the church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, but including the church of the Holy Sepulchre. According to one account, he ordered this last to be destroyed because of his disgust at the imposture of the Holy Fire; according to another because of the intrigues of an ambitious monk, John, who, on being refused a bishopric by the patriarch, denounced him to the caliph as a traitor. On the death of the madman the Christians, with the aid of the Byzantine emperor, were allowed to rebuild their churches. But it was some years before the church of the Holy Sepulchre rose from its ashes. The destruction of a shrine venerated throughout Christendom had serious repercussions in Europe, and prepared the way for the first crusade. Unfortunately it had other repercussions also. The story circulated in the west that it was at the instigation of the Jews that al-Hakim had given the order, and widespread massacres and forced baptisms were the result.

For a brief period after the death of al-Hakim, Palestine seems to have enjoyed peace, and there was a great development of pilgrimages. We read of the arrival of bands numbering several thousands, and though they were sometimes molested by bedouins, they seem to have been otherwise accepted. But the country suffered during the eleventh century from a series of earthquake shocks, which wrought immense destruction. The most serious were in 1016, when the cupola of the Dome of the Rock fell, in 1034 and in 1068. But yet another army of Turkish invaders was approaching, that of the Seljuks, who, like earlier conquerors, came from the far-eastern provinces of Islam, in this case from the actual frontiers of China.

The Seljuk branch of the Turks became Muslims about the end of the tenth century, while they were employed in the service of an Islamic dynasty, the Ghaznavids, who ruled over Persia and north west India. Like their predecessors, they quickly made themselves independent of their masters,

and in 1055 Tughril Beg occupied Baghdad, and was proclaimed supreme political ruler, with the title of Sultan, by the acquiescent caliph al-Kaim, whom Tughril was only too glad to accept as a purely religious chief. In 1063 Alp Arslan succeeded Tughril, and with the aid of a brilliant vizir, Nizam al-Mulk, set out on a career both of conquest and of consolidation and restoration of Islam. His complete defeat of the Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes at Manzikert (Malazgerd) north of Lake Van in Armenia (1071) was one of the causes of the Byzantine appeal to the west for help which was answered by the crusading movement. In the same year another Seljuk, Aziz, nominally acting on behalf of Alp Arslan and in the name of the Abbasid caliph, overran Syria and Palestine, but met with considerable opposition from the Fatimid governors. In 1073 Alp Arslan died and was succeeded by his son Malikshah, who gave Syria and Palestine to his brother Tutush. Tutush succeeded where Aziz, whom he murdered, had failed and recaptured Jerusalem, which he held until his own murder in 1095. Confusion followed until in 1098 the Fatimids re-established their authority for the few months which intervened before the arrival of the crusaders.

While there is little new to be said of the Christian communities during the last two centuries before the crusades, other than that their numbers dwindled continuously under the pressure of Islam, there are a number of changes to be recorded in the life of the Jewish community, which also must be assumed to have lost considerable strength during the period. The two messianic movements of the eighth century, to which reference has already been made, were to some extent connected with a not unexpected reaction against the Talmudic system of interpretation and the elaborate religious life which it ordained. This reaction took a fuller development, largely in Palestine and Syria, as a result of the teachings of Anan ben David in the second half of the century. Anan had expected to succeed to the Babylonian exilarchate on the death of his uncle but, being rejected, set himself up as an independent teacher, emphasising always the laws of the Bible as opposed to those of the Talmud. His followers, known as the Karaites, still exist. Unable to make much headway in Babylon, they made Jerusalem their centre. Other events contributed to bring Jerusalem for a brief period into the centre of the picture of

world Jewry. The Babylonian exilarchate had come to an end during the ninth century; the two great Talmudical schools of Sura and Pumbeditha were both in decline. Before their extinction they had a brilliant flicker in two great geonim, Saadiah (892-942) and the last Gaon, Hai (969-1038); but Babylonian Jewish life had become too insecure and internally corrupt to maintain its integrity amidst the decay of political and intellectual life into which the Abbasid caliphate had sunk. New schools were springing up in Egypt, Kairouan and Muslim Spain. The Jerusalem Talmud, which had been completely eclipsed by the Babylonian, was in temporary favour in the schools of Kairouan; Jewish philosophy and poetry were to be reborn in Egypt and Spain; but while these were still coming to fruition, for a short while Jerusalem inherited a shadowy supremacy, albeit in a period that lacked both religious and intellectual distinction.

Jerusalem possessed thus the interest both of the Rabbanites (Talmudists), whose chief, the head of the Jerusalem Yeshivah, assumed the title of Gaon of Jacob, and of the Karaites, who founded in that city an ascetic brotherhood of the Mourners of Zion, who, in the manner of Christian ascetics, passed their lives in poverty and prayer for the restoration of the Temple. The Jewish community possessed a somewhat complicated organisation, half independent and half dependent on that of Egypt. The successor to the exilarch of Babylon, though with much less general recognition in Jewry, was the nagid of Egypt, and his authority was recognised by the Fatimid caliphs as extending over all Jews and Samaritans within their dominions. The nagid was not necessarily a member of the house of David, as had been the Babylonian exilarch; but there were representatives of the royal house who took the title of nasi (prince) and enjoyed some kind of authority in both Egypt and Palestine, though what the relationship of this authority was to that of the nagid or the presidents of the local communities it is impossible to say in detail. While the political organisation was thus centred in Egypt, the religious authority of the gaon of the Academy of Jerusalem was recognised for such matters as the fixing of the calendar throughout the Fatimid dominions. But this authority was of short duration. The Palestinian community had been so utterly impoverished by the natural disasters and the constant political unrest of the period that it was in constant need of

help from the wealthier community of Cairo; and the school of Jerusalem had itself to vacate the capital and take to a wandering life in various cities until it too passed into Egypt and disappeared during the period of the first crusade, with the death of its president, Ebyatar Hacoheh in 1105.

It is during the two centuries which preceded the crusade that the main emphasis of Palestinian history passes from the Christian and Jewish communities to the Muslims, though it must be said of them also that they passed into ever-increasing obscurity, poverty and decline. This decline only showed its full effects in the period following the crusades; but it was the failure of the caliphate to build up any kind of continuous security or competent public administration that ultimately led to it. In the centuries before the Arab conquest Palestine probably possessed the largest population and the most varied economy of any period of its history. This at least is the evidence uncovered by archaeologists from the study of the innumerable deserted sites to be found in every region of the country. This economy only gradually decayed; during the first two centuries after 640 Arab geographers and travellers could still speak of the many products of both agriculture and industry which were produced in its cities and villages; what we know of its tax payments shows a prosperity little inferior to that of northern Syria and the Lebanon.

To what extent the decline of the economy was produced by a change in the population, as well as by harsh taxation, bedouin raids and civil wars, it is difficult to judge; but it is probable that there was, in some parts of the country at least, a considerable influx of Arabs during the latter part of the period, and that they settled down to a more primitive agriculture than that practised by the other inhabitants, Christians or Jews, whom they supplanted. In any case we hear more as time goes on of disturbances caused by the typical inter-tribal rivalries of Arab life, which would have been unlikely without a considerable influx of Arabs accustomed to those quarrels. There was no reason for their outbreak among a population which had been indigenous over a long period and organised in entirely different ways. The fact that the whole population was beginning to speak Arabic, and that the majority were now Muslims, would have given an impetus to the acceptance of Arab ways and standards in a country so near both to Arabia and the desert, although elsewhere in Islam totally

different influences, stemming from Persian or Turkish sources, were becoming dominant. This change did not add to the strength, political or spiritual, of the resistance which the inhabitants were able to offer to the crusaders. The Latin conquest was effected without excessive difficulty, and the reversion of the country to Islam, when it came, was not to come from Arab sources, but from a fresh wave of Turkish invaders represented by Saladin.

THE WESTERN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE:
THE CRUSADES

THE CRUSADING MOVEMENT was not an irrational and isolated incursion of the Occident into a wholly and naturally oriental environment. Culturally and politically Palestine can with as much logic belong to the Mediterranean as to the middle-eastern world; economically it is an integral part of both. If the background of the Palestine of the Old Testament be primarily oriental, that of the Maccabees and the New Testament is as much hellenistic and Roman. Much depends on whether at any moment the Mediterranean unites or divides the peoples who dwell around its shores. If the former, then the essence of the geographical position of Palestine is that it is part of the Mediterranean littoral; if the latter, then its cultural inheritance as part of the Aramean, or semitic, world is likely to be decisive. But even this is not wholly so; for history is as important as geography; and Palestine, in its own right and not merely as part of the Syrian littoral, is the homeland of two world religions. As the centre of Christianity moved westwards into Europe, so a new kind of chain was forged binding Palestine to the West. Less easy to discern though it be (for Jewry remained but a single people while Christendom became a continent) the same phenomenon will appear when we come to consider the relations of the Jewish people with its ancient homeland.

The Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries had destroyed the unity of the Mediterranean world. The sea divided two new civilisations, one in western Europe and one in the east whose centre fluctuated from Baghdad to Cairo. But there was no clear frontier between these new powers, and it shifted as opportunity favoured one side or the other. At first the initiative had lain with the Arabs, and western Europe, together with the relics of the old Mediterranean power of Byzantium, had been compelled constantly to retreat; but the Arab empire was brittle and unstable, and the

initiative passed gradually to the other side. In this world of movement Palestine might at almost any time have changed masters.

The particular circumstances which dictated the form which that change should take—a movement of conquest and colonisation coming from the west of Europe and not from the nearer Byzantium—were many and complicated. One was the change in direction of the flow of peoples out of the central steppes of Asia. While the Mediterranean and middle-eastern regions were held safe in the power of Rome and Persia, the nomads had moved along the northern fringes of the civilised world, repopulating northern and western Europe with vigorous if barbaric stocks. When Rome broke, the hordes poured down into Italy, Spain and the rich lands of the western Mediterranean basin. That was in the fifth century, and since then the barbarians had themselves formed strong new societies, well able to resist subsequent invaders, and to make counter offensives into the lands of their enemies. Saxon, Avar, Slav and Arab discovered this to their cost in the triumphant campaigns of Charles Martel (717-741) and Charlemagne (768-814); and though the unity of Europe broke up in the following century, the feudal knight and the feudal castle gradually proved equally successful against the last invaders, the Magyars, the Petchenegs and the Normans. As western Europe became impenetrable, the whole shock of the nomad migrations had to be taken by the Byzantine empire and the wide, thinly held dominions of the Arab caliphate. As the earlier nomads had provided or invigorated the stocks from which sprang many of the crusaders, so this later movement, which lasted several centuries, provided at once the cause of the crusades and the forces which were to defeat them. For it was not the cruelty and intolerance of Arab Muslims which provoked a demand to rescue the Holy Places, nor was it the military power of Arab generals which defeated the crusaders; the Arabs themselves had been the first victims of the new invader from the north-east, the Turk. At the same time, if we are considering the wider implications of the crusading movement and particularly its religious aspect, it is important not to forget that, side by side with the defence against the Muslim Turks, Byzantium was engaged on its northern frontier with the defence of Christendom against various other asiatic peoples, and that the same is true of the

new Christian power of Russia. It was occupied at this time with a desperate conflict against another branch of the Turkish peoples.

The bulwark of Byzantium had for some centuries given western Europe the security in which it could consolidate its strength; and the effort had led to a considerable loss of power, a loss accentuated by its own past mistakes. In the sixth century, when the memory of the Mediterranean world had not yet faded from men's minds, Justinian (527-565) had made a desperate attempt to restore it under the leadership of Constantinople. All that he succeeded in doing was so to weaken his empire in manpower and in wealth by his continual wars, that his successors were in no position to meet the Arab invaders a hundred years later. The eastern provinces fell almost in a matter of months, and during the seventh century Arab armies and fleets stood on several occasions within sight of Constantinople. In 838 a Byzantine emperor, Theophilus, made the first appeal to the West for help; but the West was not yet strong enough to respond. The appeal was not quickly repeated for the Arab danger was passing, and in the following century the Byzantines went over to the counter-attack. But before new frontiers could be consolidated the balance shifted again, and they lost all that they had regained before the advancing Turks.

It was in the middle of the eleventh century that the Seljuk Turks obtained complete control of the capital of the Abbasid caliphs. By 1071 they had become sufficiently powerful for one army, led by their sultan, Alp Arslan, to inflict a decisive defeat on Byzantium at Manzikert, while, in the same year, his general Aziz drove the Fatimids out of Syria and Palestine. The former event compelled a fresh Byzantine appeal to the West; the latter interrupted the pilgrimages from the West which still kept alive the religious link with the foundation of Christianity in Palestine. These two events, which were the direct cause of the first crusade, do much to explain the subsequent relations of the crusaders with Byzantium. From the standpoint of the former it was a western European enterprise to reopen the road to the Holy Land; from that of the latter, the crusaders were assisting to re-establish the power of Byzantium over provinces which she had been in a fair way to recapture by herself until the sudden emergence of the Seljuk power confronted her with an enemy which

threatened her very existence and was too powerful to meet alone.

The appeal which had failed in the ninth century came at a more apposite moment at the end of the 11th. Western Europe was everywhere expanding and developing a super-abundant energy. The attack on Islam had already begun successfully in Spain and Sicily. The commercial cities of Italy, especially Venice, Pisa and Genoa, were developing navies equal to those of Islam, and were anxious to increase their trade with the eastern Mediterranean ports. The new social order was producing a class of knightly warriors only too anxious for fresh opportunities to carve out a kingdom by the sword, as well as a surplus agricultural population unable easily to find new work at home. Above all the Western Church had set her house in order and had gained a powerful hold over men's actions and imaginations. The call to crusade was primarily the work of the papacy, and if many of the effects of the movement on the life of western Europe have been exaggerated, the part which it played in the development of papal power and policy is incontestable. In consequence of all these causes, the call fell in 1095 on ears ready to accept the appeal from every one of the motives by which men are moved to action.

The plans elaborated by Urban II were for a carefully picked and directed invasion, mainly recruited from those parts of France where experience had been gained by men like Raymund de St. Gilles, Count of Toulousc, in fighting with the Muslims of Spain. The mob oratory of Peter the Hermit, and the undisciplined march of the 'poor men' across Europe, spreading ruin and massacring Jews on their route, were no part of the original papal plans. But with this part of the crusade we are not concerned; it perished in Asia Minor without ever reaching the Holy Land. The official army, led by the papal legate Adhemar, Bishop of Puy, comprised a contingent from Provence led by Raymund, three from northern Europe, one led by Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lorraine and son of the count of Boulogne, one by Robert of Flanders, and one by Stephen of Blois. A contingent from Sicily was led by Bohemond of Taranto. On the naval side the most important fleet was that of Genoa. At Constantinople all the leaders, except Raymund, formally accepted the idea that they were acting as vassals of Byzantium and received in

return considerable financial help, as well as guides and provisions, from the emperor, Alexis Comnenus. In Asia Minor their presence enabled Alexis to reconquer the western portion of his lost Asiatic provinces; and the successful battle of Dorylaeum (1 July 1097), inspired such fear in the Turks that the crusaders were enabled to reach the south-eastern corner of Asia Minor without further fighting. There they found scattered Armenian Christian communities who gladly welcomed them. As they left Byzantine territory some of the leaders began to look to their own advancement. Baldwin, brother of Godfrey and later first king of Jerusalem, moved with Tancred, nephew of Bohemond, through Cilicia, constantly quarrelling on the way. There they separated and Baldwin advanced towards Edessa. He managed to ingratiate himself with the Christian ruler, Thoros, but once safely established, connived at his murder. He then made himself count of Edessa, and took no further part in the crusade. Bohemond acted similarly on the capture of Antioch; and it is to be noted that neither of these princes, once in possession of their dominions, recognised the oath of loyalty which they had taken to Alexis. It was an ill beginning to the collaboration between Byzantium and the West. At Antioch ambassadors arrived from Fatimid Egypt, proposing an alliance against the Seljuks. The crusaders pretended to agree, and invited the Fatimids to drive the Seljuks out of Jerusalem, which they did (20 August 1098). The army stayed at Antioch for more than six months, and the quarrels between the leaders, especially when the death of Adhemar de Puy left no one possessed of supreme authority, so disgusted Godfrey of Bouillon that he left to join his somewhat disreputable brother at Edessa. In January 1099 the rank and file, equally disgusted by the conflicts and the rapacity of their leaders, forced them to make a move towards Jerusalem. Bohemond refused to go, but Godfrey returned from Edessa and joined the march near Tripoli. The advance southwards along the coast met little resistance from the petty and practically independent amirs along the route, and on June 7 the army came in sight of Jerusalem, the first city since leaving Antioch to offer determined resistance. But on July 15 it was captured and there followed a massacre of all the Muslims and Jews found within the city. The bloodshed shocked even the crusaders, and had the unfortunate effect of stiffening resistance in all the towns

of the coast, whose possession was essential to the establishment of the Latin colonies.

With the capture of Jerusalem the objective of the crusade was reached; and those of the crusaders who had no intentions of remaining in the east considered that they had only to arrange for its future government and return home. But at this point there was a division of opinion. Most of the clerics considered that, like Rome in the west, the Holy City should become an ecclesiastical principality. The barons were more realistic in seeing the need for a secular and military ruler of what was still an exiguous outpost in hostile territory. The more prominent crusaders having rejected the post, they chose Godfrey of Bouillon who had been one of the first to scale the walls of the city. Godfrey accepted, but only with the title of Defender of the Holy Sepulchre, an office he was prepared to accept from the newly elected Latin Patriarch, Arnoul de Malecorne (Arnold of Rohez). There was no time to consider the matter further; for within a fortnight of the capture of Jerusalem a Fatimid army was reported to have reached Ascalon. Godfrey collected what forces he could and set out to meet the enemy. The Fatimids defeated, Ascalon lay at his mercy. But here occurred the kind of conduct which was ultimately to ruin the whole adventure. At Antioch and at Jerusalem Raymund de St. Gilles had twice been thwarted of his ambition to obtain an important principality for himself. Lest Godfrey should obtain Ascalon he secretly betrayed to the defenders of the city the weakness of the force confronting them, and advised them to refuse to open their gates. In consequence Ascalon remained an advance base for a southern invasion by land or sea for fifty years.

The battle of Ascalon delayed the departure of most of the crusaders only for a matter of weeks. The subsequent establishment of the Latin kingdom was the work of no more than a few thousand Franks (as the Muslims called them all, whether they came from France or not). The only prominent leader who remained with Baldwin was Tancred, who had not yet obtained a principality. Together, with an army containing not more than a couple of hundred knights, they set out to secure their position. Tancred operated in the north and was rewarded with the principality of Galilee, while Godfrey secured his position in the south. In December Bohemond arrived at Jerusalem on pilgrimage accompanied by Daimbert,

Archbishop of Pisa, who as papal legate might expect to receive the patriarchal throne, and whose support, as leader of the Pisans, was important. Irregularities were discovered in Arnoul's election, and he was deposed in his favour. Neither cleric was of a character to inspire any respect; and the avarice and arrogance of Daimbert soon brought a clash with the secular powers. But so long as Godfrey lived the clash was avoided, for the Defender of the Holy Sepulchre was ready even to accede to the demand of the patriarch that he should hand over Jerusalem and Jaffa, and seek for himself a kingdom in other parts of the country. Fortunately Godfrey's death prevented Daimbert from securing his ambition to see himself an eastern counterpart of the Roman pontiff.

On the death of Godfrey the barons, supported by some of the clerics themselves, resolved on offering the throne to his brother Baldwin, count of Edessa. Baldwin accepted. Daimbert and Tancred thereupon plotted to prevent his arrival—Daimbert in order to perpetuate his possession of Jerusalem, Tancred because of a personal grudge dating from the quarrels in Cilicia. The plotters wrote to Bohemond that Baldwin should be seized while passing through Antioch. The letter miscarried and fell later into Baldwin's hands; Bohemond had, in fact, already done the same and fallen into the hands of the Turks. In consequence Baldwin arrived, the kingdom of Jerusalem was established, and the only real protection of the Latin colonies came into existence. For the house of Boulogne, and the house of Anjou which succeeded it, produced a series of excellent monarchs. It was a kingdom on a perpetual war footing; as soon as it produced a ruler who lacked military talent it fell. Natural calamities, such as drought or disease, and the heavy costs of ransoming important prisoners at times produced general distress. But in the intervals its citizens and subjects enjoyed just under a century not merely of relative security, but of quite extraordinary prosperity, a prosperity which, owing to the wisdom of successive kings, was shared not only by pilgrims and churches, but by barons without honour, merchants without piety and Muslims without baptism.

The Latin colonies consisted, from north to south, of the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the county of Tripoli and the kingdom of Jerusalem. The claims of the Byzantine emperor to the suzerainty of Edessa and Antioch



were at first ignored. The county of Edessa was short-lived, but by the middle of the century it had become politic to recognise the Byzantine overlordship of Antioch. Meanwhile all looked to the king at Jerusalem for military assistance, and for civil administration in cases of minority or the capture of their ruler, and so recognised a certain feudal obedience to the house of Boulogne. The special feudal system evolved to meet the new situation was generally identical in all parts. The collection known as the Assises of Jerusalem is one of the most remarkable monuments of feudal law in existence. While in their present form its various books were composed in Cyprus after the fall of the kingdom, it rests on the customs elaborated from the time of Baldwin, and it will be convenient to give here a picture of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, as a background to the wars in which it was constantly involved.

During the whole period the Franks themselves remained a minority. This was largely due to a disaster which befell the later waves of the first crusade, which might have brought into Syria the invaluable addition of some tens of thousands of colonists. The news of the capture of Jerusalem created widespread excitement in Europe and thousands of men of all classes set out for the east in 1100 and 1101. Some bands were led by prominent barons, some were more like the poor men's crusade of 1096. But through folly and treachery all alike perished at the hands of the Turks of Asia Minor, and only a few remnants ever reached the Latin colonies. The new society had, therefore, from the beginning to pay careful attention to the rights of the local population. The period in which the inhabitants of a captured city were automatically slaughtered was of short duration. It soon became necessary to assure eastern Christians, Muslims and Jews alike that they would be granted security of life and property if they surrendered peaceably. In fact the Latin states seem to have treated their peasantry, including Muslim peasants, better than they were treated in the neighbouring states. The normal tenure gave a quarter or a third to the overlord and left the tenant the rest. But in addition they were protected from bedouin raids, and exempted from military service; and the general prosperity of the interior of the country exceeded anything it had known for some time previously or was to know again until modern times.

It is important to emphasise this point, because so much can be said about the superiority of the Muslim culture which the Latins encountered in the country. It is true that the intellectual level of the courts of the caliphs, as well as their artistic standards and luxurious living, exceeded anything which was to be found in contemporary Europe. And this is not surprising, when it is realised that this high level was the syncretistic inheritance of the Greek, Roman, Hebrew and Persian civilisations which were far older than that of Europe, and that their legacy had much more to do with the society which the crusaders found in Syria than either the Arabs or Islam. But Europe had already passed ahead in its conceptions of government, primitive though they were and still incapable of instilling loyalty and discipline into the feudal nobility itself. The ignorant Frankish baron might gape with amazement at the intellectual subtlety or artistic luxury displayed before him by a Muslim prince; when it came to dealing with his tenants or administering justice to his subjects he had nothing to learn from him. In the end the Latins took back with them to Europe the philosophical, medical, mathematical and other knowledge which they had acquired in Syria, together with many pleasant plants and stuffs. Their Mamluk successors in control of Palestine spread only economic havoc, administrative decay and the destruction of all social order.

The supreme power, as we learn from the Assises of Jerusalem, lay with the council of the greater barons, in whose hands was an elective kingship which, in fact, soon became hereditary. The kingdom contained four great baronies, Ascalon with Jaffa, Sidon, Galilee and Oultre-Jourdain (Kerak and Montreal). The royal demesne consisted of the land around Jerusalem, Nablus, Acre and the port and county of Tyre. In addition to the great baronies should be mentioned the two great military Orders of the Hospitallers and Templars whose power was greater than that of the greatest baron. The service due from the barons included the normal feudal service of military aid, but for a period of a year. In addition the constant need of soldiers led to an extensive use of another form of fief already familiar in Europe. Military service was given in return for a grant by the king, not of lands, but of a rent charge in cash or kind on land. The knights were continually recruited from the richer burghers, and only so could an adequate body of heavy cavalry be maintained. For light

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cavalry, known as Turcopoles, extensive use was made of the native population.


The baronies, great and small, possessed their own courts with a jurisdiction commensurate with their importance, and dependent on the royal court of Jerusalem. The military Orders of the Templars and Hospitallers, however, were completely independent in their courts of both patriarch and king, and depended solely on the pope.

In addition to the baronial courts and, of course, the ecclesiastical courts, there were a variety of courts dealing with the affairs of the burgesses and citizens, whether of western or eastern origin. There were special courts to deal with commercial matters (*La Fonde*) and with maritime matters (*La Chaîne*), and the native Christians had their own courts presided over by special officials called the *Rais* (head, chief). Muslims and Jews continued to exercise their own jurisdiction in religious affairs. Otherwise they enjoyed almost the same rights as native Christians, a position much more favourable than Jews enjoyed in feudal Europe; for it raised them to the same level as the majority of the population, and they were in no way the private property of their rulers.


The terrible losses of 1101 were never made good by subsequent mass immigration from Europe. While there was a constant trickle of men of all classes from peasants and pilgrims to merchants and knights, gradually native-born Franks came to provide the backbone of the Latin population. The first native-born ruler was Baldwin III who became king in 1144. These native-born Franks, together with those who had settled in the country permanently, soon came to consider themselves to be Syrians, and to adopt many of the habits of the country. They built their houses in the Syrian manner; they enjoyed frequent bathing; eastern dress was found more suitable to the climate than western, and they clothed themselves in long flowing robes and the head-dress covering the neck and forehead still familiar in Arab dress (it survives in western heraldry in the mantling attached to the helm in a coat of arms). Many of the chroniclers of the crusades record the speed with which French and other immigrants had acclimatised themselves; and the fact had a great importance for the social life of the country, in that it broke down the barriers between the immigrant and native

groups, led to frequent intermarriage at all levels of society, and created a prosperity which all alike shared. Even religion failed to provide a barrier; the eastern Christians, as will be discussed below, reached a *modus vivendi* with the Latins by some formal act of recognition of the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch; the Muslim farmers, traders and artisans lived in complete harmony with their neighbours; and the fact that the Christian and Arab societies shared many of the same conceptions of chivalry created a bond which tended to bring western and eastern civilisations together even in their warfare. Finally, to increase the prosperity of a land which was itself capable of providing a good living for its agricultural and merchant citizens, a constant flow of money was brought into the country by the piety of western Europeans and the glamour of the Holy Places and the Holy War. The military Orders soon came to be fabulously wealthy; the church of the Holy Sepulchre and other great abbeys and churches possessed property in almost every country of Europe; many of the crusaders themselves, as well as the merchant communities, were scions of rich houses, or citizens of rich cities. In a word, on a background of almost continual warfare and of the continuous threat of war, a fascinating, prosperous, and even vital society was created which had adapted itself to the country as completely as its predecessors in the days of Greece and Rome.

There was, of course, a reverse to this picture. The kingdom possessed serious weaknesses, especially in the authority of the king himself. Had there not been such an able series of monarchs on the throne, it would have fallen to pieces much earlier. King, barons, churchmen, military Orders and Italian merchant colonies all came into existence at the same time, and all were capable of acting without any reference to the others. The king had the main responsibility for defence, but he was by no means the wealthiest figure in his kingdom and his constitutional authority over the different sections of the kingdom was very limited. In the thirteenth century the Orders and the merchant colonies could even conduct their own negotiations with the common enemy, and make peace or war as pleased them, without reference to the wishes of the king. The absence of a strong central authority also encouraged a moral weakness and even degeneration among the Latin element of the population. Prosperity led to quarrels,



JERUSALEM IN THE 12TH CENTURY



and the glamour of the East and the warmth of the climate invited to a seductive luxury.

This weakness was emphasised by the unsatisfactory nature of the religious leadership. In both Antioch and Jerusalem, the crusaders had taken on themselves the authority to elect new patriarchs without reference to Rome, and this meant that throughout the period of the Latin states the most important ecclesiastical dignitaries obtained their positions as a result of local intrigue, and out of the clash and rivalry of local interests. Few of the patriarchs of Jerusalem were even good men; and none were great Christian leaders in any sense of the word. The most eminent Latin Christian of the whole period was William, Archbishop of Tyre, who was also Palestinian born and one of the most important historians of the crusades. Yet he was manoeuvred out of the patriarchate by a scoundrelly and ignorant cleric, Heraclius, who had already obtained the archbishopric of Caesarea because his good looks pleased the queen mother. With such conditions obtaining in the chief office, it is not surprising if there was constant complaint that the clergy were immoral and rapacious. The complaint against their rapacity was, indeed, continuous, in spite of the fact that they were the richest clergy in the world. They extended the system of tithes far beyond what it was in contemporary Europe, and were ever ready to threaten ecclesiastical penalties if they were not paid, but they also had enormous revenues from very extensive properties in Palestine, from gifts from barons and pilgrims, and from property in Europe. They had, of course, considerable special expenses. They were responsible for the maintenance of poor pilgrims, and for the provision of hospitals; and it is fair to add that the care given to the sick excited the admiration of Muslim visitors. In addition they had to provide substantial levies for the defence of the kingdom. Some idea of their wealth can be seen from the fact that while the citizens of Jerusalem, Acre, Tyre, Nablus, Caesarea and the eight major towns provided between them 2275 soldiers, the patriarch, archbishops, bishops and monasteries provided 2750.

The patriarchate contained four archbishoprics (Tyre, Nazareth, Caesarea and Beisan), nine bishoprics and nine mitred abbeys. In Jerusalem were the canons of the Holy Sepulchre (Augustinian), and the abbeys of Mount Zion, the

Valley of Josaphat and Mount Olivet. Outside Jerusalem the main abbeys were at Mount Tabor (Cluniac), St. George de Labeyne between Acre and Safad (Benedictine), St. Joseph of Arimathea and St. Joseph with St. Habbakuk, north east of Lydda (both Premonstratensian). But in addition the patriarchal authority was accepted by a considerable number of native prelates, lauras and monasteries. One of the best sides of its work was its development of good relations with the eastern Churches. The Orthodox Church, on the whole, remained unfriendly, and a rival patriarchate was nominally maintained by Constantinople. This patriarch was not admitted in Jerusalem, as he came to be in Antioch, as the coequal of the Latin. Orthodox clergy however were readmitted to the church of the Holy Sepulchre together with the monophysite and Nestorian Churches. The Armenians were allowed to establish themselves in the south-western corner of Jerusalem, with their church of St. James, and still retain this quarter to-day. The Armenian catholicos took part in Church councils in both Antioch and Jerusalem. Though it may have been due to his personal distinction, Michael the Syrian, the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch, was also held in high honour. Certain Churches returned to communion with Rome during the crusading period, and have remained in communion with her to this day. The most important group was the Maronite Church of the Lebanon which was received in 1181. In 1246 the Orthodox patriarch of Antioch also made his submission; but this and similar acts by other ecclesiastics usually only covered themselves, and possibly their immediate followers.

The policy of friendship with the native Christians was a politic act in which the clergy were following the lead of the kings. Baldwin I brought in Syrian Christians from Transjordan to populate Jerusalem, and all through there was a tendency for Christians under neighbouring Muslim rule to migrate to the Latin colonies. Nevertheless the friendship was fragile; the status of the Syrian Christians was always inferior to that of the Latins; evil and intolerant patriarchs could do much to drive such Christians back into the hands of the Muslims; and the loyalty of the Orthodox was always uncertain. When Edessa fell, many of the Armenian Christians returned gladly to Turkish rule; and there were suspicions that the Orthodox clergy of the Holy Sepulchre were in treasonable correspon-

dence with Saladin to deliver the city into his hands. In dealing with the position of the Church it is impossible to omit reference to the religious military Orders. Started with the best motives and to perform the most valuable functions, their arrogance, exclusiveness and selfishness came to be a disaster for the whole community, and seriously contributed to the final downfall of the kingdom. That they fought bravely until they were killed in the battle of Hattin and the final siege of Acre, when no alternative was open to them, cannot palliate or excuse the extent to which they—or their Masters—had by their previous behaviour brought about those two disasters.

While the Church and the military Orders divided a great part of the wealth which came from land, and abstracted it from the authority of the king, the wealth which came from commerce was even less in his control. The Italian cities of Genoa, Pisa and Venice, each possessed their own quarters in the ports, in which they lived completely separate lives, possessing not only complete freedom from tolls, but obeying only their own consuls and their own courts. Even their churches were independent of the patriarch of Jerusalem.

After the massacres of the early sieges, no attempt was made to displace the indigenous population—except that neither Jews nor Muslims were allowed to dwell in Jerusalem—and a substantial proportion of the subjects of the Latin states were always Muslims. What proportion this was in the kingdom of Jerusalem it is impossible to say. It is possible that many who had only adopted Islam a few generations before the arrival of the Franks returned to the Christian faith. Indeed Baldwin I on his first campaign in the southern regions is said to have been guided by local inhabitants who had recently returned to Christianity from Islam. Moreover the Arab traveller Al Maqdisi who was born in Jerusalem in the second half of the 10th century speaks of the Christians and Jews outnumbering the Muslims even in his day. But in any case the Muslim farmers and peasants must have formed a very substantial proportion of the country population. What facilities they had for religious worship we do not know precisely, but there were no attempts at forcible conversion or interference with their domestic affairs. They were excluded from their sacred shrines of Jerusalem and probably from

other sites on which the Christians had built churches and monasteries. But the Spanish traveller Ibn Jubair, who visited Palestine between 1183 and 1185, reports that in the old mosque of Acre the Muslims had been left a chapel near the tomb of a Muslim prophet, though the rest had become a Christian church, and that in another mosque on the east side of the city the reverse obtained: the Muslims retained the centre and the Christians had a chapel. The same traveller speaks highly of the prosperity of Muslim farmers in Galilee, and the fair treatment of Muslim traders in Acre. He also mentions a Muslim as mayor of one of the towns he passed through between Damascus and Acre. Even the bedouin were included in the general regulation of society, and the wealth of their flocks made them valuable 'possessions'. When the Franks first arrived, the bedouin raids on their communications, as well as on pilgrims between Jaffa and Jerusalem, were one of the main elements of insecurity. The kings of Jerusalem, however, entered into agreements with their sheiks for the security of the roads, and the good behaviour of the tribes under their control. They were allowed to move freely to and from their pastures, and were, in their turn, protected from attacks from without.

Proportionally to their numbers, the Jews probably lost more than any other group on the conquest of the country. They had shared in the resistance offered by the Muslims, but in addition they had made the mistake of flocking into the cities for security. Actually the crusaders had spared the villages, since they needed the food produced, and it was the urban population which was wiped out in the first flush of conquest. In this way the entire Jewries of Jerusalem, Acre, Caesarea and Haifa were destroyed, and those of Ramleh and Jaffa dispersed as refugees, while the village communities of Galilee survived. In the middle of the 12th century the community began to revive, but the numbers remained small. When the Spanish traveller Benjamin of Tudela visited the country in about 1165 he found the 'Academy of Jerusalem' established at Damascus, and the Jewish population of that city considerably larger than that of the whole of Palestine. The intellectual centre during the crusading period seems to have been first at Tyre, which had the largest community (400 families), then at Acre; and in the latter city some semblance of an academy was revived during the 13th

century. The main occupation of the Jews seems to have been dyeing, in which they were so expert that Jewish dyers were even allowed to return and live in Jerusalem in close proximity to the royal palace situated in the Tower of David. Other occupations were glass making, shipping, and peddling. A few of the more prosperous Jews are mentioned as bankers or physicians to the barons. Apart from the rabbanite Jews there were small Karaite settlements, and the Karaites were allowed to stay in Jerusalem by the Christians on the grounds that they had had no share in the guilt of the crucifixion. Though no Latin chronicler mentions the Samaritans, Benjamin of Tudela tells us that there were at least three settlements in the country, the largest at Ascalon, the others at Caesarea and Nablus. The importance of the cities on the coast gradually caused a shift back in the Jewish population; and this was maintained in the 13th century when Jews who came from Europe seem on the whole to have settled in the Christian rather than the Muslim part of the country, a tribute to the status which they enjoyed in the Latin social structure.

The society created by the Franks in Syria was thus one possessing many points of interest. It was for external reasons, rather than because of the undoubted internal corruption and decadence, that it existed throughout on a curiously fragile and unstable basis, which enabled it to endure as a reality but for a century, and as a phantom for a century more. To have survived longer it would have needed a more mature understanding of its situation than was likely in its age. The Latin kingdoms never realised that to secure a safe land connection through Byzantine territory was an essential life-line for themselves; and the Byzantines in their turn never realised the extent to which their own survival depended on the Latin kingdoms. Had they made use of the military strength and vitality of the Latins to the full, the Turks should never have ruled a wide European empire from Constantinople. There were thus two essentials on which alone the Christian possession of the Syrian littoral could be permanent, and the Franks secured neither. It was not the expression of a united Christendom; for between it and its western bases lay the half-hostile and always suspicious Byzantine empire; but also it too often failed even to present a united front, much less a united strategy, to Islam. In such circumstances its survival

could be measured by the time required by a powerful Muslim prince to gather sufficient forces against it.

Forty years before the first crusade the final schism between Rome and Constantinople had taken place. Into the responsibilities of Pope Leo IX and the Patriarch Michael Cerularius we need not enter, except to note that the political ambitions of the patriarchs, and their refusal to recognise any superior, made the healing of the breach impossible, and therefore deprived the eastern empire of the possibility of the full support of the West. The religious breach unfortunately occurred simultaneously with a political breach caused by the Norman conquests of Byzantine territory in Italy; and it is not surprising if the reception of Bohemond as a crusader was somewhat cold, when this same Bohemond had but a short time previously been openly conducting war against the Byzantine territories of Greece itself. With the ecclesiastical leaders of the crusading movement not anxious to help the Byzantines, and with the Byzantines unwilling to help their Norman enemies or the allies of the latter, the subsequent tragedies are easy to foresee. The Byzantines were relatively indifferent to the destruction of crusading manpower by the Turks; and the Normans at least were as ready to attack Byzantine territory as Turkish.

Such was the situation when the crusading movement opened, and it continued in this state until the reign of the Byzantine Emperor John Comnenus (1118-1143). John was a vigorous and warlike ruler, who spent his life in the camp. But after he had successfully defeated the Seljuk kingdoms of Asia Minor, instead of driving them right out of this territory and permanently reclaiming it for Christendom, he left them only half-weakened and turned on the Christian kingdom of Cilicia. When he had compelled that to accept his authority, he moved south against Antioch in 1137, just at the moment when the prince of Antioch, Raymund of Poitiers, was absent fighting the Turks. By the statesmanship of Fulk of Anjou, king of Jerusalem, Raymund recognised the overlordship of the Byzantine emperor, and a combined Latin and Byzantine army set out to attack the real enemy. But the lack of mutual confidence prevented the expedition from being successful. Both Fulk and John Comnenus died in 1143. Fulk's son, Baldwin III (1143-1162) was still a minor when the Turks captured Edessa in 1144. The shock this disappearance of a

Latin state caused in the West led to the second crusade, under the Emperor Conrad III. The successor of John Comnenus, Manuel (1143-1180), was much more anxious to develop close relations with the western empire than his predecessors, not only because he much admired western chivalry, but because he hoped the western emperor would aid him against their common enemy, the Normans. Instead, Conrad led a crusading army to the East, leaving the Normans to continue to reduce Manuel's empire; but the failure of the crusade compelled closer relations between Byzantium and the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. Manuel permitted Baldwin III to marry his niece, Theodora, and agreed with him to a campaign against the Turks, which, like previous common ventures, came to nothing. Baldwin's brother and successor, Amaury I, continued his policy and married another relative of Manuel, with whom in 1167 he planned a common campaign in Egypt, where the Fatimids were in a state of dissolution. But this campaign shared the fate of all such attempts at a common enterprise; and when Manuel offered to renew it ten years later the Latins refused. At home the constant good relations which Manuel had had with the West had only increased the hostility of his Greek subjects. Two years after his death, in 1182, there was a terrible massacre of the Latins in Constantinople. So wide had become the breach between the two branches of Christendom that of his successors, Andronicus (1180-1183) actually concluded an alliance with Saladin for the division of the Latin states, and Isaac Angelus (1185-1195) plotted with him for the discomfiture of the third crusade immediately after the fall of Jerusalem.

The second reason for the failure of the crusading movement was that such treason was not foreign to the crusaders themselves. In 1108, less than ten years after the capture of Jerusalem, a civil war broke out between Tancred, prince of Antioch, and Baldwin, count of Edessa, and each side was aided by a different Seljuk prince against the other. Even graver was the long story of treachery, avarice and selfishness which marked the career of Renaud of Chatillon, and directly provoked the attack of Saladin in 1187 which brought about the fall of Jerusalem. At no time could the Latin king wholly rely on the loyalty of all his nominal vassals; and when in Jerusalem itself there was a disputed succession or a regency, personal ambitions

; were very likely to prevail over loyalty to the cause of the Latin kingdom and Christianity.

Because of the insecurity of overland communications with Europe through Byzantine territory, the sea ports came to assume an even greater importance than would, in any case, have been theirs. Owing to the treachery of Raymund de St. Gilles before Ascalon, the Franks possessed at first only Jaffa, which they had obtained with the aid of the Pisan fleet. Their further conquests depended on the visits of fleets from various sources. Haifa fell in 1100 (Venetians), Arsuf and Caesarea in 1101 (Genoese). Acre was captured in 1104 (Genoese), and in 1109 Tripoli (Genoese). In 1110 Beirut fell (Genoese), and, with the aid of a Norwegian fleet, Sidon also was captured. Tyre did not fall till 1124 (Venetians). When finally Ascalon fell in 1153 the Franks possessed the whole sea coast, and the Muslims had no port nearer than Egypt from which Christian shipping could be attacked. Nevertheless none of these ports was much more than a day's march from the Muslim frontier on the east. The great chain of inland cities, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, remained impregnable; the only policy possible was therefore to seek to keep them divided and at war with each other. Only in the south did the Christian territory extend across the Jordan valley line. There the possession of the Lordship of Oultre-Jourdain assured a valuable control of the route to Egypt for both armies and caravans, and even a stretch of the pilgrim road to Mecca. The control was never complete, for the territory was large and thinly held. But it made it difficult for Syria and Egypt to help each other against the Franks.

When the crusaders first arrived, Syria was completely divided between the heirs of Malikshah, and it was from the Fatimids of Egypt that the counter-attack came. This was defeated in almost annual campaigns between 1100 and 1107. Interest then turned to Syria, and the obvious policy of the kingdom of Jerusalem was to keep the different city states divided by allying with, or at least supporting, the nearer Damascus against enemies from the north or east.

That Baldwin I had done his work well in consolidating
• the kingdom and especially in asserting his authority over the northern Latin states, was dramatically shown in the reign of his successor Baldwin II (1118-1131). In 1119 Roger

of Antioch was killed in battle, leaving Baldwin to administer the principality for a minor; in 1123 Joscelin of Edessa was taken prisoner, and in the following year, Baldwin, campaigning in the north, was also captured. The three major states were thus simultaneously deprived of their leaders. Yet the kingdom survived this test; and when Baldwin was released the following year, he found that his regent, Eustace Garnier, had been able to take advantage of the presence of a Venetian fleet to capture Tyre.

It was in the reign of Baldwin II that the weapon was forged which was gradually to provide the Latin states with the equivalent of a standing army. In the reconstruction following the reign of al-Hakim the merchants of Amalfi had built and endowed a hospital at Jerusalem. Under its Master, Raymund of Puy, it added to the task of caring for sick pilgrims that of defending the Christian faith. Raymund secured permission for the creation of a military Order to be attached to the hospital, and this soon came to overshadow its former work. In this action he was following (or even anticipating) *the action of a group of knights banded together under Hugh de Payne and Godfrey de St. Omer* to defend pilgrims on the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem. While the Hospitallers remained in their quarters south of the church of the Holy Sepulchre (the Muristan), the other group was given quarters in the Mosque of Aksa, known to the Franks as the Temple of Solomon. They thus came to be called the Templars. These two Orders captured the imagination of Europe, and gifts poured into their coffers. They were never a charge on the king of Jerusalem. On the other hand, their wealth became not only a temptation to their neighbours, but a serious cause of moral decline in themselves. The quarrels between the two arrogant Masters contributed not a little to the collapse of the kingdom, and the fatal advice of the Master of the Temple led directly to the disastrous defeat of Hattin.

The most valuable contribution of the Orders was the garrisoning of the country with a series of castles, some of which remain to-day as the most magnificent and complete examples of feudal military art. Their main castles were Le Crac des Chevaliers and Margat (Hospitallers) and Tortosa (Templars). All these were in the north, but within the kingdom the Templars guarded Gaza (Gadres), and next to them the Hospitallers held Ascalon with an outlying castle at Beth

Gibelin (Beit Jibrin). Further north the Templars held Latrun (Le Thoron des Chevaliers) while the Hospitallers held the heights above it at Abu Ghosh (The Spring of Emmaus). In the northern part of the country the Templars later had a ring of castles round Athlit (Chateau des Pelerins), including one on Mount Carmel (chateau de Ste. Margaret), while on the Jordan the Hospitallers from their castle at Beauvoir commanded the bridge below the lake of Tiberias at Jisr al Majami, and (during its short existence) the Templars guarded the northern bridge of Jacob's Ford from the castle of Le Chatelet. After the fall of Jerusalem the German crusaders created an Order of Teutonic Knights, similar to the two Orders already existing and almost wholly French; and from their headquarters at Acre, built a ring of castles in western Galilee, of which the chief was Starkenberg (Montfort).

When Baldwin II died in 1131 the throne passed to his son-in-law Fulk of Anjou (1131-1143), grandfather of the English king Henry II. Fulk was an equally vigorous and warlike ruler, and needed all his skill to contend with a new and more dangerous situation on his eastern frontier. In 1127 Zangi, son of a slave of Malikshah, had become atabeg of Mosul, and shortly afterwards conquered Aleppo and began to move southwards. But Zangi was not only a successful soldier; he was a deeply religious man, and succeeded in infusing into the Syrian Muslims the idea of a Holy War to expel the Christian Franks from the territory of Islam. It was during the reign of Fulk that John Comnenus moved against Antioch, and it speaks well for his statesmanship that he was able to persuade the Byzantine emperor instead to join him against Zangi. The campaign, as already related, was a failure, and Fulk found it more useful to ally himself again with Damascus. But before any decision could be reached, he was accidentally killed while hunting. Zangi immediately took advantage of the fact that his son, Baldwin III, was still a minor, and that the regent was a woman, to descend on Edessa. The place was poorly manned and fell into his hands after a short siege. Zangi massacred the Latins, but spared the eastern Christians, and won many of them to his side. The loss of Edessa was the signal for the second crusade, led by the Emperor Conrad III and Louis VII of France. These two monarchs agreed no better than any other rival chiefs

of crusades, with the result that each lost most of his men in separate defeats by the Seljuk Turks of Asia Minor, and arrived in 1148 with very diminished forces in the Latin states. There, instead of making an attack in the north, they decided to seize the friendly city of Damascus, but failed even in that enterprise. The defeat of two of the most powerful monarchs of Europe by a minor Muslim amir had an ill effect on the reputation of the Franks; and their return to the west was watched with as much satisfaction by the barons of the Latin states as by the Muslims.

In 1152 Baldwin assumed control of affairs after a short conflict with his mother who was unwilling to surrender power. He proved a wise and vigorous ruler. Realising the strength of the Turks, now ruled by Nur ad-Din, son of Zangi (1146-1174) he took three important steps to consolidate his position. He succeeded at last in securing his southern frontier by taking Ascalon; he married the niece of the Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus, and he renewed the alliance with Damascus. But the attempt to get the Byzantines to co-operate in a military campaign was unsuccessful; and he died, poisoned by his doctor, in 1158 without having inflicted any decisive defeat on Nur ad-Din. He was succeeded by his brother Amaury (1162-1173), who continued his policy, but tried to implement it in another direction. The Fatimids of Egypt were by this time in complete decline, and it seemed a reasonable plan to invade Egypt and so secure a flank for the Latin states which would at the same time cut the Muslim world in two. Amaury had the advantage that by the possession of Oultre-Jourdain, which reached right down to Akaba, he could nominally prevent Nur ad-Din from either coming to the rescue of the Fatimids or supplanting them; and for some time his policy looked like succeeding. Egypt actually paid him tribute and acknowledged his suzerainty in 1167 and 1168. But in fact the forces at the disposal of Nur ad-Din, who had become master of Damascus in 1154, were far greater than those available to Amaury. Not only was all Syria now united against the Franks but Shirkuh, his able general, succeeded in passing through Latin territory and made himself vizir of Egypt on behalf of his master. When he died in 1170 he was succeeded by the son of his brother Ayyub, Salah ad-Din, known to the western world as Saladin. Four years later Nur ad-Din died, and Saladin gradually extended his rule over

Syria as well as Egypt, until the whole of the land frontier of the Latin states was in his hands. The end could then be only a matter of time.

So long as Baldwin IV (1173-1185), son of Amaury, lived that end was averted; for Baldwin was at once the noblest and saddest figure of the story of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. As a child he gave every promise of excellence, in character, intelligence and physical strength; but at the age of nine he was found to be a leper. His father died when he was thirteen, and at fourteen, though officially under the regency of Raymund III of Tripoli, he was already successfully leading his armies against Saladin. Almost all his life, until his death at the age of twenty-four, was spent in the constant checkmating of his attacks. Even when his disease had so far advanced that he was blind and helpless, and had to be carried into battle, the mere sight of his stretcher amidst his meagre troops was enough to cause Saladin to beat a hasty retreat. But the courage and endurance of a leper, who was also little more than a child, could not at the same time deal with the intrigues of the court, the irresponsible selfishness of women like his sisters Sibyl and Isabella, and robber barons like Renaud of Chatillon. Just as Renaud owed his dominions to the fact that a silly girl, who happened to be the heiress of the prince of Antioch, cared only for a pretty lover and so handed over one of the most important of the Latin states to the evil genius whose gangsterism provoked the final invasion of Saladin, so now Sibyl, sister of the heroic Baldwin, rejecting the necessarily political proposals of her advisers, chose as future king of Jerusalem another pretty boy, Guy de Lusignan. Once Baldwin was dead Sibyl crowned her husband king. His arrogance and incompetence, backed by all that was selfish in the realm, threw into the arms of Saladin the whole military strength of the kingdom on the fatal day of the Horns of Hattin. On July 3, 1187, against the advice of Raymund and the more experienced barons, Guy insisted on the army marching across the completely dry and waterless hills of Galilee in the height of the summer heat, to be cut down as it fainted with thirst and exhaustion by the soldiers of Saladin, waiting for it by the refreshing waters of the Lake of Tiberias. The military Orders were all but completely annihilated; the trained knights and foot soldiers were utterly destroyed; and the cities and castles of the kingdom lay entirely open to the

conqueror. Acre, Jaffa and Beirut had fallen by the middle of August. On September 5 it was the turn of Ascalon; and on the 20th Saladin appeared before Jerusalem. It surrendered on the second of October; and the generous conduct of Saladin stands out in noble contrast, not only to the actions of the crusaders when they had first taken the city a hundred years earlier, but even more to the avarice and selfishness shown by the patriarch and the Temple and the Hospital, none of whom would disgorge their treasures to pay the modest ransom Saladin demanded for the Latin poor. In the end the conqueror not only relinquished a large proportion of the ransom due, but escorted them at their choice either to Egypt, or to the Latin territories of the north. The Italian merchants were to take back to Europe those who chose the former alternative; and here again the clemency of Saladin stands in noble contrast to the conduct of the Christians. The Genoese, Pisans and Venetians had to be compelled, under the threat of never being allowed to trade again with Egypt, to give the refugees a passage home. And even then the officers of Saladin had to make the captains personally responsible with their lives for their safe delivery; for it was discovered that they intended simply to dump them on some desert shore of Africa. Those refugees who were taken to the Tripolitan territories still in the hands of the Latins found as little sympathy as those in Egypt, and were cruelly exploited by their fellow-Christians.

Although from 1187 onwards, there was a Muslim as well as a Christian government within the territory of Palestine, it will be more convenient to follow through the history of the Christian kingdom first, leaving the story of the Ayyubids and Mamluks for the following chapter.

After the disaster of the Horns of Hattin the Latin territory was reduced to the mountain fortresses of the Orders in Tripoli and Antioch, and the coast towns of Tyre, Tripoli, Tortosa and Antioch, together with narrow strips of land around them. That these also did not fall was largely due to the arrival in July, 1187, of Conrad of Montferrat. He put new heart into the Franks and organised the defence of Tyre, of which city he was recognised as prince. One of his first actions was to send his archbishop, Joscius, successor of William of Tyre, to western Europe to appeal for help. The appeal fell on fruitful ground. In May, 1189, the emperor himself,

Frederick Barbarossa, set out with one of the largest and best disciplined armies that had ever taken part in a crusade. The complete breakdown of the religious fellowship between Byzantium and Rome is shown by the fact that the first news Saladin received of the coming of this force was from the Byzantine emperor, Isaac Angelus. Frederick crossed Asia Minor safely; but was then drowned while crossing a small river in Cilicia. His death led to the disintegration of his army, which his son was too incompetent to lead or even control. Only small fragments ever reached the Latin colonies. In 1189, however, Guy de Lusignan, who had been released by Saladin, revealed the possession of considerable courage and audacity by gathering a force to besiege Acre; and while the siege was still in progress, fresh reinforcements arrived from the west under the kings of France and England, Philip Augustus and Richard I. The two kings actually collaborated sufficiently to ensure the capture of Acre. But Philip thereupon went home. Richard stayed behind and, deprived of the political wisdom of the French king, proceeded to kill all the Muslim prisoners in Acre, to the number of three thousand, although Saladin was ready to ransom them. This act of savage folly naturally put an end to the chivalrous fashion in which Saladin had thus far treated Christians who fell into his hands. Richard remained fifteen months in the country, performing acts of prodigious and usually futile valour along the coast. But he was unable to invest Jerusalem, though it remained open to all Christian pilgrims. In September 1192 peace was made on the basis of the status quo, after Richard had somewhat naïvely suggested that his sister might marry the brother of Saladin, and the couple receive Jerusalem as a dowry.

Saladin died in 1193 and there was the usual division of his empire among his sons, none of whom inherited his genius. Among the Latins a rapid succession of nominal kings of Jerusalem assured the existing colonies but was unable to regain anything of what had been lost save a number of towns of which the most important were Beirut, Sidon, Lydda and Ramleh. In 1204 a fresh crusade set out from Europe; but under Venetian inspiration it diverted itself to the conquest of Constantinople, and established a Latin empire there. For the next sixty years western European adventurers spent their time in the Balkans instead of in Syria, and in embittering

still further relations between the eastern and western Churches instead of regaining Jerusalem. Moreover the very word crusade had become debased. Every attack on the pope's enemies was a crusade; every suppression of popular discontent was a crusade; every device for raising cash for the papal coffers was justified by a crusading purpose. At this moment the whole story of the crusading movement received its most poignant and most tragic expression. This word, bandied about continually by the princes and ecclesiastics, was seized upon by children. In 1212 two movements took place simultaneously, though we know nothing of any link between them. In northern France a shepherd boy summoned children to go with him 'to God'. It seems evident that it was a crusade to the Holy Land he had in mind, but actually this group got no further than Paris, where the children were persuaded to go home. The other movement started in the Rhineland, and was more mixed. Men and women joined under the leadership of a boy, and actually made their way as far as the Italian ports. In their wanderings thither many died or were murdered, many fell by the wayside. But some reached the ports, and finding no shipping which would take them pressed on to Rome. There the pope absolved them from their vow—or its immediate fulfilment—and they straggled miserably home. Only a few reached Germany, and a few may later have reached Palestine. The story was much exaggerated by later chroniclers, and there seems no reason to believe it true that many did sail and were sold as slaves in the market of Alexandria by the scoundrelly shipowners. Yet it was a pathetic and moving adventure, and it would have been well if it had proved the end of the crusading movement.

It did not do so; and in 1217 a fresh army arrived from Europe under the king of Hungary and the duke of Austria. That they arrived quarrelling scarcely needs to be said. The Hungarian king, following the usual precedent, returned home almost immediately; the duke remained until the arrival of some considerable bands from France enabled John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem by virtue of his marriage with Marie, grand-daughter of Amaury I, to plan an invasion of Egypt. The conquest of Damietta was sufficient to make the Egyptian sultan offer to exchange it for Jerusalem. But at this moment a papal legate, Pelagius, arrived to take command and, in opposition to the opinion of John and the whole

Palestinian barony, he refused to consider the exchange. Insisting on his absolute authority he led the army to complete disaster among the tortuous channels of the Nile. The unfortunate soldiers were only saved from starvation by the generosity of Saladin's nephew, al-Kamil, sultan of Egypt, who both fed and evacuated them.

In 1225 John of Brienne married his daughter to the young emperor, Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Frederick was one of the most brilliant and unusual characters of the 13th century, a German king who lived in Sicily, and had more contacts with Islam than with Christianity. This marriage shifted the emphasis, which had hitherto lain with France, to Germany as the European base of the Latin kingdom. Frederick had, for years, been bullied by the pope to undertake a crusade and rescue Jerusalem; he had long refused the papal demand, but in 1226 an admirable opportunity appeared to exist for him to play the diplomatic game which he most enjoyed, and to obtain the ambition of a crusader without fighting. In the struggle between the heirs of Saladin who ruled at Damascus and Cairo the former appealed for help to the leader of a new horde of Turkish tribes which had just appeared in the east, the Khwarizmians. Fearful of the consequences of a Khwarizmian invasion, the sultan of Cairo, al-Kamil, already a friend of Frederick, appealed to him for help, and offered him Jerusalem in exchange. Unfortunately Frederick delayed his acceptance too long, and this delay was doubly fatal. For the pope excommunicated him for not starting; and the sultan of Damascus died, leaving a small son of whom al-Kamil had no fears, so that al-Kamil had no need of him. Nevertheless in 1228 Frederick set out and, on landing in Cyprus, at once involved himself in a conflict with the Palestinian barons by acting as an autocratic monarch and refusing to recognise the customs of the kingdom of Jerusalem. However, he finally arrived at Acre, where his mere presence was embarrassing to al-Kamil; for there was always the danger that he might side with the infant monarch of Damascus. So, though Frederick had no soldiers with him, al-Kamil handed over in February 1229 by the treaty of Jaffa, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth and the seigneurie of Thoron in the Lebanon. Frederick was now in an embarrassing position himself. For he had gained his objective, but he was still excommunicated; neither the military Orders nor the

clergy would have anything to do with him; and the pope supported them in rejecting the peaceable surrender of what he had excommunicated Frederick for not attempting to obtain by force. Frederick had finally to crown himself in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, in a city under an interdict, and without the presence of any but his own lay followers. The treaty of Jaffa allowed the Muslims, under a local judge, to retain the Haram ash-Sharif, including both the Dome of the Rock and the Mosque of Aksa, though Christians might enter the area to pray. It was thus to be a Holy City for both faiths, and the treaty made no arrangements for its refortification. After a day or two at Jerusalem, Frederick returned to Acre, where he found almost civil war between his German followers and the local Franks. Disgusted at the whole situation, in May he returned to Europe—narrowly escaping being lynched by the crowd as he departed. But the governors he left behind involved the country in continuous disputes until 1243. The departure of the imperial troops in that year left Palestine a congeries of communities, some baronial and some municipal, but without any centre or central authority. The crown was vested in the Holy Roman Emperor, who was an absentee king, and whose governor was not recognised by his nominal subjects.

Even before the final departure of the imperial troops, the arrival of a number of French barons with Thibaut of Champagne in 1239 proved sufficient for the quarrelling sultans of Cairo and Damascus to offer further concessions to the Latins in return for non-intervention. The loss of Jerusalem in that year (when the peace of Jaffa expired, and it was seized by the Muslim lord of Kerak) was compensated by the concession of Ascalon and Galilee. Jerusalem itself was regained for a brief while but in 1243 the whole country was raided by Khwarizmian Turks, whose inroad into history lasted barely forty years, but forty years of pillage and destruction. Before they were finally annihilated in 1247, after successive battles against the Egyptians in the neighbourhood of Damascus, they sacked Jerusalem, massacring all the Christians who remained, and looting the church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The following year, 1248, Louis IX, supposedly the ideal crusading figure, arrived in Cyprus with a considerable force. He decided to begin operations in Egypt, but his inability to discipline his brother led to a defeat and massacre as

obviously inevitable and unnecessary as that which overwhelmed his predecessor, the legate Pelagius. For Louis also could have received Jerusalem in exchange, once he had seized the port of Damietta; whereas after his defeat he had to surrender Damietta as his personal ransom, and find half a million livres tournois to ransom the fever-stricken remnants of his armies. This he could only do by seizing the coffers of the Templars, who, true to their tradition, had refused to lend the ransom voluntarily. In 1250 he could again have received Jerusalem in return for an alliance with the Mamluks of Egypt against the descendants of Saladin in Damascus; but before he could decide, the rulers of Baghdad succeeded in reconciling the two in face of advancing hordes of Mongols. Louis remained in Acre until 1254, but the quarrels which he managed to quell by his presence—humbling even the arrogance of the Templars—broke out again as soon as he departed. This time the main trouble lay between the Genoese and Venetian merchants, and amounted almost to civil war throughout the remaining Latin colonies. In 1260 the Mongols arrived in Syria. As many of them professed a crude form of Nestorian Christianity, the citizens of Antioch and the Armenians joined them in the pillage of Damascus and other Muslim cities. Acre, on the other hand, allied with the Mamluk sultan Baibars (1260-1277), who succeeded in annihilating them in Galilee. After his victory he showed no gratitude to the Christians for their aid; in 1263 he destroyed the church of Nazareth, and in 1265 he began the systematic elimination, accompanied by ruthless massacres, of their remaining castles and cities. In 1271, however, the last of the crusaders, Prince Edward, the future Edward I of England, arrived at Acre and obtained from him a ten years' truce—ten years which the Latins spent in renewing their civil war. In 1289 Qalaun (1279-1290), successor of Baibars, renewed his campaign with the siege of Tripoli. On his arrival the Genoese and Venetian merchants, whose avaricious quarrels had prevented the Christians from using the previous breathing space for strengthening their defences, forthwith packed themselves and their wealth into their ships at night and fled, leaving the rest of the population to their fate. In 1291 Al-Ashraf Khalil (1290-1293) began the final attack on Acre. When it fell on May 18 the other cities surrendered without fighting, and the Latins were allowed to evacuate all for

whom they had ships. The last spot on Syrian soil in their possession was the island of Ruad off Tortosa, from which they were driven in 1303. With this evacuation an enterprise, which might have done much to build a permanent bridge between East and West, ended unhonoured and unlamented, leaving behind it nothing of which Christendom could be proud.

PALESTINE UNDER THE MAMLUKS

DURING THE TWO CENTURIES in which the main interest had been the contacts of Palestine with the West, a complete change had taken place in the Christian and Islamic world around it. The last relics of Arab predominance in the political life of Islam had passed into oblivion before the Latins had passed from Acre; and the comments of European pilgrims suggest a contrast between the tolerance and urbanity of the Arabs and the roughness and cruelty of their Turkish successors. The empire of the Seljuks, which had once stretched over almost all the territories of the eastern caliphate, was reduced to the small sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor. Baghdad, the creation and seat of the Abbasid caliphs, had been sacked by the Mongol Hulagu in 1258, and the caliph al-Mustasim together with thousands of his followers murdered. The city itself had ceased to be the metropolis of an independent sovereign, and had become a mere provincial capital in a Mongol empire whose centre lay further east in Persia. During the 13th century even the survival of Islam in those regions appeared uncertain, for some of the Mongol conquerors professed a primitive form of Nestorian Christianity. In Egypt the Shiite caliphate of the Fatimids had passed with the collapse of the Fatimids themselves; and Syria and Egypt had been united under the Sunni orthodoxy first of the Ayyubids and then of the Mamluks. A shadowy Abbasid caliphate had come into existence in Cairo to replace the almost equally shadowy figure of the murdered leader of Baghdad. Finally in eastern Christendom a short-lived Latin empire had arisen in Constantinople in 1204 out of the criminal diversion of the fourth crusade to the conquest of that city. The Greek emperor of Nicaea had returned in 1261, but the combined powers of the Byzantine empires of Nicaea-Constantinople and a rival which had come into existence at Trebizond were insufficient to constitute a threat to the Islamic hold on Syria.

The new picture is of a Mongol power stretching from the borders of China to the borders of Syria, where the Mamluks

hold it at bay, while behind the scenes a new Turkish tribe, the Osmanli or Ottomans, are gathering their forces to attack, first the Seljuks of Rum, then the Mongols, and finally the Byzantines and Mamluks, and so to establish a new and secure Muslim dynasty over most of the territories of the caliphate. But if the names have changed, nothing else is new in the political picture. Turk, Mongol and Mamluk showed no greater capacity to organise and administer their territories than Arab and Seljuk. It has already been pointed out that, while Europe learnt much from her contact with the Arab world in fields where the latter was pre-eminent, the reverse is not true. In spite of the constant warfare of the Latin states, commerce and agriculture flourished; justice was administered in a hundred baronial and commercial courts; Syrian Christian, Jewish and Muslim peasants went about their business in safety. All this decayed when the Franks were expelled. Its disappearance is all the more curious in that there is no lack of noble figures among the Mongol, Turkish and other rulers of Islam. There are many of whom it is recorded that they built and endowed schools and hospitals, that they made roads, irrigated land and provided water supplies for cities, that they favoured scholars and artists, and ruled justly and wisely. But that ever-widening decentralisation of culture and responsibility which is the hall mark of a creative society they never achieved. While a sultan or an amir might by his own interests and efforts create and endow great public works, in Europe such work was being done by a thousand nameless churchmen and barons, guilds and communities; so that, whereas in Muslim lands it is necessary to go to capital cities or religious centres to see their architecture, their buildings and their planning, in Europe churches and schools and hospitals, as splendid as those of the cities of the princes, are to be found scattered through innumerable medieval towns and villages; while among the hills and dales, the forests and swamps which had covered the greater part of northern Europe at the time when Arab civilisation was at its highest, now ten thousand monasteries and even manors were not only diffusing religion and education, but were draining and clearing, planting and tilling, and building up the agricultural riches of innumerable peasant communities.

The Ayyubid dynasty which Saladin founded lasted for little more than fifty years after his death. One branch ruled

in Cairo, another in Damascus, and others elsewhere, and there was perpetual conflict between them. Al-Kamil, nephew of Saladin and friend of Frederick II, died in 1238. His son, as-Salih Ayyab, died while Louis IX was besieging Damietta, but his widow took power into her own hands, and ruled alone until her amirs elected one of their number to the throne. Then she married and later murdered him. This amir, Aybak, was the first of the line of Mamluk sultans.

The word Mamluk means slave, and the incredible series of rulers who held Egypt and Syria intact for over two hundred and fifty years, repelled the successive invasions of the Mongols, wrote *finis* to the Latin colonies, and made of Cairo one of the most beautiful medieval cities in the world, were all foreign slaves, first mostly Turkish, then mostly Circassian. Forty-seven of them succeeded to the throne in 267 years, making an average reign of less than six. Only in the one case of the Qalaunids did power remain in one family for four generations. An-Nasir, son of Qalaun, came to the throne at the age of nine in 1293 and ruled (with two intervals of usurpation) for forty-seven years. But in the twenty-one years from 1340 to 1361 eight sons succeeded him one after another. Some of the Mamluk sultans were insane, some even illiterate; among the Circassians many were figureheads set up for their own purpose by their amirs; they came to the throne by intrigue and assassination and by intrigue and assassination they perished. It has been calculated that the population of Egypt, Palestine and Syria when the Osmanli finally replaced them in 1517 may have been reduced to one-third of what it was in 1250 when their rule began. And yet they held the frontiers intact and beautified their capital cities with hundreds of mosques and colleges.

Only a few of these many rulers were of sufficient importance to warrant special mention, and in the history of Palestine there is only one, Baibars (1260-1277), who began the final conquest of the Latin seaports and the castles of the Orders. He has left a name in Muslim legend as high as that of Harun al-Rashid and Saladin, renowned for his conquests, his patronage of learning and his piety.

The Latin states disposed of by his successor Qalaun and the latter's son al-Ashraf Khalil, there were only two foreign powers with which the Mamluks had to cope, the Mongols and the Christian West. The Mongols were defeated in three

successive campaigns. Their farthest penetration was to Ain Jalud, between Nazareth and Beisan, where the forces of Hulagu were defeated in 1260, mainly through the generalship of Baibars. Qalaun defeated them again in northern Syria in 1280, and in 1303, after they had sacked Damascus, they were finally overthrown at the battle of Shaqhab south of the city. Tamerlane a hundred years later never challenged the Mamluks to battle; for after a lightning raid on Damascus, from which he carried off many of the best artisans of the city, he returned at once to the east and died shortly afterwards on his way to invade China.

Apart from the Mongols there was no power strong enough to challenge the northern frontiers of the Mamluks. Nevertheless, it was the one which most needed guarding, for there was no possibility of attack from the south or west. This fact posed a difficult problem; for it was also the frontier most distant from Cairo; if, then, the sultan put it into the hands of his ablest servant, and gave him an adequate army for its defence, he was tempting him to rebellion; but if he was incompetent and master of only small forces, he was inviting invasion. The solution was twofold; the command of a district and the command of its citadel were put into different hands, except where (as in so many cases) the citadels and castles had been destroyed; and the governors were changed frequently. As to Jerusalem, it became the chief city of a prefecture under the authority of Damascus until 1373; only after that date did it rank in importance with the three capitals of Safad, Gaza, and that across the Jordan at Kerak. The changes of governors and areas had ill effects on the population, for insecurity of tenure meant an increased impetus to the quickest possible exaction of all the wealth that could be collected by taxes and other means from the unfortunate cities and peasants.

With the Christian West the Mamluks were only rarely involved in military occupations, although Peter I, king of Cyprus (1359-1369), did attempt to arouse Europe to a new crusade. Failing to get any adequate response he gathered enough forces to sack Alexandria in 1365, and in 1367 he ravaged the already desolate coasts of Palestine and Syria. In revenge the Mamluks closed the church of the Holy Sepulchre for five years; and many Christians, including all the Franciscans of Mount Zion, perished in prison. Otherwise, he achieved nothing. For, with such an eventuality in mind, the Mamluks

had destroyed the coastal cities as they captured them, and had created in the rich coastlands a desert much of which remained until the end of the 19th century. The real issue was not war, but trade; for a very important part of the revenue wherewith they purchased slaves for their armies, and built their mosques, schools, hospitals and palaces, came from the fact that in Mamluk hands lay Alexandria and all the other ports at which European traders might acquire the merchandise of the East, especially the pepper and spices which were eagerly sought after to make dried, salted and tainted meat more palatable. For fifty years after the fall of Acre, papal policy was directed towards the cessation of this trade. It was commonly recognised that, unless the Mamluks could be considerably weakened, any attempt to recover the Holy Land by force was chimaerical. For the European trade not only provided immense revenues, but many of the deficiencies of Egypt were normally made good from Europe and provided the basis of exchange with the produce of the East. Egypt possessed no iron wherewith to make weapons, no wood for ships, and needed even to import food. If these supplies could be cut, the advantage would be obvious. For with neither iron nor wood, nor money to buy slaves, nor adequate food, the Mamluks would wholly lack the sinews of war. But at best the papacy secured temporary and partial successes; the desire for wealth was too strong, and not only were the Italian cities, Venice, Pisa and Genoa, impossible permanently to coerce, but Barcelona, Marseilles, Ragusa, and other ports of the Mediterranean were beginning to adventure into the field, while great merchants of the north like Jacques Coeur of Bourges were making immense fortunes from their dealings with the Levant.

When both sides were anxious, for their own advantage, to see that trade continued uninterrupted, the results are easy to foresee. The demands of the papacy met with scant regard, until the popes too found that the most profitable thing to do was to license, for enormous fees, exceptions to their own prohibitions; the apostles of crusading such as Peter of Cyprus and his minister, Philippe de Mezières, were regarded as nuisances; Christian kings gladly made treaties with the Mamluk rulers, who in their turn extended to Christian merchants and their consuls privileges they would have scornfully refused to their own Christian subjects. Only the most

ignorant and avaricious of them demanded such tolls and bribes that trade ceased to be profitable; but this began to happen with increasing frequency towards the end, when the destitution and exhaustion of their own territories after two centuries of insurrection and misrule had made the profits of Alexandria the most important part of their revenue. Unhappily for them, their increasing pressure came at a moment when improvements in navigation and ship design made it possible for Europe to consider alternative routes to the East. Before the end of the fifteenth century Africa had been circumnavigated, and the whole balance of trade was altered. The Mediterranean lost its importance; the northern ports and northern powers inherited the affluence of Genoa and Pisa; and the Egyptian and Syrian littorals sank into the obscurity which would have long been their lot had it not been for the constant injection into their degenerate body politic of the gold of Christendom.

Against this general background the story of Palestine presents a sad picture of decline. In the commercial prosperity of Egypt and the north it had no share; for its ports were in ruins and deserted. A few merchants touched at Acre for a while to buy cotton; two pilgrim ships arrived annually at Jaffa. At Ramleh there was a little activity. But this was all. Although its soil was only once invaded by a foreign army, when the Mongols penetrated into Galilee to meet defeat at Ain Jalud, the political system meant constant military unrest as rival amirs competed for the uncertain joy of supreme power. Further the lack of an effective administration exposed the countryside to the depredations of the bedouin, who on one occasion, in 1480, actually chased an amir of Jerusalem into his palace gates, and sacked a good part of the shops of the city in the process. For Jerusalem was again an unwallled city.

If the interest which was taken in the Haram ash-Sharif was less than that taken in either Aleppo or Damascus, and if all three together could not rival Cairo, yet the Mamluks did not ignore it, and it would not be unfair to compare Jerusalem during those centuries to an English medieval cathedral city, a famous and ancient shrine accustomed to receive from time to time the gifts of kings and governors for the maintenance of its religious life and to attract the recluse and the scholar to its calm. It was also a favourite city for

exiled or semi-exiled officials and benefited from their gifts. The Haram area was enriched by successive Mamluk rulers and other benefactors with a number of small but beautiful buildings, marble pulpits and fountains, while both the Dome of the Rock and Al Aksa were kept in repair and received various endowments. In addition the graceful arcades which give entrance to the platform of the Dome were built by Mamluk sultans; some of the gates of the Haram date from the same period; and four of that favourite creation of Seljuk and Egyptian Muslims, the Madrasah, or mosque and school combined, were built in Jerusalem. Though it is not recorded that any of them became famous centres of Islamic theology, they produced a number of pious scholars. Outside Jerusalem a tower at Ramleh, clearly based on Latin architecture, and a mosque at Khan Yunus in the south, together with some smaller buildings elsewhere, complete the record of architectural monuments of the period.

While the Haram and the Dome were receiving various gifts, the Christian churches, in spite of gifts from pilgrims and rulers, were gradually falling into decay, or being confiscated by the Muslims. It was exceedingly difficult to effect repairs, for the amount of bribery required to obtain permission to do so was often more than the impoverished community could raise. The Muslim population was increasingly fanatical, and the life led by the Christians was unenviable. Whenever a Mamluk ruler had reason to be displeased with the conduct of the Christian West, he vented his indignation on his own Christian subjects. His revenge for the raids of Peter of Cyprus has already been mentioned, but such an incident was not an isolated one. In 1422 the church of the Holy Sepulchre was again shut and many Christians imprisoned and tortured because some Catalan ships had attacked the Egyptians; and when in 1444 Pope Eugene IV preached a new crusade, primarily against the Turks, Christian shrines were desecrated, the Holy Sepulchre was with difficulty saved from destruction, and the Christians, especially the Latins, suffered violent persecution. From this situation they were rescued, and the buildings were saved, by the king of Abyssinia, who threatened to pull down all mosques and kill all Muslims within his dominions if the Christians were not left in peace.

In the intervals between persecutions various firmans were issued from Cairo, to both Greeks and Latins, guaranteeing,

or granting rights. These are discussed in Chapter Nine. The basis of these firmans was the Muslim practice of regarding all property in the countries which they conquered as vested in themselves, so that it lay within their power to give it to whom they willed. It was the churches of Egypt which suffered most from this practice at this period, for it was on Cairo that the Mamluks concentrated their enthusiasm for rich and beautiful architecture, and many of their buildings were enriched with columns taken from Coptic churches. They regarded it as a normal procedure to pull down as many churches as was necessary did they wish to build a new mosque.

It was in accordance with the practice of regarding the churches as his property that Saladin, when he captured Jerusalem in 1187, shut the church of the Holy Sepulchre until he had decided to whom to give it. His choice finally fell on the Syrian, Jacobite, Christians, and by what means the Orthodox patriarch returned we do not know. But for a considerable period the different Churches seem to have shared the Holy Places among themselves without conflict. The pilgrims for more than a century after Saladin report the services of many different denominations as taking place simultaneously in the same buildings. Pilgrimages may have been less frequent than in earlier days, but they continued from both the western and eastern Churches, and they were not normally interfered with by those in control of the city, as they brought in valuable revenue.

Records of the origin of Franciscan settlement in Palestine have perished, but they certainly possessed houses in the Latin coastal cities in the thirteenth century, and some were killed in Jerusalem by the Khwarizmians in 1244. Others were martyred in Galilee by Baibars in the latter half of the century. But after the loss of Acre they appear only as pilgrims until about 1335 they bought land on Mount Zion, including the Coenaculum (the room where the Last Supper of Jesus with His disciples was reputed to have been held, and where after the crucifixion they received their divine commissions to preach). This they obtained through the good offices at Cairo of King Robert of Sicily. This convent became their headquarters, and they gradually came to be accepted as the official representatives of the Latins, and as guardians on behalf of the western Church of the Holy Places. So far as the Latins themselves were concerned, they received the right of

representation by a bull issued in 1333. But it is evident that at first this representation was accepted by both sides as implying no exclusive possessions in them.

The record of the Franciscans during the following centuries is one of considerable suffering and heroism, and of a general care for the Latin pilgrims to Jerusalem. Though the brothers themselves continued their rule of poverty, they came to be an exceedingly wealthy order, and were in continual need of money since bribery was the only means of averting persecution, securing the local enforcement of firmans granted at Cairo, and sometimes even of survival at all. Once it came to countering firman with firman, neither the local Christians nor the failing Byzantines could cope with the wealth of the Franciscans or the protection which they enjoyed. For the Mamluks were indifferent to their own subjects or to the Greeks, but they cared much for the trade with the West. The Franciscans were protected by various western powers at different periods; James II of Aragon had been one of the first to seek to obtain for them the right to a settlement; Robert of Sicily had obtained it for them. But it was of particular value that they were under the protection of Venice, the wealthiest of the trading cities, and of Genoa whose traditions of commercial relations with Syria were even older than those of Venice. This connection enabled them to care for pilgrims whether they arrived via Ramleh (from Jaffa) or Alexandria, for these cities had their special warehouses and buildings at which pilgrims could be lodged. Later the Franciscans had their own hostel at Ramleh. At all stages the pilgrims were under the protection of a western consul. There was a Venetian consul at Ramleh and a Genoese consul at Jerusalem. Later there was a Venetian consul there also.

In the middle of the fifteenth century, as a result, it is said, of a Jewish project to purchase the reputed site of the tomb of David, the Franciscans lost most of their convent on Mount Zion. For the Muslims claimed David as one of their prophets, and confiscated part of the Franciscan church of the Coenaculum as being his tomb, and made it into a mosque. Actually David was not buried anywhere near this part of Jerusalem. It was in revenge for the supposed Jewish responsibility for this loss that for a time Jews were prevented from sailing to Palestine on Venetian and other ships. The Franciscans retained very narrow quarters on Zion, and in the sixteenth

century succeeded in obtaining a firman ousting the Georgians from their convent actually adjoining the church of the Holy Sepulchre. This has since been their headquarters. During the fifteenth century their work for the sick was extended by their receiving papal permission for the Franciscan sisters, the Clares, to come and work in their hospitals at Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The life of these women must have been exceedingly difficult. One of the conditions of all the Christian houses under Muslim rule was that their doors had to be open at all times and any Muslim could enter and demand what he liked. The records of the Franciscan houses are full of descriptions of the cost this situation involved; but for the women it must have been an almost unbearable additional burden. Incidentally the Muslims also retained the right to worship in Christian shrines, particularly those associated with the Virgin Mary, whom they regarded with special reverence.

As to the various eastern churches, Georgians, Abyssinians, Copts, Jacobites and Armenians, all continued to have some stake in the Holy Places and the Holy City together with the Greeks or Orthodox; but all alike suffered a decline during these centuries. From time to time a sultan or amir would revive the various laws of Arab days against the Christians; and Muslim fanaticism could make their lives a burden without special restrictions being added. Taxes to the sultan and the local amir, and the payment of bribes for protection, reduced the Christian peasantry to starvation or conversion to Islam, and those who lived in the towns fared little better. The Palestinian Church became a Church without a history, because there was no one with sufficient education to compile it.

In the Jewish community the tragic divisions which allowed to exist side by side in common insecurity an increasingly wealthy and intolerant Latin Franciscan community, and an increasingly impoverished native Church which they did nothing to assist, were fortunately absent. The Jews of Palestine shared with their Christian, and indeed their Muslim brethren, the consequences of the general collapse of the economy of the country under the extortions of their rulers. But in compensation, it is during this period that it became the custom of the wealthier communities of the dispersion to contribute to the maintenance of Jews in the Holy Land; and there was a small but not unimportant immigration of rabbis and others from the west which prevented any such intellectual and

spiritual stagnation as seems to have befallen the native Christians.

During the period in which the country was divided between Christian and Muslim rulers, the Jews seem to have preferred to remain in the Christian cities; but it is impossible to say whether it was their commercial activity or their political system which provided the attraction. In any case the first group of immigrants from western Europe who made a substantial impact on Palestinian Jewish life seem mostly to have settled at Acre. These were rabbis and scholars from France and England—the number is usually given as three hundred—who arrived in 1211. It was the period of the controversy about the rationalism of the great Egyptian Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). The academy of Acre, led by French and English scholars, seems to have been mystically rather than rationalistically inclined, and it was from Acre that the strongest condemnations of Maimonides were issued. Even the inscription on his grave at Tiberias was altered by them, and its laudatory phrases struck out and replaced by the simple statement that he was a heretic. While the first western scholars settled at Acre, the next important European to arrive chose rather the impoverished and depressed community of Jerusalem. Nachmanides (1194-*c.* 1270) was a Jew from Spain, and one of the most important scholars of his age. His decision to go to Palestine may have been due to the fact that he had just been banished from Aragon after defeating Paulus Christiani in a public disputation held before James I, king of Aragon, and that the consequent hostility of the Dominicans, whose champion Paul was, made it safer for him to leave Christendom. Since he was an old man of seventy-three when he arrived, it is reasonable to believe that some such danger had led to his sudden change of life—for conditions in Spain and Palestine were very different at this time. Nachmanides managed to revive the Jewish community of Jerusalem so successfully that there has been no gap in its history from that day to this, and his synagogue for long remained the centre of Jewish life.

During the period under review there was a constant trickle of Jewish immigrants into the country, some from Christendom and some from other Islamic territories and especially North Africa. While the persecutions in northern Europe and in Germany sent few of these immigrants, for the difficulties of

travel were too great, the increasing distress of Jewish life in the Christian parts of Spain was fruitful of new settlers. After the first great persecution of 1391 many came, and still more after the final expulsion in 1492, but these latter will be considered in the following chapter. Many, however, came, not to spend the rest of their lives in the country, but as pilgrims. For to some extent the interest in Holy Places had spread from Christians to Jews, and they have left many itineraries taking the traveller to the alleged tombs of rabbis and prophets, and illuminated with stories of myths and marvels, exactly parallel to the Christian pilgrims' guide books. They possess, moreover, one other interest in common with the comparable Christian productions. Just as we can occasionally learn something of the state of local Christianity from the Christian guides, so we learn of the existence of Jewish communities and synagogues in various cities from the Jewish guide books. Towards the end of the period the Jerusalem community received another European rabbi whose work was comparable to that of Nachmanides at the beginning. This was the Italian scholar Obadiah da Bertinoro, who arrived in 1488, and died between 1500 and 1510. He was a learned scholar, whose character won the respect of the Muslims, and he was able to found a rabbinical college in Jerusalem which was recognised as an important authority in rabbinic matters among the Jewish communities of the Islamic world. In view of what has been said of the experience of travellers of the Turkish rulers and officials with whom they came into contact, Bertinoro's remarks on his relations with the local Arab population are of particular interest. He records that "the Jews are not persecuted by the Arabs in those parts. I have travelled the length and breadth of the country and none of them has put an obstacle in my way. They are very kind to strangers, particularly to anyone who does not know the language; and if they see many Jews together they are not annoyed by it."

Of the organisation of the community there is little that can be said. In the earliest days there is mention of a nagid in Damascus possessing authority over the Jews of Palestine; in the days of Bertinoro it is equally clear that this authority lay with the nagid in Cairo, and the change was probably effected early in the Mamluk period. It is likewise difficult to speak with exactitude of the sites of Jewish settlements. There

was first a movement from the sea coast back into the hill country, since the Mamluks deliberately left the coast towns in ruins; as time went on there was another movement from the villages to the towns; for the life of the peasant—whatever his religion—had become intolerable. In Jerusalem the southern quarter, which is still a Jewish quarter, was their centre, and though two travellers of the thirteenth century speak of finding only one Jew in the city, the community numbered some hundreds by the fourteenth. Lydda and Ramleh were the only inhabited cities of the coastal plain, except for Gaza in the south and Acre in the north, where in the fourteenth century there was a community largely composed of immigrants from France and Germany. Beisan, Tiberias and Safad possessed communities, and there seems to have been continuous settlement in just a few villages, such as Nebi Samwil near Jerusalem, a few in Galilee and one or two in Transjordan. But for the first time there is a silence (which lasts two hundred years) about most of the hill villages of Galilee. Of the Jewish sects there is even less to say. The great Samaritan colony of Caesarea perished with that city, and their centres outside Shechem itself were in Cairo and Damascus. In the former they were said to be a larger and richer community than the rabbinic Jews. The same is reported of the Karaites; few were left in Palestine, including Jerusalem, but they were numerous and prosperous in the Mamluk capital.

One grievance from which both Jews and Christians suffered equally was the constant loss of their shrines and buildings on the grounds that the person commemorated was venerated also by the Muslims, or, occasionally that their worship interfered with a Muslim mosque. The latter reason was the cause of the loss of the great church of St. Mary south of the church of the Holy Sepulchre; but the earlier reason caused far more extensive damage. In Jerusalem the still standing church of St. Anne became a mosque when Saladin recaptured the city (and is almost unique in having been restored in the 19th century to Christian worship), as did the churches of Gaza, St. George of Lydda and elsewhere. The Franciscan convent on Mount Zion was lost because King David was claimed as a Muslim prophet. The exquisite doorway of the cathedral at Acre was removed to Cairo to form part of the mosque of an-Nasir Hasan. But Jewish losses were equally heavy. A thirteenth-century Jewish pilgrim, Rabbi Jacob, who

came from Rabbi Jeziel of Paris on the difficult mission of collecting money from the impoverished Jerusalem Jews for the rabbinical seminary of Paris, relates, entirely without resentment, that Muslim shrines are to be found on such spots as the altar of Elijah on Carmel, the tombs of the patriarchs at Hebron, the tomb of Jethro, father-in-law of Moses, at Kfar Hittin, the tomb of Jonah at Kfar Kanah, the tomb of Samuel outside Jerusalem, and even the tomb of rabbi Gamaliel at Jabne. In fact the only Muslim Holy Place of the period which had involved no seizure from Jews or Christians was the mythical tomb of Moses on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, built on the spot to which, according to Muslim legend, the body of Moses had been brought by angels because he was lonely on Mount Nebo. But though the buildings on the site were set up by Baibars, the festival of Nebi Musa is of later date, and is first mentioned at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

This penetration of Islam into what had previously been Jewish or Christian sites had this justification—or at least explanation—that it is during the Mamluk period that it first becomes possible to speak of Palestine as a primarily Muslim country. During the first century and a half of the Arab period the Christian and Jewish communities certainly constituted the majority of the population; if the Muslims had overtaken them before the crusades, largely through conversion under social and financial pressure, they still constituted important minorities whose presence it would have been impossible to overlook. The crusades led to a further diminution of the Jewish community, but to a more than corresponding increase of the Christian. But during the Mamluk centuries, both the Jewish and Christian communities suffered tremendous losses through conditions which made life intolerable. Yet it must not be thought that the Muslim peasant or artisan fared much better. Though in the gardens and fields around the residence of an amir cultivation may still have been flourishing, yet it is Muslim writers speaking of Muslim peasants who compare their lot unfavourably with that of slaves; and though proportionally to Christians and Jews they may have increased in numbers, their total steadily declined. The lack of ports and trading centres meant that there were few rich merchants or skilled artisans such as thronged the cities of Cairo, Damascus or Aleppo. Palestine had become a land of

peasants and of bedouin, and such it was to remain for centuries after the Mamluks had fallen.

Finally, to add to the tragedies of misrule, extortion and disorder, these centuries witnessed an exceptional number of natural calamities. In every century we hear of famines, of droughts, of plagues of locusts and of earthquakes. The Black Death which ravaged Europe from 1349 to 1352 continued for seven years in Syria and Palestine, and its toll of deaths was equally heavy; and there were constant lesser plagues. Exceptional rains in 1473 caused the collapse of over three hundred houses in Jerusalem, and in 1491 a disastrous winter caused still more to collapse. It is not surprising that the most frequent word in many descriptions is 'ruins'; for there can have been hardly a city in the country in which the population had not dwindled since crusading days, and many villages were entirely desolate. While medieval Europe suffered similar natural disasters, the vitality of its civilisation led to the quick replacement of the losses. The same was not true under Mamluk rule. That they depended for their armies on the constant purchase of foreign slaves is enough in itself to reveal the misery and feebleness which had overcome their native subjects; and there is nothing improbable in the estimate that the two and a half centuries of their power cost the country two-thirds of its population.

PALESTINE UNDER THE TURKS, 1517-1798

CONSTANTINOPLE FELL AT LAST in 1453. By the beginning of the sixteenth century Turkish arms had been carried to the gates of Vienna and the plains of Poland and the Ukraine; and the Mediterranean power of Venice had been humbled. But the period of Turkey's real greatness was short, and it was during the brief half-century when she was at the summit of her power that Selim I (1512-1520), satisfied for the moment with what his predecessors had bequeathed him in Europe, turned the incomparable Turkish armies to the enlargement of his Asiatic empire. He conquered wide territories from the Shi'ite shahs of Persia, and in 1517 added to his dominions Syria, Egypt and Arabia. It is uncertain whether the story is true that he persuaded the last of the Abbasid shadow-caliphs of Cairo to hand over to him the relics of Muhammad which were the insignia of the caliphate, but from a slightly later date the sultan of the Ottoman Turks called himself also the caliph.

The conquest of Syria, Egypt and Arabia, together with the occupation of the southern Mediterranean littoral by his successors, gave the Ottoman empire even wider territories in Asia and Africa than in Europe. Nevertheless it was on its European frontiers that the government's attention was fixed during the whole period up to the end of the eighteenth century. The European provinces were the richest, and across the European frontiers were the most dangerous enemies—Austria and Russia. During the seventeenth century the main battle front lay in the northern Balkans and in Hungary; and here the Turks had to meet the increasing power of Austria, and its steady improvement of the tactics and instruments of war. Everywhere the frontiers had to be drawn in; and after the final defeat of a vast Turkish army before the walls of Vienna in 1683, the Austrian forces were able gradually to take the offensive, especially during the campaigns of the brilliant military genius Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736). As the

frontier towards Austria came to assume a relative stability, leaving Turkey in possession of the Christian Balkans but excluding all Hungarian territory, the northern frontier came to be the main sphere of operations. Russian power and ambitions were increasing and led to a steady pressure along both the eastern and western shores of the Black Sea. Russia and Turkey first met as enemies as early as 1568, but it was not until the eighteenth century that the vast plans of Catherine the Great (1729-1796), who aimed at nothing less than the recreation of a Christian—i.e. Russian—empire at Constantinople, led to a series of campaigns, varied by temporary truces, which were inconclusive, but in which the Turks gradually lost ground in the north as they already had in the west. These campaigns led to an increased interest of western Europe in Turkish affairs, and to the beginning of the diplomatic belief that the preservation of some Turkish sovereignty in the Black Sea, in the Balkans and at Constantinople was necessary as a counterbalance to the ambitions of Russia.

While Turkey was engaged with Austria she could count on the friendship of France who was herself perpetually at war with the house of Habsburg; while she was engaged in stripping the old empire of Venice of her Mediterranean ports and islands, she could count on the friendly indifference of the new commercial powers of England and Holland. Even when the pirates of the Barbary Coast, nominally under Turkish sovereignty, were destroying British shipping, both Turkey and Britain agreed that any British action in the matter should not be a *casus belli* between them. In 1697 Britain and Holland mediated between Turkey and Austria and secured the Treaty of Carlowitz. The idea that the position of Turkey was an affair of European concern dates from that event. The same procedure was followed by the same powers twenty years later at the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718; but it was the French who next mediated between the opponents and secured the Treaty of Belgrad in 1739. The important treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774 was arranged directly between the Russians and Turks without European interference; but when in 1791 yet another war had been fought to a standstill, Pitt was actually prepared to go to war with Russia to secure more favourable terms for Turkey than the outcome of the campaign warranted. Only the violence of the parliamentary opposition led by Fox and Burke restrained him; and the treaty of Jassy was signed

between Russia and Turkey in January 1792 without European mediation. This interest of the powers in the European affairs of Turkey had no repercussions on the general situation in Palestine; it will, however, need to be considered in the chapter dealing with the Christian Holy Places.

From the beginning of the 16th to the end of the 18th century the only military activities of the Turks in Asia against external enemies were on the northern portion of the eastern frontier of the empire where various campaigns were fought against the Persians. Syria and Egypt enjoyed complete freedom from any external invasion during the whole of the period. The campaign in which they had been won required only some minor engagements, and two battles, one fought from Aleppo and one on the outskirts of Cairo. The Mamluk empire was in full decay, and local chiefs and rulers were well able to see that it was the Turkish and not the Mamluk star which was in the ascendant. The important amirs Ghazali of Damascus and Khaibak of Aleppo deserted to the conquerors and the former was rewarded by being retained in his amirate. For some reason the Mamluks were able to retain a great deal of their power in Egypt itself. Under the usually nominal rule of a pasha appointed by Constantinople they continued to exercise authority for three further centuries. When after the death of Selim Ghazali revolted and tried to make himself independent, Syria was reorganised into the three pashaliks of Aleppo, Tripoli and Damascus. Later Sidon was added. Damascus contained ten 'sanjaks', and the territory of Palestine was included in those of Jerusalem, Gaza, Nablus, Sidon and Beirut. When the pashalik of Sidon was established it received Galilee. To provide himself with a strong fortress in the south of Syria, Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the last of the great sultans, rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem, and it is his walls which, unchanged, surround the 'old city' to-day.

The system of government which had been devised by the earlier Ottoman sultans was one of the most elaborate and artificial systems ever shipwrecked by the difference between theory and practice. Designed to secure an invincible army, an incorruptible administration and a speedy and efficient system of justice, it ended by producing a byword among the nations for squalor, corruption and inefficiency. But at the time of the conquest of Palestine these evil effects were not

yet in existence. The empire was reaching the brief apogee of its glory, and its carefully created institutions had not yet revealed their faults. They were still superior to almost anything which existed in contemporary Europe. The Turkish army and administration were built on a special form of slavery. Only the judiciary, the religious hierarchy, and the local feudal estates were open to the Osmanli and other Muslims. The military and political personnel were recruited by the annual 'tribute' of Christian boys collected from all parts of the empire, but at this period primarily from Europe. Taken from their homes between the ages of 12 and 20 they were brought up in three colleges at Constantinople and educated into the Islamic faith. The system has been somewhat unjustly condemned as inhuman, but the careers open to these children offered glittering prizes they would never have known in their native mountains and villages. The sons of shepherds and peasants became ministers of state, governors of provinces and commanders of the army. All the boys were physically fit, and those who showed little more than physical fitness became the janissaries, the crack corps of the Turkish army, better trained, better disciplined, better paid, and better fed and equipped than any other forces the sixteenth century could produce. Those who showed intellectual ability passed on to a second college, and there trained for the court and the central and provincial services. The most intelligent had yet a third period of training for the highest posts of the empire. The provincial governors, the military commanders, the grand vizir himself, all were by birth Christians, by standing slaves, owing obedience only to their master, and untrammelled by ties of family or provincial influence. To such slavery there was no stigma attached. Just as one or two Mamluk sovereigns showed their attitude by adopting as names the price for which they had been bought, so the slaves of the sultan, raised to the highest ranks of the empire, had no need to be ashamed of the fact that they were the absolute property of their imperial master. There was, however, the disability that he could, and frequently did, at a moment's notice order their execution. The conqueror of Palestine, Selim I, had seven vizirs decapitated in his presence during the eight years of his rule.

Such was the system the Osmanli had evolved. Its weakness was that all depended on their one master, and the sultanate

itself passed by heredity, not by choice of fitness. It depended on absolute integrity at all levels, and when the sultan himself began to accept 'presents' for appointments it collapsed like a house of cards.

After a brilliant series of sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, not one single member of the family of Osman down to the 19th was capable of exercising either political or military leadership. That the empire did not perish earlier they owed to many reasons, not the least important being their slave vizirs, especially the unique Albanian 'dynasty' of Koprulu.


While, during the great period, the system provided for the maintenance of order, and the speedy execution of justice, the function of a provincial pasha was no more than to maintain the forces allotted to him and collect the taxes due from his province; and in the course of collection he had to provide for his own salary and expenses. Apart from this the landowners of the province were left to the hereditary enjoyment of their estates in return for the provision of a fixed number of auxiliary troops. If feudal landowners in seventeenth century Turkey chose to behave like their predecessors in fourteenth century Europe and make war on each other for the enlargement of their estates, this left the pasha indifferent. His direct authority often extended only to his capital city and its environs, and the rest of the province was only visited once a year for the purpose of collecting taxes. It is these two factors that led to the ruin of the provinces, including Palestine.

The annual progress for the collection of taxes came to be a terrifying experience for the population, as well as devastating for the country. The penalty for non-payment was often the destruction of the means by which future payments might be made. Trees were cut down, villages destroyed until whole areas passed out of cultivation, while those who managed to pay only did so at a cost which created a permanent burden of debt upon the agriculture of the country. The decline of population and the increase of waste land in its turn brought in the bedouin, accustomed to pasturing their destructive goats on any unoccupied area. Whole tracts passed back to a state in which they could only support the desert nomad instead of the rich agriculture of earlier centuries; and the tragic process of soil erosion, and the turning of rivers and

streams into stagnant marshes, continued unchecked while the Turk looked on indifferent.

This recession in its turn emphasised the divisions between the settled peasantry, quarrelling for the little that was left; and the feuds between clans and villages, between the northerners and southerners, became part of the regular routine of life, adding their quota to the economic destruction of their common patrimony. Nor were the feudal landowners and bedouin sheiks idle in this situation. Private wars between families and tribes flourished, and some of the best governors Palestine had during these troubled centuries were leaders in such conflicts who had made themselves practically independent of the local pasha.

The first of such rulers was Fakhr ad-Din (1583-1635), a man of uncertain origin but the hereditary amir of a Druze tribe of the Lebanon. Starting from a secure base in the Lebanese mountains, he fortified Beirut and made it his capital. Established there, he set out to attract European merchants, and allied himself with Christian princes. To the Christians of the Lebanon he showed himself favourable, hoping by their aid to establish himself as an independent prince with territories which included Galilee and Carmel. But neither the Christian powers of the west, nor the Lebanese Christians, came to his help when in 1613 the pasha of Damascus was ordered by Constantinople to suppress him. A land attack he might have resisted, but when the Turkish fleet appeared off Beirut he fled to Italy, hoping to secure help, but in vain. His son Ali took over his government and made his submission to the Porte. When peace was re-established Fakhr ad-Din returned, but to aid and not to replace his son. For fifteen years they maintained their power, but in 1633 the pasha of Damascus was again ordered to suppress them entirely. They were not strong enough to meet the Turks in a pitched battle, and Ali was killed on the field, while his father, less fortunate, was taken to Constantinople and executed. Nevertheless the family continued to exercise some authority in the Lebanon until the end of the seventeenth century, and the memory of Fakhr ad-Din was long treasured among its Christian population as the most favourable ruler they had experienced. The insecurity of the general position of the Christians at this time is shown by the fact that the sultan Ibrahim (1640-1648), the most debauched and cruel



of all the sultans, decided to order the massacre of all the non-Muslim subjects of the empire, and was only prevented by the Muslim religious authorities.

During much of the seventeenth century a series of rulers of much less ability terrorised rather than ruled considerable parts of northern Palestine. These were the sheiks of the bedouin tribe of the Tarabin, whose central territory was the valley of Jezreel, which they ruled from Jenin. Their authority at times stretched as far as Haifa and Safad. But during the same period there were also Druze amirs who disputed their power, and in their turn raided and sacked such cities as Safad and Tiberias, making life intolerable for the settled population.

Early in the eighteenth century another local prince appeared in Galilee, Dahir al-Umar, sheik of the bedouin tribe of the Beni Zaidan, whose usual pasture grounds stretched from the region of Safad and Tiberias across the plain of Esdraclon. Dahir made himself master of these two towns, and after a few skirmishes the pasha of Damascus decided to leave him in peace. In 1749, when he was already a man of 64, he seized and fortified Acre and made it his capital. He secured his position with the Porte in the same manner as his predecessor Fakhr ad-Din. He offered more tribute than had been paid by the pasha of Sidon from whose authority he had seized the town. Although the fortifications of Acre were an extremely primitive affair, they were sufficient to give him a secure base, and he proceeded to act as ruler of a wide territory. He gave the peasants security from bedouin raids, and acted with equal justice towards Muslims, Jews and Christians, with the result that numbers immigrated into his district from the surrounding country. A colony of Greek Christians came from Cyprus to settle in the vicinity of Acre, and Tiberias was rebuilt by a rabbi and his followers from Smyrna. He was successful also in attracting Christian merchants, and the trade of Acre began to revive. In particular he developed the raising of cotton, and an extensive trade, of which France secured the monopoly, resulted. This trade continued until Mehmet Ali developed a superior cultivation in Egypt. To extend his authority he married his sons and daughters into the families of the bedouin sheiks whose pasture lands adjoined his dominions, and gave to his sons separate governorships in Galilee. But this proved one of the main causes of his downfall;

for the sons quarrelled among themselves and needed to extort ever larger sums from the peasants to finance their mutual conflicts. To raise more money Dahir took the desperate expedient of buying the spoils when the bedouins raided the Mecca pilgrimage as it passed east of the sea of Galilee, and also entered into partnership with Maltese corsairs to divide the spoil taken from Turkish ships plying to Egypt. In 1760 a new pasha, Osman, was sent to Damascus and his sons were made pashas of Tripoli and Sidon, in order that a concerted attack from all these centres should be made on Dahir. But when in 1764 Osman and his sons had gathered their forces, they suffered a disastrous defeat near Nablus. Dahir then returned to the trick of securing his position with the Porte by offering an increased tribute, and this secured him a moment's respite. But Osman was only waiting to raise more troops. Unfortunately for him his only means of raising them was to increase the taxes due from various parts of Palestine. Ramleh, Gaza and Jaffa in turn revolted; and the unsettled state of the country induced Ali Bey, the ambitious Mamluk ruler of Egypt, who had expelled the Turkish pasha in 1770, to send his general Muhammad Bey (Abu Dahab) to invade Syria and to seek to add that country to his territories. The moment was well chosen, for the Porte was fully occupied with one of its periodical campaigns against Russia, and a Russian fleet was actually in the Mediterranean. Ali made an alliance with Dahir, and his army advanced to Gaza. Dahir marched south while Abu Dahab occupied Jaffa and Ramleh. Osman dared not meet their combined forces, and the allies after completing their plans at Acre, marched suddenly on Damascus. The city fell into their hands with very little resistance; but then the army of Ali suddenly retired precipitately to Egypt. It was said that Abu Dahab had been bribed and intimidated by Osman. Two years later Ali was expelled from Egypt by Abu Dahab and took refuge with Dahir. Together, and with the aid of the Russian fleet, they defeated the Turks near Sidon. But on his return to Egypt in the following year, Ali was seized and killed by Abu Dahab. Osman renewed the offensive against Dahir and, after an initial defeat at Safad by Dahir's son Ali, succeeded in uniting against the old bedouin prince (Dahir was now about 85) not only the Mutawali clan of the Lebanon, but the important sheik of the Nablus-Jaffa

area. But Dahir held his enemies at bay for two more years, from 1773 to 1775, by which time the Porte was prepared to make peace with him. At this moment Abu Dahab again invaded Syria. Gaza opened its gates, Jaffa fell after a few days' siege, and Acre itself capitulated to the Mamluks. But his sudden death led to a retirement of his army, and Dahir returned to his capital. It then appeared that the Egyptian invasion had been planned by the Porte, which had offered Dahir peace merely to lull him into a false security; for, no sooner had the Mamluks withdrawn than Hassan, the most famous Turkish admiral of the day, seized Sidon and appeared off Acre. Dahir found himself deserted in his determination to resist, and was killed while seeking to escape from the city. He was probably the greatest and best of all the local rulers who set themselves up in different parts of the country during the Turkish period. Certainly he formed a noble contrast to his successor at Acre, al-Jazzar, 'the butcher', the builder of the large mosque in that city. A Bosnian by birth, al-Jazzar, after various adventures, was made pasha of Sidon, where his cruelty and avarice made him more hated even than most pashas who succeeded each other in the government of Palestine.

Of the Muslim fellaheen little is recorded during this period. They shared with all other peasants in the unhappy empire the misery of constant extortion and insufficient security. It was a period in which there must have been a considerable modification of the composition of the population, a modification already begun in Mamluk days. The many travellers who visited the country tell a continual tale of lands out of cultivation and of villages destroyed. The disappearance of the settled peasants opened the doors to a continuous infiltration of bedouin tribes from the deserts and semi-deserts of the east and south into the once fertile plains of the coast, and even into the hill country of Judaea and Samaria. If it is during the Mamluk period that the country can first be called a primarily Muslim country, it is not until the Turkish period that in the ethnic sense it acquired a substantial Arab population, though there were other elements as well who entered the country during these centuries.

Of Jerusalem and the Haram ash-Sharif there is nothing new to be said; it slumbered, except when it was disturbed by local disorders. But it is during this period that the festival

of Nebi Musa came to play a part in the religious history of the country. First definitely mentioned about 1500, it was introduced, perhaps originally by Saladin to balance the Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem by a Muslim pilgrimage; to give it equal importance, it was associated with the mythical grave of Moses in the desert of Judaea between Jerusalem and Jericho, over which Baibars built an extensive mosque. It served also to raise the dignity of Jerusalem by giving it an annual event comparable, though on a lesser scale, to the annual assembly of the pilgrims for Mecca at the rival city of Damascus. Curiously enough its date is fixed by the Christian, not the Muslim, calendar.

The situation of the Christians was more affected than that of the Muslims by the change in rulers; for the four Orthodox patriarchates, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, now lay within the territories of a single sovereign. The Turks took over the millet system from the Arabs and still further developed it. The non-muslim citizens of the Porte, known as 'rayahs,' were divided into nations, and each nation had a single head, usually resident in Constantinople, who was responsible for the members of the nation wherever they might live. In this way the Orthodox patriarch was head of the "Rum" millet, for the Orthodox Christians were known to the Turks as Romans. Other Christian bodies at various dates were also recognised in the same way.

The gathering of all the ancient Orthodox patriarchates within a single state might have meant a certain increase of security as well as a strengthening of their spiritual life. That it did not do so was due to two causes. In the first place the character of the ecumenical patriarchate rapidly declined. The office came to be sold to the highest bidder, and constant intrigues led to a quick succession of men who were completely unworthy of their high position. The Orthodox Church did produce some martyrs and confessors among its patriarchs; but it produced far more rogues, charlatans and speculators. Finally, though the office was given great formal dignity and importance, the sultan could, if he so desired, regard its holder merely as another of his slaves, on whom he might inflict any humiliation he chose, and deal with as he thought fit. In so far as the Jerusalem patriarchate was concerned a further reason for decline lay in the increasing gulf between the patriarch, his officials, and especially the Brotherhood of the

Holy Sepulchre on the one side, and the dwindling number of local Christians on the other. For the former came to be exclusively Greeks and the latter were wholly Arabic speaking, and, so far as Transjordan was concerned, Arabs. The patriarch was generally a Greek of the Phanar quarter of Constantinople, elected at Constantinople under the auspices of the ecumenical patriarch, living at Constantinople, and only occasionally visiting Palestine.

In the second place the position of the rayahs throughout the empire was increasingly miserable. The system by which the pashas were completely free to extort what sums they could from their pashaliks exposed them to the heaviest exactions; and since the pashas and their subordinates usually changed annually the extortion was continuous. The few worthy vizirs who tried desperately to reform the administration of the provinces, and secure proper treatment for all the subjects of the Porte, passed much too quickly to effect any permanent improvement. Moreover the Christians had to suffer increasing burdens from the hostility, barbarity and avarice of the Muslim population. Islam itself decayed under the dead hand of the Turks, and the religion of the peasants, the bedouin and the urban mobs was little more than a crude, violent and intensely arrogant superstition, which took delight in robbery and murder. When the governors and officials themselves gave an example of insatiable avarice, it is not surprising, if every village and tribal sheik did the same; and there was no group who was robbed and victimised with greater delight than the unfortunate Christian population. The last 'berat' or patent of office to be given to a patriarch of Jerusalem by the Turkish authorities was issued to the patriarch Damianus in 1897. It contains this astounding clause—among many which deal with the extortions of officials—'let there not be interference by officials when he travels in places which are dangerous; the best way to go and be saved from bandits is to disguise himself and carry arms contrary to ancient custom'. The life of the Christian peasants and townsmen in previous centuries can be imagined, when such advice is given in a solemn official document to the patriarch himself at the end of the 19th century, when great reforms had already taken place.

Meanwhile the Latin Christians lived an equally miserable life made still more miserable by the violence of the religious

hatred which separated them from the Orthodox and eastern Christians, a hatred which each side manifested with equal consistency. In the relations with the Porte itself the Latins were in the better position, for they were protected by European powers with which the Porte wished to remain friendly; and they were much wealthier than their rivals. The position which had been occupied by the consuls of Genoa or Venice during the Mamluk period was, from the sixteenth century, occupied by France and occasionally for brief periods by other European powers. A small group of Carmelites managed to re-establish themselves on Mount Carmel in 1631 (their predecessors had been massacred in 1291), and maintained themselves, though not without serious interruptions, from then onwards, until in 1825 they obtained security by building the present fortress-like monastery. But apart from them the Franciscans were the only permanent residents in the Holy Land. In the sixteenth century they obtained their present buildings within the city walls in place of their old convent on Mount Zion; and outside Jerusalem and Bethlehem they maintained precarious rights in Tibcrias, Nazareth, Ain Karim and at Jacob's Well near Nablus. As time went on the Franciscan Custos of the Holy Places assumed the deportment and train of a patriarch, doubtless in the belief that only so would he receive the respect of the Turks. The Order was exceedingly wealthy, but enormous sums had to be spent on bribery. A French canon, I. Doubdan, has left us the story of the attempt made in the middle of the 17th century to repair and restore the Franciscan convent in Jerusalem. Having obtained permission by copious bribery from the Porte for the restoration, 20,000 livres (about £850 in the money of that day) had to be spent in bribes in Jerusalem before a stone could be moved; and from then onwards extortion, riot and violence marked every step of the repairs. But it was not only for such legitimate purposes that money was spent. Where bribery could obtain a patriarchate it could as easily buy a Holy Place, and the eastern Christians could not have hoped to outbribe the wealthy and intolerant Franciscans, even had they ceased to quarrel among themselves and united to do so. The Turks favoured all these quarrels, for there was always profit to be made by setting one side against the other, and favouring those who could make the largest present in any particular incident. In fact a considerable proportion of the

revenues of the governorship of Jerusalem came from the taxes on pilgrims and the money which could be made out of the disputes of the Christians.

The one outstanding event in the history of the Palestinian Church during these centuries was the council called at Jerusalem on the occasion of the repair and rededication of the church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, in 1672 by the Patriarch Dositheus. The purpose of the council was to examine into the doctrines of one of the most interesting patriarchs of Constantinople during these centuries, Cyril Lucar (1572-1638), the donor to Charles I of the Codex Alexandrinus, now in the British Museum and one of the most important manuscripts of the Bible in the world. He was born in Crete while it was still a possession of Venice, and so came into contact with western European thought, and particularly with the theology of Calvin and the Reformers. While he did not wholly accept any form of Protestantism, he found much in it with which he agreed, and was very anxious to reform his own Church, both in its government and its doctrine. He was killed by the Turks, on the suspicion of friendship with the Russians, and his views were condemned in successive councils. But the most important was that held under Dositheus at Jerusalem.

During this period there was a considerable change in the provenance of the pilgrims who visited the Holy Land. The Franciscans still took charge of all Latin pilgrims, but these came in decreasing numbers. They were also prepared to be hospitable to other pilgrims coming from western Europe who were members of the Protestant Churches, and who could be more accurately described as travellers than pilgrims in the old sense. They seem to have made a considerable profit out of the pilgrims, for though they charged no rent for receiving them, the pilgrim found himself obliged to make a "present" which, according to some travellers at least, more than equalled the amount for which an equally good lodging could have been found elsewhere. But while pilgrims from the west declined in numbers, increasing quantities of the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Porte annually visited Jerusalem. In the eighteenth century their numbers amounted to several thousand a year. Towards the end of this period occurs the first mention of pilgrims from Russia, the main source of pilgrimages in the following century; for it is during the

eighteenth century that Russia began to make tentative claims to the role of protector of the Greek Church to balance the position of France or other western powers in relation to the Latin subjects of the Porte.

In the beginning at any rate the change to a Turkish government involved much greater changes for the Jewish than for the Christian population, but to get the full story of these changes we need to go back a century to the establishment of a firm Turkish foothold in Europe. The condition of European Jews in the fifteenth century was one of steadily increasing poverty and insecurity. In Spain the persecutions and mass baptisms of the end of the fourteenth century created for the first time a large class of Marranos, nominally professing the Christian religion but in their hearts remaining loyal to Judaism. In Germany and central Europe persecutions and expulsions had followed each other until many ancient Jewish centres were almost denuded of population. In these circumstances, some fifty years after the Turks had established their capital at Adrianople in 1366, the rabbi of that city, Isaac Zarfatti, sent a letter to the Jewries of western Europe inviting them to settle under Turkish rule, where they would suffer neither persecution nor restriction, and could live in freedom and practise their religion openly. Only a trickle answered the call; for the route was long, dangerous and expensive. Marranos from Spain were among the first; but Jews from Germany followed, and new Jewish centres grew up in the Balkans. In 1492 came the great expulsion from Spain; and the expulsion from Portugal followed four years later. Sephardic Jews fled mostly by sea, for the French frontier was closed to them, and many settled in Italy and throughout North Africa and the Levant. In the middle of the sixteenth century the Jews of Italy in their turn fell on evil days, when the intolerance of the counter-reformation deprived them of the protection they had hitherto enjoyed in the Papal States. But before this last calamity, the Turks had conquered Palestine, and the Holy Land was open to those who could reach it. That more did not come was due to the difficulties of travel, not to lack of desire to come.

The conquest of Palestine and Egypt involved a change in the administration of Palestine Jewry. The Turks, following the example they had set with regard to the Christians, established a chief rabbi—the Haham Bashi—in Constantinople,

and made him supreme over the whole Jewish millet of the empire. The Jews of Palestine were no longer in any way subject to Egypt, and the last nagid of the Egyptian Jews, Isaac Solal, actually settled in Jerusalem in the very year of Selim's conquest. The great advantage of the millet system to both Christians and Jews was that it left them complete management of their own affairs, their own schools and law-courts, once they had paid the special poll tax levied on all non-muslims.

The Jewish community under the Turks passed through a period of very rapid and brilliant expansion, during which Palestine became for a brief while again the centre of Jewry, to almost as rapid and catastrophic a decline. The central cause of this expansion was the Sephardic immigration from the Iberian peninsula and from Italy. Sephardim soon came to outnumber the Arabic-speaking indigenous Jews; and they were, until the eighteenth century, more numerous than the Ashkenazic immigrants from Poland and northern Europe. The centre of the new community was in the north, where a number of Jewish villages still survived, and where Safad, a seat of local government, offered a certain security. Jerusalem remained in the second place, for though the community grew in both numbers and learning, it had no Jewish hinterland to sustain it as Safad was sustained by the Galilean villages.

Jewish life in Safad was two-sided; it was an important commercial centre, lying between Damascus and the port of Sidon; and its industries, especially the weaving and preparation of woollen cloth, found a ready market within and outside the country. But while Safad was rich in merchants it was even richer in scholars of the Cabbala. The succession of events in Europe which marked the end of an epoch—the expulsion of the last great Jewish community; the retreat of Christendom before the advancing Turks; the breakdown of the religious unity of the Middle Ages—all convinced Jewry that they were living through the birth-pangs of the Messiah, and that his coming was imminent. Under the leadership of a young Ashkenazic Jew, Isaac Luria (1534-1572), born in Jerusalem of German parents, the Zohar and its mysterious prophecies became the centre of study; and it was natural that Galilee should have attracted the Cabbalists, since it was in Galilee that Simeon ben Jochai, the reputed founder of Jewish

mysticism, lived and was buried. His tomb, at Meron on the spurs of Jebel Jarmaq, is still the centre of an annual pilgrimage from Safad. The Jewish population of the latter town rose to something like 15,000 by the middle of the century, possibly the most extraordinary community in Jewish history, as it passed its time in almost continuous religious excitement, dancing and ceremonial. To the weekly festival for welcoming the Sabbath Judaism owes its most familiar Sabbath hymn *Lekha Dodi*, written by Solomon Halevy Al-Kabbez, who came to Safad from Constantinople. But Safad had not merely three thousand looms for weaving wool, and several times that number of mystics; one of the mystics, Joseph Caro, a Spanish Jew who had been brought to Turkey at the age of four, combined his studies of the Cabbala with so profound a knowledge of the Talmud—usually rather ignored by mystics—that he produced in the *Shulhan Arukh* what has remained to this day the standard codification of Talmudic law for orthodox Jews throughout the world.

While Safad was reaching its zenith, Tiberias lying below it on the shores of the lake was still an unpopulated ruin. But it was to Tiberias that the attention of Dona Gracia Mendes, one of the most remarkable, wealthy and influential refugees from Spain at the court of Sulciman the Magnificent was directed. Possibly Dona Gracia was attracted by the healing springs near the city; but for some reason, about the middle of the century, she extended her charities to the Palestinian community by establishing a settlement and college in Tiberias, and announced her own intention of retiring there. This scheme was taken up by her son-in-law and nephew, Don Joseph Nasi, and a charter was obtained from Sulciman granting him Tiberias and seven villages surrounding it, with permission to rebuild the walls of the city and settle the town and the land with Jews whether immigrant or native. Don Joseph, who became Duke of Naxos, was a practical man, and began by having the walls rebuilt. He then invited Jews to settle in the town, extending his invitation to the Jews of Europe, especially those of Italy who were feeling the full weight of the intolerance of Popes Paul IV (1555-1559) and Pius V (1566-1572). Though he was able to offer transport in his own ships, yet few seem to have been able to come, and of those who did some were seized at sea by the Knights Hospitallers and sold as slaves. Don Joseph planted mulberry

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trees, to encourage a silk industry, imported the finest wools from Spain for weaving, and hoped to develop the fishing industry on the lake. But the plan fell far short in its realisation of the semi-independent refuge he had hoped to provide for the distressed Jewry of Europe. The intrigues of the court kept him at Constantinople, and he never visited his estate, though Dona Gracia may have lived there for a year or more before her death in 1569. The opposition of the Custos of the Franciscans, working through the French ambassador, and the power and brigandage of the local Arab tribes, all combined to wreck his hopes, and when he died in 1579, his ambitious scheme was abandoned. Nevertheless it was revived by another powerful Jewish courtier, Solomon ibn Ayesh (Alvaro Mendes), who had become Duke of Mitylene. He secured the concession for his son Jacob, who actually resided in Tiberias; but he was more interested in scholars than in commerce, and when he died in 1603 it had already become necessary for the community of Safad to rescue the scholars of Tiberias from starvation.

The development of Jerusalem, though less ambitious than that of Safad and Tiberias, was nevertheless striking, and when in the seventeenth century Galilee became insecure, it regained its primacy. There also numbers of Sephardic Jews supplanted the indigenous and Ashkenazic communities; and the Jerusalem academy enjoyed a great reputation. The smallest of the four cities regarded as "Holy Cities" was Hebron. There a community struggled with isolation and with the constant repression of local rulers and bedouin tribes. Though never wholly wiped out, it never succeeded in becoming prosperous, and the only flourishing community in the south was in the commercial city of Gaza.

All the prosperity of the sixteenth century had vanished by the beginning of the 17th. Both Safad and Tiberias were sacked by bedouins and Druzes in succession; and the latter was not rebuilt until eighty years later in the time of Dahir, when it was settled, at his invitation, by Hayim Abulafia of Smyrna and a new Jewish community. They managed to restore something of the prosperous agriculture of earlier days, and when the settlers were joined by some Chassidim from Poland, Tiberias became again one of the four Holy Cities. Other immigrants came from Poland and settled in Jerusalem, Safad and elsewhere during the eighteenth century,

but it was impossible to restore the ground which had been lost. The insecurity created by the complete indifference of the Turkish pashas to the local wars and raids of local amirs, bedouin tribes, Druzes and others, was reducing not only the Jewish community, but the whole country to a degree of poverty and desolation even greater than it had known under the Mamluks. Traveller after traveller reports desert and marsh where there had been fertile fields, and ruins where there had been towns and villages. But even so, the country had not yet sunk to its lowest level. It was in the early part of the 19th century that the cumulative effect of centuries of neglect and destruction reached its culmination.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PALESTINE: THE PROMISED LAND OF JUDAISM

PALESTINE ALL THROUGH ITS history has been the home of different peoples and of different religions. In this fact there is nothing unusual. What gives Palestine its unique position is that members of three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, who do not dwell in the country, are yet for religious reasons concerned in its destiny. This interest, though it exists for all of these religions, has in each case special characteristics. For Muslims the issue is not Palestine as a Holy Land, but Jerusalem as a Holy City. For, according to Muslim belief, it was to and from Jerusalem that Muhammad was miraculously transported in order to make his ascent into heaven. Jerusalem is therefore the third holiest shrine in Islam. For Christians, Palestine as a whole is the Holy Land, as the scene of the earthly life of Jesus Christ. In this sense it is unique and pre-eminent, and has no rival. The Christian Church has never sought to make the land the religious centre of the Christian religion; neither, with small exceptions, have Christians desired to live in the country as a religious obligation. All through history Christian actions have been directed to securing access to the country for pilgrims, and control over the particular Holy Places associated with the Christian religion; and, apart from the crusades, if this access is secured they have been satisfied. For Jews Palestine is a *Holy Land* in the sense of being a *Promised Land*, and the word indicates an intensity of relationship going beyond that of either of the other two religions. As for the Christians, the land is unique; but the nature of its unique appeal goes further, and has throughout the centuries involved the idea of settlement and return, and an all-pervading religious centrality possessed by no other land.

To understand the full implications of this fact for the history of the Jews we must know something of the nature of Judaism; for much misunderstanding has arisen in relation to all three religions from the failure to realise that in spite of a common

monotheism, with its inevitable implications of universalism, they are in their emphases *three different kinds of religion*. The central emphasis in Islam is on the submission of the individual to the will of Allah, and it recognises the equality of all Muslims, whatever their colour, nationality or country. The central emphasis in Christianity is on salvation in Christ, and as such it cannot be tied either to any particular geographical area, or to any particular people. But the central emphasis in Judaism is on the divine revelation of a way of life to be lived by men in community; and it is therefore revealed to a special community. Moreover while it shares the belief in a future life with the two other religions, this belief has played a smaller role in Judaism than in either of the other two, and the concern with the life of men in community in this world has played a correspondingly larger role. Comparisons between religions are at all times difficult, and it is natural to avoid them where possible. But without some such statement of fundamentals it is impossible to get a true perspective of the relation of the three religions to the past and present history of Palestine.

The intimate connection of Judaism with the whole life of a people, with its domestic, commercial, social and public relations as much as with its religion and its relations with its God, has historically involved an emphasis on roots in physical existence and geographical actuality, such as is to be found in neither of the other religions. The Koran is not the history of the Arab people; the New Testament contains the history of no country; it passes freely from the Palestinian landscape of the Gospels to the hellenistic and Roman landscape of the later books; and in both it records the story of a group of individuals within a larger environment. But the whole religious significance of the Jewish Bible—the 'Old Testament'—ties it to the history of a single people and the geographical actuality of a single land. The long religious development which it records, its law-givers and prophets, all emerge out of, and are merged into, the day to day life of an actual people with its political fortunes and its social environment. Its laws and customs are based on the land and climate of Palestine; its agricultural festivals follow the Palestinian seasons; its historical festivals are linked to events in Palestinian history—the joyful rededication of the Temple at the feast of Hanukkah the mourning for its destruction on the ninth of Ab, and

above all the commemoration of the original divine gift of the land in the feast of the Passover. The opening words of the Passover ritual conclude with the phrase: 'now we are here, but next year may we be in the land of Israel. Now we are slaves, but next year may we be free men.' And the final blessing is followed by the single sentence 'next year in Jerusalem'.

Confusion can also result from identifying the Jewish and Christian views of the Messiah, or the Jewish view of his coming with the Christian view of his second coming. The Christian believes in a second coming of Jesus Christ to mark the end of the world and the final judgment. The function of the Jewish Messiah, as conceived in the period with which we are now dealing, was the restoration of the Jewish people from all the lands of the dispersion to the land of Israel. Ideas of judgment, of world redemption and of eternal life, were not wholly absent; but the restoration of the Jewish people occupied the foreground of the picture.

Finally it is important to realise that such a hope of restoration was inevitably kept alive and strengthened by the impossibility of obtaining a substitute in any other land. The belief which had come to be accepted as normal by Christendom, that it was only possible to have civic unity on the basis of uniformity of belief, made it absolutely impossible for a Jewish group to be anything except second-class subjects. The same was true within Islam, and there the status of second-class subject was, of course, shared by the Christians. Neither within Christendom nor within Islam could Jewish destiny be fulfilled; and the whole world, as the Jewish people knew it, was occupied by the one religion or the other. It is correct to say 'the Jewish people' and not 'Jews'; for even when they were scattered in a thousand ghettos in innumerable different Christian and Muslim countries, the Jews recognised themselves as, and were universally recognised by others to be, a single people. The conception of Englishmen, Poles or Americans of the Jewish persuasion is a wholly modern one, a product of emancipation, and has never been applicable to more than a minority of Jewry. During this period, from the second century to the eighteenth, nobody would have challenged the truth of the idea that it was just as accurate to compare Jews with Turks or Frenchmen, as to compare them with Christians or Muslims. They were recognised as both a religion and a nation,

and it occurred to no one that there was anything inconsistent in the dual attribution. This recognition by themselves and others that they were still a single people reinforces the naturalness of their continued association with the land of their independent history and of their lawgivers and prophets. Moreover their restoration to the land of Israel was an article of Christian as well as of Jewish belief, even though the Christian associated it with their acceptance of Jesus Christ as their Messiah.

In following out the relationship between the Jewish people and the land of Israel, we shall need to examine three separate aspects of the subject. First there is the place of the land in the general religious life of Jews in dispersion; second there is the story of messianic expectation and the appearance of false messiahs; thirdly there is the story of actual Jewish immigration into Palestine.

During the centuries of their dispersion Jews built up a double religious life. Their loyalty in the lands of their sojourn was governed by the general principle that 'the law of the land is law'; and each community was entitled to build up its own ordinances for its own religious government. A wide latitude was allowed for the adjustment of Biblical and Talmudic law to the actualities of life under different rulers; and a continuous correspondence took place between communities and outstanding rabbis as to the steps to be taken when new developments made new regulations desirable. But, side by side with this, as it were, *ad hoc* legislation the central study and religious interest of Jewry lay in the great codes of the Bible, the Mishna and the Talmud whose integral fulfilment could only take place in the land of Israel. Neither in sanctity nor in interest did the great corpus of diaspora legislation ever supplant the legislation concerned with Palestine; the history of the Jewish people remained their history in Palestine, and it was not until late that any Jewish chronicler concerned himself with their life in Spain, or France or elsewhere. And it was never conceived of as possible that any essential new revelation could come to them anywhere save in Palestine.

While thus Palestine remained central in the whole religious interest of the Jewish people in dispersion, the subject was especially focussed into their messianic expectations. All through the centuries under consideration false messiahs succeeded each other, and sudden rumours sprang up, now

from the east, now from the west, that the Messiah had actually manifested himself. Rabbinical scholars, even the most eminent, gave themselves to calculations of the time of his coming, though there were some few scholars, equally eminent, who resisted the temptation. Three times, in the 11th, the 16th and the 17th centuries, messianic excitement swelled to a climax which swept all through Jewry, from the furthest communities of the west to North Africa, Arabia and Tartary. The first of such waves of excitement came in 1096, the year of the first crusade. It seems to have arisen in Abydos opposite Constantinople, at the time when the German crusaders were still milling round the capital, pillaging and looting, uncertain whither to proceed. The rumours reached France and Germany that the Messiah had appeared in the east; men in Turkey said that they had met Elijah, returned in the flesh, and that he had promised that the Messiah was on the way. In the land of the Khazars seventeen communities abandoned their possessions and set out to meet the lost tribes who were said to be coming from the east to join him. Jews from all countries began to gather at Salonika to take ship to Palestine to meet him. In both west and east the more responsible leaders seem to have kept their heads; but twenty years later, when Benjamin of Tudela visited Germany, he found the Jews still in a ferment at the Messiah's expected coming. But by then most knew the reality; no Messiah had come; instead thousands of Jews had been massacred by the crusaders in the Rhineland and hundreds had been burnt in their synagogue when the Christian armies reached Jerusalem. But soon the rumours began again. A proselyte, Obadiah, had spoken with him on the road to Damascus. He had been seen in Cordova; men had heard that in Fez he had declared himself. Then in Persia. Then in the Yemen. Always the Messiah was coming; and when hope died the calculations began afresh; fresh figures, fresh dates were examined; and, unheeded, the cautious warned against the belief that the time could be known. In the thirteenth century Nachmanides, taking the analogy of the demand of Moses to Pharaoh that he would release the children of Israel, proclaimed that when the Messiah really came it would be known because he would appear before the pope and demand the freeing of his people; and in 1280 the Spanish mystic, Abraham Abulafia, convinced that he was the Messiah or his forerunner, sought to visit

Nicholas III. The pope gave orders that, if he came, he should be seized and burnt at the stake. But on the very night Abraham arrived, the pope died suddenly, and Abraham was saved. Then for two hundred years the ferment died down; the sordid miseries of the later Middle Ages contained none of that dramatic element of high tragedy which could seem the prelude to great events.

As the sixteenth century dawned the ferment welled up again with even greater strength. The expulsion from Spain, the breakdown of medieval Christian unity, the conquering advances of the Turk, all convinced men that some great dramatic change was coming. For the first time there was a faint breath of Christian speculation accompanying the Jewish excitement. Millenarian sects arose, awaiting the speedy End of the World. As it was believed that before this could take place all the tribes of Israel would have to be gathered together, a new interest arose in 'the lost ten tribes'. In those days, when voyages of discovery were taking place every year, rumours were constant that they had been found, now in Africa, now in some hidden part of Asia, even in America. In this atmosphere there appeared in Istria a German Jew, Asher Lammlein, who travelled through central Europe, giving himself out to be the Messiah, and then vanished (c. 1502). Twenty years later appeared a much more flamboyant character, David Reubeni, self-styled brother of Joseph, Davidic king of a Jewish kingdom of Khaibar in Arabia. He did not give himself out as Messiah; he promised no immediate deliverance to his fellow Jews. But he was able to say where, in Africa and Asia, the lost tribes were to be found; and his mission had the messianic flavour of the deliverance of Jerusalem from the Turks. But it was a military deliverance he proposed, and he offered the princes of Europe an alliance with his imaginary brother's forces to this end. He was received by the pope; his offer was favourably considered by the king of Portugal; other princes followed suit, and he set out to see the Emperor Charles V at Ratisbon. But by this time men had come to judge him an impostor, and he was arrested by the emperor and sent to Portugal, where he disappeared in the prisons of the Inquisition. During the same years a gentle Spanish mystic and visionary, Solomon Molcho, gave himself out as Messiah. He was a Marrano by birth, and this in the end caused his death. But his attractive character

and deep religious sincerity made a great impression on Christians as well as Jews. He was received by the pope and by Christian princes, and he accompanied David Reubeni on his fateful visit to the emperor. He also was arrested, and was burnt at the stake as an apostate.

For a hundred years the excitement died down again in Europe; but a change was taking place in Palestine. Under the influence of Isaac Luria, cabbalistic interest passed from the gnostic and theosophist contemplation and examination of the Divine Nature, to the practical question of the coming of the Messiah; and the influence of the mystics of Safad, armed as they were with the first printing press in Asia, spread all through the Jewries of Europe, particularly of eastern Europe. Dates and times were calculated again; but this time the Christian interest equalled, if it did not even outweigh, the Jewish. Everywhere, in France, in Germany, but especially in England, there was religious disorder, and new Protestant sects, each with wilder ideas than its predecessors, were to be found on all sides. Again the lost ten tribes were proclaimed to have been discovered; so that nothing was lacking but their conversion to belief in Jesus as Messiah, and His return could not be delayed. The year 1648 was believed to be the appointed time. It was a period of immense distress in Europe. For thirty years Germany had been ravaged by a religious civil war which utterly destroyed whole cities and provinces, and reduced the population from sixteen to six million. England was in the throes of a bitter conflict between king and parliament. And in the east the cruel bands of the Cossack Chmielnitzki, aided by Tartar allies, had spread havoc and desolation through all the Polish Ukraine, massacring Poles and Jews by tens of thousands. Jews and Christians were equally oppressed by the evil of the age, equally looking for deliverance. When 1648 passed and nothing was revealed, Christians accepted the date of Jewish expectation, 1666; and waited with a painful intensity equal to that of Jewry. This time it seemed to many thousands that their hopes were to be answered. There was born in 1626 in Smyrna, son of the agent of an English merchant, Shabbetai Zevi. From his early years Shabbetai devoted himself to the Cabbala and practised rigorous austerities. In 1648 he confided to the intimate circle of his friends that he was the expected Messiah; but the knowledge did not pass beyond Smyrna. Nevertheless


in 1651 he was banished from the synagogue of the city for his pretensions, and for ten years he led a wandering life. In 1660 he settled at Cairo under the patronage of a wealthy Jewish tax-farmer and mint-master, Raphael Joseph Halabi. Thence in 1663 he went to Jerusalem, still making no open claims, but seeking to make himself popular with the Jews there. On their behalf he returned to Cairo to seek financial help from Joseph. In Cairo he heard of a young woman, Sarah, refugee from the massacres of Chmielnitzki, who had announced that she was to be the bride of the Messiah. Shabbetai sent for her, married her and with her returned to Jerusalem. On the way he found a certain Nathan at Gaza who was to be his prophet. Nathan wrote to Jewish communities throughout the world, announcing that his Master, the Messiah, had revealed himself. But Jerusalem would have none of him, and fearing to make an open announcement there, Shabbetai returned to Smyrna, arousing wild excitement on the way. There in 1665 he openly proclaimed himself Messiah. The news spread like wildfire. Business men in London and Amsterdam discussed it seriously; Jews everywhere prepared for their departure for Palestine. Shabbetai went to Constantinople, perhaps expecting that some miracle would intervene to establish him with the sultan. Instead he was put into honourable confinement and, after several months' imprisonment, he was brought one day before the sovereign and brusquely given the alternatives of Islam or death. No miracle occurred, and he chose Islam. Nevertheless, men still believed in him. When he died some years later, an obscure prisoner at Dulcigno in Albania, he still had enthusiastic followers in many countries, especially in Poland. The Shabbetaian controversy troubled the Synagogue for another century; it produced curious sects like the Frankists in Poland; and one survived in Turkey as a mixed Jewish-Muslim sect known as the Domneh until the twentieth century.

Jewry could not easily recover from the blow of the apostasy of the man on whom so many hopes were set. There set in a bitter reaction and nowhere was it felt more than in Palestine itself. Palestinian Jewry, oppressed by Turkish misgovernment and crushed by the weight of taxes and exactions, sank to its lowest level of physical and intellectual misery. After Shabbetai no messianic ripples disturbed its stagnant waters. The long centuries of alternate messianic hope and despair were


succeeded by an apathy which was not broken until the 19th century.

Though it was only at the coming of the Messiah that the rabbis expected a mass movement to Palestine, it was held at all times to be a meritorious action to settle and live in the land of Israel. But just as there is a natural connection between messianic expectation and the pressure of external events, so also those who came of their own will did so mostly as a result of pressure in the land of origin. The voyage was exceedingly expensive and fraught with many dangers; the conditions of the land were well known from the reports of travellers, and men knew that they could expect only the most miserable poverty to await them. It is not surprising if in the more prosperous communities most Jews found that their contributions to the fund for the relief of captives who had fallen into the hands of the Knights Hospitallers or the Barbary corsairs on their way to the land, and to the fund for the maintenance of those who lived in the land itself, excused them from considering their own removal from their familiar surroundings before it was perfectly clear that the Messiah had come. At times a Jehudah Halevy or an Obadiah of Bertinoro would be moved by purely religious emotions; but most came like the refugees from Spain, because they *were* refugees.

It is interesting that the Muslim rulers seem at no period to have refused to allow Jews from foreign countries to enter and settle in Palestine. This was not a permission accorded to western Christians; for the Franciscan Custos was obliged to guarantee that pilgrims stayed only a certain time and then left the country. It was of great value to the Jewish population, for without immigration it could scarcely have survived. Through every century there came a steady and unrecorded trickle which at least kept a few communities in existence, and made it possible, from time to time, for more important numbers to come. In the period before the crusades we know of several groups coming from other Islamic countries, from Babylon, from Arabia and the Yemen, and from North Africa. The first important European group were the three hundred scholars from England and France who came early in the 13th century. It was not until the expulsion from Spain in 1492 that another substantial group arrived. During the brief period when Turkish administration was efficient, it was possible for Palestine to hold a substantially increased



AREAS IN WHICH THERE WAS JEWISH



SETTLEMENT AT VARIOUS PERIODS

population, and this time the immigrants amounted to some thousands. But the situation quickly deteriorated, and it was only a trickle which came in the following century. After the Ukrainian massacres of 1648-1649 the trickle grew to a stream, and at the end of the century a band of fifteen hundred set out from Poland and a thousand actually reached Palestine; but many found themselves unable to maintain themselves and sorrowfully left again. Small groups of students came from Italy on two occasions in the 18th century and established their colleges in the country; and larger groups of Chassidim from Poland came in the second half of the century, rebuilding the communities of Safad, Tiberias and Hebron.

It is impossible during this period to estimate what was, at any time, the actual Jewish population of the country. At times it must have sunk to very few thousands; but though the community of indigenous Jews, who could claim that their ancestors had never known exile, dwindled to a single village by the 19th century, there had grown up in its place a community, accepting hardships and poverty, insecurity and danger, which represented almost all the Jewries of the world, eastern, Sephardic and Ashkenazic, which was supported in its need by all the Jewries of the world, and which was regarded by Jews everywhere as peculiarly blessed because it lived upon the holy soil itself.

PALESTINE: THE HOLY LAND OF
CHRISTIANITY

SOMETHING HAS ALREADY BEEN said in the previous chapter of the differences between the Jewish concept of a 'promised' land and the Christian concept of a 'holy' land. The Christian association with Palestine rests on its being the scene of the earthly life of Jesus Christ, and not on any subsequent primacy of the country in the institutional hierarchy or religious thought of the Christian Church. That this unique characteristic has resulted in a tragic conflict for the ownership of various Holy Places is due to some extent to the chequered political history of Palestine, but owes something also to the evolution of the Church of Jerusalem in relation to the rest of Christendom.

After the separation of Christianity from Judaism had been consummated in the early decades of the second Christian century, the centre of the former passed very rapidly into the gentile world, and in the following century the bishopric of Jerusalem lost all but local interest. The destruction by Hadrian even of the name of the city in which Jesus had lived, taught and died, and the building of a new city with a new name on the site, doubtless accelerated the process; but we must also consider the probability that until the fourth century Christians had not that veneration for sites and relics which afterwards came to invest the Holy Land with a special significance.

A change came in the days of Constantine, under whom the land and its capital city was turned into a central religious shrine for Christendom. Not only in Jerusalem but all through the country, in Galilee and Samaria as well as in Judaea, churches and monasteries sprang up associated with incidents in the life of Jesus Christ. The result was inevitably a stimulation of religious and intellectual life; but even then Jerusalem had neither ecclesiastical nor intellectual pre-eminence. Its bishop was still a suffragan of the archbishop of Caesarea, himself subordinate to the patriarch of Antioch; in the great

religious discussions of the time it played but a secondary role. But this was of no importance, for it was not a rival or competitive eminence with other bishoprics that Jerusalem and the Holy Land were accorded, but a peculiar primacy which made it the common property of the whole Church. Such a shrine as that created by Constantine to embrace the accepted sites of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ had as intimate and direct a relationship to the furthest parish in the premier patriarchate of Rome, as it had to the nearest parish of the local suffragan bishop of Jerusalem in the patriarchate of Antioch.

It is not unnatural that, when such universal veneration was poured out upon the church in which their episcopal throne was established, it should seem improper to the bishops of Jerusalem that their office should occupy so subordinate a position in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; and they set out to secure the recognition of patriarchal dignity for the church of Jerusalem. They achieved it in 451, and they thereby unconsciously altered the whole standing of the Holy Places under their guardianship. It would have been better if they had sought some title, equal to a patriarchate in dignity, but in itself unique.

The position of the patriarch of Jerusalem was still further affected when the eastern Church was rent by schisms which were never healed. The patriarchate of Jerusalem remained faithful to the creed of Chalcedon, and the Orthodoxy which is henceforth, for convenience, called Greek; so that the shrines which were equally venerated by all Christians now came to be the exclusive possession of one section of the Christian body and, so far as we know of this period, closed to other sections. Justinian certainly would have been unlikely to tolerate the presence in them of those he judged heretics. With the Arab conquest a still further break took place. The patriarchates of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem all fell within the Arab dominion and were shut off from their customary contact not only with the premier patriarchate of Rome but with what had come to be accepted as the premier eastern patriarchate of Constantinople. Relations continued, but of a different kind; and they were liable to interruption. However during this period the special and universal character of the Holy Places came again to the fore, while the significance of their possession by the local patriarchate of Jerusalem fell into the

background. Palestine became a centre of pilgrimage from all parts of the Christian Church, from outside as much as from within the political dominions of the caliphs. As Islam itself venerated the shrines of Christians and Jews, and tolerated the religions of both, and as the pilgrimages were profitable, the Muslim rulers of Jerusalem encouraged them, and on two occasions gave explicit recognition to the universal Christian interest in the Holy Land of Christianity.

In 797 Harun al-Rashid recognised the interest of Charlemagne, by permitting him to endow and maintain in Palestine centres for pilgrims from the west, and this action not only did not offend the patriarch of Jerusalem but was, partially at least, inspired by him. In 1036 the Fatimid caliph, al-Mustansir, in permitting the Christians to rebuild their shrines, recognised the right of the Greek Emperor Constantine Monomachus to rebuild the church of the Holy Sepulchre, destroyed with other churches by his predecessor al-Hakim, and to nominate the patriarch of Jerusalem. It is doubtful whether any inference can be drawn from the fact that Charlemagne was a "Latin" and the Byzantine emperor a "Greek". The reason for the Muslim choice may well have been in each case purely political; and though both 797 and 1036 fell in periods of great tension, the eastern and western Churches were not yet divided. Harun al-Rashid may well have preferred the western emperor simply because he was at war with the eastern one, whereas al-Mustansir preferred to conciliate the ruler of Byzantium because both alike were in fear of the same enemy on their eastern and northern frontiers. The action of Charlemagne and Constantine restored the distinction between the universal significance of the Holy Places and the local significance of the Jerusalem patriarchate; and it seems to have been restored during this period in a second sphere also. The Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem himself came to recognise the interest of eastern schismatic or heretical Christians in the Holy Places, and they began to be admitted to what after the rebuilding by Constantine Monomachus was a single church embracing the sites of the Crucifixion (Golgotha) and the Resurrection (the Holy Sepulchre). This was probably a natural consequence of the drawing together of the scattered Christian populations under Muslim rule; but in any case there is the fact that the first head of the Christian community recognised by Islam was the Nestorian

catholicus in Mesopotamia, and that their subsequent recognitions of other Christian ecclesiastics were based on their own convenience and not on the orthodoxy of the ecclesiastic concerned.

This action of the Orthodox patriarch was therefore the natural consequence of his recognition by the caliphs as the head of the whole Christian community in Jerusalem, but it corresponded also to a tendency among the eastern Churches to create for themselves a special position in the Holy City. In most cases we cannot date exactly when such an interest developed. In some it goes back to Byzantine times; in some it took place during the Middle Ages. One of the earliest Churches to establish a special centre in Jerusalem was that of Georgia, a mountain kingdom in the Caucasus. As early as the time of Justinian the Georgians established in Jerusalem the Monastery of the Cross, covering the site where the tree was supposed to have grown from which the Cross was made. During the period in which Nestorianism and Monophysitism flourished in the east the Georgians remained strictly Orthodox. In the time of the Mamluks they obtained special favours from the conquerors, probably because they were famous warriors, and their kingdom lay on the frontiers of Islam and Byzantium, where their friendship was valuable to both sides. They came to possess a number of other monasteries in Jerusalem and they are the first Church of whom we hear as sole custodians of special portions of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. It was during the crusading period that the Jacobite Syrians created a special bishopric in Jerusalem in order to counter the attempt of the Latin patriarch to assume authority over the native Christians; and there has been a continuous line of bishops since the middle of the 12th century, some of whom have assumed the title of patriarch. In the middle of the 13th century the Copts, who had hitherto accepted the authority of the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch over Coptic Christians outside Egypt, also consecrated a special bishop for Jerusalem, and have likewise maintained their bishopric. It is the only see outside Egypt. Two other churches which had taken similar steps at some period before the 13th century were the Nubians, or Abyssinians, and the Armenians. They also early established claims to special places in the church of the Holy Sepulchre. The former do not seem to have established a special bishopric, being content with monasteries;

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but the latter created a bishopric which in the 18th century assumed patriarchal dignity. Except the Georgians all these Churches were Monophysite. The Nestorians appointed a bishop of Jerusalem as early as 893, whose function was to care for Nestorian pilgrims, rather than for any settled Nestorian congregation. After 1065 their bishops in Jerusalem ranked as metropolitans, and continued to be appointed up to the beginning of the 17th century.

While such was the situation of the eastern Churches, relations with the west followed a different pattern. In the middle of the eleventh century the final break took place between Rome and Constantinople. This did not appear to have any immediate effect on the treatment of western—or as we can now call them, Latin—pilgrims to Jerusalem; and what might have developed subsequently was interrupted by the crusades. According to the western tradition the Orthodox patriarch died just at the time of the arrival of the Latins, so that the consequences of appointing a Latin patriarch may not have been fully worked out. The eastern tradition maintains that he lived until 1106, so that the appointment of a Latin patriarch was definitely an act of schism; but the step was itself inevitable during the Latin occupation. The Latin Christians would not have accepted the jurisdiction of a 'Greek' patriarch whom they in their turn regarded as schismatic. But, *mutatis mutandis*, the same applied to the local Christian population, and still more to the Greek Orthodox population of Byzantium. A successor to the Orthodox patriarch was, therefore, consecrated at Constantinople, and seems to have resided there during the crusading period. Nevertheless the distinction between the patriarchal see and the Holy Places was recognised. The Orthodox and other eastern Christians were not excluded from worship in the church of the Holy Sepulchre. The monk Theodoric in 1172 found Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Jacobites and Abyssinians possessing altars; and the Latin kings were even prepared to attend Orthodox ceremonies. Moreover the Orthodox reached some *modus vivendi* with the Latin ecclesiastics, though it would probably be anachronistic to attempt to define its implications too clearly. It did not amount to reunion. While some of the Latin patriarchs showed themselves intolerant and oppressive to the local 'Greeks' and Syrians, no fundamental change was made in the situation during the period of the Latin patriarchs.

The Orthodox and Syrians continued to use the church. When the Latins were expelled, the Orthodox patriarch automatically assumed his previous rights, though he did not expel the Latin Christians from the shrines.

The humiliating and disastrous failure of the crusades led to a widespread heart-searching throughout the western Church. While some still thought out strategic plans by which an armed attempt might be made to recapture what had been lost, the more spiritually minded, especially the newly constituted Franciscan and Dominican Orders, turned to a religious rather than a military solution of the problem. They were influenced in this attitude not only by a desire to convert the Muslims themselves, but by the increasing knowledge which the crusades had brought them of the existence of very widespread Christian congregations in the east which were not in communion with the west, but which were not felt, as was the Orthodox Church, to have deliberately and consciously broken off contact with the papacy. It was soon found that missions to the Muslims were impossible. Even such men as Francis of Assisi himself, or the saintly Dominican, Raymund Lull, were unable to make any impression on the adherents of Islam; and as death was the penalty both for the missionary who sought to turn a Muslim from his faith, and for his convert, did he succeed in making one, the attempt was soon abandoned. There were always a few fanatics from both western and eastern Churches who sought deliberate martyrdom by proclaiming their faith in the mosques of Islam, but the conversion of Islam at this period was not regarded officially as practicable. A more hopeful line seemed the rallying and strengthening of the Christian forces which existed throughout the wide dominions claimed by Islam. Something has already been said of the sterile hope that the Mongols might permanently adopt Christianity—though had they done so at that stage of their development they might well have been as much a liability to Christendom as the Ottoman Turks were later to Islam—and many missions, half religious, half diplomatic, were sent to the Mongol khans. But there were also hundreds of thousands of descendants of pre-Islamic Christian communities in Persia, Armenia, Georgia and other lands, as well as in Syria and Asia Minor, who might be strengthened by the presence and assistance of western clergy and missionary stations.

The ending of the crusades, then, imposed a double task on the western Church, and it was entrusted by Pope Innocent IV to the two great preaching Orders. To the Dominicans was given the missionary task throughout the east, and to the Franciscans that of safeguarding the access of the west to the Holy Land. It may be said at once that it proved impossible for the Dominicans to get any foothold whatsoever in Palestine as, section by section, it passed back into Muslim hands. The Franciscans, on the other hand, did succeed in establishing themselves in Jerusalem and, to some extent, other towns, and in caring for the pilgrims who still came from Europe to visit the Holy Places. But the manner in which they conducted the struggle to establish themselves in these Holy Places made them so hated by almost all the eastern Christians that they could not hope to combine their guardianship with any missionary work among native Christians who regarded them as more deadly and insidious enemies than the Muslims themselves. All round the fringes of Palestine and further afield the Dominicans succeeded in establishing good relations with native Christian groups, and some, through their work, were reunited with Rome. To such work the Franciscans themselves had closed the door, so that an eastern Christian in Palestine, as the fourteenth century pilgrim Burchard reports, would rather have become a Muslim than a Latin.

As the rest of the story is, from all standpoints, tragic, and to many must seem highly unedifying, it is well to remember three facts without which a real understanding of the problem is impossible. In the first place, all through the centuries the Holy Places were visited with deep and sincere devotion by tens of thousands of simple Christians of all Churches who were concerned with a genuine and humble adoration of the Master in whose earthly footsteps they believed themselves to be following as they visited the various shrines shown to them; and who viewed the variety of language and devotion which they witnessed at those shrines as evidence of the universal nature of their religion, rather than as the assertion of the rival rights and claims of different ecclesiastical institutions. Their thoughts dwelt only on the sinless life and redeeming death of their Saviour. In their pilgrimages they underwent great hardship and passed through many dangers in order to express a religious faith which was wholly sincere; and many of them died in the course of their pilgrimage. In the second

place those Churches and ecclesiastics themselves which became involved in unworthy acts of bribery, and even in bloody conflicts, were led originally into these mournful courses, not by any personal ambition but by an extreme, and even fanatical, sense of the importance of the sites which they conceived it to be their duty to guard for the innumerable members of their respective faiths. They fought in order that simple pilgrims might not be excluded from shrines which they regarded with the utmost veneration; and in order that the spiritual benefits which they believed to accrue from the pious visitation of such sites should not be lost to members of their own Church. Finally, when we consider the bitter and contemptuous terms in which each tended to condemn the activities and ceremonies of the other, especially the Latin descriptions of the devotions of the Orthodox and Syrians which are mentioned later in the chapter, we must remember that these authors did not belong to a period in which the study of religious psychology would have enabled them to understand the underlying reality in actions which, if performed by themselves, might have been frivolous and unseemly. The members of the eastern Churches, living in the oriental environment of Islam, naturally tended to express their religious emotions in the manner familiar to them from their environment, but the faith and devotion which they sought to express was the same as that of their more restrained western brethren.

The problem which faced the Latin Church when its patriarch and clergy were compelled to quit Jerusalem, and still more when they were compelled to quit Palestine, was a difficult one. The Orthodox patriarch had already become accustomed to making some accommodation with schismatic or heretical eastern Churches as to the use of the Holy Places. The Latins themselves had not wholly excluded them during the crusading period. But no such accommodation had been formally made during the brief decades between the split between East and West and the crusaders' capture of Jerusalem, and no such accommodation could easily be made at the time of the collapse of the Latin kingdom in view of the hostility between the Churches at that moment. In consequence, as they ceased to be residents in the Holy Land, the Latins, alone of all Christian bodies, gradually found themselves with no status in the Holy Places. At the very beginning of this

stage the step was taken of obtaining rights, not from their fellow Christian, the Orthodox patriarch, but from Saladin.

The step itself was possible, as has been already said, because of the Muslim conception of the legal ownership of such places. Muslim rulers held themselves to be the owners of all religious buildings within their dominions, to whatever religion they were devoted, and therefore claimed the right to allocate them, confiscate them or close them. No such buildings could be repaired or rebuilt without their permission. No protest could lie, if they decided that they should be turned into mosques. Such is the background of a situation of which we can find many examples in Jerusalem in every century down to the end of Turkish rule. At the very moment of the reconquest there was a discussion as to whether the church of the Holy Sepulchre should not be again destroyed, as it had been by al-Hakim. It would be unfair to say of Saladin that his motives for deciding to allow the building to stand were financial; but such were certainly the motives of his successors. The governors of Jerusalem and all their hangers-on made immense profits out of the Christian shrines. For the pilgrim was taxed on entering not only into Jerusalem, but also into the church of the Holy Sepulchre, which was open free only on certain days during Easter and the festival of the Invention of the Cross. And yet, when the pilgrim Thietmar visited Jerusalem in 1217, he found the church closed, empty and deserted. It was a reminder to all Christian sects that they held their rights only by the goodwill of their rulers, and other occasions on which the church was closed have already been mentioned.

For the understanding of the subsequent story some account of the churches of the Holy Sepulchre and the Nativity is essential. The former church consists of two main parts. At the west is a large rotunda, covered by a dome, often rebuilt and usually open to the sky in the centre, and surrounded by a two-storied aisle. In the centre of the rotunda is the Holy Sepulchre, with a chapel around and over it. To the east of this rotunda are the transepts and choir of the crusaders' cathedral. North of the north transept is a large chapel (the chapel of the Apparition, where Jesus was supposed to have revealed Himself after His resurrection (Matt. xxviii. 9)). In the south transept, which contains the main entrance to the church, is the stone of anointing, on which the body of

Jesus was believed to have been prepared for burial; and east of the south transept is a two-storied building containing the rock of Golgotha above and the chapel of Adam below. Apart from the crusading period, the choir has always been the seat of the Orthodox patriarch, but around its apse are the usual series of chapels, each of which has come to be allotted an incident from the Passion story. Still further east, and at a lower level, is the chapel of the Empress Helena, and beyond and below that lies the chapel of the Invention (i.e. discovery: Latin *inventio*) of the Cross. The church of the Nativity consists of a four-aisled nave, apsidal transepts and apsidal choir. In front of the choir, and entered from the north and south transepts, are two staircases going down to the grotto of the Nativity, and the grotto of the Manger. Both churches are surrounded by monastic buildings in the possession of various Christian bodies.

Of the two the church of the Nativity is the more ancient. Although careful examination has shown that it is not the original building of the days of Constantine, the columns of the four-aisled nave may date from his period, reset at a higher level above the lovely mosaic floor of his church of which there are still substantial remains. The transepts and choir belong to the time of Justinian. The other church has little left of Roman or Byzantine days. The rotunda was rebuilt in the 11th century on the original site; but of Constantine's church of the Martyrdom nothing but fragments of foundations remain. In place of it, the crusaders in the 12th century built the present transepts, choir and ambulatory, which they attached to the rotunda, and also to the Golgotha chapel. They thus incorporated all the holy sites in a single building. In 1808 the whole building, but especially the rotunda, was seriously damaged by fire.

The keys to the church of the Nativity have been a subject of quarrel between Christian bodies. But from 1239 the keys of the church of the Holy Sepulchre have been kept by a Muslim family; since 1517 order has been maintained by Turkish soldiers, and the very heavy tax on entrance (until the end of Turkish rule) was collected by Muslim officials from every Christian resident or pilgrim, except at Easter and the Feast of the Invention of the Cross.

The official re-establishment of the Latins was originally due to an interview in 1192 between the bishop of Salisbury

and Saladin, as a result of which they received permission for two priests and two deacons to be attached to the churches at Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem, and for Latins to visit the Holy Land on pilgrimage. How long this permission lasted we do not know, but there is no mention of these priests in the accounts of pilgrimages from the beginning of the thirteenth century. The significance of this new departure was not immediately visible; for a brief period certain Latin bodies still continued to exist in the Holy Places apart from this permission, and many eastern Churches continued, throughout the Mamluk period, to enjoy rights in the church of the Holy Sepulchre and elsewhere which they had received from the Orthodox patriarch without any payment to the Muslim rulers. Of these at the beginning of the period the Georgians were the most powerful group. They had more shrines than the Latins or any other community except, of course, the Orthodox, and they had the privilege of keeping the keys of the Sepulchre itself. Mention is made by medieval pilgrims of special shrines of the Abyssinians, the Armenians and the Syrians; but doubtless the Copts and Nestorians also possessed some special centres, though it is only mentioned that they were to be found in the church. By a bull of 1333 the authority of the Latin Church in relation to the Holy Places was given to the Franciscans and the head of their Order in Palestine had episcopal dignity and the title of Guardian, or Custos, of the Holy Places. They gave the first sign of their increasing power when in the middle of the fifteenth century (a period when, after the Council of Florence, reunion with the West was in the air) they were able to outbid the Georgians for the keys of the Sepulchre, the first example of the policy they were to pursue with increasing single-mindedness during the succeeding centuries, of displacing other Christian groups by bribing the Muslim authorities. But at the end of the Mamluk period they still had no more than four altars, though these included the exclusive possession of an altar on Golgotha and the right to celebrate mass in the Holy Sepulchre—the two principal shrines of the whole building.

The Turkish conquest introduced a new factor into the position of the Latins by substituting the power of France for that of individual princes and the Italian cities. The French Church had for long regarded with pride the long connection between France and Palestine. The relations between Harun

al-Rashid and Charlemagne were magnified until it came to be believed that Charlemagne was admitted by the caliph to be his overlord for the Holy Land. The predominant part that France had taken in the whole crusading movement was proudly emphasised. When therefore France received the most favourable privileges for her trade and consular activities in Turkish territory, the effect was immediately seen in an intensification of the activity of the Latins in regard to the Holy Places. The main feature of the period which runs from 1517 to 1740, when the Franciscans secured the most complete recognition of their claims, is the partial disappearance of the lesser Churches. The lavish scale on which the Franciscans could buy rights and the vigour of the political pressure which France was prepared to apply compelled them to drop out. They had no influence and no money. A French traveller, Canon Morison, visiting Jerusalem in 1698, records the unhappy situation of the Copts. There was but one priest left in a dark corner of the aisle of the rotunda. He was unable to go out, and his people could not pay the fees demanded for the opening of the doors to come in. They could only visit him twice a year when the doors were opened free. If the Franciscans had not occasionally given him food he would have starved. Only one eastern group had been able to improve its position. This was the Nestorian Church which had been taken under the wing of the Dominicans and Franciscans in the hope of reunion. In consequence they had been given definite possession of a tiny alcove off one of the Franciscan chapels 'big enough for four people to enter'. The Armenians, however, though at their weakest at this time, managed to restore their influence later and during the 19th century and to-day their patriarch enjoys an equal status with the Orthodox and Latin patriarchs in relation to the Holy Places.

Politically the position of France rested on the capitulations which had been agreed between Suleiman the Magnificent and Francis I in 1535. While they involved no diminution of Turkish sovereignty (as did later European 'capitulations' with Asiatic powers) they gave France complete pre-eminence over other European powers, who might only trade with Turkey in ships bearing the French flag, and whose European residents depended for their protection on the French consuls. While these capitulations made no reference to the Holy Places,

they gave a handle for subsequent claims on behalf of the Franciscans in that they allowed France the protection of the western pilgrims and the Franciscan residents. The fact, however, that the Franciscans themselves came from all the Roman Catholic countries of Europe, and especially from Italy and Spain, brought in the interest of other European powers, so that even when there was tension between France and the Porte, the Franciscans were not without protectors.

After the Reformation the Franciscans still remained responsible to the Turkish authorities for all western pilgrims, which now included Lutherans, Calvinists and other Protestants. On the whole they seem to have acquitted themselves fairly of what must have been a difficult task. If up to the end of the 18th century the pilgrims sometimes complained that the Franciscans expected considerable payments for their hospitality, it may well be that they were unaware of the fees which had to be paid by their hosts to the Turks. Nor was it unnatural that the Franciscans should feel that sums given them by faithful pilgrims of their own flock, or by the princes of Europe, should not be expended on the care of heretics. They were therefore careful to see, when a Protestant pilgrim arrived at Jaffa, whether he had adequate money for all his expenses. If he appeared to be insolvent he was liable to be sent home again. During the eighteenth century the wealth of the Franciscans diminished considerably; the number of pilgrims was much reduced, and the exactions of the Turks increased. They were compelled by circumstances to exercise every economy and, even so, lived a sufficiently miserable existence. In the 19th century their situation gradually improved, and almost every Protestant pilgrim records his gratitude to the Franciscan fathers for their care and attention.

The pressure exercised by the Franciscans from the 16th century onwards led to a reaction on the part of the Orthodox, whose power, though less than that of their rivals, was increased by the political reunion of the Jerusalem patriarchate with the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople. The intensity of the struggle was increased by the mutual antipathy of the antagonists. The Latins held the eastern Christians, whether Orthodox or schismatic, in ever increasing contempt; and it has to be admitted that the descriptions of western travellers go far to explain this feeling. While the members of the patriarchal staff and the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre

were Greeks, there was no difference in cultural level between the laity of the Orthodox, the Syrian, or the other eastern Churches; and all alike had become thoroughly 'orientalised'. The combination of a wildly emotional devotion to the Holy Places with all the physical gyrations, contortions and extravagances normal to a congress of dervishes did not predispose western visitors, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, in favour of the rights—or rites—of eastern Christians. And in addition to the religious exercises of the Easterners they must have suffered considerably from the dirt and smell of a shrine in which one of them gravely raised the question whether it were possible that the marble pavement spontaneously generated fleas.

As one of the great assets in establishing possession was that the party in question had been permitted to effect a repair or rebuilding, the Latins scored a triumph when in 1555, at the request of the Franciscan Custos, the emperor Charles V and his son, Philip II of Spain, secured permission to rebuild the dilapidated chapel over the Sepulchre itself. This made it a Latin possession, and from then onwards they exercised the right not merely to say mass in the tomb, but to prevent any other Church from doing the same. With the permission of the Franciscans an eastern Christian might enter this, the holiest shrine of the whole building, to say his private prayers; but he was not allowed to do more. Such was the curious position in this church that if he did, a fine of 500 piastres had to be paid to the Turks. The securing of so exclusive a right in such a place as the Sepulchre itself meant war to the knife on the part of the Orthodox, and it is not surprising that deaths and severe bodily wounding became a feature of the Latin-Orthodox conflict from then on. During the seventeenth century the Franciscans—according to their later claims—increased their holdings; but it is uncertain what shrines they actually had occupied to produce the edicts in favour of the Orthodox of 1634, 1644 and 1676, cancelling their 'encroachments'. For the Turks with perfect indifference described as 'encroachments' in an edict to the Orthodox what they had recognised as 'rights' in capitulations made with the French, or edicts issued to the Latins. In 1634 the Orthodox for a time ousted the Latins from Golgotha, and in 1676 scored a further triumph in ousting them from the Sepulchre, and proceeded to celebrate their victory by giving the maximum offence to

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their opponents. But their triumph was short lived, for in 1691 the Latins recovered the Sepulchre, and their position on Golgotha, and held them until the fire of 1808. In 1740 the French negotiated new capitulations with sultan Mahmoud I, and article 33 guaranteed the Franciscans in the possession of 'the Holy Places of pilgrimage which they have, in the same manner as they have possessed them in the past.' At no time were the Turks anxious to define more exactly the privileges which they granted; so that when in 1757 the sultan Osman guaranteed the Orthodox against any further encroachments of the Latins, he left it happily vague as to what was encroachment and what was ancient possession. That there had been encroachment can be seen from the fact that in 1850, when the Latins were claiming to be put in possession of the shrines to which they had secured rights by the capitulation of 1740, they claimed, instead of the four, which they had possessed since the Middle Ages and which still remained the whole of their claims in 1621, almost the whole of the building except the actual choir of the crusader church which was the cathedral of the Orthodox patriarch. They claimed the whole of the rotunda and the transepts with all their Holy Places, practically the whole of the ambulatory around the Orthodox choir with its Holy Places, the crypt of the Invention of the Cross, all except one altar of the two-storied building of Golgotha, and the whole of the quadrangle on the south side of the building by which alone it was possible for anyone to enter it from outside. That they had ever, in practice, exercised the exclusive possession of these fantastic claims for more than brief periods they were of course unable to show; but the subtle nature of the privileges granted by the Turks made it equally impossible to prove that they had not. While the main interest of the Churches centred in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, similar conflicts existed over Holy Places in the church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and elsewhere.

In 1808 a fresh situation was created in the church of the Holy Sepulchre by a disastrous fire which started in the gallery of the rotunda, and destroyed the whole rotunda, including the shrine of the Sepulchre, and severely damaged the rest of the building. In spite of protests from the Latins, the Orthodox managed to secure the exclusive rights to execute all the necessary repairs; and put such haste into it that the church was ready for rededication in 1810. In doing the work

some £200,000 was expended, of which £125,000 was accounted for by bribery at Constantinople, and of the remaining £75,000 much went on similar expenses at Jerusalem. The result can be easily foreseen; the building lost what dignity it had possessed; the architecture was poor, the reconstruction clumsy and slipshod, and the execution shoddy. In the course of the work the Orthodox managed to oust the Latins from many of the shrines of which they were actually in possession, and even vented their spite in destroying the tombs of the Latin kings of Jerusalem. For some decades the Latins were not in a position to attempt to counter this increasing influence of their opponents, or to recover the altars which they had lost. It was only in 1850 that the French ambassador to the Porte, supported by the ambassadors of the Roman Catholic kingdoms of Sardinia, Spain, Belgium and Austria, made a formal demand for the restoration to the Latins of all the places which they claimed to have possessed in 1740. These demands were, of course, opposed by Russia, and for two years an extraordinary battle raged between the embassies at Constantinople. The actual issue was in itself trifling and concerned the church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The Orthodox had stolen a silver star which the Latins had placed over the actual spot marking the Nativity, and had secured the keys of the church itself. The negotiations made it clear that neither France nor Russia intended a settlement. The star and the key being disposed of by a new star and key being provided by the sultan, an issue was found in the decayed state of the dome of the rotunda of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. When that was disposed of by an agreement that a new dome should be built by the rulers of Turkey, France and Russia, the Latin rights in the church of the Tomb of the Virgin proved impossible of settlement; and when the difficult matter had been dealt with as to whether the Latins could be expected to say mass on a 'schismatic' block of marble, on which stood as ornaments 'schismatic' vases, it was at last found that the position of the Russian fleet was an intolerable menace, and Britain, France and Turkey found themselves allies in a war against Russia.

Partly through the influence of Sir Stratford Canning, the British ambassador who had no claims to make for himself, the Porte resisted the attempts of either side to secure new definitions of rights; and in 1852 the sultan Abdul Mejid

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issued a firman in which he ordered the maintenance of the status which each Church possessed in 1757. This declaration of the status quo was confirmed by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and formed the basis of the rights exercised by the different Churches when they were most carefully defined by the British in 1929, in which each lamp, picture and altar is exactly specified.

A similar story of the piety of innumerable individual pilgrims and the unhappy jealousies of Churches could be told of all the other Christian shrines in the country. In the case of those sites to which Christians regained access only in the nineteenth century, the usual habit has been for different Churches to select different spots as the authentic holy place; and this has obvious advantages, so long as they are unable to go back to the early medieval system of sharing them without quarrel or question of precedence. There are thus two gardens of Gethsemane, two Mounts of Temptation, two scenes of the Transfiguration, two dwellings in Cana of Galilee where the wedding feast took place, and so on. In each case one of these is in the possession of the Latins, and one belongs to the Orthodox. But with other sites such divisions were not possible, and the struggle had to be for a single site. Of these the more interesting are the churches of the Nativity and the Tomb of the Virgin.

The Virgin Mary enjoys such reverence among the Muslims that the church of the Nativity at Bethlehem was the only Christian shrine spared by al-Hakim. From the days of the Arab conquest the Muslims enjoyed the right of praying in the south transept, where Umar himself prayed. They are recorded as having joined in the Christmas pilgrimages in the 9th century; and in the treaties made in 1241 and 1244 with the sultan of Damascus, this right was specifically retained. Another point of interest in regard to this church is the rare record, in a fourteenth century pilgrim, Jacques de Verona, of the presence of Indian Nestorian Christians celebrating in the north transept, with other Nestorians and the Abyssinians. In the church of the Tomb of the Virgin there is likewise evidence of Muslim interest; and they possessed a prayer recess in the southern wall between the Latin and Greek altars.

The restoration by the Orthodox of the church of the Holy Sepulchre in 1808 was largely made possible by the extensive contributions made by the Russians; and thereby marks a

new stage in the conflict over the Holy Places. In the 19th century the Russians stood behind the claims of the Orthodox just as the French had stood behind those of the Latins. The two powers came into open conflict in the middle of the century, and made the issue of the Holy Places the pretext for a struggle for power over the decaying body of the Turkish empire which led to the Crimean war. Actually the war did nothing to solve the problem of the Holy Places, for at the end of it the powers agreed to maintain the *status quo* which had been drawn up by the Turks before its beginning. But the balance of power in Palestine had changed, and in a later chapter the new position established by the Russians will need consideration.

JERUSALEM: A HOLY CITY OF ISLAM

THE COMMON PHRASE THAT Palestine is the Holy Land of three faiths is not strictly accurate. It is not appropriate to the Islamic relationship, for the land which corresponds to the position of Palestine in the thought of Jews and Christians is for Muslims Arabia. Moreover no particular sanctity of any kind has ever been attributed to Palestine as a whole. Its Biblical frontiers had no significance, and never featured as a separate Muslim administration. The country was divided, according to convenience, between different provinces, whose frontiers were continually altered. Jerusalem also was never a Muslim capital. Even the two Umayyad caliphs who were most closely associated with the country, Muawiyah and Sulayman, showed no special regard for it. Muawiyah, who was proclaimed caliph at Jerusalem, made Damascus the seat of his government; and Sulayman, who chose Palestine for his residence during the three years of his rule, built himself a new capital at Ramleh. Nor had it a paramount religious position, save for brief periods when Mecca was, for some reason, inaccessible to the Muslims of Syria. When the crusaders were approaching the city in 1098, the Abbasids were unmoved by appeals from their fellow Muslims for assistance. The Ayyubid, al-Kamil, exchanged it for a treaty of alliance against Damascus with Frederick II. On two occasions in the thirteenth century, when the Christians captured Damietta, al-Kamil and his successor as-Salih were prepared to exchange this port for the holy city of Jerusalem.

Such a situation sufficiently indicates the political difference between being the *first* holy city of a religion and the *third*. But Jerusalem remains the third holy city of Islam. Its Arabic name is al-Kuds, the Sanctuary, a name which it owes to the Haram ash-Sharif with the twin shrines of the Dome of the Rock and the mosque of Aksa, and the group of colleges, libraries, tombs, and other religious buildings occupying the wide area of Solomon's Temple and its courts and palaces.

From the historian's point of view there is a difficulty in the

fact that the very sanctity which Islam attributes to the Haram ash-Sharif is due to the association of the spot with the other two religions involved, and not to any comparable Muslim relationship. In the earliest days of his preaching, when the contrast between the lofty monotheistic faiths of Judaism and Christianity and the primitive paganism of Arabia was still vividly impressed on his mind, Muhammad showed his preference for these older faiths by making Jerusalem the city towards which his followers should turn in prayer. But when it became obvious to him that neither Jews nor Christians were willing to accept his claims to a divine mission, entitling him to the position of the last and final authority on the revelation of God to man, he changed his mind. He had conquered Mecca, and he made its originally pagan shrine, the black stone of the Kaaba, the centre to which all Muslims should turn in prayer. But while neither Christians nor Jews were prepared to assign such claims to Muhammad as he demanded for himself, he was unable to dissociate himself from the spiritual authority attributed to Moses and to Jesus by so large a part of the world with which he was familiar. He therefore continued to demand the support of both of them for his new religion, and to claim to have more fully understood their contribution to revelation than the adherents to the faiths of Judaism and Christianity themselves who had hitherto accepted their respective revelations as final.

It was to emphasise this claim that he placed the scene of his ascent to Heaven on the site of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, even after he had moved the direction of prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca; and in their commemoration of this event, the Muslims have attempted to parallel not merely Jewish but Christian holy places. For as there was once the Jewish Holy of Holies on the spot whereon the ladder stood by which Muhammad climbed, so, on leaving earth he left the imprint of his foot upon the rock, to equate the imprint of the foot of Christ shown on the Mount of Olives in the church (now the mosque) of the Ascension.

The difficulty of the historian is still further emphasised by the fact that the nature of the ascension of Muhammad is such that it is entirely useless as historical evidence. The association of Jews with Palestine is a historical fact, whether one believes that association to be the result of a divine intervention or not. The association of the Founder of Christianity

with Palestine is a historical fact, whether or not one accepts the Christian theological claim as to His nature, or even the ecclesiastical claim of authenticity for the Holy Places. But the association of Muhammad with the country rests on willingness to believe that in a single night, and on a winged horse with the face of a woman and the tail of a peacock, Muhammad flew to and from Arabia, in order that he might then mount by a ladder for a personal view of the heavens and an interview with Allah; while his remarkable mount, al-Burak, remained tied near to that point in the whole area which stood above the only remaining Jewish Holy Place, the Wailing Wall. The event is not the poetical or theological dramatisation of an incident which, stripped of the miraculous element, rests on solid historical foundations. It has to be accepted as it stands, or there remains no evidence whatever associating Muhammad with Jerusalem other than the early choice and quick rejection of that city as the direction towards which Muslims should pray; and this choice, in any case, rested on a veneration for Judaism and Christianity and not on a personal experience of Muhammad.

What is true of Jerusalem turns out also to be true of the other sites in the country on the basis of which the claim is made that Palestine is the 'Holy Land of three faiths'. The shrines are either Jewish or Christian; and in any historical consideration a prior claim to their enjoyment would rest with one or the other, or both, of those two religions. The two holiest of these shrines are the tomb of the patriarchs at Hebron, and the 'tomb of Moses' in the wilderness between Jerusalem and Jericho. The former of these is an ancient Jewish shrine, which was also venerated by Christians, to the extent that the name of the town in crusading days was 'Saint Abraham'; and the Muslim sanctuary is largely of crusading or earlier Jewish construction. The latter is not an ancient shrine, but rests on a Muslim legend about the Jewish leader. The present group of buildings was not erected before the thirteenth century, and it did not become an important place of Muslim pilgrimage until the sixteenth. And, as with the footstep of Muhammad, so here, the Holy Place did not arise out of Muslim autonomous tradition, but from the desire to provide for Muslims an attraction which gave Jerusalem an importance for Islam similar to that which it received for Christianity from the constant stream of Christian pilgrims.

Of the other shrines, we can sometimes trace the actual date and circumstances in which the Muslims seized them from either the Jewish or Christian possessors, and all alike relate to Jewish or Christian and not to Islamic history. Such are the Jewish Holy Places of the tombs of Rachel, Samuel, David, Gamaliel and others, or the well of Jacob; or such Christian Holy Places as the tomb and the house of Lazarus, and the reputed scene of the Ascension. The Cenacle and Franciscan convent on Mount Zion were taken as late as the sixteenth century. In addition to these shrines, from which in most cases Jews and Christians were wholly or largely excluded after their seizure by the Muslims, Muslims always demanded access to the shrines still left to Jews and Christians. One of the most interesting cases of this concerns the great and autocephalous convent of Saint Catherine at the foot of Mount Sinai. The convent is built as a fortress against the depredations of raiding bedouins; but such was the Muslim veneration for St. Catherine, of whose life incidentally they knew absolutely nothing, that during the Mamluk period a mosque with minaret was built within the actual walls of the fortress. The monks who, in accordance with the tradition established by the church of the Holy Sepulchre, had provided chapels for all the different eastern Churches, had to maintain also this mosque in case any important Muslim desired to worship there. As to the village shrines (Mukams) they differ in no degree from similar shrines in other Muslim countries. They commemorate real or legendary local figures, often without any relation whatever to their supposed religious virtues. Notorious brigands and robber sheiks have been made objects of subsequent local canonisation.

We must, however, recognise that, from the Muslim point of view, the appropriation of Jewish and Christian shrines followed naturally from the belief of Muhammad that Islam had superseded and fulfilled what were genuine previous revelations given by God to Jews and Christians. In this belief he was, to some extent, following the precedent already set by the Christian Church, which similarly appropriated to itself the Jewish Scriptures, and spoke of the Jews and their understanding of the Scriptures in terms considerably more opprobrious than those used by Muhammad. There was, however, this important difference. Christians considered the text of the Old Testament to have divine authority and left it

unaltered (though they sometimes accused Jews of falsifying particular passages) so that they embodied in their religious faith the moral and ethical teaching of the Law and the prophets, and the personal religion of the Psalms. But Muhammad, while expressing high respect for Moses and Jesus, considered the Old and New Testaments full of error, and provided in the Koran, especially in the second and third Suras, his own version of the sacred history of both Jews and Christians. In doing this he omitted almost everything of independent value in their teaching. From the historical point of view the version of Muhammad has no special significance. It rests on no independent tradition, but is based on verbal communications from Jews and Christians; for the Bible did not exist in Arabic in his days, and there is no evidence that he could read it in any of the languages in which it did exist. But from the point of view of a Muslim, the version of Muhammad rested on an independent divine revelation, and was ample authority for the appropriation of any shrines of the earlier religions if the Koran showed that the Prophet had venerated the personality with whom the shrine was associated. While this remains true of particular sites, it does not constitute the country as a whole an Islamic Holy Land. For Muhammad in the third sura declared an association between Abraham and Mecca. The land which was promised by God to Abraham was made to be not Palestine but Arabia. The pilgrimage to Mecca was given a high antiquity by being attributed to a divine command given by God to Abraham, and his footprint was shown within the sacred enclosure of the Kaaba itself.

But if the claims of Islam to a place alongside of Judaism and Christianity in their relationships to Palestine be based on appropriations from those religions, rather than on any genuine historical association proper to itself, two things still remain true. The majority of the inhabitants of Palestine have for many centuries been Muslims; and in such matters as religious veneration it is necessary to take into account the emotional as well as the historical aspect of the question. Even if the Muslim Holy Places of Palestine have been appropriated from other religions, the veneration paid to them by Muslim believers is a historical factor of importance.

As the previous chapters will have shown, the Muslim inhabitants of the country are, to a large extent, the previous inhabitants, converted to Islam from either Christianity or

Judaism during the centuries which preceded or followed the crusades. There has been a constant addition from other stocks, as was inevitable in a country which changed masters so often, and which was always something of a corridor; but the basic Muslim stock remains ex-Christians and ex-Jews who have entirely forgotten their previous language and religion, and who feel themselves to be successors of the original Muslim conquerors of the country. There is in Islam a very strong sentiment of the inalienability of territory conferred by Allah on true believers; and while this sentiment was not deeply affected by the loss of the European possessions of the Turks, the land won by the original wave of the Arab conquests of the seventh century is felt to be peculiarly a Muslim patrimony. Damascus prides itself enormously on the fact that the unbeliever has never held the city since its first conquest by the followers of Umar; and it is felt to be a stigma in the history of Jerusalem that it has been lost to Islam for periods in its history. Though the Abbasids did nothing to prevent its conquest in the eleventh century, some at least of the enthusiasm which inspired Nur ad-Din and Saladin for its reconquest in the twelfth was religious, the duty to recover from the pollution of Christian ownership what had been Islamic territory and what had been Islamic shrines, especially of course the Haram ash-Sharif. To what extent this remained a conscious feeling it is impossible to estimate, for the occasion never arose subsequently for its exercise. Palestine remained in the heart of the Islamic world until the first world war.

During that period the possession of the Haram ash-Sharif was never questioned, and it continued to enjoy great prestige. It did not rank with Mecca in holiness, or indeed with Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo or Constantinople in the wealth that was poured out on it; it was something that was there, and it never occurred to a Muslim that it would not always be there. The pilgrimages to Palestine, to the Haram, to the tomb of Moses, to the tomb of the patriarchs at Hebron, were pilgrimages of great local significance, and attracted a certain number from distant Islamic territories. Jerusalem has already been compared to one of those cathedral cities of Europe, remote from the world's affairs, whose sanctity was commonly accepted but whose paths were rarely trodden by men busy with more mundane matters; and this is indeed a fair parallel.

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For the sanctity of Jerusalem in Islam does not stand apart in splendid isolation, as it does in the traditions of Judaism and Christianity. Thus both Judaism and Christianity saw it as the scene of the final judgment. But Islam, which accepted Jesus as the final Judge, and believed that this judgment would take place in Jerusalem, believed that it would be preceded by the appearance of the Messiah on the minaret of a mosque in Damascus, and followed by his burial at the side of the Prophet at Medina.

As a centre of scholarship or spiritual life Muslim and Christian Jerusalem present close parallels. For it was never an important centre of Islamic studies, though it had its schools, and was often visited by famous scholars from more celebrated centres of learning and piety. Its own scholars were mostly associated with the 'Shafiite' school of interpretation, which lies half way between the liberalism of Iraq and the conservatism of Medina. Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii, its founder, was born in Gaza in 767, but his teaching was mostly given at Baghdad or Fustat in Egypt. Most Palestinian Muslims still belong to this school of thought. Several Jerusalem scholars became martyrs to their faith. One was Abul Kasim ar-Ruwaili, who was murdered by the crusaders on their entry into the city in 1099. Perhaps the most famous Islamic writer which Jerusalem produced was the geographer al-Maqdisi (al-Mukaddasi) who flourished in the second half of the tenth century, and wrote a famous account of his travels in all Islamic countries except Spain.

The Islamic veneration for Jerusalem has been greatly increased in modern times by association with the growth of Arab nationalism but this aspect of the question must be reserved for a subsequent chapter. It is, however, pertinent to observe that from the political standpoint it is impossible to base political treatment on the actual authenticity or historical validity of a religious and emotional veneration. The Jewish sentiment attached to the Wailing Wall, the Christian devotion to the churches of the Holy Sepulchre and the Nativity, and the Muslim veneration for the Haram ash-Sharif and the sanctuary at Hebron, are political facts of high importance, and could only be violated by a political authority at the cost of a great deal of violence and bloody repression. This was recognised as early as the thirteenth century, when Frederick II guaranteed Muslim access to and authority over the Haram

ash-Sharif; and it was maintained by the Turks in their attitude to the Jewish and Christian shrines in their possession.

There is one further point of interest. While the increasing fanaticism both of Islam and of the local Muslim population led in many cases to the complete exclusion of non-believers from sites regarded by Islam as holy, this principle allowed of exceptions. In the days before the Arab conquest the normal procedure was for both churches and synagogues to be open to all who desired to enter them, except during special services. The Muslims, of course, claimed the right of access for themselves to all Christian shrines; but there still remained one or two places where the old tradition survived, and where members of all faiths were allowed either equal rights or at any rate some right of access. Examples have already been quoted from the crusading period; there was the curious situation at the convent of St. Catherine at Sinai. Other cases were the church of the Tomb of the Virgin and the mosque of the Ascension. The fact that such cases survived the increasing bitterness, ignorance and fanaticism of the centuries under review is not without importance.

In dealing with the relations between Islam and Palestine there are important aspects of the question which cannot be covered by a discussion of actual Holy Places. In such a discussion Islam inevitably appears at a disadvantage as compared with Judaism and Christianity. But on the other side must be set the fact that the whole cultural and religious influence to which the population has been exposed for more than a thousand years, apart from the crusading period, has come from Islam. It is inevitable that we should condemn the Muslim rulers, Arab, Mamluk and Turk, for having turned a fruitful land into a desert by their avarice and misgovernment. But it is unjust to forget their positive contribution also. In all centuries we get evidence from western travellers, Christian and Jewish, not only of robbery and extortion, but also of courtesy and hospitality, tolerance and sympathy; and if Islam must bear the blame for the one it is right that it should have the credit for the other. Moreover, there has always been a small cultured class of clergy, merchants and landowners whose rational philosophy and religious tolerance have been in favourable contrast to the fierce intolerance of the Christian sects, or the narrowness and misery of the Jews. And it remains true that in the Dome of the Rock Islam has created, albeit

with a Greck architect and fragments of Roman and Christian masonry, one of the most exquisite and spacious sanctuaries in the world. This very quality of an intensely individual creation out of elements which were neither Arab nor Muslim is indeed the essential quality of the Islamic civilisation at its greatest period, when it gathered together under the Umayyads and Abbasids the passing greatness of the Hellenic, the Persian and the eastern Christian cultures. Palestine was never the country in which this harvest was shown in philosophy, mysticism or literature. But in marble and mosaic, in column and arch and dome, as well as in spacious planning and gracious approach, there is no Islamic monument in the Middle East whose beauty equals that of the Dome of the Rock and the area of the Haram.

POLITICAL HISTORY FROM THE NAPOLEONIC
TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY Turkey had maintained the integrity of her territory not by the power of her armies but by the mutual jealousies of the European powers. None of them were willing to see a rival enriched at her expense, and this situation continued through the nineteenth century down to the first world war. The most significant factor in the eighteenth century had been the gradual expansion of Russia southwards, and this movement continued during much of the nineteenth century. From the time of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774 onwards, the Russians had their eyes firmly fixed on Constantinople. Inconclusive war followed inconclusive war, but at each peace treaty Russian power was one stage nearer its objective. In 1783 the Crimea was annexed and a great naval base constructed at Sebastopol. In 1829, by the treaty of Adrianople, she secured for her subjects the same right to live under their own consular jurisdiction as had been enjoyed by France since the sixteenth century. In 1833, by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelesi, she obtained the exclusive right to come to the military or naval assistance of the sultan, the equally exclusive use of the Bosphorus for her ships of war, and what amounted to a protectorate over the Turkish empire. This marked the zenith of her power; for the other states of Europe were too watchful for her to exploit still further the influence which she had gained, or to reach her real goal, the possession of Constantinople.

During the Napoleonic wars it had seemed for a brief instant as though Napoleon might sweep all the Asiatic and African provinces of Turkey within the wide net of his imperial ambitions, and it was only the decline of French influence after his defeat that allowed Russia to secure the advantages she obtained in 1829 and 1833. But though the effects of Napoleon's intervention in the affairs of Turkey were but transitory, the strategy which underlay them revealed a

radical change in the situation of Palestine. The expansion of European interests through trade, colonisation and conquest, which marks the eighteenth century, brought to an end the period in which European interest in the country had been academic or religious. But this change involved a reversion, not to the type of interest of Rome or Byzantium, or even of the crusades, but to that of an earlier period. It was not Palestine as part of the Mediterranean littoral which drew would-be conquerors, but Palestine the bridge between great possessions. As once those had been expressed in the empires of the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates, now they were expressed in the relations of European political and commercial powers with the wealth of India, China, the Far East and Australasia.

It was just over five hundred years after the last European forces of the crusaders had been driven out that a new European army, under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, crossed its frontiers. He had just concluded a successful campaign in Italy, and considered the time ripe to strike a blow at England's eastern empire by conquering Egypt and Syria. That an extension of French power in these areas would provide a valuable balance to British influence further east was no new idea in French political circles; but it was only in 1798 that the political and military opportunity coincided. Napoleon had an excellent army of trained veterans, and the government was not unwilling that they should be employed, together with their successful and ambitious general, at a safe distance from the shores of France. It was in May 1798 that he embarked with 32,000 men from Toulon for a secret destination. Malta was occupied without difficulty; by a stroke of luck the French fleet and convoy passed the British fleet under Nelson unnoticed in an early morning haze; and on the first of July the army landed at Alexandria and captured the city on the following day. By the battle of the Pyramids on July 26 Napoleon obtained control of Egypt; but a week later his whole plan was seriously endangered—if not shattered—by the complete destruction of his fleet by Nelson at the battle of the Nile. Return to Europe thus cut off, Napoleon settled down for the winter in Egypt, and introduced considerable reforms into the corrupt Mamluk government of the country, besides setting on foot important scientific and archaeological projects. But the time for such activities was short. The sultan

had declared war on France on September 1, and two expeditions were being organised against him, one by land through Syria, one by sea from Rhodes. Napoleon decided to meet the first before preparations for the second could be completed, and then to return to Egypt to meet it. In the latter task he succeeded, but not in the former.

He seized Suez in December and advanced into Palestine with 13,000 men; al-Arish was reached in February, and on March 6, after a brief resistance, Jaffa fell. Twelve hundred soldiers of the garrison were barbarously executed after their surrender, on the grounds that many of them had been previously taken prisoner at al-Arish and released on condition that they took no further part in the fighting. Twelve days after the fall of Jaffa, he was encamped before Acre, and expected the town to fall after the first assault. It was here that, for the second time, his plans went wrong. In spite of the destruction of his fleet he had sent his siege guns from Jaffa by sea along the coast, and they were detected and captured by a British squadron under Sir Sydney Smith. Smith then had time to return to Acre, where he found not only a resolute pasha—the infamous al-Jazzar—but a brilliant French royalist engineer, Col. Phelippeaux. Working together the three set out to make something of the ruinous defences of the city, and were so successful that, deprived of his heavy artillery, Napoleon's first assaults were a complete failure, and he had to settle down to vigorous siege tactics. He guarded his position against a land attack by sending Murat to occupy Nazareth and Safad, and another general to seize Tyre. Nevertheless in the beginning of April the Turks, who had assembled their forces in Damascus, crossed the Jordan, both above and below the lake of Tiberias. After preliminary skirmishes they took up their position on a line from Mount Tabor to Afula. There, on April 15, Napoleon attacked and completely routed them. His hopes of success were raised still further by the arrival at Tantura of three French frigates with new siege guns; and with these he was able to press the siege of Acre more closely. But his advantage was somewhat offset by the arrival of a Turkish fleet at the beginning of May from Rhodes; and, though at each attack Sydney Smith admits in his despatches that he expected the town to fall, the defences held. On May 18 Napoleon decided to retreat, writing to the French government in his despatches that the

town was not worth the effort to capture it. On the 20th the camp was secretly evacuated, and in the beginning of June he recrossed the Egyptian frontier without having had to fight any rearguard actions. Jerusalem he never attacked, but it had been put into a position of defence by the combined efforts of the Muslims, Christians and Jews, none of whom were deceived by Napoleon's proclamation to each that he had come as their special protector. On August 23 he left secretly for Europe, leaving behind him his army and his dreams of eastern conquest. Once or twice during the long drawn out war which ended at Waterloo he attempted to replan his eastern policy, but without success; and for thirty years after his departure Palestine sank back into obscurity. Al-Jazzar died in 1804, and a new chief appeared in the Lebanon; but the greater part of the country passed back into the hands of pashas appointed annually from Constantinople, who provided with scarcely relieved monotony the traditional misgovernment.

In Turkey itself, however, events were slowly moving towards some elementary measures of reform. The sultan Mahmoud II, though not particularly able or, indeed, forceful, possessed a patient tenacity, and in a reign which lasted from 1808 to 1839 was able to lay certain foundations. His most important achievement was the destruction of the janissaries. For more than a century this once famous corps had been entirely without military value; but it dominated the capital and the palace, and made and unmade sultans at will. Mahmoud realised that without a modern army he could not hope to retain any semblance of his empire, and at the same time that, so long as the janissaries existed, no modern army could be brought into being. After waiting patiently for eighteen years, in 1826 he suddenly turned on them and mowed them down in the streets of Constantinople and in their barracks. But it was too late for him to reap the benefit of this action himself. Largely encouraged by Russia, but with the support of other European countries also, all his Christian European provinces were in a ferment, and in Greece he was involved in a long and costly war. But that was not his only difficulty; his pashas, profiting from the weakness of the central authority, made themselves practically independent in their provinces and robbed him of both the military and the financial resources of his empire. In Syria, Palestine and Egypt, the Christian minorities were too weak to think of

revolting; but in the race between Christian rayahs and Turkish pashas to dismember the empire, one of the ablest of the latter class was the Albanian, Mehmet Ali (1769-1849) pasha of Egypt.

Mehmet Ali, as second in command of an Albanian regiment, took part in the disastrous descent on Egypt from Rhodes in 1799. In 1801 he returned to the country in command of his regiment, and in the confusion which followed the withdrawal of both the French and the British made himself pasha with the support of the Mamluks. In 1805 the sultan confirmed him in his pashalik, and he set out to organise his dominion. Strongly favouring the French, he drove the British out when they staged a rather ill-planned invasion in 1807, and invited all kinds of French experts to reorganise first his army, then the industry of his country; and finally, with their help, he built himself a navy. He organised a curious kind of totalitarian state, half barbarous, half highly civilised for his day. Land was ruthlessly nationalised; all profitable raw materials or industries were made state monopolies; conscription was introduced to provide an army of 100,000 and forced labour was employed on large public works. These projects led to a great increase of taxation, and the lot of the fellahen became even more unendurable than under the Mamluks. The possible hostility of the latter he eliminated by a treacherous and wholesale massacre in 1811.

In the next eighteen years Mehmet was occupied with wars nominally at least on behalf, and at the request, of the sultan Mahmoud. He waged war on the new reformed Islamic sect of the Wahhabis, and drove them out of Mecca and Medina. In 1824, three years after the Greek war of independence had broken out, Mehmet provided the sultan with his best—as well as most bloody and ruthless—troops in Greece. He planned to obtain as a reward the pashalik of the Peloponnese (Morea) for his son, and of Crete for himself. When this failed he demanded Syria, and on being refused satisfaction, in 1831 he sent an army under his son Ibrahim, whose ability equalled his own, to invade it. Gaza, Jaffa and Jerusalem were occupied with little opposition, for Turkish rule had few admirers even among the Muslim peasants. Acre and Damascus fell in May and June of 1832, and Ibrahim marched rapidly northwards. The army which the sultan sent against him was easily destroyed, and Ibrahim was soon master of the whole of Syria

and threatening Asia Minor. At this moment Mahmoud appealed to Europe for help, and Ibrahim captured Konieh and advanced towards Constantinople.

The moment was a bad one for European intervention. In 1832 England was fully preoccupied with reform at home; France, which half supported Mehmet, was also preoccupied with domestic troubles. It was Russia's opportunity, and she took it, as already related, to crown a half century of slow but successful penetration. Moreover she had no intention of allowing a new and vigorous dynasty to occupy the seat of the decadent Ottoman sultans. She sent three successive contingents, both naval and military, to Constantinople, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were fortified at the orders of the "Russian Commander in Chief and Ambassador Extraordinary in the Turkish Empire." Europe took alarm. Russia refused to withdraw until Mehmet Ali also withdrew his forces; and this Ibrahim refused to do. Finally the powers forced Mehmet and Ibrahim to be content with the whole of Syria, and the Russian forces withdrew from Constantinople. So matters remained for six years. But in 1839 Mahmoud decided to reconquer Syria, and his troops were disastrously defeated. Again the powers intervened; and though France half-heartedly supported Mehmet, Britain sent a fleet to bombard the Syrian coast. Beirut, Sidon and Acre were occupied, and Mehmet compelled to content himself with the hereditary pashalik of Egypt. The natives of Palestine, who had readily welcomed Ibrahim ten years previously, as readily saw him driven out. For conscription, high taxation and a crude efficiency had proved more intolerable than the slipshod exploitation of the Turks. Nevertheless the period of Egyptian rule had important consequences for the future. Mehmet and Ibrahim readily opened the country to western visitors, and it was under their rule that the first western schools and hospitals were introduced by British and American missionary societies. In addition the increased security of their government made it possible to travel with relative safety throughout the land, and this possibility has left permanent results in Biblical research and in the series of exquisitely illustrated books on the Holy Land, which provide the most illuminating, if not always the most pedantically accurate, pictures of the land, its conditions and its natives. The first half of the 19th century was a great period of book illustration, and the steel

engravings of Finden, Bartlett and others, and the lithographs of Roberts, illustrate almost every corner of the land. One event of this period, which had nothing to do with politics, must be mentioned. On 1 January 1837 a terrible earthquake devastated northern Palestine, especially Safad and Tiberias. In the former town more than 5,000 perished out of a population of 10,000, and in the latter 700 out of 2,500.

The period between the restoration of Palestine to Turkish rule and the Crimean war was one of considerable importance. It witnessed many changes—changes which, however, still left it possible to say of Turkish rule *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. The successor to Mahmoud II, Abdul Mejid (1839-1861) was a man of totally different character. Weak and debauched, he was yet mild and benevolent, and accepted, without resistance, the passage of effective authority to the European ambassadors at his court, and in particular to the British ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, later Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who 'reigned' at Constantinople from 1842 to 1858. Following advice left by his father, Abdul Mejid at the very beginning of his reign proclaimed with great solemnity the Hatti-Sherif of Gulhané, in which he granted various important reforms to his subjects. All, without distinction of race or creed, were promised security of life, honour and property, just incidence of taxes, and the public trial of prisoners. But the vizir who inspired and drew up these generous promises, Reshid Pasha, was immediately violently attacked by all the reactionary forces of the empire, and their implementation was left to his successor, a man of so appropriate a temperament that he would admit to the administration no one who could even speak or understand a Christian language. Naturally they were ineffective. Sixteen years later, at the close of the Crimean war, the measures of the Hatti-Sherif of Gulhané were repeated and enlarged in the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856 which gave non-muslims legal equality and access to the army and the civil service. But whereas the earlier reform was the subject of constant pressure by the various ambassadors at Constantinople, and their consuls elsewhere, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 contained a clause whereby Turkey's desire for reform was accepted as genuine and the powers bound themselves not to intervene for the proper implementation of the Hatti-Humayoun. In its unpopular parts it remained, therefore, an even deader letter than its predecessor.

Nevertheless certain measures were inevitably taken, and this was particularly the case in Palestine, where the rule of the ambassadors at Constantinople was paralleled by the rule of the consuls at Jerusalem. The first of the consuls was actually appointed by Great Britain in 1838, during the rule of Ibrahim. This was followed in 1843 by the appointment of consuls by France, Prussia and Sardinia. In the next year an American consul arrived; and in 1849 Austria replaced Sardinia. Spain followed suit in 1854. The Russians, however, were content to possess an agent in Jerusalem dependent on Beirut, where they had maintained a consulate-general since 1839. In addition to the consuls there were various officials with special interests in different classes of the local population, particularly the non-muslims, who possessed another nationality than the Turkish, or required some special protection. There was a rabbi with authority over Jews who were Russian or Austrian subjects; an English bishop was sent out jointly by England and Prussia in 1842; a Latin patriarch arrived with authority over Latin Christians in 1847.

While all these officials together could not amend the basic venality and incompetence of Turkish rule, or indeed exercise much influence over the affairs of the Muslim population, they could, and did, secure that some of the reforms of Gulhané were carried out in the interest of Jews and Christians. Such international protection was very necessary at the period in which the consulates were established. In 1840, partly at least owing to the denunciations of an antisemitic Frenchman, the Jews of Damascus were involved in an accusation of ritual murder, and feelings against the Jewish population became dangerously high. During the whole decade there was unrest in the Lebanon, and sometimes open civil war between the Latin, Orthodox and other Christians and the Druzes. It would have been easy for such troubles to have spread to Palestine; but the protection afforded by the presence of the consuls proved adequate. The Jews turned to the British, the Christians to the French or Russian officials for assistance; and the British consuls, as one of their official duties, exercised a general protection over the Jewish subjects of the sultan and over Jewish residents who possessed no other protector. This work, often difficult and delicate, took up a good deal of the time of the first two consuls, Mr. Young (1839-1845) and Mr. James Finn (1845-1862). Later it was considerably reduced.

And yet the most interesting story of the protection of one people by another during this period comes not from the work of the European consuls, but as an act of reparation in the long story of Jewish-Samaritan relations. In 1841 the Muslims of Nablus, always among the most fanatical of the inhabitants of the country, planned the extermination of the last remnants of the Samaritan people. They were saved by the chief rabbi of Jerusalem, who gave them a certificate attesting that 'the Samaritan people is a branch of the children of Israel, who acknowledge the truth of Torah' and so were entitled to protection as one of the 'peoples of the Book'. In 1854, as the result of the appeals of Joseph esh-Shaleby, a Samaritan leader, they were taken under the protection of the British consul.

While the security of the rayahs and foreign visitors and pilgrims steadily increased, until not merely travel but residence in the country became relatively safe for Europeans, there was little basic change in the position of the Muslim population. As has been said, the consuls could not alter the system of government, nor could they normally interfere in any matter concerning Muslims. To remind them that they had no authority where 'true believers' were concerned, each consul had to be accompanied by an armed Muslim Kawass, for it would have been dangerous for a Christian to strike a Muslim, even in self-defence. But even on this subject some changes took place. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century no Christian had been permitted to enter the area of the Haram; one or two did so disguised as Muslims, or by bribery and under extraordinary precautions. But in 1855 the government of an exceptionally enlightened pasha happened to coincide with the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Brabant, later King and Queen of the Belgians, and the royal guests expressed a wish to visit the area. The pasha, after taking the utmost precautions, consented, and a large party of Christians was rapidly shown over the more important sites. The visit having passed off successfully, it was not long before it was repeated, each time with fewer precautions, until the Muslim population became accustomed to the idea of Christians' entering the area without fear.

Pashas were appointed annually, and some of them were men of over eighty. They were surrounded by a council of local Arab effendis; but this contributed little to their efficiency,

for the effendis were both corrupt and themselves involved in the constant feuds which disturbed the country. These feuds the pashas lacked the power to put down, and often the will. For it had been a regular principle of Turkish government to sow discord among the subject populations, lest they should unite against their Turkish masters; and the most corrupt and inefficient pasha was, by very instinct, a master of the art of encouraging jealousy and discord. In the north of the country the two families of Abdul Hadi and Tukan perpetually disputed control over the Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin areas. West of Jerusalem the powerful clan of Abu Ghosh divided its time between mutual rivalries and the plundering of travellers on the road to Jerusalem. In the south the sheiks of Hebron and Beit Jibrin copied the example of their peers in the north. And, profiting from all this rivalry and conflict, the bedouin sheiks and their tribes sold their aid to one side or the other, robbed and murdered sometimes at will, and increased both the poverty and insecurity of the unhappy peasant. While such a picture is warranted by the facts, yet such is human nature that, in spite of it, many villages lived tranquilly and prosperously, under competent and humane local rulers. Taxation, where it was justly exacted, was light, the land was fertile, there was an ample market for their produce, and in normal times the evils of conscription only lightly affected them.

The Crimean war had singularly little effect on the local situation. The claims about the Holy Places made on behalf of the Latins by Napoleon III had been no more than an indication to Turkey and to Europe that France had recovered the determination to re-establish herself after the loss of influence which had followed the defeat of Napoleon I and the disregard for her views at the time of Mehmet Ali. She was no longer unwilling to challenge Russia who had reached the high-water mark of her power in the treaty of Unkiar Skelesi in 1833. This situation was expressed locally in the increasing hostility between the Orthodox, under Russian protection, and the Latins. The removal of the Latin star at the scene of the Nativity in Bethlehem took place during this period of Russian ascendancy, and was one of the principal subjects of grievance brought forward by France in 1850. The issue of the Holy Places was settled by the sultan issuing, on his own authority, an edict establishing the 'status quo' at the shrines,

which, without entering into details, prescribed that the actual situation at the time of the edict (1852) was to be maintained; and this, in the end, prevailed against all the intrigues and counter-intrigues of the embassies in Constantinople and the Churches in Jerusalem. The real issue was elsewhere, in the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, and it left Palestine untouched. Strangely enough, the defeat of Russia by England, France and Turkey, also left the Russian influence in Palestine intact, and it was in the decades following the Crimean defeat that Russia secured an immense increase in her prestige by the Turkish surrender of the Maidan, the great public recreation and parade ground outside the city walls, for the erection of the huge Russian compound, with cathedral, hospital, and hostels for pilgrims, which is still a conspicuous part of the landscape of modern Jerusalem.


The shifts in the balance of power which led to the French temporary occupation of the Lebanon in 1860 to protect the Christian population, and the British permanent occupation of Egypt twenty years later, which led likewise to further wars and rebellions in the Balkans and a fresh conflict between Russia and Turkey, all this which fills the pages of the history of the eastern Mediterranean in the '60's and '70's had singularly little effect on the Palestinian situation. The death of Abdul Mejid, the brief reign of his amiable but drunken and extravagant successor, Abdul Aziz, likewise produced no change. But in 1876, on the accession of Abdul Hamid II, a new and important stage in the reform of the empire was announced, with the proclamation of a National Assembly, in which all sections of the population should equally take part. This measure was the work of a great reforming vizir, Midhat Pasha, who had already tried to reorganise the provincial system ten years earlier. But in Abdul Hamid a sultan had ascended the throne who had no intention of favouring reform but who, unlike his predecessors, had the skill and tenacity to defeat both the pressures of the European powers and the desires of his own subjects. The Turkish parliament survived only a matter of months, and then the unhappy country found itself in the toils of a subtle and evil tyrant, whose long reign effectively prevented any further amelioration of the conditions of his subjects until the twentieth century.

There was, however, one branch of his administration which it was in his own interest for Abdul Hamid to reform. During

his reign Turkey pressed forward the modernisation of her army; and this involved a certain tightening up of the provincial administration, both in order to obtain finance and to enforce conscription. The hatred of conscription among the fellahs explains the fact that most of the figures for the 19th century population of the country are on the side of under-estimates, since the villagers cheerfully rendered false returns in order to avoid the permanent loss of their children. In the tightening up of the administration various changes took place in the provincial boundaries. At the beginning of the century there had been a pashalik of Acre which covered the coastal region as far south as Jaffa. Below that the pashalik of Gaza extended to the Egyptian frontier. All the hinterland formed part of the large and important pashalik of Damascus. Abdul Hamid created a new pashalik of Beirut and gave new frontiers to Syria (or Damascus, for the Arab name for both province and capital is Ash-Sham, the left, or north). In the pashalik of Beirut were comprised the sanjak of Acre which included all of Galilee, and the sanjak of Balqa which included Samaria. All of Transjordan right down to the gulf of Aqaba fell into different sanjaks of the pashalik of Syria. In 1889 a territory roughly corresponding to the ancient Judaea was turned into a separate Mutesarifiat (or independent sanjak) of Jerusalem, depending directly on the Porte, and outside the control of the pashas of Beirut and Syria. The need for this change is probably to be found in the increasing European population drawn to the country, which, in 1889, already included the first Zionist colonies.

To checkmate the influence of the powers previously most determined to protect their interests in his empire, Russia, France and Great Britain, Abdul Hamid accepted the friendship of the new European great power, Germany. In 1889, the Kaiser Wilhelm II, after visiting Athens for the wedding of his sister to the king of Greece, went on to Constantinople and was the first of the rulers of an important Christian country to accept the hospitality of the sultan. In 1898 he made a second tour in the Levant and paid an extremely theatrical state visit to the Holy Land. The walls of Jerusalem were breached at the Jaffa Gate in order that he might enter the city in mounted procession, and forthwith great German buildings began to out-top the Russian and other European structures which had already risen in the modern city. At the

TURKISH
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nearest possible point to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, and on the site of part of the convent of the Hospitallers, rose a German Lutheran church. High above the old Franciscan buildings on Mount Zion towered the vast German Benedictine basilica of the Dormition of the Virgin. And dominating the whole city from the Mount of Olives, was erected, in the style of a Rhineland castle, the palace, hostel and hospital of the Empress Augusta Victoria.

In 1908, after more than thirty years of the oppression and misgovernment of Abdul Hamid, the Turks themselves revolted. He was deposed by the Committee of Union and Progress, led by a group of army officers known as the "Young Turks". But the course of the revolt revealed only too clearly the limitation of the Turkish understanding of the contemporary world. The officers represented almost the only class which had been effectively westernised since, as already said, even Abdul Hamid had realised that without a modernised and Europeanised army, the state could not hold together. But the military mind and military interests are both limited. The Young Turks believed themselves to be liberal in offering the non-muslim and non-Turkish population equal participation in a Turkish constitutional assembly, under strongly Turkish influences. It was rejected as hopelessly inadequate by peoples who desired national independence, and the Young Turks found it no easier to handle their Christian subjects than had the sultans. They made the same mistake with the Arabs in the eastern half of their empire. The old council of the Arab effendis desired no constitutional changes. They had been useless from the standpoint of government, and indifferent to the rights of their own tenants; but they had enjoyed both personal power and considerable profit out of the Turkish system, and had been left largely to manage their own affairs. In consequence they were hostile not only to conscription in the interests of a Turkish imperialism, but even more to forms of government and education which were designed to create an artificial unity on the basis of a deliberate turcification of the non-Turkish population. In view of the general situation at the beginning of the 20th century, the Young Turks found that they had stimulated, more than the old Turks had ever done, the rise of an Arab national feeling, and the consciousness of a separate Arab destiny.

In consequence, when the first world war broke out, the

loyalty of the Arab sections of the empire was, for the first time, in doubt. In Palestine itself Arab nationalism had hardly come into existence; the centres of the new movement were in Damascus and Beirut; but Palestine was affected as much as any other Arab country in the struggle for Arab support waged between the main antagonists, Britain and Germany. The Germans hoped that the war would be proclaimed a Jihad, a Holy War, and that this would involve Britain in unrest or rebellion among her many million Muslim subjects. But a Holy War would need to be supported by the Arab prince Husayn, a descendant of the Prophet and Guardian of the Muslim Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. Husayn was therefore arduously courted not only by the Turks and Germans in the interests of Turkey, but also by the British, once Turkey, in November 1914, had thrown in her lot with Germany. The negotiations with Husayn will be discussed in chapter fifteen, but the success of the British, and particularly of Colonel Lawrence, in raising and maintaining a bedouin Arab force commanded by Husayn's son Faisal played an important part in the later phases of the Palestine campaign.

It was obvious from the beginning that one of the objectives which Germany would set her Turkish ally was the cutting of British communications at the Suez canal; and considerable forces, commanded by Jemal Pasha with General Kress v. Kressenstein as his adviser, were concentrated in Syria. In February 1915 some Turks actually crossed the canal in an attack on the British line which lay to the west of it; but for the greater part of that year the main Turkish army was concentrated in the Gallipoli campaign. Early in 1916 the British crossed the canal; but they stopped about ten miles to the east of it, and it was not until December that they crossed the desert and occupied al-Arish. Part of the delay was due to the need for advancing the railway and a water pipe-line to supply the army. This later stood the British in good stead, while the extreme weakness of Turkish communications—over one thousand miles of single track line from their base on the Bosphorus—contributed not a little to their defeat. While the British were still establishing their position at al-Arish, the revolt of the desert Arabs had begun to cause some embarrassment to the Turkish left front; and, to prevent the Arabs or Jews of Palestine from showing sympathy with the enemy, Jemal adopted a ruthless policy of oppression, which resulted

in the deliberate destruction of houses, roads, fruit trees and crops, and the execution or imprisonment of considerable numbers of the population. In consequence few Palestinians took part with the British in the Palestine campaign. The general effect of the war on the inhabitants is described in chapter fifteen.

In March 1917 the British made an unsuccessful attack on the Turkish line at Gaza, and for six months no further move was made. In the summer General Allenby replaced General Sir Archibald Murray as commander in chief, and the Arabs reached Aqaba, where they were within possible communication with the British army to the west of them. By the end of October Allenby's plans were ready and, making a feint on Gaza, he heavily attacked and routed the Turkish left flank at Beersheba. The Turks retired to a line from Jerusalem westwards to south of Jaffa, and there Allenby attacked again on November 16. Jaffa was taken, and he detached a considerable force to march directly eastwards on Jerusalem. On the 21st Nebi Samwil was occupied, but there were not enough men to take the city. It fell without resistance on December 11, and both sides prepared for the final battle, which took place on September 19, 1918, on a line across the Judæan hills south of Nablus and Tulkarm. This time Allenby feinted against the Turkish left stretching beyond the Jordan valley and covering the railway from Damascus southwards, and delivered his main attack in the coastal plain. British desert forces and the Arabs together held the left occupied, while Allenby annihilated the forces in the plain, and with a swift cavalry movement reached Nazareth, Jenin and Beisan in less than forty-eight hours. Thereby he completely cut off the Turkish retreat, save across the Jordan where the Arabs were waiting for them. After the rout of September 19, there was little more to be done. Damascus was occupied both by the Amir Faisal and the British on October 1, and the armies swept northwards. The armistice was signed on October 31, 1918, and four hundred years of Turkish misrule came to an end.

CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN INTERESTS
BETWEEN 1815 AND 1914

THE CHANGES WHICH TOOK place during the nineteenth century in the world situation and in the political history of Turkey not only had a general effect on the position in Palestine, but also had special effects on the three communities dwelling within the country's frontiers, the Muslims, the Christians and the Jews. As has so often been the case in Palestinian history, the motives which led to these effects were in each case largely different and independent of each other. In this situation it is logical to take first the position of the Christians; for it was in the relationship to the country of Christians that changes first took place, and the new Christian interest, while primarily concerned with religious matters, did, in fact, have a considerable influence on subsequent developments affecting the general population and the Jews.

In so far as Christians are concerned the nineteenth century witnessed a revolution in two fields—in the position of the indigenous Christian population and in the relations of Christendom to Palestine as a common Christian Holy Land. While in the main the two movements were distinct, they met in the field of education, and in the offering by other Churches, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant, of new educational opportunities to the indigenous population. While in most cases this education was offered to the whole population, it was the Christians who most frequently took advantage of it. For, in spite of the fact that Sir Stratford Canning had, in 1844, secured the right of the Muslim to change his religion without incurring the death penalty prescribed by the Koran, the Muslims were afraid of Christian influence; and in 1854 they returned to a policy of open hostility, from which the Christian schools and mission stations throughout the empire had to suffer, and which caused many of them to be closed. The Turkish attitude was clearly expressed in four points:

1. The Turkish Government will not allow any attempts, public or private, to assail Islam.
2. They will not allow the missionaries or their agents to speak publicly against Islam.
3. All attempts to convince Muslims that their religion is not of God must be regarded by the Turkish authorities as insults to the national faith.
4. They will not allow the sale or distribution, in public or private, of any controversial works.

While it is perfectly correct to speak of a 'new' Christian interest in the country in this century, and while this is as true of the Roman Catholic as of other Churches, in the case of the Roman Catholics this new interest was additional to an established policy which had been continued with but little interruption since the break between the eastern and western Churches, and had been consolidated in 1622 by the establishment of the Congregation, and later of the College, of Propaganda in Rome. The papacy aimed always at a restoration of relations with the members of eastern communions and had, in the course of the centuries, made considerable progress in parts of the eastern world. Hence arose uniate Churches, representing sections of the various Churches of the east which retained their own language, together with many of their customs, but were in communion with Rome and accepted the doctrines of the Roman Church. In the case of the Maronites the whole body accepted reunion with Rome, and the Maronite Uniate Church dates from the crusading period. In all other cases it was only a section which was reunited, so that two bodies, and often two patriarchs, are to be found in the subsequent period. A uniate Church was formed from Syrian Jacobites about the end of the seventeenth century; in 1724 one was formed from Orthodox in the patriarchate of Antioch, and to this Church is given the name of Melkite, a name which in the controversies of the fifth century had applied to all Christians who accepted the decrees of Chalcedon. There is a long and tangled history of relationships with Rome in the stories of the Armenian, Nestorian, Coptic and Abyssinian Churches, in each of which uniate bodies ultimately came into existence and had their position regularised during the nineteenth century. Most of these Churches possessed no members in Palestine, but Maronites and Melkites had small

congregations which had their part in Latin ceremonies in the church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The motives which led the first Protestant Christians to settle in the country were twofold: the reformation of the eastern Christian Churches and the conversion of the Jews. The English Church Missionary Society and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions seem to have arrived almost simultaneously at the idea that the time was ripe for a friendly approach to eastern Christendom from the Protestant world. Between 1816 and 1819 the Rev. W. Jowett travelled through the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, making contacts both with the Orthodox and other eastern Christians on behalf of the Church Missionary Society. In 1821 he returned, and in Syria encountered an American, Pliny Fisk. Together they visited Jerusalem, but neither was able to remain in the country, owing to the hostility of the Turks. But in the same year another American, Levi Parsons, attempted to set up a permanent station in Jerusalem. His main desire was to circulate the Bible, believing it would lead to a revivification and reform of the Churches, and he was well received by many of the eastern clergy. But his health broke down, and he died the following year in Alexandria. In fact death took a heavy toll of the pioneers in this field from Britain, Europe and America. The Americans then decided to make Beirut their centre. There they became firmly established, in spite of the violent hostility of the Maronite clergy to their distribution of the Bible to the Maronite laity. So violent was the opposition of the Maronite patriarch that in 1824 he secured a firman from the sultan, forbidding the giving of the Bible to Turkish subjects, and in 1826 the first Protestant convert, Asaad esh-Shidiak, was starved to death by his orders in a cell of the Maronite monastery of Kannobin. Nevertheless the translation of the whole Bible into Arabic, and its printing on well-cut Arabic type, was one of the most important works of the Americans at Beirut. In 1828 there was another violent persecution, and most of the missionaries had to retire temporarily to Malta.

Meanwhile the second interest of the western Churches, the conversion of the Jews, was also leading to action. The earliest society directly concerned with that object was the London Society for promoting Christianity among the Jews, which

was founded, under the royal patronage of the Duke of Kent, in 1808. It began work in England, and only gradually spread through Europe, where it encountered Swiss and German societies with the same objects, to Palestine. In 1820 it sent out a young Swiss pastor, M. Tschudi, but he encountered violent opposition among the Jews of Jerusalem, and was not able to establish a permanent post. The Rev. Lewis Way, one of the founders of the society, followed with a group of missionaries in 1823, and remained for some time in the city. But it was not until 1833 that a permanent station was created for the society by Dr. Nicholayson, a Danish minister in the service of the London Society, and it was not until 1849 that the first Protestant church was dedicated in Jerusalem. But in the meantime medical work on a substantial scale had been undertaken, and gradually a number of medical units were established throughout the country by doctors and nurses from various European countries.

In 1841 a much more grandiose step was taken, the establishment, under British and Prussian auspices, of a Protestant bishopric to stand beside the Latin, Orthodox and other Churches at the central shrine of Christendom. The action had many contributory causes. One, which has nothing to do with Palestine, was the desire of the Prussian king, by securing Anglican episcopal ordination for a Prussian Protestant minister, to reinsert the thin end of the wedge of episcopacy into the state Church of Prussia and to unite German Calvinists and Lutherans into a single episcopal church; another was the desire of England to signify its position as a Christian power vis-à-vis the Porte. A third was a desire on the part of the Anglican Church to establish relations with the Orthodox patriarchate, and the first bishop, Dr. S. Alexander, took with him letters to the patriarch which were warmly received. The bishop had not the title of 'bishop of Jerusalem', but 'bishop in Jerusalem', in order to make it clear that there was no intention to deny the authority of the Orthodox patriarch. Dr. Alexander, who was an English Jewish convert, died in 1845, and was succeeded, on the king of Prussia's nomination, by Dr. Gobat, a Swiss who had previously served the Church Missionary Society in Abyssinia. He held the see from 1846 until 1879 and during that period undertook extensive educational and medical work, as well as building several churches for English congregations. With the death of his successor in

1881, the dual arrangement lapsed. Prussia refused to nominate, and in 1887 the Church of England re-established the bishopric, so that succeeding bishops were representatives of the Anglican Church only.

In 1851 the Church Missionary Society of London also began educational work in the country, and towards the end of Dr. Gobat's episcopate they took over many of his schools. The result of these different efforts was that, whereas when Dr. Gobat opened his first school the only other western establishment was a Roman Catholic school with twenty boys, at the end of his period there were over a hundred schools in the country conducted by a number of different societies, representing different Churches and countries. The fact that educational work inevitably led to a desire among the pupils to join the Church of the teachers led to complicated relations later with the Orthodox Church; and, in spite of their desire not to offend the Orthodox, Arab Christian congregations attached to the western Churches came into existence.

The activities of the Protestant Churches did not leave the Roman Catholics unmoved. In 1847 the Latin patriarchate of Jerusalem was revived, and at the same time efforts were made throughout the east to bring order and conformity into the various eastern Churches in union with Rome. In 1848 a Greek uniate patriarchate was established on a firm footing at Damascus, and in 1865 a seminary for Melkite Uniates was established in Jerusalem at the ancient crusading church of St. Anne, which had been presented to France by the sultan at the conclusion of the Crimean war. While it was not difficult to secure friendly relations through the Latin patriarchate with the native Christians of the Uniate Churches, it was more difficult to fit a new patriarchate into the ancient pattern of authority spun by the Franciscan Guardian of the Holy Places, and the patriarch was in the somewhat embarrassing position of being very much poorer, and possessed of very much larger responsibilities, than the Franciscan Guardian who remained firmly outside his jurisdiction.

The third Christian power to establish itself impressively in the Holy Land was Russia. In the eighteen twenties Russian Orthodox circles had become interested in the distribution of Bibles to the eastern Christians, and Russian pilgrims had been coming in numbers which increased in every decade. At first

many had come overland through the Caucasus, and only half ever expected to return, so heavy were the losses at the hands of Arab brigands, and so severe the physical strain. Others came in sailing ships, taking a month or more to make the journey from the Black Sea. After the Crimean war steamers ran special services for the pilgrims, and they began to come by thousands. Their maintenance in Jerusalem laid a heavy responsibility on the Orthodox patriarch and the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, and this involved many complaints on both sides. The Russians complained that the pilgrims were ruthlessly fleeced by the monks, and the monks that the pilgrims constituted an unjust drain on the finances of the patriarchate. The Russian government was at first uncertain whether it desired officially to encourage these pilgrims or no, and in 1859 the Grand Duke Constantine came at the time of the pilgrimage, apparently in order to report on it to the government. The result of his visit was the purchase in the following year of an area of ten acres north west of the Jaffa Gate, though it was the only flat area in the neighbourhood of the city, and as such used for all ceremonies and reviews. On this area in 1860 began to rise a Russian cathedral and a vast quadrangle of hostels, offices and hospitals to house and care for the Russian pilgrims.

The evangelical revival which marked the first half of the nineteenth century throughout the Protestant world, and which was productive of much of the work already described, produced also a revival of various forms of millenarianism. This led certain groups to seek to settle in Palestine in expectation of the return of the Messiah. These movements can be traced as far back as the eighteen forties, but it was twenty years later, in 1866, that a group of colonists actually arrived at Jaffa from the United States. They called themselves the 'Church of the Messiah' and brought prefabricated houses with them which they erected in Jaffa. The following year the movement collapsed, and the survivors of the colony departed. But in the meantime a Lutheran group of pietists from Wurtemberg, known as 'the Temple' and led by Drs. Hardegg and Hoffmann, had been exploring the possibility of settling in the country. They encountered every kind of obstacle from the Porte, but in 1867 twelve of them established themselves near Nazareth. They all died of fever within a year; but,

undeterred, the Templars bought the houses of the departing Americans and in 1868 established two colonies, one at Saron near Jaffa and one at Haifa, while individual settlers established themselves in other parts of the country. The movement prospered, and soon had additional settlements near Jerusalem, at Wilhelma near Jaffa and at Waldheim in Galilee. At its height it included over a thousand members, who had been carefully chosen for their physical fitness and training before they were allowed to come. The settlers encountered continual difficulties from the Turkish authorities and from their Arab neighbours, who trespassed freely on their land. In Haifa they had also to encounter the hostility of the Carmelites whose lands adjoined theirs. Nevertheless they persisted, and their craftsmanship and good farming gradually led the more intelligent of their neighbours to copy their example and improve the fertility and cropping of their land. They were able to show both that it was possible for Europeans to work the soil in Palestine and that its fertility could be increased by proper developments. They were also the first modern settlers to introduce wheeled vehicles, and to make roads on which such vehicles could operate. Though they had their internal difficulties and divisions, they survived until 1939 when the colonies were closed. They had never forgotten their German origin, and from 1933 onwards were sedulously worked by Nazi agents, with the result that they were regarded as suspect by the British authorities. And with some reason, for a number of Nazi leaders in the Middle East were drawn from these colonies which had once been composed exclusively of Lutheran pietists expecting the return of the Messiah.

To bring the whole picture of the changes wrought in Palestine during this period on to the canvas, one other aspect of the interest of the Christian world needs to be described. While the establishment of the missions, the Anglo-Prussian bishopric, the Latin patriarchate and the Russian compound were all directly concerned with religious and ecclesiastical questions, and the Templars with their own affairs, the country was 'invaded' simultaneously by Christian scholars whose interest was in Biblical and Christian archaeology, and who revolutionised the study of the land, its peoples, its ancient sites and its historical geography. While earlier travellers engaged on such studies had to encounter considerable dangers

and difficulties in their task, by the middle of the century it had become relatively safe to wander over the whole land, provided adequate financial precautions were taken to secure the approval and assistance of the village and tribal chiefs in whose territories travel was intended.


The travellers came from nearly every country of western Europe and from the United States. A German, Dr. U. J. Seetzen, explored eastern and southern Palestine between 1805 and 1807. In 1809 a Swiss, J. L. Burckhardt, discovered Petra. Thirty years later an American expedition, led by Lieutenant Lynch, revealed the true depth and nature of the Jordan rift. The identification of Biblical sites was immensely advanced by Dr. Edward Robinson of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, who recognised that many names were still preserved by the fellahs, and that their identifications were much more reliable than those of Christian 'archaeologists' of the crusading or earlier periods. In 1858 Dr. W. M. Thomson, an American stationed at Beirut, published *The Land and the Book*, in which he related the customs and folklore of the existing fellahs to hitherto unexplained, or wrongly explained, Biblical narratives, and created a new type of Biblical study and illustration in which the 'stained glass window' types of early Christians were replaced by real Palestinian characters.

In 1865 another immense step forward was taken by the founding in London of the Palestine Exploration Fund, though the idea had older roots—a Palestine Society founded in London at the beginning of the century, and the Jerusalem Literary Society established by the British consul, James Finn, in 1849. The first task of the Fund was a survey map of western Palestine, on which distinguished members of the Royal Engineers were working for a dozen years. Claude Regnier Conder carried through most of it, and Lieutenant (later Lord) Kitchener completed it in 1878. Meanwhile the excavation of sites was also being developed, and in this task, as well as in architectural studies, French scholars, especially the de Vogüé's and Ernest Renan, took an important part. In 1887 the accidental discovery by Egyptian fellahs of some clay tablets at Tell el-Amarna in Egypt threw a new light on early Israelite history and the relations of Palestine to Egypt in the fourteenth century B.C.; and three years later, Flinders Petrie, the interpreter of the tablets, was invited by the

Palestine Exploration Fund to start the excavation of Tell el-Hesi, which was ultimately revealed as the site of eight successive cities of Lachish. The scientific dating of its pottery introduced a new era in the excavation of many Palestinian cities. The year after the discovery of Lachish, George Adam Smith published his *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, in which the unity and interdependence of history and geography in the long millennia of the story of Palestine were shewn in a book which is still a delight to all Biblical students and travellers.

During the period between the end of the Crimean war and 1914, there was a general extension of all the religious interests whose establishment has already been mentioned. In this they were aided by the continued presence of the European consuls, which gave them the security of a certain political dignity; and when Abdul Hamid came to the throne in 1876 he made genuine efforts—if largely from self-interested motives—both to see that the officials sent to govern the country were reasonably efficient and presentable, and that the administration of the affairs of the Christian minorities gave no excuses for the intervention of Christian governments. The unreality of the Crimean war, in so far as Palestine and the Holy Places were concerned, has already been shown in the facts that the war only resulted in the restatement of the position about Holy Places as it had existed previously, and that the defeated power, Russia, within less than ten years of its termination, was able to erect the vast Russian compound overlooking the walls of Jerusalem.

The increase of Russian influence in relation to the Orthodox Christians was balanced by a steady increase of French influence among the Latins and Uniates. At the beginning of the century the Franciscans had been alone as representatives of the Latin West, and their tenure of certain of their monasteries outside Jerusalem and Bethlehem was still uncertain. Then came the re-establishment of the Carmelites on Mount Carmel, and the recreation of the Latin patriarchate. After the Crimean war there was a general advance all along the line and new foundations were established such as the Institute of the brothers Ratisbonne, the houses of the Sisters of Our Lady in Zion, the Sisters of Nazareth, the seminary of the Algerian Fathers in the church of Saint Anne, and many others. The work of these institutes and convents was very varied. Many



were educational, many medical, some cared for orphans, some for women, some concentrated on Jews, some on Uniates, some on eastern Christians, and some on western pilgrims. Many of the Holy Places from which Christians had been for centuries excluded, were reoccupied. At the same time the great and established Orders, with the assistance of different Roman Catholic powers, established centres in the country. The Jesuits concentrated on a Bible Institute in Jerusalem and the Catholic University of St. Joseph at Beirut, established a year after the American Protestant College, which headed up all the educational work done in the many different institutes in the area. The Dominicans established a convent on the site of the church of St. Stephen, north of the Damascus Gate, which became an important centre of scholarship. In all, at the end of the century, the Roman Catholic Church had established in the country thirty Orders, Brotherhoods and associations, with twenty convents, eighteen hospices, six higher schools, forty-six day schools, sixteen orphanages, four industrial schools and five hospitals. It is a remarkable record of activity in which France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Germany and other countries co-operated.

Some of the work done by these institutions was made possible by the financial support they received from different governments, interested to maintain their prestige in the Holy Land. On the whole the Protestant Churches had to depend on voluntary contributions, and the only substantial creations by a government were the original Prussian gift towards the Anglo-Prussian bishopric, and the German emperor's acquisition of a site in the Muristan for a Lutheran church. The work was done by many different societies, representing Churches in different countries. The main difficulty involved was, as already mentioned, the dilemma created by the desire of the Anglican Church and others for cordial relations with the Orthodox and other eastern patriarchates, and the desire of the more Protestant bodies for the acceptance of proselytes from these Churches into what they believed to be a purer form of Christianity.

When the replacement of the Anglo-Prussian by an Anglican bishopric was being discussed in 1887, the proposal was made that it should be set up at Beirut, in order to avoid the clash of interests in Jerusalem; and it was the direct request of the Orthodox patriarch which led to its return to the latter city,

CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS IN MODERN JERUSALEM

41

▽ School


+ Church

□ Hospital

○ Convent

+ Hospice

1. Syrian Orphanage & School
2. S. George's Cathedral & School
3. American Colony
4. St. George's Cathedral
5. Abyssinian Church
6. Italian Hospital
7. S. Stephen (Benedictine)
8. German Hospital
9. Argentinian Girl School
10. Russian Compound
11. School and Orphanage of the Rosary
12. Russian Compound
13. French Hospital
14. N. Dame de France Hospice (Dominican)
15. Latin Ch. of Gethsemane
16. Russian Ch. of Gethsemane
17. Viri Galilee
18. Carmelite Convent
19. St. Ann's College
20. Y.M.C.A.
21. Jeune Bible Institute
22. Latin Patriarchate
23. Greek Patriarchate
24. Armenian Patriarchate
25. Russian Holy Sepulchre
26. Convent of St. Anne
27. Austrian Hospice
28. Convent of Sœur de Zion
29. S. Anne (Pères Blancs)
30. Lutheran Church
31. Bp. Gabast's School
32. Ch. of Dormition



still with the title of 'bishop *in* Jerusalem'. These friendly relations led to interesting breaches with the ancient and unhappy tradition by which Christian bodies outbid each other for rights in Holy Places, and violently opposed the extension of rights of any Church other than their own. It became the habit of the Armenian patriarch to invite the Anglican bishop to give the blessing at the conclusion of one of the great ceremonies of the Armenian Holy Week. Even more interesting was the invitation of the Orthodox patriarch to hold services in a chapel of the church of the Holy Sepulchre itself. This invitation was originally made in an individual case in 1885 to Dr. C. Hale, an American Episcopalian. When the Anglican bishopric was established in 1887 it was extended to all those on whose behalf the Anglican bishop asked for the courtesy. The chapel selected is the chapel of Abraham, situated above the site of Golgotha; the use of it lies wholly in the hands of the patriarch; the service is prepared for by him; and it is understood to convey no legal rights which would create an alteration in the status quo. During the mandatory period the interchange of courtesies between the two communions was considerably extended.

At the same time, the position of the bishop and the Protestant societies was not easy. The latter were alarmed, and even hostile, at an attitude which appeared to them to ignore the practical difficulties they encountered when individuals, clergy and laity, from the eastern Churches affirmed to them their inability to remain within their previous communities. Though the situation was less difficult than that which confronted the Americans in the Lebanon dealing with the Maronite Church, it was a problem neither the bishop nor the Church Missionary Society found it easy to resolve. Dr. Gobat had at times been in a very embarrassing position as representative of both Prussia and England, both the Anglican and the Lutheran Churches. Dr. Popham Blyth, the first bishop on the Anglican establishment, found himself in an equally embarrassing position as bishop without any diocesan clergy, since the many Anglican workers in the area covered by his bishopric were all servants of different missionary societies, and under their orders. He therefore set out to establish the bishopric itself, with its own funds, headquarters and activities, without allowing these to appear in competition with the existing societies. The result was the creation

of a new society, the Jerusalem and the East Mission, through which he built St. George's Close and cathedral church, together with other churches in the country, and a series of schools for boys and girls directly under his jurisdiction.

The activities of the Roman Catholics and Protestants were paralleled by those of the Russians. Having established their centre at Jerusalem, they extended their work to cover other sites visited by their pilgrims, and gradually came to be extensive owners of land throughout the country. Two of their main establishments were at Nazareth and at Ain Karim outside Jerusalem. They also started schools for native eastern Christians, and, while the work of all the Churches also contributed to a renewal of life within native Christianity, it was through Russian action that a new and critical issue arose within the Orthodox patriarchate.

While in the struggle of European powers over the body of Turkey Russia naturally stood as the defender of Orthodoxy against the pretensions of the Latins, within the Orthodox Church she engaged in a parallel struggle to lessen the influence of the Greeks, by forwarding the interests not only of her own Moscow patriarchate, but of all movements for independence or recognition among non-Greek elements in the Balkans and elsewhere. This inevitably involved her in a struggle in Palestine where the peculiar nature of the patriarchate made it one of the most important centres of purely Greek interest within the Orthodox Church.

In eastern Churches there has often been a much closer connection between the monastic and episcopal hierarchies than has ever been common in the west. But the Jerusalem patriarchate was unusual for being wholly in the hands of the monastic Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre. From its ranks were chosen not only the patriarch but all the higher clergy, most of whom continued to be resident members of the court of the patriarch in Jerusalem, even while enjoying metropolitan and episcopal titles from centres where there were Arab Christian congregations. This would have been a serious matter in any case, but the situation was made worse by the fact that the Brotherhood in the 19th century was an exclusively and fanatically Greek body, to which access was almost wholly impossible for the native Christians of the patriarchate; and the fact that the Patriarch Cyril II (1845-

1872) moved his regular residence from Constantinople to Jerusalem did not make any difference.

It was the old dilemma of the patriarchate in a new form, the issue as to whether it existed because of the Holy Places or because of the presence of a body of Christians—though they amounted to considerably less than fifty thousand—within the geographical area over which it held sway. The situation had been gradually developing ever since the return of the Orthodox patriarch after the crusades. During the Mamluk period, though the links with the ecumenical patriarch at Constantinople were never broken, and though the liturgical language continued to be mainly Greek, there had always been a strong local influence in the Holy Places, and many of the patriarchs were Arabic-speaking local Christians. But after the Turkish conquest the ecclesiastical hierarchy tended to become more and more exclusively Greek in origin. In the nineteenth century, when Greek nationalism had been fanned to a flame by the war of independence, it became wholly so. The Brotherhood regarded itself as an outpost of Greek culture, guarding on behalf of the Greek Church and nation Holy Places largely erected by emperors they considered Greek.

In such a situation the task of Russia was not easy; but in 1872 the Russians had so won the friendship of the Patriarch Cyril that in the synod called at Constantinople in that year to pronounce the excommunication of the Bulgarian Church for proclaiming its independence of the ecumenical patriarch, the patriarch of Jerusalem alone refused to ratify the excommunication. The Brotherhood replied by deposing him as a traitor to Greek interests. Inspired by the Russians, the local Christians rioted in his favour, but the Porte supported his deposition and forcibly removed him. The local Christians, however, were not satisfied, and were prepared to air their grievances over the whole field. One of their main complaints was that they received no educational opportunities, as well as very little pastoral care, from their own Church, as the hierarchy was interested exclusively in the service of the patriarch and the Holy Places.

The patriarchate at this time was exceedingly wealthy, and possessed lands in most of the countries of Orthodoxy. But it was legitimate to argue that these donations had been made not for the service of local Christian congregations at Haifa

or Nablus, but in honour of the sanctuaries venerated by all Christendom. Indeed the Brotherhood regarded it as a sign of their extreme benevolence that they spent any of their funds at all on the maintenance of local clergy and churches. Many of these properties were in Russia, and the Russian government replied to the deposition of Cyril by confiscating some of the patriarchal revenues.

In 1875 the matter was submitted to the Porte, which accepted a new constitution for the patriarchate proposed by the Patriarch Hierotheos. By this constitution, natives were to be admitted to the Brotherhood, schools were to be established and governed by a mixed council of equal numbers of clergy and laity, and bishops of dioceses where there were congregations (Nazareth and Acre) were to be chosen from men able to speak Arabic and to spend a suitable part of their time in their dioceses. None of these reforms were carried out, and matters simmered until the Turkish revolution of 1908. Under the new Turkish constitution the patriarchate was obliged to set up a mixed council of clergy and laity for its government. The local Christians proceeded at once to demand such a council, even before the law for its establishment had been ratified. The Patriarch Damianus refused to agree; but the Brotherhood believed that he was sympathetic to some of their demands (especially admission to the Brotherhood) and demanded his resignation. When he refused, they deposed him; but he refused to accept this also as being wholly uncanonical. Nevertheless the new Turkish government recognised his deposition. But when there had been riots of the local Christians in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Bethlehem, and the local pasha assured the government that his deposition could not be effected except by bloodshed and the display of a considerable force, the Brotherhood climbed down. Unhappily at this point the new policy of Turcification caused the government to maintain the deposition, as they had no intention of supporting what appeared—and was—an Arab demonstration. There were more riots and the tension continued for several years. In 1910 it was ordained that a mixed council should be set up with control, in the interest of the local Christians, of one-third of the patriarchal revenues or £30,000 annually, whichever sum should be the larger. But this was not put into effect and nothing had been finally put into practice when in 1917 both the patriarch and his synod were removed by the Turks

to Damascus, and the affairs of the patriarchate left in the hands of a committee of the Brotherhood. This committee showed that its attitude was unchanged by immediately placing its affairs in the hands of the Greek government.

The indifference of the Brotherhood to the needs of the Arabic speaking congregations led to a considerable decline in numbers during the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century nine-tenths of the local Christians were members of the Orthodox Church; at the end of it they amounted only to two-thirds. The main congregations outside Jerusalem were to be found in fairly compact groups. Around that city there were Orthodox Christians in Ramallah and some villages in the north east corner of the Judean hills to the north, and in Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahur to the south. In the southern district were substantial communities at Jaffa, Gaza and Ramleh. In the north they were to be found at Acre and Nazareth; and in the central hills were smaller communities at or around Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin. Across the Jordan were three main centres, Es Salt, Kerak and al-Husn. For a time the monastery of the Cross outside Jerusalem was maintained as a theological college for local clergy; but in spite of this, many of them were almost entirely uneducated, and those of their congregations who rejected the schools of the Protestants or Roman Catholics had to rely on the Russians who maintained about a hundred schools in connection with their properties and convents. Schools maintained by the patriarchate were non-existent outside of Jerusalem.

As a result of this century of activity Palestine, at the outbreak of the first world war, presented a curiously contradictory spectacle. It possessed more schools, hospitals, orphanages and similar institutions than any other country of the east. It was visited annually by large numbers of Christians from all over the world, and though they lacked comfort in their travels they enjoyed almost complete security. And yet almost nothing had changed in the government of the country; it remained wholly indifferent to health, education and social welfare, and concerned itself almost exclusively with the collection of taxes from the local population and the exploitation for its own advantage of the interests of other countries in the area. In so far as the local population itself was concerned it was only the small Christian minority which was able to

enjoy the benefits conferred by the work of other Churches. The Muslims were largely afraid or indifferent; the fellaheen remained ignorant and downtrodden, and the bedouins continued their millennial ways. The only sign of indigenous life had been the revolt of the Arab Orthodox Christians against the Greek policy of the patriarchate and even that had not produced any effect by 1914.

THE LOCAL POPULATION AND THE
REBIRTH OF ARAB NATIONALISM

THE INCREASED SECURITY AND protection which Christian interests obtained during the nineteenth century was by no means immediately reflected in parallel improvements in the lot of the local population. Neither Egyptian nor Turkish rulers were vitally concerned with the lot of their own subjects and warfare between the different clans and tribes was endemic until the despotism of Abdul Hamid managed to secure a certain authority over the local sheiks and their followers. Movements towards a national revival and ambitions towards independence only affected narrow circles of the intelligentsia, and that in the years immediately preceding the first world war.

Up to that time it is not possible to speak of the existence of any general sentiment of nationality, and the word 'Arab' needs to be used with care. It is applicable to the bedouin and to a section of the urban and effendi classes; it is inappropriate as a description of the rural mass of the population, the fellaheen. The whole population spoke Arabic, usually corrupted by dialects bearing traces of words of other origin, but it was only the bedouin who habitually thought of themselves as Arabs. Western travellers from the sixteenth century onwards make the same distinction, and the word 'Arab' almost always refers to them exclusively.

During the nineteenth century many European scholars visited the country for long periods, and some took up their permanent residence there. It was these scholars, some working as missionaries, doctors and educators, some in the consulates, who first made independent studies of the fellaheen, and gathered reliable information about their customs, religion and origin. Gradually it was realised that there remained a substantial stratum of the pre-Israelite peasantry, and that the oldest element among the peasants were not 'Arabs' in the sense of having entered the country with or after the

conquerors of the seventh century, but had been there already when the Arabs came. One of the clearest proofs of this arose from the attempt of men like Drs. Thomson or Robinson, and above all the makers of the Palestine survey, to identify the various sites mentioned in the Old Testament. The identifications made by the crusaders or later Christian travellers were often found to be obviously wrong, and then some spot or heap of ruins in the neighbourhood was found to be called by the local peasantry by a name which was founded on the Biblical Hebrew. Gezer was identified in Tel-Jezer, Ai in Haiyan, Gibcon in al-Jib, and so on in hundreds of examples. In many cases Greek and Roman and later names had been discarded, and the old Biblical name recalled, as when Bethshan, which had been Scythopolis, reverted to Beisan. In fact almost the only classical names which have survived are Nablus (Neapolis) and Sebastiyah (Samaria-Sebaste). This could only have happened if there had been continuity in the villages, independent of successive conquests. Yet further evidence was provided by the presence of customs which were not the product of Islam, but which recalled, in some cases, pre-Israelite religion and in some the laws of the Mosaic code. Perhaps the most striking survival is the local 'high place' (mukam) which neither the centralising tendency of later Judaism, nor the stern monotheism of Islam sufficed to destroy. The customs and religious traditions which centre in the mukam, as the mukam in turn occupies the real centre of peasant religion, owe little to the three great monotheistic faiths which in succession have controlled the country.

Palestine's many changes of master have, in fact, not been accompanied by wholesale alterations of the population. There have been cases in which new masters meant only the addition of a new official class. There were, for example, few Roman or Turkish settlers in the land. But even when new masters meant new settlements, as with the original Israelites, the Greeks, the Arabs or the crusaders, the newcomers did not displace the existing population. There are, therefore, to be found among the fellaheen traces of all the strata from neolithic to modern times. On a foundation of Canaanite, which in itself is a name possibly covering many settlements, Israelite, Syrian, Greek, Arab, Latin, Egyptian and Balkan have all contributed elements to the present population. Some are completely absorbed; some still show distinct origins. In some cases villages

are wholly populated by settlers from other portions of the Turkish empire within the nineteenth century. There are villages of Bosnians, Druzes, Circassians and Egyptians. The proportion in which these different elements are present is, of course, impossible to define. But it is to be expected that the long period of Islamic rule, community in the use of Arabic, and a sense of kinship, should have made the Arab element the strongest addition to the earlier mixture.


In the towns the situation is somewhat different. It is probable that each successive conquest displaced the previous population to a considerable extent, and in many cases towns have been wholly sacked and repeopled. Moreover townsmen have shallower roots. Arab landowners and ex-soldiers, Greek and Syrian merchants, slaves and ex-slaves from all parts of the Turkish empire and beyond, Armenian refugees, Christians drawn by the Holy Places, Jews drawn by the appeal of the Promised Land, all can show a long residence in the different towns of Palestine. They have always been cosmopolitan; they have always contained different quarters where different races and tongues lived their own lives, sometimes unimpeded, sometimes all alike crushed under the heel of a master alien to all of them.

But townsmen and peasants have never been the only inhabitants of a country two of whose frontiers are the desert. The third section of the population comprises the bedouin. The pure bedouin is pure Arab, and the word 'Arab' is almost exclusively applied to the bedouin in all writers before the first world war. Yet even here the rule is not universally valid. For south of Jerusalem there were at the end of the nineteenth century tent-dwelling nomadic tribes who had been fellaheen at the beginning of the century, and had become bedouin because of the ruin of their villages and fields in the ceaseless tribal warfare of the times.

The impossibility of making clear cut distinctions in the field of ethnology applies also in that of religion. Of the Muslim peasant stock of to-day it is possible to say that its oldest elements are composed in the main of ex-Jews and ex-Christians. For if it be true that in the days of the Hebrew kingdom the Mosaic religion may not have reached many of the villages, which, even to-day, show signs of pre-israelitish customs, yet in the time of the Maccabees and the Herods it is probable that most of the countryside, nominally at least, practised

- B. Bosniak
- C. Circassian
- D. Druse
- M. Matawalli
- Mo. Moroccan
- P..Persian
- T. Turcoman

*There is considerable
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
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Judaism. It is likewise true of the Christian period that at first the religion spread mostly in the towns; and it is as well to remember that in many parts of the country Greek religion and Greek mysteries prevailed; but in the last centuries before the Islamic conquest most of the villages were probably reached by the Church, and Justinian in the sixth century disfranchised all who did not accept the religion of the state. After the Arab conquest we have already seen that the country remained for some time predominantly Christian and Jewish. But it is equally important to remember that the process of Islamisation is one which has been going on throughout the whole period, right into modern times. There are villages which to-day are Muslim which were Christian or Jewish within the last couple of centuries. Nor can we always identify the word 'Arab' as used in its pre-war sense—with the word 'Muslim'. Of those Arabs who lived in the eastern and southern parts of the country before the Arab conquest many professed Christianity and there are pure Arabs in Transjordan who are still Christian. The situation of these groups has already been discussed in the previous chapter; and the situation of those Jews who are Arabic speaking, and can consider themselves as much 'indigenous' as any other section of the population, will be discussed in the following chapter. Here we are concerned with two groups who are to-day both 'Muslim' and 'Arab'. On the one hand there are those who are descended from the Arab conquerors and settlers of the seventh and succeeding centuries, and on the other are the majority of the population who have come to speak Arabic and profess Islam at various dates, but who only began to think of themselves as 'Arabs' in the present century.

Dealing, as we are in this chapter, with the period before 1914, we have to recognise that the mass of the population had no real feeling of belonging to any wider unit than their village, clan or possibly confederation of clans. The extent to which warfare went on between tribes and villages right into the second half of the nineteenth century exceeded anything that was known in the most turbulent centuries of early feudal Europe. The units were constantly changing. Sometimes they were grouped around the traditional contrast between 'northern' and 'southern' (Qais and Yemen) for which all historical reason (in so far as any ever existed) had been forgotten; sometimes they were attracted by personal leaders

such as Abu Ghosh of Kuriat al-Anab, Akhil Aga, the Egyptian fellah leader from Galilee, or many others who appeared in each generation. The Turkish governors were not averse to a continuation of this state of affairs, since they had no desire to see the power of any of the local effendi families consolidated on the permanent basis which peace and security would have ensured; and governors were even known to have been ready to lend (for a suitable fee) the forces of the government to aid a warring sheik to overcome his more powerful neighbours. In such circumstances it was impossible for the ordinary villager to extend his loyalty beyond that of the sheik or clan to which he belonged. If people the other side of his own hill could (with the connivance of the government) be regarded as his permanent enemies, the material was lacking by which he might have been led to the understanding that all the population were his brothers within a national unity. Actually the Turkish empire itself was anonymous. It had no name other than 'the realm of the sultan', so that there was nothing concrete to make the peasant, who was not conscious of his local or national affiliation, conscious even of the nature of his political affiliation. He had no idea of the extent or nature of the empire to which he belonged, and the Turkish official did nothing to enlighten him. On the contrary, the censorship constantly showed the most absurd fears when western educators tried to make it clear to their students what and where 'Turkey' and the 'Turkish empire' were. One of the founders of the American university at Beirut relates that when they had painstakingly produced a map of the Turkish dominions they were forced to destroy it because it distinguished the provinces by different colours and this implied 'inequality' in the eyes of the censorship. And in one case a cookery book was forbidden because it contained recipes for cooking turkey—to the censors an obvious political plot!

It might be thought that Islam could take the place of the state as centre of unity. But this also did not prove to be so in practice, save for limited and not always desirable purposes. Common membership of the religion of Muhammad never prevented intertribal wars between Muslims, and in these wars few of the merciful practices recommended by Abu Bakr against enemies outside of the fold were observed towards brothers within it. In the north Palestine was to a small extent affected by the bitter and bloody rivalries between different

Islamic sects, but Druzes and Shiites, who flourished in the Lebanon, were not very numerous. What was more important was that to a large extent the loyalty of the people to Islam was a formal and even superstitious loyalty, and that they were little affected by the ethical and philosophic toleration and spirituality which were to be found in other centres of Muslim orthodoxy. Jerusalem was almost negligible as a centre of Muslim study; the dervish orders who were to be found in the country were on the whole an element of superstition and not of mystical devotion; and the mosque had long ceased to be a centre whence radiated an effective religious education.

In fact much of the actual religion and ethic of the population owed nothing to Islam at all. It was pre-Islamic or independent in its origin. This is particularly true of the one characteristic which is almost universally commended by travellers of all nations—the hospitality of the Arab and his loyalty to the laws of hospitality. Though there were strict and even narrow limits to the exercises of this virtue, there is no doubt of its reality, and of the contempt which any Arab or Muslim would have incurred who violated its rules. But the idea of sanctuary and the exercise and definition of hospitality is an essential of nomadic life in a semi-desert country and is to be found wherever such conditions of life exist apart from Islam. All that Islam needed to do was to consecrate already existing laws with the sanction of its authority. Of more questionable value is the Muslim acceptance of the worship of the 'high places' which antedated not merely Islam but both Christianity and Judaism, and which might entitle the Palestinian peasantry to claim to be the most tenacious in the world. Judaism had long to compromise with this local worship, and Christianity, in Palestine as in pagan Europe, turned many local deities into Christian saints in order to purify the ineradicable practices of the rural population. Christianity did, in fact, effect a considerable purification of such local worship, because the cult of local saints was accepted and incorporated into general worship. Islam made no such concession to 'idolatry' as to try to reform it, but did wink at its survival, with the result that the worship retained untrammelled the superstitious features of antiquity. The village mukam contained provisions for hospitality, it is true, but beyond that it contained little which could elevate the

villager. Many of the 'saints' to which such shrines were dedicated were wholly non-existent; some were brigand sheiks; many had the names of Jewish or Christian characters—Elijah and St. George being the most popular—but without any knowledge whatever of the lives or virtues of those characters. In fact the stories told of the local 'saints' in absurdity and meaninglessness make many of the lives of saints in eastern monasticism appear the moral lessons of a Puritan Sunday School.

It was, and still is, the tragedy of Islam that all movements of reform suffer from a nostalgia for the simple life of the desert in which the faith was originally proclaimed, and have not found the way to make the teaching of its saints and mystics available for the life of the peasant and the townsman. The eighteenth century revival of the Wahhabi and the nineteenth century revival of the Sanussi both partake of the same nostalgia for the desert, and both have found their following in the desert—in Saudi Arabia and in the oases of the deserts of North Africa. During the nineteenth century Islam produced two great figures who preached reform apart from these movements back to the desert. Jamaluddin al-Afghani propounded the doctrines of Pan-Islam as a basis for the revival of Asia, and al-Kawakebi fought valiantly against injustice in Syria and Egypt. But in fact the extent of the idea of reform in Islam at this period could be compared only to the state of Christianity in the time of Wiclif. There was nothing suggesting a pulsation of new life such as was to be found in the period of the sixteenth century Christian reformers. Nationalism has taken the place of religion and not acted as a servant of it, and there has been no religious revival which might affect the daily lives of Muslim peasants and townsmen in Palestine or elsewhere. One movement which needs mention in this connection is the Bahai; for in view of its numerous adherents in Europe and America it might be thought that it should have played a beneficent part in the revival of religion in Palestine. The story of the Bahai movement goes back to 1835 when a young Persian Shiite proclaimed himself the Bab, the doorway by which alone might God be approached. Later he advanced his claim to be the last Imam or successor to Ali, founder of the Shiite schism, and an incarnation of Divinity. He proclaimed the need for reform in Islam with such vigour that, in spite of

the lofty ethical character of his preaching, he was executed in 1849. Before he died he appointed a successor who, with his half-brother (who later took the name of Baha-ullah), was exiled from Persia. The sultan of Turkey kept them as state prisoners in Adrianople, where a schism took place. One was sent to Famagusta, and his following gradually dwindled. Baha-ullah was sent to Acre where he lived in complete retirement but in great state. He died in 1892. His son, Abbas Effendi, dropped the claim to be a divine incarnation, but continued the message of his predecessors. But while he attracted many followers both in Persia and in the west, he made no attempt to spread his teaching or attract followers in Palestine itself. There the movement consists of only a few hundreds, and has no influence on local Muslim life.

In general, then, Islam has unhappily proved an agent for the division and degradation of the country, as much as for its enlightenment. Among the Muslim clergy, the muftis, imams and leading figures in the dervish orders, many Christian travellers in all centuries have found men of a wider vision and tolerance than were easily to be found among the eastern Churches. But little or none of this genuine religious sentiment was reflected in the religion of the peasant and townsman. The festivals and pilgrimages, such as those of Nebi Musa and of Nebi Rubin near Jaffa, had in them little of the religious devotion which marked the ordinary Christian pilgrim to the Holy Places; and the religion of Islam normally expressed itself only in the intolerant and intolerable belief in his superiority which was exhibited by the most ignorant Muslim in the presence of a Christian patriarch or a Jewish rabbi. So ignorant was their arrogance that nineteenth century writers report again and again their belief that the British sovereign and all the other princes of Christendom, were merely the vassals of the sultan, who fought the Crimean war or expelled Ibrahim from Syria in execution of his orders. Fanaticism is a natural concomitant of ignorance and arrogance; and it is unfortunate that Christians and Jews, in the hope of securing better treatment for their fellows under Muslim rule by the flattery of the Muslim authorities, should have created out of Koranic tolerance of their religions the legend of the favourable treatment of Christians and Jews. It might indeed be said of the Turkish authorities that they exhibited the toleration of indifference when suitably paid to

do so. But, apart from this, the legend of good treatment of the Christian and Jewish minorities has no support in the Muslim history of the last thousand years, apart from the brief period of the early Osmanli sultans.

At the same time, it is well to remember in dealing with the Muslim peasantry and townsfolk of Palestine that they also were a subject people, exploited and misgoverned by Turkish rulers with no interest in them save as payers of taxes and conscripts in wars not of their seeking. That they should have become cruel, treacherous and untruthful is not surprising in the circumstances. That their good qualities should be reserved for their own circle and for their own friends and allies has been the fate of other peoples similarly oppressed. But here also Islam has been no help to them. For side by side with an absence of any effective social teaching is the fatalism of its predestinarianism, and the coldness of its Puritan monotheism. Islam may proclaim that Allah is generous and merciful. But it does not, like Judaism and Christianity, proclaim that men are His children. They are His slaves or His subjects; and in consequence Islam has provided little consolation and strengthening for the weak and oppressed.

Nevertheless both peasant and bedouin have many good qualities. There is no doubt that the peasantry are industrious and hardworking during the season of agricultural labour. They are deeply attached to their native soil, and part of their hatred of conscription arose from their hatred of leaving—often for ever—their native village. Family life is respected, and poverty makes most of them monogamous. They are loyal to their word, once it is given; and docile and obedient to their sheiks; they are brave and willing to endure hardship. The bedouin likewise are a people with an intense admiration for courage and endurance, and a detestation of what by their traditions they consider dishonesty or disloyalty. They accept willingly the poverty which their love of freedom entails. The tragedy has been that they keep faith only with those whom they have accepted as friends or allies, and are cruel, cunning and unreliable in any dealings with those outside that charmed circle.

Peasant and bedouin alike have contributed to the ruin of the countryside on which both depend for a livelihood. In the wars between villages it was far too common a practice to cut down fruit trees and olives and to destroy crops, and

this in the end caused as much loss of life through hunger as was caused by the actual casualties of fighting. Bedouins freely destroyed the crops of villages which they raided, and killed or carried off their livestock. They filled wells with stones and broke down reservoirs and cisterns. They often caused such insecurity in whole districts that wide fertile areas were for years left completely uncultivated, while streams and rivers became dammed, malaria became endemic and the unlucky peasants fled elsewhere or starved in the towns. As already related some villagers in the nineteenth century themselves took to the bedouin life because of the ruin of their agriculture. An agriculture conducted on so precarious a basis could not hope to avoid the curse from which such an industry has suffered in every primarily agricultural country in the world—hopeless peasant indebtedness. The peasants were indebted to their landowners, to the tax farmers, and to professional moneylenders, and they paid rates of interest from fifty per cent upwards. From birth to death and from generation to generation they could never hope to escape from crippling debts. In the midst of an already ruined country the flocks of goats ably assisted the work of man, and the recurrence of earthquakes and famines and of epidemics of cholera, smallpox and other diseases, as well as the ruthless oppression of the government tax collectors, completed the work of destruction created by the goats, the peasants themselves, the bedouin and the moneylenders.

Nor did the land-holding system in vogue in much of the country lead to agricultural improvement in areas in which security and the fertility of the soil made a precarious prosperity possible. While in some villages the individual peasant was a freeholder or an individual tenant, in many the village land was held collectively and redistributed biennially between the cultivators. In such a situation proper maintenance and manuring, the planting of trees and the maintenance of terraces all suffer. For each labourer thought that in making such long-term expenditures of his labour he might only be benefiting another. An established crop-rotation continued unchanged, exhausting the soil, just because it had always been so, and the peasant, intensely conservative by nature, only slowly responded to the suggestions of change which western schools or the agriculture of such bodies as the Templars, suggested to him. In spite of the immense fertility of the soil, it is probable

that in the first half of the nineteenth century the population sank to the lowest level it had ever known in historic times.

In this situation the realisation that the peasantry of to-day contained widespread elements of the pre-Islamic and pre-Arab population contains a seed of hope. It is unhappily true that for a picture of Palestinian prosperity we need to go back to a time when the two elements out of which the present majority and the present nationalist temper are composed were absent from the picture. But, just as it is true that the bedouin camping in the ruins of Petra or Palmyra is camping amidst the works of his ancestors, so it is true in Palestine that the terraces and reservoirs which the peasants of many centuries destroyed were the work of their own ancestors; the irrigation channels which once gave the land prosperity were part of an agricultural life with which their ancestors were familiar. The ownership may have been in the hands of foreigners; the workmen were of their own blood. It is easier to hope that what they have done once they might do again, than to expect men of a different race and civilisation to understand and to inherit the work of men with whom they had no link through history and tradition.

During the reign of Abdul Hamid material conditions began to improve in certain fields. Something at least was done to suppress the continual village warfare and to restrain the raids of the bedouin. During the seventies much of the great plain of Esdraelon was brought into cultivation again by a firm of rich Syrian bankers, the Sursoks. The cultivation of oranges in the maritime plain proved extremely successful. Roads began to appear, and one joined Jerusalem with Jaffa. There followed a railway between these two towns and another which joined Acre with Damascus on the Hedjaz line east of the Jordan. Better security for agriculture and increased opportunities for work caused the population to begin to increase, and probably led also to some rise in the standard of living of the peasantry and the towns. There was even a certain immigration from the northern parts of Syria. But trade still remained extremely slight. Palestine had no port, and there was little exchange except of local produce. Some beginning was made in education, but here also it hardly penetrated into more than a small proportion of the villages; and more children were still educated in the foreign schools

than in those run by the authorities. Nevertheless a change was slowly appearing, and providing some background for future developments.

It was, however, not in Palestine but in the Lebanon that Arab nationalism was born out of the groundwork provided by the Syrian Protestant University which the Americans had founded. Even here the soil on which such a movement could grow was extremely poor. During the brief period in which Ibrahim had governed Syria for his father Mehmet Ali he had tried to bring an Arab national movement into existence as a background to the dream of an Arab empire which he shared with his father. But though he improved the administration, ensured equality before the law for Christians and Jews, and attempted to develop local education, he was unable to arouse any national feeling; and when he increased taxes and enforced conscription he had to face rebellion in many parts of the country. When the European powers forced him to abandon the country and returned it to Turkish rule, what few improvements he had introduced were lost, and the country sank back again into apathy. It contained none of the elements out of which nationalism had risen to be a force in many countries of Europe. There was a landowning class, but almost no middle class of merchants, professional men and officials. The Muslim and Druze peasants had not a glimmering of either national consciousness or the meaning of political nationality; the Maronites were attracted to France rather than to the idea of Arab unity; and the bedouins felt no solidarity either with the villages or the towns. There was no national literature possessing any relevance for a political revival, and the spoken dialects had departed so far from literary Arabic that the great masterpieces of the period of the Arab caliphate were unreadable by the ordinary man. The only Arab history to which they could refer with pride belonged to an age which had passed away almost a thousand years earlier. Finally, what education was available came almost wholly from the Christians schools of foreign powers. There was, however, another side to this sorry situation. From the point of view of effective political action the destiny of the Arab world lay in the hands of a very small class, and they had no need in the early stages of their movement to worry about popular support.

This was important because it brought into high relief the

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two historical factors into which a new Arab political nationalism could most easily be grafted: Islam and Arabic. Once the movement had passed its initial stages, stages in which the initiative had largely lain with the Christians, it had become a Muslim movement, and the unity of Islam, together with the religious primacy of the Arab in the creation of Islam and its theology, was a matter of common pride uniting the small class of educated Arabs throughout the Middle East. Likewise Arabic, though in its colloquial forms it followed a hundred dialects, was a single literary language throughout the whole area, and it was the language of the Koran and of the classical literature of Islam. In the cultural-religious field there was no need to strive to make such Arabs conscious of a common inheritance. They were already aware of it, and proud of it.

This cultural-religious inheritance had a social side in that it had created certain common forms of life which made it easy for an educated Arab to be equally at home in a dozen different Arab cities. Accepting the great division of power between the landowning families and the bedouin sheiks as a division within a single society which had always contained both, the nationalist could imagine the existence of an Arab unity which, in reality, was very far from the fact.

While these facts made possible the extraordinarily rapid spread of nationalism they were in themselves dangerous, for they made it appear that all that was needed was a single act of political emancipation for a new and democratic state to come instantly into existence. A certain democratic equalitarianism had always existed in the Arab world, particularly among the bedouin, but exemplified also in the village council. But it was the democracy of Anglo-saxon rather than of 19th century England, the democracy of a simpler social life, untroubled by responsibility for major political decisions, and entirely unfamiliar with the ballot box, the political representative or the machinery of party politics. After 1908 Arab representatives sat in the new Turkish parliament, but as a training in democratic election or action, such an experience was negligible, and in any case lasted only eight years and affected a few dozen effendis.

It is these facts which explain the unusual phenomenon of a national movement which had no foundations in the prepared soil of either popular religion or popular education, which had no economic or social programme, and scarcely a vestige of

even local administrative experience, which was exclusively political in the narrowest sense, and showed little awareness of the day to day problems which would arise if its political objective were reached.

The earliest beginnings of the movement are traced by George Antonius in *The Arab Awakening* directly to the University of Beirut and to other foreign colleges. Apart from a revolutionary poem, circulated from mouth to mouth in 1857, the first serious steps were taken when a group of five Christian students at the college in 1875 formed a secret society with revolutionary aims. They established contact with friends in Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon, and took as a method of action the pasting up of proclamations on the walls of their respective towns. These posters could count on rousing some popular sympathy, for Abdul Hamid had in recent years disappointed his subjects by his immediate withdrawal of the constitution he had himself proclaimed in 1876. But on the other hand, he was rather successfully posing as a champion of Islamic unity and piety in terms which flattered his Arab subjects, and the posters produced no more than a passing excitement. During the next twenty years the spies of the government made it unsafe to stay in Syria, and the nationalist movement took root in Egypt—where its first leaders were Syrians, including al-Kawakebi—and there it developed an entirely independent programme.

It was not until the Young Turks' revolution in 1908 that activities recommenced among both Muslim and Christian Syrians. For a brief moment the revolution had caused a wave of enthusiastic fraternisation among all the peoples of the empire; but this moment soon passed as it was realised that the Young Turks were set on carrying out a policy of Turcification, and were capable of doing it more efficiently than Abdul Hamid. Four main societies came into existence at this period, and it is at this moment that the names of Arabs from Palestine are first found among the nationalists. It is interesting that none of the movements originated on Syrian soil. Two were formed in Egypt, and showed how much more mature the nationalist movement had become in that country. They aimed at the decentralisation of the empire, and at the development of either provincial autonomy or a dual monarchy. Among the members of these societies were several Palestinians who were later executed by Jemal Pasha

during the first world war—Salim Abdul-Hadi of Jenin, Hafiz al-Said of Jaffa, and Ali Nashashibi from Jerusalem. A third society, of which Jamal Husseini of Jerusalem was a member, was formed in Constantinople. The fourth and most extreme, Al-Fatat, was formed in Paris and included among its members Auni Abdul-Hadi and Rafiq Tamimi of Nablus. In the few years which remained before the outbreak of war none of these societies managed to secure any satisfactory concessions from the Young Turks, who had become as adept at evasion as Abdul Hamid; and in 1914 an Egyptian officer, Aziz Ali al-Mazri, formed from their membership a secret group (Al-Ahd) composed almost entirely of army officers. Through them he hoped, at the appropriate moment, to secure adequate military support for an Arab rebellion. For if he secured the officers he believed that the Arab conscripts would follow them in fighting the Turks.

It will be seen that few Palestinians had become directly involved in the nationalist movement at the outbreak of the war, but these few represented some of the most important families in the country, and their influence could be considerable. The movement had scarcely gone further, though later events proved that some understanding of what was at stake had begun to penetrate through the urban section of the population. It had not reached any numbers of the fellaheen, and it still lacked any social or economic policy of the kind which would be likely to attract them. In this the Syrian movement remained well behind the Egyptian which was still following an independent course.

One feature both shared: a profound and increasing distrust of the European powers. Though the Syrian movement would certainly not have come into existence at all without the work which had been done by educators from all the western countries, yet, with the sole exception of the Americans, all these powers were suspected of pursuing ulterior political aims in their willingness to spend large sums on educational and medical work in the Middle East. The ambitions of Russia were scarcely veiled. The *mission civilisatrice* of France, as exemplified in North Africa, alienated all except the Maronite and Melkite Churches of the Lebanon which looked to French support against the eastern Christians. The arrogance of Britain in Egypt and the Sudan, and her refusal to treat Egypt as an equal and independent power, damned her equally

with France and Russia. And had Italy entered into consideration, her conquests in North Africa would have turned the Arabs against her. It was the tragedy of the national movement that, created by the work of the western powers and greatly in need of close contacts and counsel from western powers in the whole shaping of the life of a modern state, it was, through the imperialism of these same powers, more hostile to foreign influences than most national movements. It voluntarily committed itself to a purely political emancipation, indifferent to all the problems of administration, education, economics and social services which alone mean real emancipation in the modern world. Having freed itself from Europe and the West, it remained enslaved to a conception of oligarchic sovereignty as arbitrary as that of the Arab caliphate in spite of a thin disguise of democratic formulae.

THE JEWS AND THE BEGINNINGS
OF ZIONIST SETTLEMENT

AT THE BEGINNINGS OF the 19th century the Jews of Palestine were possibly fewer than they had been at any time since the beginning of this history. The most populous centre was Safad, where they numbered some thousands. But Jerusalem, when it was visited by Sir Moses Montefiore in 1827, had less than a thousand. In 1839, however, we have the advantage of a report on the Jewish situation made by the first British consul in Jerusalem. This shows that the situation was then reversed, and Safad had sunk to the second place. It had passed through a series of disasters, of which an epidemic of plague in 1812 and an earthquake in 1837 were the most serious. In consequence western European Jews went increasingly to Jerusalem instead of to the northern holy city. The consular report gives the following figures for the Jews throughout the country. Jerusalem stood first with 5,000. Safad came next with 1,500. Of the two other holy cities, Hebron had 750 and Tiberias 600. A certain number of Jews, presumably engaged in trade and commerce, lived in the three sea-coast towns of Acre (200), Haifa (150) and Jaffa (60). Apart from the holy cities, the only inland town in which Jews were discovered was Nablus, where there were 150. In the villages there were estimated to be about 400. This gives a total population of round about 10,000. Other estimates give somewhat smaller figures, and 10,000 can be taken as the maximum. By the middle of the century, largely through increases in Jerusalem, the figure had risen to 20,000 and by 1880 to about 25,000.

At the beginning of the period the largest community was that of the Sephardim. Since its establishment after the expulsion from Spain it had absorbed earlier elements, and it continued to absorb most of the Jews from the east who came to Palestine. The Ashkenazi increased rapidly during the 19th century, and in 1857 secured the right to build a new

synagogue in Jerusalem, through the mediation of Sir Moses Montefiore. There were also smaller communities from countries within the Turkish empire and other Arabic speaking lands. Of these three communities the Ashkenazic was the most abnormal, in that it largely consisted either of elderly persons who desired to die in the Holy Land, or of young students, whose passage thither had been financed in order that they might concentrate exclusively on the study of the Law. All communities alike lived in extreme poverty, for even those who desired to earn their own livings had few openings for doing so. They were very largely dependent on external support. Many of the Ashkenazim brought some funds with them. These they deposited with the community and received in exchange a pittance on which to live; but many depended entirely on the annual collections for Palestine made in the synagogues of the Diaspora (the Halukkah). As these contributions were irregular, the community contracted what were, for them, enormous debts with local non-Jewish moneylenders, and the payment of interest (usually 50% or more) formed the first charge on money sent from abroad. In addition the method by which these monies were collected was extravagant and unsatisfactory. The rabbis of Jerusalem licensed collectors to visit different parts of the world and to receive the collections made. They had to deduct the costs of travel—often for a period of one or two years—out of the funds received, and, in addition, expected to receive up to a quarter of what they finally brought back as honorarium for their work. In 1880 these collections were found to amount to an annual sum of about £60,000. But, once the various costs were deducted, the amount received by the individual Jew was inadequate to keep body and soul together. Yet to the Turkish authorities and the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem the reception of sums from abroad gave the impression that the Jewish community was wealthy, and they increased their exactions accordingly. In the hierarchy of misery and exploitation, the place of the Jews was at the bottom. The Christian might be ill-treated with impunity by the Muslim. But the Jew had to suffer from both the Muslim and the Christian.

Like all other sections of the population of Palestine, they owed the first steps in the improvement of their condition to the work of foreign visitors. It was in 1827 and 1838 that

Moses Montefiore (1784-1885) made his first pilgrimages to Jerusalem, and excited the amazement of the whole population, Muslim and Christian as well as Jewish, by the sight of a Jew who was not only a man of wealth and standing among the 'Franks', but was the personal friend of Mehmet Ali, and received with an official welcome by the governor of the city. Throughout his long life Montefiore laboured unceasingly for the good of the Jews of Palestine. He made seven visits to the country, and in 1840, at the time of the ritual murder accusation in Damascus, he procured a valuable firman denouncing the accusation. This was of great value when in 1847 a similar charge was launched from the Orthodox convent against Jerusalem Jews. In his earlier visits Montefiore made various plans which would, he hoped, lead to a resettlement of Jews in the country. But the impossibility of obtaining satisfactory conditions from the Turkish authorities turned his mind more and more to the immediate problems of rescuing those already living there from the demoralising effects of Halukkah, and of finding some means to enable them to earn their own livings. He was able somewhat to improve living conditions, partly by the erection of a group of cottages outside the Jaffa gate; and he made tentative, though not very successful, experiments in the agricultural field. But his main contribution lay in none of these precise plans, but in the impression made by his personality, as a distinguished English Jew, on the authorities and Jewish population of Jerusalem, and in the interest in Palestinian Jewry which his visits aroused in western Europe.

The greatest practical results in these early days came, not from Jewish efforts, but from the establishment of a British vice-consulate, soon raised to a consulate, in Jerusalem in 1839. On January 31, 1839, Mr. Young, the first to hold the post, received the following brief minute from the Foreign Office:

"I am directed by Viscount Palmerston, to state to you that it will be a part of your duty as British Vice-Consul at Jerusalem to afford Protection to the Jews generally: and you will take an early opportunity of reporting to his Lordship upon the present state of the Jewish population in Palestine."

In November of the same year he received further instructions, explicitly permitting him to extend his protection to Jews who were subjects of other European powers, did the consuls of these powers at Alexandria (he was still the only European Consul in Jerusalem) request him to do so. The actual setting out of which such instructions arose will come to be considered later in the chapter; but their value to the Jews already resident in the country, and to Jewish immigrants who arrived there, is obvious. It was the first time that any European power had definitely interested itself in their lot. France protected Latin Christians; Russia had pretensions to exercise the same authority over members of the Orthodox Church; but the Jews had had nowhere to turn for the representation of their interests, or their protection from local injustice. Though to a varying and diminishing degree, this protection of Jews came to be one of the most onerous and important tasks of the consulate. It was also an extremely delicate task, and not infrequently involved the consuls in difficult negotiations with both the Turks and the other European consular offices. In the end the matter dropped, but from 1839 to 1893 it played a considerable part in local Jewish history.

The most interesting of the consuls on whom this duty devolved was James Finn, who occupied the office from 1845 to 1862, and whose wife was the daughter of Dr. Alexander McCaul, the most learned and prominent leader of the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews. This meant that Finn and the missionary station in Jerusalem were in very close contact with each other, a situation which had obvious disadvantages, as well as assets. The disadvantage lay in the suspicion which was inevitably aroused among the rabbis and orthodox Jews of Jerusalem that all the activities of the British consul were tainted with designs for their conversion. The advantage lay in the voluntary support which Finn was able to enlist for various projects for the betterment of the Jews, and in the fact that Finn himself, as well as his wife, were accomplished Hebrew scholars. Those Jews who came to the consulate were sure of being able to make themselves understood, and of being assisted with a devotion which went far beyond official demands. He was, in fact, constantly being rebuked by his superiors for having exceeded his duties and powers in the services he rendered the Jews of Jerusalem.

Like Montefiore, Finn was always seeking opportunities to enable them to earn their own living, and during the distress caused by the Crimean war he provided several hundred with agricultural work both at Urtas, south of Bethlehem, and at Talbiyeh outside Jerusalem, and these schemes were completely free from any proselytizing activity.

In the visit which he paid to Cairo and Constantinople in 1840 at the time of the ritual murder accusations at Damascus, Montefiore had been accompanied by Adolfe Crémieux, a leading member of French Jewry, and from that time onwards French Jews also became interested in the difficulties of their brethren in the Holy Land. Members of the French branch of the house of Rothschild undertook projects similar to those of Montefiore. The founding of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in 1860 made it possible to lay a foundation firmer than the benevolence of individuals, and the Alliance gradually came to represent the philanthropic interests of British and American, as well as French, Jews in all matters affecting the lot of their brethren in the east. In 1870 the Alliance bought a considerable tract of land outside Jaffa, and there founded an agricultural school, Mikveh Israel, which has endured till the present day. Ten years later they began to establish primary schools for boys, but by that time the situation had changed, and the emphasis was passing from work for the already existing Jewish community to projects of resettlement which led in turn to a new form of agricultural colonisation.

The transition was provided in 1875 by the pioneer purchase of land north of Jaffa for agricultural work by a group of Jews from Jerusalem. The site was named Petah Tikvah (gate of hope), but the site was swampy and malarial and, like all other early projects, it only survived with the aid of outside help. But that does not lessen its importance as a first effort, made by Jews of Palestine by themselves, to build a new life on a foundation of agriculture. The experiment was quickly followed by similar efforts undertaken by Jews from Rumania and Russia. In order to understand this development we need to go back to a much earlier period and follow the discussions, among Christians as well as Jews, as to the possibility of resettling substantial numbers of Jews on the soil of Palestine. In chapter eight the continuity of the Jewish relation to the Promised Land, and the various forms which that relation took, have already been discussed. In the 19th century the

perennial hope expressed itself in new ways and with a new intensity.

The action of Lord Palmerston was in large measure due to the influence of Lord Shaftesbury, who had become convinced that a Jewish resettlement of Palestine would be advantageous not only for the Jewish people, but also for the sultan, who could count on the loyalty of new subjects who would, at the same time, restore a desolate province to prosperity. At the time when the powers were decided to compel Mehmet Ali to abandon Syria, but were still uncertain of its future, the project was mooted of creating a Jewish commonwealth in the southern half of the country—i.e. in the area of Biblical Palestine. That nothing came of these projects was in some measure due to the fact that western European Jewry was primarily engaged in the struggle for its emancipation and its consequent assimilation, and saw no point in the political re-establishment of a Jewish nation.

While, therefore, practical programmes of resettlement, largely initiated by benevolent Christians, languished for a period in the west, the struggle was taken up within Jewry. A number of rabbis in Germany and Poland, of whom the leader and most distinguished was rabbi Zvi Hersch Kalischer (1795-1874) put before their depressed and persecuted brethren the idea of resettlement in the Land of Israel. The main opposition which rabbi Kalischer found himself compelled to meet arose from the belief that such an idea, effected by human agency, was in conflict with the messianic beliefs of orthodoxy. In 1860 Kalischer called a conference at Thorn, where he was rabbi for forty years; and in 1861, as an outcome of the conference, there was founded "The Society for the Colonisation of the Land of Israel". It was partly due to the influence of Kalischer and his followers that Mikveh Israel was founded by the Alliance in 1870. Meanwhile a Jew of a different type, Moses Hess (1812-1875) was expressing similar ideas. Hess had been a political journalist, and at one time a colleague of Marx and Engels. He took part in the revolution of 1848 and after its failure withdrew from politics and went to live in Paris. There in 1862 he produced *Rome and Jerusalem*, a book which laid the intellectual foundations of Jewish nationalism.

It was nearly twenty years before there were practical consequences from these and similar books and projects,

whether of Christians or of Jews; and by that time the scene had shifted farther east, to Rumania and Russia. The Jewries of these countries were largely ignorant of the earlier discussions in western Europe, and came to the idea primarily through their own troubles. In both countries their lot was exceedingly miserable. They possessed none of the rights of citizenship, but were expected to shoulder most of its burdens; while their own social and economic existence was curbed and limited in every direction by administrative and legislative action designed expressly to keep them in a state of poverty, ignorance and subjection. Two events brought matters to a crisis. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin attempted to ensure that the Jews of Rumania should be guaranteed equality of citizenship with the rest of the population. Though they sought to make this grant a condition of recognition, the Rumanian government evaded its obligations successfully right down to the outbreak of the first world war. Instead of citizenship the Rumanian Jews saw their position continually deteriorate, and the thought of emigration became urgent in many Jewish homes. Three years later an even more signal disaster overcame the Jews of Russia. In 1881 the Tsar Alexander II was murdered, and the bureaucracy, seeking for a scapegoat, laid the blame on the Jews. Pogroms, inspired by the authorities, broke out in many towns, and on top of mob violence the Jews found themselves subjected to even more rigorous restrictions than those from which they had previously suffered. The result was a mass emigration, amounting in the end to millions. The greater part fled westwards to the industrialised centres of Europe where work could easily be found, or to the new world. The Jewish community in the United States grew annually by tens of thousands of members. But a few turned their thoughts away from a further life in the Diaspora to the idea of settlement in Palestine, and listened willingly to the summons which was being issued from many centres by various Jewish voices.

There had come into existence in Russia a movement known as Chibbath Zion (Love of Zion), supported by such men as the novelist and journalist Perez Smolenskin (1842-1885), Moses Leib Lilienblum (1843-1910), the reformer, Eliezer Ben-Jehuda (1857-1922), who out of the ancient language and all scraps of modern usage, recreated Hebrew, and Leo Pinsker (1821-1891), the author of the rousing pamphlet

Auto-Emancipation. Societies of Choveve Zion (Lovers of Zion) sprang up in many cities, and began to spread rapidly to the west, and even to America; and in the same year, 1881, a group of Jewish students of Kharkov University toured the country with the slogan "Oh house of Jacob let us go forth." The initial letters of this slogan in Hebrew formed the letters BILU, and they were known as the Biluim. The organisation spread so rapidly that in 1884 it summoned a conference in Kattowitz to discuss methods of supporting the settlements which were already being established, and as a result of this conference a central office, charged with raising funds, was set up in Odessa under the chairmanship of Pinsker. At about this time one of the most sensitive critics and, at the same time, profoundest writers of the early years of the movement made his appearance, Asher Ginsberg (1856-1927) who wrote under the name of Achad ha-Am. His first article was a call to fuller preparation, spiritual as well as material, before colonisation could be pushed forward.

Meanwhile the first steps had been taken in Palestine. From a Rumanian committee in Galatz two groups had actually set sail for Palestine, where they arrived early in 1882. One settled at Samarin (later renamed Zikron Yaakob) in the hills south of Carmel and the other at Rosh Pina (Cornerstone) on the road from Tiberias to Lake Huleh. Only a short while afterwards the first two colonies of the Russian Biluim were established at Rishon le Zion (First in Zion) and in the temporarily abandoned Jerusalem colony of Petah Tikvah. A fifth settlement, founded by Jews from Poland, was established in the following year north of Rosh Pina. We have an account by Laurence Oliphant of the first days of the settlement at Samarin, and a report a year later from Mr. E. F. Veneziani, a member of the central committee of the Alliance who was visiting the east in connection with the Alliance schools. From these two accounts it is easy to see what difficulties the new settlers faced and with what naïve inexperience they faced them. Oliphant, who was a thoroughly sympathetic witness, speaks of the Rumanian Jews as 'effeminate be-ringletted townsmen' forming an extraordinary contrast to the fellaheen on whom they relied for co-operation in the actual agricultural work. Mr. Veneziani a year later found the colonists at the point of starvation and on the brink of abandoning the whole project. Nor was the situation any

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better in the other colonies. The colonists brought enthusiasm, but neither experience nor the physique which could resist the rigours of the climate, especially the malaria which resulted from the swamps and undrained rivers.

To increase their difficulties the Turkish government opposed itself firmly to the whole movement, and for the first time in history Jews were subjected to an ordinance that they might visit the country on pilgrimage, but that they were absolutely prohibited from acquiring the ownership of land or taking up permanent residence. For a short time it was uncertain whether the Russian government might not insist on the extension of the right of all Russian subjects to acquire land in Palestine—a right guaranteed by treaty—to cover Jewish immigration; for Russia was not averse to Jews leaving the country. But in the end nothing was done, and in most cases the settlers had to acquire their land by a number of more or less inconvenient subterfuges. At first the local population was often as hostile as the Government, and the settlers had to suffer from attacks both from the bedouin and from the neighbouring fellahcen. But at this moment when the whole project seemed doomed, a French Jew, the Baron Edmond de Rothschild, came to the rescue.

The next fifteen years were years of difficulty, of internal hesitations and of conflicts. Some new settlements were built, and some new settlers arrived. But many left in disgust, for in their enthusiasm the propagandists of Choveve Zion had painted rosy pictures of the wealth and prosperity which could be immediately attained by settlement in Palestine. In the settlements to which the Baron gave his assistance there were difficulties of another kind. Convinced that the settlers needed the guidance and control of experienced agricultural experts, the Baron confided the direction of his enterprise and the disbursement of the vast sums he provided to men with whom the settlers were frequently at variance, and who tried to carry matters with a heavy hand, relying on the paternal authority of the Baron. Their conception of agriculture was a western European one, relying largely on exports and not concerned to develop a subsistence industry largely consuming its own products; and they followed also the western capitalist idea of seeking the cheapest labour for their production. Such labour could evidently be more easily provided by Arabs than Jews, so that many of the settlements ended in the

spectacle—utterly at variance with the original ideals of the Choveve Zion—of a Jewish ‘planter class’, protected by bribes paid to the most powerful sheik in the neighbourhood, working under the strict direction of French or other experts, with Arab labour, for the production of goods which needed to be exported in order to be used. Vines were one of the main crops on the Baron’s settlements, but he was sometimes obliged to buy the whole vintage himself, since it proved impossible to find a market for it.

The year 1897 marked the opening of a wholly new phase in Zionism. Up to that time it had been a mainly eastern European movement, resting on the twin foundations, one idealistic, that of seeking a rebirth, under conditions of freedom, of the Jewish tradition and culture, and the other practical, that of seeking some spot where it was possible to earn a decent living. But in that year a congress was summoned at Basle of members of the Jewish community throughout the world to deliberate about their future. The summoner of that congress was Dr. Theodor Herzl, and he was almost wholly unaware of the events in Russia, Rumania and Palestine already described. That such a situation could arise was evidence of the anomalous position of the Jewish people in the nineteenth century. That which lay behind the action of Dr. Herzl was the evidence of Jewish insecurity even in lands where political equality had been granted. From 1879 onwards a new anti-semitic movement had been making considerable headway in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and Herzl himself had experience of it in his home, Vienna. It might, however, have seemed to so completely assimilated a Jew as was this Austrian journalist and playwright to be a mere political flash in a pan which could not long survive German stolid common-sense or Austrian culture. But in 1894 Herzl went to Paris as correspondent of the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse*, and found himself reporting the Dreyfus trial. The sight and hearing of the French crowds howling like wild animals for the blood of Dreyfus and the Jews provoked a profound revulsion; for France was the pioneer of emancipation and boasted itself the centre of civilisation and culture. Herzl had no knowledge of Jewish culture or tradition; he suffered no economic hardship; but he became convinced that his political security and self-respect could not be assured so long as Jews lived in the anomalous position they occupied in their dispersion. He had

no particular interest in Palestine, but was convinced that Jews must have their own state somewhere to which they could turn if life was made intolerable in other lands. The history of the remaining years up to 1914 is occupied with the interaction of these three new motives for interest in Palestine—desire to earn a living, desire for the rebirth of the Jewish tradition, and desire for political security—with the motives of other bodies interested in the country, but supporting none of the Zionist groupings.

Eastern European Jews, and Palestinian settlers were, at first, sceptical of the activities of Herzl. They were present at all the Zionist Congresses, but gradually drew round themselves a party called the 'practicals', opposing the schemes of supporters of Herzl who were dubbed the 'politicals'. They wished to see the Palestinian settlements extended by every possible means, and regarded as temporary and unimportant the subterfuges and difficulties which the actual purchase and settlement of land involved. To Herzl and his followers these difficulties not only deprived the settlement of proper dignity, but involved dangers to the whole of his scheme for the achievement of security by the establishment of a Jewish state. For Turkey continued to reject all demands by which the Zionists sought legally to purchase land in Palestine, and had gone so far as to prohibit it by law in 1882 and 1891. Though the law was never strictly enforced, it gave officials opportunities for unlimited demands for bribes to wink at its evasion. When the Young Turks succeeded Abdul Hamid they were no more favourable to settlement, and more efficient in putting obstacles in its way. Herzl desired to meet this situation by direct diplomatic intervention with the Porte, and by securing an open agreement by which an autonomous Jewish colonisation of Palestine on a large scale might take place. This objective stands first in the programme enunciated by the first Congress of 1897, and remained the official programme of the Zionist Organisation up to 1914:

"The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

"The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

"1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonisation of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.

"2. The organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

"3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

"4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism."

In his efforts to secure the recognition in 'public law' which he sought Herzl attempted to interest the Foreign Offices of Europe, and had several interviews with the sultan. When this was evidently not going to lead to practical results, the British Government in 1903 offered the Zionist Organisation opportunities for settlement, first at al-Arish in the Sinai peninsular and then, when that proved impossible, on a stretch of land in the highlands of East Africa. This offer provoked a violent controversy between the practicals and the politicals. The latter were for considering it, and they included some disillusioned Palestinians; the former would consider nothing but Palestine, and in this they were supported by the idealists to whom the rebuilding of Zion could take place in no other land than Palestine.

In the following year Herzl died at the early age of 44. There was no one of his stature to succeed him in his political activities, and power gradually shifted to the practicals, with the result that various developments took place in the building up of the new Jewish community in Palestine.

In the meantime the 'non-zionists' had also been active. The early settlements were wholly rescued by the generosity of the Baron Edmond de Rothschild; but their complete dependence on his philanthropy meant in effect merely a new kind of Halukkah, and was almost equally demoralising. In 1899 he handed over all his interests to the Jewish Colonisation Association, and they set out to reform the agricultural programme as well as the economic conditions of the settlements, with the result that they began steadily to improve. Meanwhile the Alliance continued its work of establishing schools. Between 1882 and 1898 schools of various kinds for boys and girls were opened in Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, Safad and Tiberias. The Alliance was followed by other philanthropic bodies from western Europe and America.

In the early years of the twentieth century a crisis developed in both these fields of activity. The settlers complained that the overseers and experts appointed by the ICA deprived them of all independence, and that their administration was overbearing and bureaucratic; and at the same time the complaint was raised in the educational field that the French schools merely set out to create little Frenchmen, the German schools little Germans, and so on; and that none of them gave adequate or, in many cases, any place to instruction in Hebrew which was the language of the settlements. In consequence of these conflicts a new type of settlement emerged, and a new set of schools was developed.

The new settlements were the product of a new party within the Zionist Organisation, the Poale Zion, a socialist party seeking to build settlements not on a 'planter' and individualist basis but as co-operatives in which no paid labour was employed, and all profits were equally shared among the members. The first of these settlements were Kinnereth and Daganian, on the southern shore of the Lake of Tiberias, founded in 1908-9. Only three others were founded before 1914, but it became a standard type of settlement after 1918. During the same period an attempt was made to solve the problem of cheap labour, by building Jewish workers' villages in the neighbourhood of the old individualist settlements, where by small holding, as well as by working on ICA estates, the worker might maintain a decent standard of living. The arrival of a number of Yemenite Jews helped in this direction. For they were hardy workers, spoke Arabic and were accustomed to the standards and the climate of the country.

The new schools started by, or in co-operation with, various sections of the Zionist Organisation, all made Hebrew the foundation of their system. The language, however, was not introduced by them into the country. It is clear from many statements of James and Mrs. Finn that Hebrew was constantly employed by Palestinian Jews for their intercourse with each other, and that one of Finn's great assets as consul had been his ability to speak and write it fluently. He even reports that in the neighbourhoods of Safad and Tiberias the language was spoken by many of the fellahen. The leadership in spreading schools wherever there were Zionist settlers was taken by the Odessa Committee. But a big step forward followed a conference of Hebrew teachers summoned in 1903

by Menahem Ussishkin, chairman of that committee and later one of the leaders of the Palestine community, at which an association of teachers was formed who took charge of the education service by forming themselves into a teachers' co-operative. It was the only such organisation in the world. It was the teachers who in 1907 created in the Herzl Gymnasium in Tel Aviv the first Hebrew Secondary School. The influence of the Zionist schools led to pioneering in new fields. In some of the old orthodox Talmud Torahs modern subjects were introduced on to the curriculum. Arabic came to be taught in many Jewish schools. In 1909 the Bezalel School of Arts and Crafts was established in Jerusalem to develop native craftsmen and artists. In 1914 a Technical School was established in Haifa; but this was the cause of a considerable disturbance. For it was under German auspices and at the last moment the Board of Directors, who were appointed by the German organisation, the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, decided that education should be in German. As the Hilfsverein had hitherto accepted Hebrew as the medium for instruction in the many schools in the country for which it was already responsible, this led to a strike of teachers and pupils. The outbreak of the war put an end to the controversy; but it also put an end to the use of European languages as the basis for instruction in purely Jewish schools. Though no beginnings had been made with the establishment of university teaching before 1914, land had been bought on Mount Scopus and funds were already collected. In this work one of the leaders was Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who even earlier had pleaded at Zionist Congresses for a Hebrew University.

In the Zionist Organisation the victory of the 'practicals' over the 'politicals' led to it taking an increasing responsibility for direct work in Palestine. So long as the politicals were in power they had refused to involve the Organisation in Palestinian questions until they could obtain a sure legal standing from the Porte. The practicals, realising that this was not going to be achieved, set up a Palestine Office in 1907 at Jaffa, and at once advanced funds from the Jewish National Fund for the beginnings of Tel Aviv. They also established the Anglo-Palestine Banking Co. in the country, where it was the first modern bank, and, as such, quickly made use of by merchants of all sections of the community. In a very short time it found it possible to establish branches all over the

country with the protection and approval of the Turkish authorities. Another company which established offices at Jaffa was the Palestine Land Development Fund, which aided individuals to secure land, and undertook the first stages of its development. It was often its task to make land ready for settlement for owners who were still abroad.

By 1914 some 12,000 Jewish settlers were occupying and working about 100,000 acres of land. Much of the work had not been done by the Zionist Organisation but by the Baron and by the ICA which administered the funds he provided and the land he had acquired. These holdings accounted for much more than half the total holdings in the country. A school system had been developed, under an almost bewildering variety of auspices, with the natural result that there was a bewildering variety of schools from the completely religious to the completely secular. Agricultural research and settlement experiment were sufficiently far advanced for it to be possible to say by 1914 that the Jews had both proved their ability to restore a prosperous agriculture to the waste places of Palestine, and had forged the skeleton organisation necessary to carry it further.

While Zionist settlers on the land amounted to about 12,000 in 1914, these were by no means the only new Jewish settlers in the country. Many Zionists themselves lived in the towns. But there had also been a considerable immigration based on the improved security and on the increasing possibility of earning a living by trade or craftsmanship. The whole Jewish population had grown to between 90,000 and 100,000 by 1914, and of these 50,000 to 60,000 lived in Jerusalem, where they formed the majority of the inhabitants, 12,500 in Safad, and 12,000 in Jaffa-Tel Aviv. In Jerusalem the Sephardic community numbered about 20,000, the Ashkenazic about 40,000. The former community included substantial settlements from many parts of the Islamic world. The wealthiest were the Bokharan Jews and the poorest those of Yemen and Morocco. The Jewish population had spread widely outside the walls of the old town, from the prosperous suburbs of the Bokharans to the co-operative townlets, such as Mea Shearim, in which different national groups lived with relatively complete self government.

During the period between the Napoleonic and the first world wars the Jewish community had developed from a poverty

stricken and persecuted minority of less than 10,000 in a population of possibly 3 to 400,000 to a very varied but energetic community of 100,000 in a community of about 700,000. And it had become a community making a contribution to the life of the country as a whole. The days of Halukkah were not over, but the majority of the Jews earned their livings in trade, in various crafts and, on the Zionist settlements, in agriculture. A third of the orange trade was theirs, and they had made substantial contributions to the development of new and better products in many fields. The community was served by a wide variety of schools for both boys and girls, and by a number of hospitals in which increasingly successful attacks were being made on the two major evils of trachoma and malaria. Much of the educational work, and all the medical, was at the service of the whole population, and was used by Muslims and Christians as well as by Jews. Though they were still exposed to the thievery and occasional violence which was regarded as natural by the Arabs and the fellaheen, on the whole good relations prevailed between Jews and the rest of the population. Certainly there was ample room for both in the country, and, apart from occasional hostile articles in the press, the nationalist movement had not sufficiently developed to present a serious problem.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND
ITS EFFECTS IN PALESTINE

THE STORY OF THE LOCAL population, and the impact on the country of diverse foreign interests, between the Napoleonic and the first world wars have been reviewed in the four preceding chapters. Throughout the period the initiative came from abroad—from Turks as governors, Christians as educators, missionaries and archaeologists, and Jews as educators and settlers. While the balance in the whole country was changed by these activities, the extent to which different elements were affected varied. The whole population benefited from an increase in security, and the beginnings of hospital and medical services. To a lesser extent the whole population benefited from the educational work done; it led to a new life among the local Christians, and enabled them to challenge the supremacy of Greek nationalism in the Jerusalem patriarchate; it led to a renaissance in the local Jewish population, and the development of means by which they could free themselves from Halukkah; it led to the beginnings of an Arab renaissance, accentuated by reactions against the attempt of the Young Turks between 1908 and 1914 to impose a Turkish education on the Muslim population, and against the imperialism which the educating powers were showing in other portions of the Arab world. Unfortunately the elements of the population least affected by all these changes were the peasant cultivators and the nomad bedouin, and numerically these comprised the majority of the inhabitants.

Parallel with these new influences on the existing inhabitants came other developments, emphasising the unique relations to the country of the Christian and Jewish civilisations. The protection of the European consuls and the reforms of Abdul Hamid led to the restoration of many of the Christian shrines and monasteries scattered throughout the countryside which had been destroyed in the previous centuries of Islamic rule or abandoned through the insecurity of the land and the

hostility of the local Muslims. It was not only in Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem that such shrines were rebuilt, but in all parts of Judaea, Samaria and Galilee. A similar movement had taken place within Jewry. The population of all the Holy Cities had grown enormously, and at the same time the recurrent emphasis on resettlement had taken on a new meaning under the impetus of Zionism and the background of eastern European insecurity, and created new Jewish settlements widely scattered through the land. That which was lacking was any parallel interest on the part of Islam. The reform movements of the Wahhabi and Sanussi had not been followed by any comparable revival among the Muslim millions who were peasants or townsmen. A few wealthy Muslims sent their children to Christian or Jewish schools; Muslims of all sections of the population took advantage of hospitals and clinics. But Islam had developed no social or educational programme of its own. It had not even attempted experiments which had failed. The Muslims had become more law-abiding because it had become more dangerous to be lawless. Otherwise they had not changed; fatalism and resignation still ruled the lives of fellaheen and bedouin alike. One of the best informed Englishmen in the country during the nineteenth century had been Colonel Conder, chief of the land survey of the Palestine Exploration Fund. Writing at the end of the seventies he had expressed the hope that regeneration would come from a kind of feudal state, led by the old land-owning families which had produced such men as Fakhr ad-Din and Dahir. Scions of these families had been brought into touch with Arab nationalism at Beirut, Damascus, Constantinople, Cairo or Paris. But there was no sign within the country of the revival which he hoped to see. Order had led, as he foresaw, to an increase of population; but it had led to no general change of spirit. There were, as happily there are in all human societies, individuals in all walks of life who were generous in spirit and noble in character. They were to be found among the religious leaders, the bedouin and village sheiks and the townsmen and fellaheen, men who would gladly and worthily have taken their places in a new and reformed society. But they remained isolated examples of what Islam could produce, and lacked that extra incentive which would have made them leaders of a national revival.

Such was the general situation when the Turkish declaration in November 1914 brought the country into the war zone. The actual course of military operations has been described in chapter eleven. But the country was as much affected by the general war situation as by actual military events. The European consulates were closed; most of the European educators had to leave; the great religious establishments of France, Italy and other countries were emptied, and many of them were commandeered by the Turks. The leaders of the indigenous Christians, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs, with their staffs, were deported to Damascus; and the Anglican bishop had to remain in Egypt. The majority of the Jewish immigrants of the previous thirty years had either Russian or Rumanian nationality, and thousands retired to Egypt, though the bulk of the agricultural settlers stayed on their land.

The Turks ruthlessly suppressed all manifestations of Arab nationalism; and a number of prominent Arabs, from members of the Abdul Hadi family in the north to the mufti of Gaza in the south, paid with their lives for their patriotic ideals. As the war progressed, and particularly as the Turks retired before the advancing forces of Allenby, the peasants also were drawn into the maelstrom. Many tens of thousands were called up as conscripts, and most of these were sent to distant fronts. Food and livestock were commandeered, trees were cut down for fuel, and the work of months often proved more effective than the neglect of centuries in destroying the agricultural foundations of village life. Nearly all the improvements of the previous fifty years were swept away. When the British entered Judaea and Jerusalem they found a land on the brink of starvation, and for their first year of administration the feeding of the population, countrymen as well as townsmen, proved their most urgent task.

A certain number of the inhabitants were drawn into more active participation in the war. As the revolt in the desert gathered momentum it drew in some of the bedouin tribes of Beersheba and Transjordan; as the Turkish forces retired northward some of the fellaheen soldiers deserted and melted back into the countryside, where they welcomed and assisted the advancing British. A few hundred took a more active part, including the future mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini. Of the Jews, some of those who remained on their land did valuable

work for the Allies behind the lines, and some paid with their lives for their courage. In Egypt a Jewish volunteer unit, known as the Zion Mule Corps, was formed out of the refugees from Palestine and saw service in Gallipoli. Later four battalions of 'Judeans' were recruited, though largely from Jews of England, and saw service in Allenby's campaign.

[Meanwhile the future of the Turkish empire was being discussed throughout the Middle East and in the allied capitals in the west. In most proposals Palestine was treated simply as a part of a larger whole—Syria, the Arab world, or the eastern Mediterranean area. All agreed that the whole should be emancipated from Turkish rule; all desired the advancement of the Arabic speaking peoples; but the type of regime which was to succeed the Turkish was seen very differently in different quarters. In addition, there were those to whom Palestine, because of its special history and associations, demanded special treatment and separate consideration. In the first group were the Arab nationalists, the British and the French; in the second, the Jews and the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches and their political supporters.]

(The Arab nationalists dreamed of a vast and united Arab empire, embracing all the Arabic speaking peoples, Christian as well as Muslim, and entirely independent of any foreign influence or control.) Intensely proud of the great period of the Arab caliphate, and almost wholly ignorant of the complex problems involved in sovereignty and independence in the twentieth century, they ignored the diversity of the area over which they demanded sovereign control, and the absence of any tradition of political unity between its different parts; and they were unrealistically and optimistically indifferent to their own lack of political experience, to the absence of that educated middle class on which a modern state rests, and to the existence within their borders of genuine interests which were different from their own, and of responsibilities which they were incapable of assuming.

In sharpest opposition to the plans of the Arabs were those of the French. With the southern and eastern portions of the area in which the Arabs sought independence they had no concern. But in Syria they claimed a traditional interest and a *mission civilisatrice*, going back to the time of Charlemagne's

relations with Harun al-Rashid. The French had never forgotten that it was Frenchmen who had been the leaders of the crusading movement. From France had come the successive dynasties of kings of Jerusalem. With the coming of the Turks it was to France that was granted the right of protecting European interests and the Latin Christians. French was the language of polite society in Egypt, and the Syrian coast towns. In 1860 she had intervened with her forces to protect the Maronites of the Lebanon. In addition to this concept of a *mission civilisatrice* she had more frankly imperialist aims. She sought a balance in the eastern Mediterranean to the recent Italian conquests in North Africa, and a counterpoise to British influence in Egypt. For these diverse reasons she considered herself entitled to control of a vast triangular area whose western side extended from the future Turkish frontier in Asia Minor down to Egypt, and whose eastern tip reached the Persian frontier beyond Mosul.

(The claims of Great Britain were of a somewhat different order. She had no desire to extend her responsibilities unnecessarily, and her main concern with the Middle East rested on its geographical position athwart the routes to India and to the oil of the Persian Gulf. Strengthened by the experience of the Turkish advance to the Suez Canal in 1915 she desired to establish herself on its eastern side, and the obvious place for this was the bay of Haifa-Acre. Here she desired to create a naval harbour and base. Aden she already possessed at the south western tip of Arabia, and she was in treaty relations with the local Arab amirs round the western shores of the Persian Gulf. She desired to have Basra as a military outpost in that area, and to be sure that no power in Baghdad could menace her oil or her route to India.)

(Finally there were interests directly concerned with Palestine, and confined to that part of the Middle East. Of these the Jewish was the more positive and extended to a desire for the establishment of a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan,) corresponding to the territory described in the second half of the Book of Joshua as the patrimony of the twelve tribes of Israel. There was also the Christian concern in the Holy Places, of which the guardians were France, the Vatican and Russia, and which was confined to the negative role of opposing any regime which might seem hostile to the proper maintenance of the Christian shrines, convents, schools and hospitals, or

incapable of assuring security of access to them for Christians from other countries.

Needless to say the satisfaction of any of these interests depended on a victory of the Allies; for Germany and Turkey equally had ambitions in the region whose realisation was incompatible with the desires alike of Arabs, Jews, French and British. Before any results could be enjoyed, victory, therefore, had to be won by hard fighting against a powerful and resourceful enemy.

In considering these separate claims it is evident that the simultaneous fulfilment of all of them was impossible. But it would be utopian to dismiss all interests except those of the Arabs as imperialist and immoral. The western world was in a transitional state. Though the frankly acquisitive imperialism of the nineteenth century had fallen into bad odour, the complexities of twentieth century life were such that world interests in communications and raw materials could not simply be subordinated to the demands of inexperienced national sovereignties. And if the French colonial policy, based on the belief in the superiority of French culture and its desirability for all other peoples, was rousing increasing criticism and hostility in the Anglo-saxon world as well as among the subjects of France in North Africa, there was developing in Anglo-saxon countries a conception of trusteeship and an awareness of the existence of ethnic and religious minorities, which was critical of the ambitions and the promises alike of imperialism and of extreme nationalism. Finally European countries which knew by their own experience that parliamentary institutions and democratic responsibilities were products of centennial growth could not but be sceptical of the self-confidence of those who believed that such ends could be achieved immediately by the stroke of a pen and a series of enthusiastic resolutions.

All these factors need to be taken into account in considering the position in the Middle East. For the whole situation was fluid. Only in the simpler societies in the southern portions of the Arabian peninsula were the Allies being asked to recognise situations which had already come independently into existence and proved their reality. Everywhere else they were expected to assist new and hitherto unproved situations to emerge, and they could not necessarily foresee future incompatibilities and shortcomings. All the decisions which

proved mistaken or unworkable were not due to conscious hypocrisy or double-dealing; supermen, working in a spacious tranquillity, would have made mistakes; actually the work of planning was undertaken in the middle of an exhausting war in which the Middle East occupied but a minor place; and even within single countries there were different interests and points of view which might lead to different local action or conflicting proposals.

It fell naturally to the British to take the first steps in regard to the claims and hopes of the Arabs. The forces engaged in the Middle Eastern theatre of war were almost wholly provided by Britain, India and the Dominions, and it was in the office of the British High Commissioner in Cairo that the first steps were taken. The Arab movement was not unknown to either the British or the Indian governments. In the years before 1914 a number of Englishmen had travelled through the Arab world and become familiar with the unrest and hatred of the Turks which was to be found in such places as Damascus and Baghdad. Some, such as Sir Hubert Young or N. N. E. Bray, had been officers on leave from the Indian army; others, such as Gertrude Bell or T. E. Lawrence, were archaeologists. In consequence there was a background of knowledge and of sympathy and understanding with the movement, and it was not only from reasons of military advantage that the British were prepared to lend it their support.

The military need was, however, great. By the declaration that the war was a jihad, a holy war, which it was incumbent on all Muslims to support, Germany and Turkey hoped to be able to make use of Pan-Islam against the Allies. Had this been done, it might have caused grave embarrassment in India, Egypt and other parts of Africa and Asia where both Britain and France had many millions of Muslim subjects. While a jihad would be declared by the sultan as caliph, the support of the sharif of Mecca, as guardian of the holy cities and of the Prophet's flag, was essential for its implementation. Husayn, sharif of Mecca, became thereby the strategic centre of political intrigues. Though he was not the most powerful figure in Arab politics, and lacked any accepted political position in relation to such men as Ibn Saud, Amir of Najd, the action of no other leader would have been equally decisive for the success or failure of the designs of the sultan, the British or the Arab nationalists. While stalling for time with

the Turks, Husayn set himself to explore the possibilities in relation to the others. With regard to the last, he was able to learn in January 1915, from an emissary of Al-Ahd, that the Damascus Arabs looked to him to lead an Arab revolt. Simultaneously he let it be known in Cairo that he would be glad to know what were the feelings of the British. In March he sent his son Faysal on a pretended mission of loyalty to Constantinople, but with instructions, in passing through Damascus, to get into contact with other leaders of Al-Ahd. To them Faysal confessed that he would prefer fighting for the Turks to surrendering the Arab world to a European hegemony. This, in fact, equally represented the attitude of the Syrian nationalists, with the result that Faysal was able to return with a sufficiently encouraging report for Husayn to enter into discussions with the British in Cairo. There followed the well-known Husayn-McMahon correspondence, an exchange of letters between July 1915 and March 1916 in which the claims of the Arabs were put forward and the lines of British-Arab co-operation laid down.

The area which Husayn claimed for the Arab kingdom had as its frontiers the Mediterranean on the west, Persia on the east, and a line drawn through south-eastern Anatolia on the north. The western end of this line included some purely Turkish regions, and the eastern was a matter of discussion. Otherwise they were the accepted frontiers of Asia's Arabic speaking world. It extended to over one million square miles and contained something under ten million inhabitants. McMahon was unwilling to be drawn into a discussion of frontiers, since in any case it was not for Britain alone to decide such matters. Husayn however insisted and, after asking for instructions from the Foreign Office, on 24 October he sent a definition of the British point of view. Primarily because of obscure drafting, this definition has been a bone of contention between the British and the Arabs ever since. The purpose of McMahon is not in doubt. He desired to exclude from the area in which the British would be committed to supporting an independent Arab kingdom certain places in the Persian gulf area, and the Mediterranean coastal region with its many minorities, its complex civilisation and its European contacts. He pointed out that these districts were not wholly Arab. He reinforced the exclusion by saying that Britain could not commit herself on regions which at the time

of writing were claimed by France; and, as has already been said, France at that time claimed the whole Mediterranean coast as her sphere of interest. Palestine is not mentioned by name, but even apart from this the grammatical construction of the reservations leaves the meaning unclear. This became extremely important later; for the correspondence circulated in the Arab world, so that the natural Arab interpretation of the reservations became a political factor of equal importance with their meaning as intended by McMahon himself. That McMahon intended to exclude Palestine rests not only on his own subsequent statement, but on the fact that no interpretation of the general situation would have warranted the exclusion of the northern coastal regions and the inclusion of the southern, where just as important non-Arab interests were involved. But it is a misfortune that the wording is so obscure; for there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Arab statement that no Arab, reading the letter, would have understood Palestine to be omitted.

Husayn did not, and in the circumstances, could not, admit the reservation of special French rights in the Lebanon and the rest of Syria. But, having said so firmly, he consented to waive further discussions until after the war. More than most European powers France was disliked by all sections of the Arab nationalist movement except members of the Maronite and Melkite Churches. This, however, did not make it any less necessary for the British to seek to come to a common mind with their allies on the future of the Middle East. The next stage of the discussion, therefore, took place between the British and the French. The result was the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in which Britain and France divided up the Arab world in just the way the Arab nationalists were determined to resist. The whole area north of the peninsula was divided into two spheres of influence. In Syria France agreed to the establishment of an Arab kingdom with capital at Damascus under French tutelage, but in the coastal region she insisted on her right to a direct French administration. However, she resigned her claims to the land south of Tyre; and it was agreed that the British should hold an area round Acre and Haifa for a naval base, and that the southern part of Palestine should be reserved for an international administration, set up after discussions with the allies, as representing the Christian powers, and the sharif as representing Islam. In the British area in

Mesopotamia a similar division between direct and indirect administration was forecast. The agreement represented a compromise between rival imperial interests and showed that neither power had complete confidence in the ability of the Arabs to manage their own affairs. But it was a bad agreement; for it dealt too great an affront to Arab susceptibilities ever to have been capable of effective execution. The British discovered this very quickly in their Iraqi mandate and abandoned it; the French attempted to enforce it and encountered continual rebellion and unrest in Syria right up to the outbreak of the second world war. At the time, however, it represented the maximum concession that the British could extract from their French allies, and it is in this setting that it must be judged.

Its general terms leaked out in the summer of 1917 and created a difficult situation for those British officers who were seeking to persuade Arab prisoners of war to enlist with the British against the Turks. They declared they had been betrayed, and that they would not fight the Turks unless the whole of their demands for independence were acknowledged. Sir Mark Sykes, who happened to be in Egypt at the time, and whose sincere devotion to the Arab cause was well-known, could only reply that any independence at all would be gained only by a victory in which the British were already shedding their blood; and that the Arabs had to choose whether it was better to fight for the next step in their march to freedom, or to refuse to fight unless they were guaranteed everything in advance. The desert Arabs under Faysal and Husayn were likewise proving to be no easy allies. Though they were fighting for their own freedom, they had to be led, fed, armed and supplied by the British at British cost; and even then only fought when it suited their own plans, and when they had been paid in advance in gold on a scale which would have made mercenaries blush. Even their most enthusiastic friends, including Lawrence himself, are quite frank about the difficulties which the Arab campaign involved for the British. The Arabs in Cairo, who mostly came from the Damascus and Baghdad areas, equally demanded the privileged position that the British should, at the cost of their own lives and treasure, secure an Arab victory in which any diminution whatever of their maximum demands should be compensated for in cash. No nation has ever won its freedom

on such terms. However, for the time, the crisis was averted by Sykes; there was sufficient confidence in British integrity to ensure that there should be no wholesale return to the Turkish side, and the British turned to other problems.

Discussions with the Zionist leaders had been carried on in London in a somewhat desultory fashion, since the beginning of the war. The British were moved by both immediate political needs, and by a genuine sympathy with Zionist ambitions. It was an identical situation to that which had led to the discussion with Husayn; and the fact that in certain countries Jews might have possessed political influence of importance to the allied cause no more invalidates the promises ultimately made than the fact that Husayn might have declared a jihad against the Allies deprives the British promises to the Arabs of moral foundation. (That the Zionist leaders should have chosen to seek the approval and assistance of the British was natural, not only because the British were primarily concerned with Middle Eastern operations, but because Britain had, in the past, been the country which had shown the most practical sympathy with the plight of the Jewish people. The Zionists were anxious for a recognition of Palestine as a Jewish state. (This seemed to the British to be too extreme a demand. The Jews were as inexperienced politically as the Arabs themselves,) and the arguments against surrendering the Mediterranean coast lands to an independent Arab state equally precluded the immediate creation of an independent Jewish state in a land in which there were important interests which were not Jewish. On the other hand Britain recognised that the Jewish assertion of a historic interest in the country rested on genuine foundations, and that the extension of the Jewish settlement in the country was a legitimate and possible objective. (In November 1917 they therefore communicated, in a letter from Mr. (later Lord) Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, as head of Anglo-Jewry, their support for 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' and promised 'to use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object'. At the same time they indicated that it should be 'clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities')

(The Balfour Declaration did not 'give Palestine to the Jews'.

It recognised the existence of a historic Jewish right in the country, and promised to assist the Jewish people in its development in such a way that the other historical rights in the country were not endangered. It equally did not 'give away what belonged not to it but to the Arab people'; for it had already refused to recognise, also on historical grounds, that the Arab claim to be exclusive owners of the country was historically true.) Even apart from the Jewish issue, it was not in the least likely that either Britain or the Christian powers generally would have considered the continuation of the humiliating conditions which Christian institutions and the Christian population had so long endured under Islamic rule and Arab insults. Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches alike had been striving to improve the spiritual and social conditions of the Christian population of the country for more than a century, and would have energetically rejected the idea that their future activities were to be at the mercy of Arab nationalism.

(The Balfour Declaration, even though it promised much less than the Zionist Organisation had asked for, was received with great joy by Zionists throughout the world;) and the Zionist Organisation set out to obtain its endorsement from the other allied powers. France agreed to it on 14 February 1918, Italy on 9 May; and President Wilson, who could not take official action since the U.S.A. was not at war with Turkey, gave it his approval on 31 August. The Vatican also gave it a somewhat reserved acceptance.

In the meantime a number of events had taken place in the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration was not immediately published in Palestine, on the grounds that it was still a theatre of war under military occupation, and that the publication of a political declaration of the kind would be both improper and cause disquiet. But on 4 January 1918 Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo was instructed to communicate its contents to Husayn. (He did so and reported that the king 'seemed quite prepared for formula and agreed enthusiastically, saying he welcomed Jews to all Arab lands'. But he added that in his personal opinion the king knew little about Palestine and that 'his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much'.) He added that he doubted whether in his own mind the king had abated any of his extreme demands, though he was prepared to delay pressing them until the

conclusion of hostilities. (Actually Husayn's attitude remained friendly towards Zionism,) as is shown by his conversations with Colonel Kisch, Chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive, when they met at Amman in 1924 and 1931.

✓ In the same month the Arabs learnt the official text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement from the new Bolshevik government of Russia, and Husayn at once wrote to Cairo for an explanation. The Foreign Office reply was sent him by Colonel Bassett, Acting British Agent at Jedda, on 8 February. This repeated, in careful diplomatic language, the British determination to secure the 'liberation' and 'freedom' of the Arab peoples, but neither repudiated the Agreement, nor used the word 'independence' in relation to the future regimes.

A third important event in January 1918 was the declaration of President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', one of which declared that 'other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'. Such words as 'undoubted' and 'absolutely' indicated a somewhat unrealistic idealism in the utterance, but not a purpose entirely at variance with British objectives. It was not, however, the British at this time but the French who aroused the greatest alarm in the minds of the Arab nationalists. For, however efficient French colonial policy might be from certain material standpoints, there is no doubt that it was far less sympathetic to the conceptions of spiritual independence which the British were anxious to secure to the Arabs as an essential part of their preparation for complete political independence. France was still interested in making Frenchmen out of her colonial subjects, and expected a colony to regard its absorption into metropolitan France, with representatives in the French parliament, as the height of its ambition.

In the summer of 1918 yet another repetition of British purposes was called for, this time by a group of Syrian Arabs temporarily resident in Cairo. Part of their anxiety rested on the suspicion that the more urbanised Arabs of Syria felt towards the subordination of all the Arab world to the rule of a dynasty established at Mecca; part rested on their fears of the scope of the Balfour Declaration and the activities of the Zionist Commission which had already started work in Palestine. In a Foreign Office statement known as the "Declaration to the Seven" the British again made a careful distinction

between different parts of the Arab world. In so far as the independent kingdoms of the south were concerned, and the areas in which the Arabs had emancipated themselves from the Turks, their objective was 'complete and sovereign independence'. This would cover the area of Transjordan in which the Arab forces under Faysal were operating. In the area which allied forces were occupying and carrying on the struggle, their 'wish and desire' was that the future government should 'have the consent of the governed'. This is not equivalent to independence, and is obviously based on the distinctions previously made. But, just as the McMahon correspondence genuinely had a different meaning when read by an Arab ignorant of its background, so here also careless wording introduced a contradiction by saying that in the areas in which the Turks were still in occupation, which included the Acre-Haifa area of northern Palestine as well as the whole of Lebanon and what is to-day Syria, their objective was 'freedom and independence'.

The impression which might have been made by this clause of the Declaration to the Seven was confirmed by the final statement in this long series of pronouncements. On 7 November 1918 a joint Anglo-French Declaration was issued by the Military Command and placarded widely throughout Syria in the following terms:

"The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

"In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing and recognising these as soon as they are actually established.

"Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the

regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories."

This proclamation is entirely conceived in the idealistic terms of President Wilson's fourteen points. Of earlier statements it can too often be justly said that their language lacked the clarity that the situation demanded. But the purpose of the British negotiators was clear, and based on a realistic appreciation of the immediate possibilities of Arab nationalism. Even of the Sykes-Picot agreement it can be said that it recorded some abandonment of colonialism, and some progress towards the acceptance of Arab ideals. (The British were genuinely anxious to see the nucleus of the independent Arab kingdom firmly established; but they were equally genuinely convinced of the legitimacy of recognising the Jewish association with Palestine,) and the need for establishing special conditions for the Holy Places and the Christian minorities. (All of this was abandoned in this foolish statement which justly entitles Arab politicians to charge Britain and France with double-dealing.) It contains no reservations, no recognition of any right save those of the Muslim Arab majorities; and it in no way corresponded with the intentions of the French or British governments, whether they were motivated by the frank imperialism which then expressed the French purpose, or the benevolently pro-Arab plans of the Cairo Office of the British Foreign Office! It was the kind of exaggerated expression of lofty principles unhappily associated with national electioneering in all countries, and totally unsuitable as an expression of official policy directed to an inexperienced people in a difficult and delicate situation. For while democratic peoples know how to estimate such absolutist effervescence at its proper value, and wait for the actual negotiations before they form a judgment of the intentions of the authority concerned, Arab politicians had no such experience at their disposal, and expected the whole of this utopian idealism to be instantly put into effect.

(The responsible Arab leaders did not share this facile optimism. Faysal was still recognised, though with increasing reluctance, as the spokesman of the whole Arab movement, and when he visited Europe for the Peace Conference he readily admitted that Palestine required special treatment. In January 1919 he made a formal agreement with Dr. Weizmann giving the most ample recognition to the Jewish desire for a Jewish state in Palestine, with the legitimate proviso that he could only be held to the agreement did the Arabs on their part obtain the Arab state they sought and believed that they had been promised. In the following month the Syrian delegation to the Peace Conference, comprising Christian and Jewish as well as Muslim representatives, likewise stated its willingness to consider a Jewish settlement in Palestine, but did not desire to see that part of the country completely cut off from the rest of Syria. Did the Jews become a majority in 'southern Syria', they were prepared for a Jewish government in federal relations with the rest of Syria; did they remain a minority, they were prepared to allow them ample minority rights.)

The possibility that the Balfour Declaration might lead to a Jewish majority and a Jewish government continued for several years to be an idea which did not shock British or other statesmen. (As late as 1921 Mr. Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, expressed his belief that 'if in the course of many years [the Jews] become a majority they naturally would take [the government] over'. On the other hand such statements increased the fears of Arab politicians in Palestine, who, in any case, did not accept Faysal as their spokesman. At the time when Dr. Weizmann was making his agreement with the Amir a meeting of Arab notables in Jerusalem, led by Araf Pasha Dajani, rejected at the same time the establishment of a Jewish national home and the separation of Palestine from the rest of Syria.) In December 1920 a convention uniting Arab Muslims and Christians, known as the third Palestine Arab congress (the two previous meetings had been in Damascus as part of the Syrian congress), (proclaimed that Palestine belonged to the Christian and Muslim worlds and rejected the Jewish claim to a place in the country.) This meeting was the first expression of the policy of the Husseini family. Its president was Musa Kazem Pasha al-Husseini and its secretary was Jamal Husseini.

(There were thus two opinions prevailing in the east as well as in the west at the time when the world entered into its reconstruction after the war. Looking back it is possible to see that the attitude which led to the breakdown of the mandate existed from the first. But it was not the only attitude, nor the only possible attitude; and its existence from the beginning would not have justified a condemnation of the whole policy which developed from the Balfour Declaration. For it rested on the assumption that Palestine was exclusively an Arab country; and that was a premise which had not only been rejected by all the parties concerned in the war-time negotiations, but was historically untrue.)

THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, 1918-1930

THE DECISIONS WHICH WERE taken with regard to Palestine during the first world war were based not only on its contemporary condition but also on its previous history. That this history is unique is an objective fact. There are no parallels elsewhere to the attitude of Christians throughout the world to the Holy Land; and much less are there parallels to the Jewish association. The Christian relationship would, in itself, have demanded some special regime; for the Christian Holy Places are not confined to Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem, but are scattered throughout the whole land. That so many churches and convents which had been built in past centuries still lay in ruins, or had been turned into mosques, dwelling houses and stables by the intolerance of Islam and the savagery of the local inhabitants, was no ground for continuing such a state of affairs, especially as the land had been delivered from the Turks by the British and not by Arab sacrifices. The nineteenth century had shown that Christians desired to rebuild these sites; they had the right to expect that under the new regime they would be able to do so.

The Jewish association created greater difficulties, because it had always been connected with settlement; and the Jewish population of the country had always been as large as its political and economic conditions made possible. It was reasonable for Jews to say that the facts that their numbers had been reduced to a few thousands in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and had risen to a hundred thousand at the outbreak of the war in spite of great difficulties and hardships, were evidence that time had not weakened their associations or dimmed their memories. On the other hand the expectation that Jews would enter in large numbers, even to the extent of reversing the majority-minority balance, was likely to cause a much greater shock to the existing inhabitants than any new needs of the Christians.

While there was a definite intention to give recognition to these Jewish and Christian associations, there was no desire to ignore the rights of the existing population, or to minimise the fact that Islam also had entwined itself around the Jewish and Christian shrines and memories of the land, until it had come to possess an undoubted holiness for Muslims also. The objective named in the Anglo-French Declaration: "to secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to favour the diffusion of education and to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy" gave in outline the programme which all the friends of the Arabs hoped to see put into effect as soon as possible. Unfortunately it was inadequately expressed in the mandate.

There are many explanations of this failure. Palestine was only one among many problems awaiting solution, and did not appear to the world's statesmen to be the most urgent. The Christian Churches, provided the status quo of the Holy Places was safeguarded, took little further interest in the matter, apart from those who saw the restoration of the Jews in Biblical terms but did not consider its relation to the subsequent history of the country. They had no plans for building a new and more creative relationship to the land as the Christian Holy Land, which was at the same time a land of three faiths, though the Anglican bishopric did introduce a new and attractive relationship with the eastern Churches, and accepted a position resting not on legal rights but on Christian fellowship. But no new relationship of Islam as such to the land was given consideration; and the result of all this was to produce a picture of a relationship of Jewry, as a world civilisation, in competition with the local Arab population, which was a grave distortion of the historical situation, and which made the task of Jewish settlers and British administrators more difficult from the beginning.

There was, however, not only an over-optimistic belief that time would solve the problems incapable of immediate solution in Palestine itself; but there was a conception of a new world society within which the development of Palestine should take place which was tragically belied by the facts of the inter-war years. Palestine was never thought of as a refuge for Jews fleeing from increasing antisemitism and persecution

in a world of nation states whose gates were closed to immigration.) It was expected that it would draw the idealists, the religious and the pioneers in a new and juster social order. (It was expected that there would be ample time to build creative relationships with an Arab civilisation likewise arising from a glorious past which had been overlaid for centuries by the oppression and indifference of Turkish rule. The Jews of Europe, protected by the new minority treaties, were thought to be secure.) The whole project belonged to the world of the League of Nations, and the idealism of President Wilson, Dr. Nansen and Lord Robert Cecil. That this world was still-born was not the fault of the Jews.

(The attempt to redress a balance whose deviation was the product of centuries, and to do it without injustice to those who had reaped the benefit of the deviation, was not an easy task; it created what was possibly the most difficult administration ever established.) The whole conception of such an attempt to redress a balance, tilted by a long historic process, by a deliberate political act and a government administration was a novel experiment. It was unique because the situation of Palestine was unique; but, once the British administration was created, it raised the issue as to whether the officials involved in it were to be expected to endorse it before being accepted for service. To ask a candidate whether he understood and accepted a decision based on the interpretation in a political programme of the unique history of Palestine would have been an innovation which appeared impossible both to the military administration which followed the British armies and the civilian administration which followed the military; but the result was that, 'all through the period of the British connection with the country, the task of the mandatory power was made much more complicated by the presence of individual officials in Jerusalem who made no secret of their disbelief in the Balfour Declaration, or in the concession of a favoured position to the Jewish people. They regarded Jews simply as a minority in a normal majority-minority situation; and they showed open sympathy with the majority in their rejection of the mandate.'

There was the additional problem that, from the very beginning, the machinery of administration was itself inevitably complicated. The two sections of the population differed considerably in the level of their civilisation, and in their

social and political needs; and they not only shared no common tradition but each possessed a strong tradition of its own. Moreover the acceptance of the Zionist ideal necessarily implied an indirect administration of the Jewish section of the population. The Jews were to be given the chance to show whether they could rebuild their national life. It was not to be done for them; and from the moment when the Zionist Commission arrived in the spring of 1918 they were in some respects an autonomous body—an *imperium in imperio*. The administration of the Arabs, however, was throughout direct; and it is natural for an administrator to have most interest in, and sympathy with, those for whom he is directly responsible. This, however, was merely another aspect of the problem that the type of public servant required for the one administration was not naturally the type best adapted for the other. Palestine, once it was handed over to the civilians, was under the control of the Colonial Office. That Office could provide experienced men accustomed to deal with the problems which faced the fellaheen and Arabs; they were not necessarily at home with the Jews who were Europeans, often as well educated as themselves. But while this might be true from an intellectual point of view, in so far as political experience went Jews were as inexperienced as Arabs; and the sometimes utopian enthusiasm of the one was no easier to deal with than the sullen resentment of the other.

It was, therefore, with no easy task before them that Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South), known as OETA 1, was set up in December 1917. In the spring of the following year the Zionist Commission, acting with the sanction of the British government, arrived to take the first steps for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. While the Administration was successfully coping with the problem of securing food and restoring basic agricultural and economic life, the Commission set itself to repatriating the Jews who had taken refuge in Egypt and to laying the foundations of communal life for the "Yishub"—the name given to the Jewish community in Palestine. As a symbolic act, in July 1918, the foundation stones of the university were laid on Mount Scopus.

In 1919 it became clear that the attitude first expressed by Wilson in the fourteen points had been hammered out at the Peace Conference into the conception of a mandate or trusteeship, and that Palestine, together with the other Asiatic

possessions of Turkey, would become such a mandate. The policy of the administration would come under the general control of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which laid down that

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”

While this clause was adequate to form a basis for the administrations of Syria and Iraq, it did not wholly fit the Palestine situation, except on the purely Arab thesis. Doubtless the Jewish national home was considered to form part of the ‘community’ whose development was to be a ‘sacred trust of civilisation’; but, as in so many of the statements dealing with the Arab world and the Middle East, this is not clear. Actually neither the French interpretation of their rights and duties in Syria, nor the British interpretation in Iraq, met with the approval, or won the confidence, of the Arab leaders in those countries; and the following year was marked by more or less serious troubles in all three areas. In Palestine there were riots in Jerusalem; and though they were not serious in themselves, they marked the first moment from which it is possible to recognise the existence of a sense of common interest as ‘Arabs’ uniting the Christian and Muslim indigenous population of all classes.)

[In July 1920, the civil administration came into existence, following a meeting of the supreme Allied Council at San Remo at which the different mandates were allotted, or rather confirmed. The separation of Palestine from the rest of Syria became thereby an accomplished fact; and this had important consequences for the future. For, while the desire of the Jews for a National Home did not involve a danger that they might dominate the Arab world, so long as the latter was thought of as a unity comprising a million square miles and ten million inhabitants, it took on a different aspect for the six hundred and fifty thousand Arabs of Palestine, once they were

considered members of a separate state. It was a period during which unguarded statements of the certainty of Jewish predominance in the future were being made, and these increased Arab restiveness. The fact that the first High Commissioner was Sir Herbert Samuel, seemed to them to confirm their fears. In the following spring there were riots at Jaffa; and though they arose out of a foolish display of communist Jewish immigrants, and were deliberately exploited by political agitators, they were undoubtedly also an expression of general Arab malaise.

In the following year the Palestine Arab Congress, an organisation largely dominated by the Husseini family, sent a delegation to London to discuss their grievances with Mr. Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary. The terms of the mandate were being finally worked out, and the time was ripe for a formal British declaration of what they meant by the Balfour Declaration, and of what future they envisaged for the country. The result was the 'Churchill White Paper', which condemned the enthusiastic remarks which had been made by both Christians and Jews in Britain, and defined 'British policy in the following terms:

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*."

While the White Paper left a vague possibility that a Jewish state might emerge—and Churchill himself giving evidence before the Royal Commission in 1937 said that he did not intend to rule out such a possibility—it made it clear that the kind of society which the British expected to develop, and which they were ready to help to develop, was one in which

(Jewish and Arab cultures co-existed within a bi-national Palestine in which the Jews would possibly be a majority. The statement was officially accepted by the Zionist Organisation as the framework within which they would work; but it did not satisfy the Arab demands, and when Churchill tried to get them to co-operate in setting up a legislative council as the first stage towards the establishment of representative bodies, they refused.

(The text of the mandate was drawn up and published in the same year—1922—though it did not come officially into force until the autumn of 1923. It showed a grave underestimate of the importance of Arab opposition, or indeed of the existence of the legitimate Arab grievance that their position was almost totally undefined in the various policy statements of the British government and the Palestine Administration. For the language which was used was such as is used of a minority—their civil and religious rights would be safeguarded; they would be recognised as equal citizens in the future state, and so on—and not only had they no intention of becoming a minority but, in actual fact, they were not one at the time these statements were being made.

(The mandate, in its preamble, quoted in full the Balfour Declaration, and quite truthfully added that the opportunity was being given to the Jews to reconstitute their National Home; but it made no reference to any promises made to the Arabs, or to the obligations assumed towards them; not only in successive British statements, but in article 22 of the Covenant. In one clause of the mandate after another priority was given to the opportunities to be allowed for Jewish development, and this could be justified on the grounds that a new political experiment required precise definition. But there was too complete a silence about the relations of this experiment to the normal development of the whole community. This was doubtless due to the fact that it *was* an experiment, and there is certainly no evidence that it expressed any intention or desire to reduce the Arab population to a position of permanent inferiority. The Churchill White Paper preceded the issue of the mandate, and it was the constant claim of the British that it was possible to fulfil their promises to both parties, and reconcile the reasonable ambitions of both Jews and Arabs in a harmonious whole. It was therefore a grievous error in judgment that no positive statement was made which could

form the basis of co-operation with Arab moderate opinion, or, indeed, bring a moderate opinion into existence by giving it a worth-while objective consonant with the Arab sense of national dignity. (The mandate contained terms for the setting up of a Jewish Agency, which was given very wide powers. No comparable Arab body was called into existence; and its powers were not related to, or made dependent on, the establishment of any wider body representing the whole country. This had the ill effect that Arab politicians had no executive responsibility for the welfare of the Arabs of the country.) They could give their whole time to nationalist propaganda and agitation and to the struggles for power between the different families, (while the work which was largely done by the Jewish Agency for the Jews was done for the Arabs by the British. Transjordan was excluded from the area in which the clauses dealing with the National Home should operate, as a natural consequence of the inclusion of it in the area in which Arab independence was promised to Husayn. But it caused a shock to Jewish opinion, and ultimately led to the formation of the Revisionist Party which demanded a revision of the mandate to include Transjordan in the National Home. From the practical standpoint of Jewish-Arab co-operation it also had the disadvantage that it still further intensified the feeling of Arabs in western Palestine that they were destined to be swamped by the superior power, wealth and numbers of the Jews.)

(While the mandate might have made more reasonable provision for the rights and future of the Arabs, the difficult position of the British was to some extent inherent in its nature. A mandate was temporary; the mandatory administration was not intended to become the centre of national loyalty; it had none of the attractions which a permanent government can build around itself. And in this case it had to recognise two conflicting communities without really possessing sufficient authority to bring them together. Education was an affair of each community; religious courts had wide and independent powers. Moreover the Administration was not a government, but had to obey orders from Westminster, which in turn had to submit reports to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations at Geneva.) As to the natural loyalties of its 'subjects', the Jews looked to the World Zionist Organisation, and that organisation appointed

the executive which formed the Jewish Agency named in the mandate. Later other Jewish bodies were brought in; but it still remained true that the members of the Agency were most of them not even subjects of the Mandatory, and that the Mandatory had no say whatever in their appointment. For the Arabs the centre of loyalty was the more intangible, but still real, conception of Arab unity, supplemented in the case of the majority by the unity of Islam.

(Finally there is the land itself to be considered if we are to form an estimate of the task confronting the British Administration. Preceding chapters will have shown the decay to which centuries of neglect had reduced it.) Soil erosion on the hills and the congestion of the rivers in the plains had enormously reduced the area in which even the hardy fellaheen, accustomed to the lowest depths of poverty, could scrape a bare living from the soil. Their debts carried on from generation to generation, and the system of land tenure largely precluded improvements. The flocks of goats added to the destruction wrought by nature; and the tradition of raiding and village wars, both between the fellaheen themselves and between the fellaheen and the bedouin, still further handicapped what agricultural progress security might have brought. In the early years of the mandate bedouin raids across the Jordan were still a constant trouble. (There were almost no roads; malaria and trachoma were endemic; there were few schools apart from those of the western missionaries; and the fatalism of Islam accepted the resulting misery as the work of God. No quick changes or radical improvements could be expected immediately out of such a situation, and it is remarkable that in the first ten years of their responsibility the British administrators and officials were able to do as much as they did. It was their reasonable hope that Jews and Arabs, once they had set their hands to the urgent tasks of reconstruction and had worked together for the upbuilding of the land for their mutual benefit, would realise the advantages which could come from collaboration, and the folly—on both sides—of extremism and intolerance. In a typically British fashion they hoped that 'time would solve the problem' in its own way.)

(The Jewish leaders on their part, having originally declared in the Zionist Congress of 1921 'the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of concord and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common

home into a flourishing community', accepted, though with some heart-searching, the definition of their objectives laid down by Churchill in 1922, and worked hard to allay Arab fears and conciliate Arab moderate opinion. It was inevitable that in the excitement of arriving in the 'promised land' many young Jews should have shown an exaltation of spirit and even arrogance of manner which Arabs were quick to note and resent.) Exaggerated hopes were expressed naïvely in press and meeting—naïvely because they were not the expression of any imperialist feeling towards the Arabs, but rather of a lack of awareness of the delicacy of their position and the urgent need to make themselves understood and accepted by their Arab neighbours. Such behaviour was not that of their leaders. The diaries of Colonel Kisch, who occupied the position of chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive from 1923 to 1931, reveal on almost every page the efforts made to secure co-operation with the Arabs; and the work of Kisch was supplemented locally in the agricultural settlements and in the world of organised labour. During the period up to 1929 local results were good; Arab extremism seemed on the wane; the power of the Husseinis was challenged by the Nashashibi family and its adherents; and various other bodies of more moderate tendencies came into a somewhat tenuous and ill-defined existence. But in the long run none of these events provided an effective counterpoise to the authority and ambition of Haj Amin al-Husseini, who in 1921 had become mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim Council.

The development of the country during these years falls into two divisions. Up to 1926 there was an almost continuous increase in prosperity, but in that year a severe economic crisis struck the Jewish community, and the depression lasted for several years. The country had only just begun to recover when the riots of 1929 caused another setback. It was in these ten years that the best and most hopeful work was done by the Administration in all fields, and that there was most justification for the hope that time would solve the problem. Samuel remained High Commissioner until 1925 when he was succeeded by Field Marshal Lord Plumer. During his period of office the country enjoyed complete peace, and the military forces were drastically reduced. In 1928 Plumer was succeeded by Sir John Chancellor, who had been Governor of

Southern Rhodesia, and it was during his absence from the country in 1929 that rioting broke out again.)

(Since more than three quarters of the Arabs were occupied with agriculture, and since the land had also the greatest importance for the extension of Jewish settlements, agricultural and land problems were throughout the period in the forefront of the Administration's responsibilities.) Even while the fighting was still continuing in the northern parts of the country (OETA concerned itself with the restoration of live stock, the provision of seed and with loans to tide over immediate need.) The main tax in Turkish times had been the tithe of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the harvest; this was reduced, and at times completely remitted; but it proved unexpectedly difficult to find a satisfactory alternative. It was not easy even to make a register of land ownership; for the Turks had removed the existing registers, and the different systems of ownership of both land and water rights (for the latter did not automatically go with the former), might mean a dozen or more individual owners of the same small piece of land, or communal ownership with every degree of vagueness as to individual responsibility. It was these underlying factors rather than peasant unwillingness or incompetence which made progress appallingly slow. (When the Administration introduced veterinary services and new varieties of seed and fruit trees the peasants were not unwilling to make use of them; and as some measure of security from bedouin raids was achieved it became more possible for them to plan ahead. But Palestine inevitably shared the world fall in food prices at the end of the '20s, and this caused a serious setback.)

(The fundamental work of reforming the tenure of land proceeded very slowly. Before the land of a village could be divided between the individual owners, the consent of the whole village had to be obtained, and a proper survey of the village lands made.) The former was sometimes difficult as the nationalists regarded corporate ownership as a safeguard against sale to the Jews, and were indifferent to the poor cultivation which inevitably followed from a biennial change of plots; and the latter was a slow process. An adequate survey of the whole of western Palestine was far from complete when the British announced their intention of surrendering the mandate in 1947. 56 per cent. of the land was still held in corporate ownership when the first general survey was made

in 1923, and in 1930 the proportion was still 46 per cent. The problem of tenure had to be settled before a direct attack could be effectively made on peasant indebtedness; and most of the fellaheen were still in debt when the high prices obtaining during the second world war unexpectedly gave them the opportunity to clear themselves. Since before 1939 the average money income of a peasant family was estimated at £P.25 to £P.30, and their average indebtedness was £P.27 it can easily be seen that, without the war prices, the problem would have been insoluble.

(The other aspect of the land question was concerned with Jewish settlement. The mandate laid it down that the Administration should assist, whenever possible, Jewish immigrants to settle on the land; but it often proved extraordinarily difficult to establish clear titles to ownership on land which the Jews wished to purchase. Sometimes this was due to deliberate action on the part of Arab nationalists; sometimes it was a consequence of the complications of tenure and the uncertainties of ownership.) In most cases where land was purchased by the Jewish National Fund a portion was set aside for the peasants who had previously cultivated it. But in other cases (the protection of tenants became the responsibility of the Administration, though during these years Jewish activities resulted in a general increase of possibilities of employment, and there was no sign that in any general sense 'Jews were ousting Arabs from the land'. There was still ample room for both.)

The progress of the peasants involved work in many other fields. Side by side with the Jewish Agency (the Administration undertook extensive work to combat malaria, to drain swamps, to sterilise standing pools, to improve stock and seed, and in many years extensive operations were necessary against locusts. The building of village schools proceeded slowly—about seventy were built annually during the first years of the Administration, but the crisis of 1926 seriously reduced the funds available and thereafter progress was reprehensibly slow. The shortage of trained teachers slowed up the work still further and government training colleges could supply only a portion of the deficiency.)

(In so far as the urban population was concerned, two of the most important tasks were the improvement of communications, and the introduction of public health and hospital

services.) When the British took over there were only two roads left in the country, from Jerusalem to Hebron, and from Jerusalem to Jaffa. (Without an efficient net-work of roads trade could not develop and order could with difficulty be maintained. Actually the Administration never caught up with the demands for roads;) for since there was no system of local rates for such purposes, even purely local roads had to be provided largely out of the general treasury. As to public health not even the city of Jerusalem had either a drainage system or an adequate water supply; and the meeting of these two deficiencies was one of the first tasks of the British, a task which the rapid growth of the city continually outran. In meeting the needs of medical services the Administration could build on the very extensive foundations already laid first by the Christian Churches and then by the Hadassah, the medical units originally created by American women Zionists during the first world war. But public hospitals and a public health service were created in all the major towns.

(Equally important was the attempt to create a comprehensive legal code out of the mass of Turkish regulations, religious laws, bedouin tribal customs and peasant traditions which the British discovered in the country. As much as they could they retained; the religious courts, Muslim, Christian and Jewish, were re-established to deal with all personal questions, such as marriage and divorce; and new regulations and laws, largely on the British model, were introduced to deal with the new problems of an advancing community with increasing commercial and international activities. Particular problems were encountered with the Muslim and Christian religious endowments. The income of the Muslim Waqfs had been largely misappropriated by Constantinople during the Turkish regime; and these had to be sorted out, recovered and applied to their proper purposes.) A supreme Muslim Council was created and the administration of all Waqf funds as well as the appointment of the religious courts, was entrusted to it. Similar rabbinical courts were established for the Jewish community. The Christian Churches presented a serious problem, for the war had deprived them of their income) and both the Orthodox and Armenian patriarchs had accumulated enormous debts. The latter were able to take care of themselves; but the Orthodox Church, having relied largely on funds coming from Russia and Rumania, found itself entirely

deprived of these sources of income and saddled with debts of over half a million sterling. In spite of strong resistance by the patriarch and the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, a commission was set up to take over the administration of the patriarchal properties; and the gradual liquidation of their debts continued to be a subject of great complexity for many years.)

Meanwhile the Jewish community was equally active. It had been intended from the first that Jews should take the maximum responsibility for their own affairs, and the Jewish Agency possessed powers which were often regarded by the Administration as embarrassingly independent. The nature of the Jewish population throughout the world gave the Agency three unique characteristics. Its membership was selected by the World Zionist Organisation which was a federation of fifty-one national organisations whose paid membership in 1939 amounted to over a million. After 1929 certain other Jewish bodies outside Palestine also participated in the work of the Agency. Its funds were raised by voluntary collections organised by Zionist bodies throughout the world; and, in consequence of these two facts, its programme was elaborated, authorised and financed by a body entirely outside the sphere of the Palestine Administration or even the British government. (The members of the Agency in Jerusalem were agents of bodies which the Administration could neither control nor even influence. In addition the Agency possessed an office in London which could negotiate with the Colonial Office directly,) and through British members of Parliament who were Zionists it could voice its criticisms of the Colonial Office and influence the formation of British policy. In doing these things it was neither acting beyond its rights, nor in an immoral fashion. The adventure contained in the Balfour Declaration was one which concerned alike the British government which had originally issued it, and the Jewish communities of the world who were its beneficiaries. But it can easily be seen that such a situation might cause difficult relations in Palestine; and that it could create the legend that the Jews were much more powerful than the Arabs, and could always get their way.)

(Actually this last statement, which was never wholly true, became increasingly untrue as the years passed by.) For Britain had many interests in the Middle East; and those interests were as well recognised and as powerfully represented at

Westminster as those of the Jewish Agency. There did not need to be Arabs in British constituencies for the interests of oil, of Islam, of communications with India and the Far East, to put points of view which were more concerned with our relations with the Arab world than with the Jews.

§ The tasks for which the Jewish Agency was responsible were no less difficult than those which faced the Administration. To transform a people is no easier than to transform a land; and the essence of Zionism lay in its conception of the rebirth of the Jewish people through a new life in its own land. That which gave this experiment its fascination, its intensity, and often its difficulties, was that the whole experiment was necessarily conducted on a voluntary basis. The funds by which the projects of the Agency were carried out were raised by voluntary effort for services which are normally provided by government out of taxation, from Jews who had already paid their taxes in many different lands; and the educational, agricultural, industrial and other projects which the money made possible were supplementary to those activities of the Palestine Administration for which the Jews paid taxes in Palestine. But because the funds were raised by voluntary effort, it was impossible to guarantee a budget; and the Agency found itself in continual financial difficulties because less money had reached its coffers than had been optimistically foreseen in the budgetary plans of the World Zionist Organisation. To a considerable extent the control which the Agency had over the Yishub was a voluntary control. It had no legal means of enforcement other than the law of Palestine, though it had a great moral authority both by its power to give or withhold financial and other assistance, and through Jewish voluntary courts.

¶ The main characteristic of the work done during the first ten years was naturally the laying of foundations; Beginnings had indeed been made before the war, but the new venture was on a so much larger scale that many new problems had to be faced. It is remarkable that as early as 1922 the Churchill White Paper was able to give this vivid picture of the meaning of a 'National Home':

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers

upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride."

1 The first problem was immigration. Registers were opened in September 1920, and a system of co-operation between the Agency and the Immigration Department of the Administration was gradually evolved by which the Agency was able to take effective steps in the country of departure to see that the right type and distribution of immigrants received the certificates entitling them to admission. (The tentative nature of the adventure in these early years can be seen from the fact that quite a noticeable proportion of immigrants left the country again.) In the last three months of 1920 over five thousand came in; in the following year nearly ten thousand. For these years there are no figures for emigration. But in 1922 nearly eight thousand entered and fifteen hundred left. In 1923 over seven thousand arrived, and nearly three thousand five hundred left. Then for three years the figures of arrival rose sharply: nearly thirteen thousand in 1924, nearly thirty-four in 1925; and in 1926 again nearly thirteen thousand. In that year the peculiar difficulties of such a venture were suddenly apparent. There was a financial crisis in Poland, and many residents in Palestine from Poland found themselves without funds, and Polish Jews could not afford to take up their

certificates for Palestine. As against the thirteen thousand who entered more than seven thousand left. In 1927 less than three thousand entered and more than five thousand left. In 1928 arrivals beat departures by ten—both figures standing at the two thousand level. From then onwards departures fell steadily; but arrivals also stood each year at less than five thousand—until the threat of Hitler in 1932 doubled the figure.

(In 1929 the community stood at about 165,000.)

After immigration came the problem of settling the immigrants as quickly as possible into constructive work. Only a relatively small percentage could be absorbed at once into agriculture. Land purchase was a slow business, and though the Jewish National Fund, originally started in 1904, was able to increase its annual contribution from considerably under a hundred thousand pounds in 1920 to over two hundred thousand by 1926, land was increasingly expensive to purchase. Moreover, in all countries it is much cheaper to absorb newcomers into industry than to place them on the land. The Agency was still experimenting in methods of training young men and women for agriculture before they arrived in Palestine; but they could scarcely reproduce the conditions of that stony and often desolate land. While during this period the majority who took up agriculture ultimately became independent individual farmers, the collective settlements were gradually gathering momentum. They were less expensive; they were more helpful to the inexperienced; and they had the spiritual excitement of being a new form of community, enshrining many values long inherent in Judaism even for those who were not themselves conscious of, or interested in, their religious inheritance.

Industry was also slowly developing mostly through small scale and individual undertakings, and by a system of trial and error. Palestine lacks most raw materials; and until the electric undertakings of Rutenberg were in operation, it had no natural sources of power. It was only gradually that, apart from obvious industries to serve local needs, especially building, right lines of industrial development were found.

(Industry and agriculture were bound together in the trade union movement, the Histadruth, which was founded in 1920.) It also had to find its way tentatively into new fields; for it existed in a country in which there was none of that social legislation which is the normal background of a twentieth-

century trade union; and such modern devices as health or unemployment insurance would have been wholly inappropriate to the Arab section of the population. It embraced all workers, from university professors to navvies, and ran an efficient medical and health service. It obtained from employers, where it could, voluntary contributions to take the place of what in a modern industrial state they would have been obliged to pay. The crisis of 1926 struck it a severe blow; and the task of looking after some thousands of unemployed proved such that finally the Administration had, quite properly, to come to its assistance. The Histadruth developed two particular fields of activity which were unusual in such a body. It actively encouraged co-operatives of all kinds, since producing, buying and selling co-operatives were of great value in such a pioneering economy. Many of these co-operatives failed; but many survived, grew and won an important place in the life of the national home. Secondly in its department 'Solel Boneh' it became itself a contractor of labour; and in road-making and building became one of the most important employers in the country. This activity created many complications; it was naturally resented by private contractors that the trade union to which their own employees belonged could enter the field against them; there was not always the requisite experience for this type of work; and Solel Boneh led a very chequered career.

(The educational work of the National Home had to provide not merely normal primary, and where possible secondary, education, but a variety of technical services and research institutes to cope with the many new problems which arose as the work grew. Agricultural training schools, technical schools, craft schools supplemented the work in chemistry, biology and science of the university and the research institutions.)

While the Jewish Agency represented the interest of Jews all over the world in the upbuilding of the Yishub, it was of great importance that an adequate local organisation of Palestinian Jewry should be created. This also proved no easy problem; and the whole period under review was occupied in discussions and negotiations with Jewish bodies and with the Administration as to the constitution and powers which should be given to the representative assembly and its executive (the Vaad Leumi) which had been originally brought into

being in 1920. It was not until 1930 that the Communities Ordinance was finally passed. The first problem to be decided was whether all the Jews of Palestine were to be obliged to be members of a single Jewish community; the older inhabitants, organised in the Agudath Israel and very orthodox in their religious outlook, were opposed to many of the activities both of the Agency and of the new Zionist immigrants; and they steadfastly refused to be compelled to enter the Zionist communal organisation. Apart from questions of principle there was the fact that it would have been quite impossible for the Administration to compel, for example, the Latins and the Orthodox to combine in a single Christian community, and they were not willing to reject the demands of the Agudah. (The voluntary principle which underlay all Zionist activities was, therefore, extended to the Jewish community of Palestine. A Jew was entitled to signify his acceptance or rejection of membership. But having joined, he became legally liable for various communal taxes, primarily for education and social services. Difficulties which might have occurred between the Agency executive and the Vaad Leumi were in large measure avoided by considerable overlapping in the personnel of the two bodies.

(In 1929 the peace of the country and its further normal development were shattered by riots much more violent and widespread than those of 1921. From the beginning of the mandate the weakness of the position both of the Jews and the British had been the lack of a defined position for the Arabs in the programme of development. It was one thing to create a new situation which recognised that Palestine had never been exclusively either a Muslim country or an Arab country; though even here there was increasingly shown in practice the dangerous weakness that it needed some historical knowledge to realise this fact, and historical knowledge is normally possessed neither by the ordinary British administrator, nor the Palestinian fellaheen. But Muslims as Muslims and Arabs as Arabs were one important part of the historical picture; just as Christendom and local Christians—foreign or native—were another; and (the regime never recovered from the mistake of merely lumping all together as 'non-Jewish' and making no conditions for their development simultaneously with that of the National Home. The 'honeymoon period' from 1917 to 1921 in which Jewish and British speakers made

exaggerated statements about a Jewish state would not have mattered, had the text of the mandate cleared up the position. But once the text was issued, even Churchill's definition, and the Zionists' acceptance of it, came too late. (The subsequent proposals for a legislative council, for an Arab agency, and all other proposals for co-operation were weakened *ab initio*, and in the end rendered wholly abortive, by the fact that they appeared as makeshifts and evasions to disguise a situation basically unjust. The position increasingly revealed itself as unfair to the Zionists also; for it entitled them to hope for a form of development which had become unrealisable, and obscured to the mass of the Yishub, as well as to the extremists who exist in every situation, the nature of the development which was still politically practicable and socially creative between themselves and the other elements who also had a historic stake in the country. The mandatory would have been in a much stronger position had it been able to reply to the exaggerated claims or excessive complaints of either side by pointing to a clear statement of the minimum and maximum rights of each party. Yet the development of Zionist thought was not as unrealistic as that of the Arabs. Whatever their secret longings, they accepted the Churchill definition of 1922; even while they still followed a policy of 'predominance' it was as the predominant partner in a single bi-national state, as Dr. Eder explained it to the 1921 commission; by 1930 the thoughts of many Jewish leaders were turning to genuinely bi-national equality. (With the Arabs a much less desirable development had taken place.)

Though they never threw up a national leader of any importance, it was in the middle classes that the nationalist passion simmered most intransigently during the whole period of official optimism between 1920 and 1929. (An important part of their grievances arose only partially from the presence of the Jews.) The mere fact that there was a British administration deprived them of the enjoyment of many political offices which would normally have been theirs in an independent country. All the highest appointments were held by the British; and from the mandatory's point of view had to be so held, since while the communities were so bitterly divided it would have been imprudent to entrust them to either Jews or Arabs. (They could only enjoy the junior and less well paid appointments, and even these they had to share with Jews. Similarly

in the business and professional world they had to meet Jewish competitors, often much better qualified than themselves, and able to draw on more capital and to rely on the support of their own community. (The British retained the village mukhtars and created a certain number of local municipalities; but the openings which these afforded were few,) and the desire for lucrative jobs is one which can be very closely allied to an apparently idealistic political passion.

(After the failure of the Arab mission to London in 1922, the Palestine Arab Congress met in June 1923, but from that date until 1928 it confined itself to continuous complaints both to the Administration and the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Meanwhile the Nashashibis formed a National Party in which they grouped their followers for a struggle with the Husseinis. In the municipal elections of 1925 they won a number of seats. Yet another blow at the domination of the party of the Mufti was the formation of a number of local 'National Muslim Societies' representing the interests of the peasants against the landowners. These societies were, partly at least, inspired by Chaim Kalvarisky, an old pre-1914 settler who knew and was known to the Arabs as a realistic worker for Arab-Jewish co-operation. But none of these efforts really succeeded in countering the power of the Husseinis embodied in the Mufti, who, as head of the Supreme Muslim Council, disposed both of funds and influence with which no other Arab leader could compete.

In 1928 an International Missionary Conference was held in Jerusalem and one of the subjects occurring in the discussion was naturally the mission of Christianity to Islam. This provoked a violent protest from the Muslim authorities, and led to a certain amount of unrest and even violence in the country. At Gaza the police were compelled to open fire on the mob. This attack was a warning of the intention of the Mufti to make use of religious fanaticism in his political programme, a use which was more fully exploited against the Jews by a campaign throughout the country, during 1928 and 1929, based on the cry that the Haram ash-Sharif was in danger, and that the Jews had designs on the mosque of Aksa. The factual basis for this campaign was of the very slightest, and amounted to no more than some imprudent incidents at the Wailing Wall, incidents with which the British authorities were able to deal and, indeed, did deal with a respect for the

exactness of the maintenance of the *status quo* which could not by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as so pro-Jewish as to menace the Muslim possession of the Haram.)

But though deliberate religious inflammation, for which the Mufti and his party bear the sole responsibility, actually led to the riots of 1929, it would be a mistake to suggest that, apart from such propaganda, all was well. (The Arabs of Palestine could not be expected to ignore developments in the neighbouring countries. In Egypt, Syria and Iraq violence had extorted from the British and the French some of the liberties which Arab politicians throughout the Arab world were demanding; and for their demands they had increasingly the support of the Arab masses. Together with an immediate religious motive, there was a political and economic background which affected all classes of the Arab population.) In their campaign against the mandate the Arab political parties had somewhat changed their tactics. (Their demand was for a parliamentary system which would give them an unquestioning majority, and so a 'democratic' justification for the destruction of the National Home.) In the distorted political situation of the Middle East violence had been everywhere the medium by which this demand for democratic rights had been most successfully asserted. (The masses were, perhaps, less interested in a parliamentary democracy; but they had been passing through a period of unemployment, consequent on the crisis of the preceding years in Jewish developments, and they were constantly told that this unemployment was due to Jewish immigration and stimulated to fear that they would lose their land to the Jews.)

(The incident which provoked the rioting was a Jewish demonstration and a much larger and more violent Arab counter-demonstration at the Wailing Wall. Accounts of the rioting in Jerusalem spread through the country and led to savage massacres in which the ancient Jewish communities of Safad and Hebron were almost wiped out, and to widespread attacks on the Jewish agricultural settlements, in which the attackers were much less successful. For the first time the Arabs realised that the new type of Jewish settler was capable of defending himself and determined to do so. (The riots took the British by surprise; the military and police forces had been reduced to an extremely low level, and there was considerable loss of life before order was restored. Once that had happened,

✓ a commission under Sir Walter Shaw, late Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, was appointed to enquire into the causes of the disturbances.)

(It found, as might be expected, that the basic cause was Arab resentment against the National Home; but the members of the commission differed as to the extent as to which this had been artificially exaggerated by the direct activities of the Mufti. They made three recommendations: that there should be restrictions on Jewish immigration and on sales of land; and that there should be a clarification of the British policy in relation to the future of the country. The government accepted these proposals and decided to have a thorough enquiry made into the land position. For this purpose Sir John Hope Simpson, who had been Vice-President of the Greek refugees settlement commission of the League of Nations, was appointed. Hope Simpson's findings were that there was no spare land for further Jewish settlement until there had been a reform of Arab holdings and a development of Arab methods of farming, after which he thought there should be room for another 20,000 families. He also connected Arab unemployment with excessive Jewish immigration. The report was violently attacked by the Zionists, who claimed that he had seriously underestimated the amount of cultivable land in the country; and subsequent events have justified their scepticism. Even more dubious was the linking of Arab unemployment with Jewish immigration; for it ignored the extent to which Arab employment, in private agriculture, industry and in government contracts, was almost wholly due to activities consequent on the existence of the Jewish National Home and the substantial contribution which Jews made to the revenue.)

(The government accepted the Hope Simpson report in a White Paper which in its language was markedly unsympathetic to the Zionists. But it also, though perhaps unconsciously, marked a profound revolution in British thinking about the terms of the mandate. For it treated the Jews throughout as though they were a normal immigrant minority who could only be granted such rights as would not interfere with the maximum demands and needs, present and future, of the majority. It is easy to understand the shock which this caused to Jewish opinion; for it was a denial of their basic position that they entered the country 'as of right and not on sufferance'.)

There followed the most serious crisis which had thus far befallen the National Home, and it came at a time when their fortunes were at a low ebb. There were less than two hundred thousand Jews in the country; the economic crisis which had just smitten the world had reduced the Agency's income, especially from America; and this betrayal, as they regarded it, was the climax. Dr. Weizmann resigned from the Presidency of the World Zionist Organisation, a position which he had held from the beginning of the mandate, and other prominent members of the Jewish Agency followed suit. (The depth of Jewish emotion seems to have surprised the British government; and, in a letter from the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, to Dr. Weizmann an effort was made to undo the effects of the previous White Paper by a somewhat lame explanation that it did not mean any abandonment of the policy enshrined in the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. While this consoled the Jews, it merely enraged the Arabs still further, and lent colour to their belief that Jewish influence was so powerful that any measure in favour of the Arabs was instantly cancelled. On this uneasy note Palestine entered the second period of the mandate, from 1929 to 1937.)

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE MANDATE, 1929-1939

(THE PERIOD WHICH STRETCHES from the disturbances of 1929 to the publication of the White Paper of 1939 is one of paradox. It witnessed simultaneously the breakdown and abandonment of the mandate, as it had hitherto been interpreted, and the signal justification of the relevance and value of that interpretation to the Jewish people to meet whose needs it had been designed.)

(From the beginning it had needed a conscious effort to secure creative collaboration between the three elements of the population; and after 1929 that effort was, unhappily, made less and less frequently. The training of the British officials still enabled them to work with the Arab villagers, but events in Europe now began to emphasise its irrelevance to the more difficult task of understanding the Jews. About half of them spoke Arabic, but only a handful Hebrew. The Arab politicians, filled with an intense and fanatical pride in a history which afforded no key to the understanding of the twentieth century, were concerned with only one thing, the granting to them of the political rights which they saw being obtained by their brethren in other countries, but which were withheld from them because they would not share them with the Jews; and this reiterated demand was beginning to lead them to view the British with the hostility they had hitherto reserved for the Zionists. The Jews in their turn, filled with an equal pride, but in their visible achievements in the country, saw nothing utopian in continuing to demand the fulfilment of the rights originally accorded to them, in spite of the obstacles which time and experience had interposed, and ceaselessly attributed every check to the blindness and malice of a hostile Administration.)

All this had been implicit in the political situation since 1922; but in this decade a new factor entered which increased the tension and widened the gulf between the three groups. Each was submitted to violent outside pressure irrelevant to

the others but which made accommodation and understanding even more difficult.}}

For the Jews the pressure came from Europe. In Poland a hostile dictatorship and severe economic stress immensely increased the number of Jews who desired to leave the country. In Germany a similar economic crisis had, in 1933, helped to bring Hitler to power and after 1933 the position of German Jews was desperate. Moreover the gates of immigration remained closed in almost all the countries of the world—except Palestine, where it was their anchor of hope that they were entitled to enter 'as of right and not on sufferance'. The British, themselves experiencing the economic crisis of the '30s, were witnessing the rapid increase of an aggressive policy first by Mussolini, then by Hitler, which they lacked the power effectively to oppose, and were increasingly swept into the policy of appeasement which led to the surrender over the Abyssinian war and to Munich. The Arabs were subject to continual broadcasts from Italy and flattering approaches from Nazi Germany, which invited them to align themselves with those dictatorships against the decadent imperialism of the British and the Jews.

(With the country subjected to these completely different pressures, the Administration found itself increasingly unable either to maintain its impartiality, or to cope with the problems which the government of the country demanded.) If the series of commissions and experts who were continually summoned to give it advice indicate the serious efforts which were made to discover ways forward, their presence was also in itself a confession that the task was more than it could cope with from its own resources. Overwhelmed by the mass of social problems which had been either inherent in the ruined state of the country at the end of the first world war, or created by the rapid expansion since that date, it became increasingly centralised and bureaucratic, and the links between Jerusalem and the districts were often unsatisfactory. But that was not the only breakdown. (As time went on, and no radical improvement occurred, British officials tended to become isolated from their Jewish and Arab subordinates, and from the leaders of the Jewish and Arab community. During the disturbances in 1936 eighty-two Jews were killed; and yet there was not a single conviction for these murders.) The reason was simple: all the government prosecutors concerned were Arabs, and it

was too much to expect Arab officials to prosecute their own people for a political crime. Such an incident was not an isolated one. Co-operation on the various projects for the development of the country was often equally insecure. In such a situation it is the better men who lose heart; the second rate are prepared to drift with the tide, to become themselves partisan, and so to accentuate the problem they have given up hope of solving. And such a situation encourages the bully and the corrupt. (How grave was the malady is shown by the paradoxical fact that this deterioration was taking place under the eyes of the noblest and most devoted of the High Commissioners, Sir Arthur Wauchope (1931-1938) who spent himself, and much of his private fortune in efforts to bring together the two communities and to assist the development of each. But in the end it was Sir Arthur's unwillingness to believe that it was impossible to bring the Mufti and the Arab leaders of the rebellion of 1936 to reason, which led to his refusal to declare martial law and take the strong military measures which the situation required.)

It was, of course, only gradually that the inner deterioration became revealed. (The first years of Wauchope's period of office were years of prosperity for both communities. Jewish immigration which had risen to nearly ten thousand in 1932 soared suddenly, through the Polish collapse and the Nazi régime in Germany, to over thirty thousand in 1933, and even that figure was surpassed by more than ten thousand in 1934 and more than doubled in 1935. In addition there was an illegal immigration of some thousands in these years, and the Jewish community reached a total of between three and four hundred thousand. Many of the immigrants, especially from Germany, were able to bring some capital with them, and capital investments rose, though they did not keep pace with immigration, and there was a short financial panic in the autumn of 1935.

While this immigration aroused Arab fears that they would be swamped by the Jews, it still remained true that these fears belonged exclusively to the future. The Arab population continued to grow at a phenomenal rate, there was a substantial illegal immigration of Arabs especially from the Hauran, and Arab prosperity increased through the increased activity of the Jewish community and the many new openings for employment which it offered. The Hope Simpson report

had referred to the need of resettling Arabs displaced by Jewish purchases, but actually few were found to take up the offer when the government offered them land. They had probably been absorbed into new occupations. It is a cherished belief of the townsman of the twentieth century that the peasant never likes to leave his land. In actual fact peasants, in Palestine as in every other country of the world, cheerfully leave their land when opportunities of earning a better wage are offered in the towns. What is, of course, true is that during slumps or urban unemployment many countrymen return to their villages; and after the economic panic of 1935 many Arabs returned to the villages, and being unemployed readily took part in the disturbances of the following years.

(It was during this period that a good deal began to be heard about the leases of the Jewish National Fund, in which it was specified that no Arab labour should be employed, and that the land was permanently inalienable. The propagandists usually forget to add that in the co-operative and communal settlements, which were the main beneficiaries of National Fund land (apart from urban areas, where the prohibition was irrelevant), no hired labour of any kind was employed. But in any case the land involved was less than half the Jewish owned land; in the citrus groves and on the many thousands of acres of individual farming, more Arab labour was employed the more land was brought under cultivation. In Haifa and in industry generally, and in the many government contracts made possible by Jewish taxes, a large proportion of the Arab rural population found employment in the dead season after the harvest such as they had never known before. Moreover every one of the enquiries into rural development which took place during the early '30s revealed that the real problems of the fellaheen were, apart from the land system itself, indebtedness and the ruinous charges exacted from them by the Arab landowners and moneylenders—usually the same class, and often the same individuals. The same Arab politicians who protested that they cared nothing for the money the Jews brought into the country, but wanted only their old way of life, showed no such contempt for money when it came to their treatment of their own peasantry. Actually the land cry was mainly raised in the towns and in propaganda for external consumption. When peasants joined in the rebellion, it was in response to the appeal of religious fanaticism, and as part of

their tradition of violence which a single generation of British rule had not eradicated. And it was often true that attacks on Jewish settlements were not made by Arab neighbours who might have been supposed to have seen before their eyes the effect of this supposed theft of their land. The attacks were from other villages, and from the mercenaries of the Mufti, and occasionally from bedouins; and in many cases the Jews were warned and even protected by their Arab neighbours.

Nationalism was still mainly an urban and middle-class preoccupation, though the 1929 riots had shown how easy it was to rouse the fellaheen by appealing to their religious fanaticism. But the sudden recovery of the Jewish community from the slump at the end of the twenties, and its immense immigration in 1933 roused widespread political fears; and if the peasants were not conscious of having already lost their land, they could easily see that a continuation of such an annual increase might imperil their future position. (All through 1933 the Arab press indulged in inflammatory articles against the British for having become the tools of the Jews; in the spring there was a boycott which still further reduced Arab participation in the activities of the Administration. In October there were riots in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Nablus, and these riots were directed almost wholly against the British. This time they were dealt with firmly. The importance of Palestine in imperial strategy had just been increased by the building of Haifa harbour, the completion of the oil pipeline from Iraq, and the inclusion of Palestinian airfields in the air route to India. There was no commission of enquiry, and no concessions were made to Arab feelings.)

In 1934 immigration figures rose again, and Arab unrest proportionally increased. Efforts were made to prevent sales of land to Jews by blackmailing or assisting Arab landowners; but this had little effect, and the leading families were themselves too implicated in this profitable traffic for their denunciations to be very impressive. Feeling continued to simmer, and in November 1935 the five Arab parties combined to present the Administration with three demands: a democratic parliament, the prohibition of land sales, and the cessation of immigration. To the second and third the High Commissioner replied with a refusal; but he announced that he had secured the consent of the British government to the establishment of a Legislative Council in which the official element would be

much reduced, and twelve out of the twenty-eight members elected. The Jews absolutely refused to co-operate, and the proposed Council was violently attacked as a betrayal of the mandate in the British Parliament.) The Arabs were disposed to consider it—only because they felt that anything which aroused Jewish opposition would be favourable to their cause; and the rejection of a proposal of the British High Commissioner by the British Parliament, because the Jews opposed it, raised their bitterness to a new level.) In April 1936, as soon as the citrus harvest had been shipped, they declared a general strike, to continue until Britain changed her policy. Although there were parts of the country which were reluctant to support it, especially places like Jaffa whose prosperity depended largely on the Jewish use of the port, the strike was widely observed, and was accompanied by a certain amount of violence. (In May the British government announced that a Royal Commission had been appointed to enquire into the state of Palestine and the remedies needed, and would take up its task as soon as order was restored. The announcement had little or no effect on the Arab leaders, and the strike continued.)

While the strike was the joint work of the five Arab parties represented in the Arab Higher Committee, the Mufti had also his personal ambitions; and during the summer he began to organise, behind the façade of the strike, a more serious and violent rebellion, designed to bring him personally into power. With so much of the country idle, there were many elements which could be drawn into his schemes, and bands, half brigands, half adventurers, began to assemble in the hills and to attack Jewish settlements. In August Fauzi al-Kaukji, who had had much experience of military and guerrilla operations in other parts of the Arab world, was brought in to complete the organisation and training of what had become a guerrilla army of some five thousand men. The nucleus was paid by funds received from Italy—some of which were handled by Italian religious institutions in Palestine—and by the misappropriation of the considerable Waqf endowments which the Mufti controlled as president of the Supreme Muslim Council.

(Up to the autumn there were few troops and no British army officer of higher rank than colonel in Palestine, and military operations were under the general supervision of the

R.A.F. It was impossible to attack or control the bands in the hills, or to protect the many isolated Jewish settlements scattered through the country.) It was as much as they could do to protect the main roads, and the roads were woefully deficient from a strategic point of view. (The Arab leaders were allowed to travel about the country freely, stirring up violence, and using the mosques to fan religious hatred to a white heat. In consequence by the summer a large part of the country was in the hands of the rebels,) operating in the Galilean hills, in the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm triangle, and from Jaffa in the south. The blowing up of much of the old town of Jaffa, though carefully carried out without loss of life, only embittered the situation still further.)

Meanwhile the official strike continued, and had been extended to a campaign of civil disobedience, complete boycott of the Jews, and non-payment of taxes. In June the Administration received a letter signed by 137 senior Arab officials stating that, in spite of their loyalty to the Administration, they were so much in sympathy with the demands of the Arab Higher Committee that they could not withhold it their support. (The Administration, however, refused to listen to the Arab complaints and more and more troops were brought into the country.) As the months drew on the business section of the Arab community became restive, for it was being ruined. Jaffa had witnessed the building of a lighter port at Tel Aviv which meant a permanent loss of trade; and, as the autumn drew on with no solution in sight, there was the prospect that the citrus crop would be a complete loss. There is no doubt that when the three neighbouring Arab rulers, Ibn Saud, Ghazi of Iraq and Abdullah of Transjordan, offered their mediation, most of the Arabs were only too glad of an excuse to bring the strike to an end. It (terminated on 11 October and exactly a month later the Royal Commission arrived.)

(The British had announced that the Commission would not sail until order was restored, but they were not able to keep their word.) The Mufti's rebellion in the hills had not been quelled and sporadic violence continued; but with the termination of the strike measures against the rebel bands were stopped, and no attempt was made to disarm them. (The termination of the strike and the continuation of a smouldering rebellion in the hills brought about a rift in the unity of the

Arab Higher Committee.) The landowners and business men realised that they had lost much and gained little by the activities of 1936; and they were increasingly opposed to the dictatorial actions of the Mufti. (By the end of June of the following year the Committee had broken up and the Mufti had turned on his Arab opponents with the same violence which he had used against the British and the Jews; and for two years he terrorised them much more effectively than either of his two other opponents.) The months of respite granted him by the Administration were used in reorganising his forces, training them and bringing them under unified control. The two main bands operated from the Galilean and Samarian hills, while a smaller band was centred in Hebron. In addition he had a private gang of assassins, and scarcely a week passed without the murder of a landowner, a business man or a village mukhtar who had refused to pay the blackmail demanded, or had opposed him in some other way. (On 27 September 1937 the District Commissioner for Galilee, Mr. L. Y. Andrews, was murdered in broad daylight in Nazareth, and the Administration at last decided on strong measures. The Higher Committee was declared illegal; four of its members were deported to the Seychelles, and the Mufti was deprived of his position as president of the Supreme Muslim Committee and of the Waqf funds. He escaped to Syria, it is commonly believed with the connivance of members of the Administration,) and continued to direct operations without difficulty from across the frontier. The French, who were not friendly disposed to the British in Palestine, did little to control or impede his activities. The break up of the Higher Committee had no effect on the rebellion, which in any case was being conducted by the Mufti in opposition to most of its members' wishes, and it deprived the British of any leading Arab personality with whom they might negotiate. Its chief effect was to intensify the Mufti's terroristic campaign for funds, since he could no longer use the income of the Waqfs.

Up to the middle of June 1938 the Jewish community had exercised remarkable self-control, and had confined its action to strictly defensive needs. But in the end there was inevitably some break in this attitude and some elements in Jabotinsky's Revisionist Party sought to counter terrorism with terrorism. How many actions were to be attributed to the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Band, both of which were formed during

the Arab rebellion, it is impossible to say; for the Mufti's assassins were also using terrorist methods against the Arab population, and some of the bombs which exploded in Jaffa, Haifa or Jerusalem may have been their work.

It was not until the autumn of 1938 that the military completed the task of making roads which would enable them to take the offensive against the headquarters of the bands in the hills, and in October martial law was at last declared in a modified form which yet gave the army effective control of the situation. Once the bands began to be defeated in open battle their powers of blackmail and terror over the towns and villages began to diminish, and (in the spring of 1939 their power was at last broken,) though isolated terrorist actions continued right up to the outbreak of war. But for more than a year they had held practically the whole country in their control, and had caused immense loss of life and property to all sections of the community.

The political events which unfolded from the announcement of the Royal Commission in May 1936 continued almost independently of the rebellion until the St. James's conferences of the spring of 1939. On its arrival in Palestine in November 1936 the Royal Commission was met with the announcement of a complete boycott by the Arabs, and they maintained this position until the Commission's last week in Jerusalem, when some of their leaders appeared to make carefully prepared statements; but their abstention did not prevent the commissioners from making an exhaustive survey of the country. While they offered a number of criticisms of the Administration, they coupled these with the statement that they did not believe that, if all they criticised were put right, it would make any fundamental difference. Without a radical change of policy the British could only meet the Arab demands with continuous and wholly sterile repression, which could, by its very nature, lead to no improvement. The expectations of Jews and Arabs had become irreconcilable, and the mandate had become unworkable. Having reached this conclusion they did not propose a re-examination of the basic historical problem, and admitted that they had not had submitted to them the promises originally made during the first world war; but, facing the situation as it then was on the basis of both Jews and Arabs possessing rights in the country, they proposed a geographical partition as the only method by


which each would receive something of their fundamental demands for self-government and control of their own political destiny. The actual division which they suggested allotted Galilee and the plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, together with the maritime plain to south of Jaffa (but not including that town), to the Jewish state, and the central hill country and the whole of the south to the Arab. Jerusalem and Bethlehem, together with a wide corridor covering road and rail communications with Jaffa they proposed to leave as a permanent international mandate.)


(When the report was published in July, it was immediately rejected by the Arab leaders. The Zionist Congress which met in the summer, while not prepared to approve it, authorised Dr. Weizmann to explore the matter with the British, but not to commit the Zionist Organisation without further consultation. The idea of partitioning the Holy Land caused a considerable shock to opinion) and in the succeeding months many discussions were entered into, in which private Jewish and Arab personalities were involved, to see if a *modus vivendi* could not be reached. But, (though the Jews showed some willingness to compromise, the Arabs did not, and a minority position in an Arab sovereign state was a solution wholly unacceptable to all shades of Jewish opinion.)

(The British government, in publishing the Commission's report, had published a White Paper announcing their acceptance of it. A heated debate in Parliament convinced them that this had been premature, and they accepted an amendment that they should seek the advice of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, which agreed to receive a detailed project before making up its mind, but shrewdly remarked that whether the mandate had or had not been workable, it had become unworkable from the moment the Royal Commission had declared it to be so.)

The government was in no hurry to appoint a commission to draw up the actual frontiers, and this dilatoriness was interpreted as a determination to abandon partition. However, in March 1938 a commission (the Woodhead Commission) was appointed and proceeded to Palestine with instructions to work out the details of partition. One important limitation of their terms of reference was that nothing was said of future Jewish immigration. They were to divide the country so as to leave the minimum minorities on both sides on the basis of

AREAS CONTAINING
JEWISH SETTLEMENT
IN 1948





the existing figures. The commission members were unable to agree, save in rejecting the Royal Commission's proposals. Most of them considered that the only acceptable division involved the creation of a miniature Jewish state from Tel Aviv northwards along the maritime plain to the southern boundaries of Carmel, with an Arab state in the hills behind it and in the southern part of the maritime plain, while the rest of the country remained under mandate, and consisted of a northern mandated territory of Galilee and Esdraelon, a southern mandated territory of Beersheba and the Negeb, and a third area around Jerusalem and Bethlehem with a corridor to Jaffa. This *reductio ad absurdum* of partition was regarded as impossible. As no discussions between Jews and Arabs had been able to reach any agreed alternative, plans were made to summon both parties to a conference at St. James's Palace in February 1939. Actually two conferences had to be held as the Arabs refused to meet the Jews. Moreover the representatives of the Mufti refused to accept any other Arab participation in the conference, and when the British insisted, diplomatic illness solved the problem in their favour—fear of assassination was a very real fear with any Arab who opposed the wishes of the Mufti. Since the British refused to allow him to come in person, he reaped the double advantage that his followers were accepted as the official representatives of Arab opinion, while, at the same time, he was personally unfettered by any action which they took in his absence.

On both sides the British had invited non-Palestinian representatives to take part. On the Arab side Egypt and the Yemen were invited in addition to the countries which had already intervened in the strike of 1936, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan. Syria, being itself still under mandate, was not represented. The scheme which Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, put forward was for a unitary government of Palestine, to be achieved within ten years by a gradual devolution of power, with safeguards for the Holy Places and the Jews as a permanent minority, though a certain amount of immigration would still be allowed during the transitional period. The scheme was rejected by both sides, and various informal conversations led to no result. The British therefore announced that they would put forward their own scheme and enforce it.

The first part of this scheme, the 1939 White Paper, was

announced in May. It outlined in greater detail the general constitutional developments put forward at the conferences, leading to independence in ten years if the country then appeared ready for it. But its most important part was its provision for immigration. The White Paper announced that the British could not agree that the commitments which they had entered into under the Balfour Declaration committed them to continual unlimited immigration in the face of Arab hostility. They therefore proposed a maximum of 75,000 to be admitted at an annual rate of ten thousand over five years, with an additional twenty-five thousand refugees from Nazi Germany to be admitted as and when the High Commissioner considered that the situation warranted it. After the 75,000 were admitted, there would be no further immigration without Arab consent. Whether there was ever any chance that this consent might have been secured under the conditions of this time is exceedingly doubtful. But within a few months the outbreak of the second world war introduced new factors into the situation.

{The emotion which this proposal caused throughout the Jewish world can only be understood on the background of the pressure of events in Europe. In Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia a million Jews were already crushed under the heel of Nazism; their civic rights had perished, and they were subjected to ever increasing violence and robbery. But that was not all. (The terrible menace of war hung over all the other Jewish communities of Europe, in particular over the three million Jews of Poland. And the doors of the rest of the world remained closed. Already Palestine had been able to absorb into new and creative life more refugees than either the United States or the British Empire. That the White Paper was a death blow to their political aspirations was bad enough. But what struck home to the least politically minded or the most ardent advocate of concessions to Arab opinion was that such a regulation meant in all probability the condemnation of millions of Jews to physical extermination at the hands of the Nazis.)

† In the White Paper it was foreseen that regulations would be subsequently published to deal with sales of land. These were delayed until the war had actually broken out, and were only published in 1940. The blow they struck at Jewish development was equally serious.) Throughout the hill country

land sales by Palestinian Arabs to Jews or any but other Palestinian Arabs, were wholly forbidden. In the plains of Esdraclon and Jezreel and in upper Galilee they could only be permitted under stringent restrictions. Only in the urban areas and the maritime plain from a little south of Jaffa to Carmel were Jews to be allowed freely to buy land. The land regulations could not be submitted to the League of Nations since the war had already begun. The White Paper was examined by the Mandates Commission, but not by the Council of the League which would have had final power of authorisation or refusal. But the Mandates Commission was unanimous that it did not conform to their previous interpretation of the mandate, and four out of the seven members (including those most neutral in the issue) considered that it was entirely unacceptable. It had an equally hostile reception in parliament, and the government with difficulty obtained the necessary majority to endorse it. Actually it was passed owing to the number who abstained from voting, feeling that in the seriousness of the general world situation they could not afford to defeat the government. Nevertheless no modification of the proposals was proposed, and the government announced its intention of enforcing its policy.

The Zionist Congress met in the last weeks before the outbreak of war, and the discussion of the attitude to be taken towards the White Paper formed the central point of the agenda. Relying on the opinions of the Mandates Commission, and conscious of the widespread opposition to the White Paper among men in all parties in Great Britain, (they denied its legal and moral validity, and refused any co-operation of the Agency in its enforcement. At the same time they denied that they desired a conflict with Great Britain, or that their opposition to the White Paper was a sign of hostility to the Arabs. Apart from anything else, they still recognised in Great Britain the best friend they had among the great powers, and realised that she would be the main defence of democracy in the war which was coming on the world.)

It would be rational to expect that the events of the decade from 1929 would have led to the spiritual and physical withering of the National Home. On the one side was an administration which, unable to maintain the fiction that it was possible to carry out satisfactorily the dual obligation of the mandate, was increasingly sympathetic to the demands

of the Arabs; and on the other was the continuous insecurity of life and property which was the consequence of the British inability—or unwillingness—to come to grips with the Mufti and treat the 'disturbances' as open rebellion.) But this is to forget the pressure under which Jewry lived during this decade. An inexhaustible optimism, born of desperation, continued to convince the masses of European Jewry that safety and self-respect lay only in Palestine; and, in fact, (during these years the National Home reached new heights) of creative development and, in so far as its internal life was concerned, justified all the hopes which were placed in it.

Of the immigrants who came from Germany during these years a number were able to bring with them the relics of their capital and this, together with increasing contributions resulting from the appeals of the national funds and from private contributions from America and elsewhere, assured a sufficient flow of capital to allow for the rapid absorption of the immense flow of new inhabitants. It was to be expected that an economy developed so rapidly and under such a strain should show many ragged edges, and that many mistakes should have been made. The serious panic in the autumn of 1935, when Palestine feared a war between England and Italy over Abyssinia, was evidence of this raggedness. On the other hand the immense investment of capital needed to develop the different kinds of agricultural settlement, while unjustifiable from a short-term economic standpoint, was socially justified, and on a long term, not unreasonable even from an economic standpoint, when it is realised that the land had to be brought from desolation to productivity within a single generation, and that operations were performed in a few years which an ordinary farming community would spread over the accumulated work and expenditure of generations.

The number of agricultural settlements of all kinds doubled during this decade; and in many communal villages experiments were made in combining farming with industry, since this allowed them to absorb newcomers at an increased rate, while still maintaining the social life which gave these settlements a significance out of all proportion to the number who were able to live in them. A national service scheme brought youngsters from the towns to work for a year in the pioneering on the land, and gave the whole community a common

interest in the rebirth, out of the soil itself, of the National Home. When it is realised that this experiment in soil restoration stood almost alone in a world in which careless agriculture had produced a soil erosion leading to the loss of millions of acres a year in every continent, it is easy to see something of the pride with which new settlements were built and manned and the task of reclamation undertaken. Of course some of the villages were built on land which had already been cultivated, but a high proportion were not. When the Arab rebellion brought all the villages into the danger zone, the work did not slacken. A new technique was devised by which a pre-fabricated village was erected between dawn and dusk by a co-operative effort of all its neighbours, so that when the first night came its stockade was completed, and its water tower, armed with a searchlight, stood ready as a watch tower for the pioneers. Many of the villages were founded in the blood of their first settlers and this increased the pride which the whole of the Yishub, and Jewry throughout the world, felt in the courage and steadfastness with which they pressed on unremittingly with the task of building new homes for the refugees from the world's oppression or indifference. (When a small Jewish terrorist organisation came into existence during the Arab rebellion, it was not from the villages that its members came but from the towns. The villages throughout remained faithful to the principle of self-restraint, fighting courageously, but only when attacked.

It was during this period that the Jewish Defence Force, the Haganah, came to be efficiently organised. Jewish defence has a history going back to the first days of Jewish settlement in the nineteenth century; and a volunteer force was built up in the early days of the mandate, after the 1921 riots. It had to be done secretly, as, according to official policy, the villages were adequately defended by the police, and were allowed only a small sealed case of shotguns in case of need. Even these were withdrawn in 1928, and in the 1929 riots the Jewish casualties would have been much more numerous had the settlers not been able to make use of their 'illegal' training and arms to defend themselves. The shot guns were restored, but organised training remained illegal. It was 'provocative' to Arab opinion that Jews should be able to defend themselves. Even the restoration of the guns was made the subject of a violent press campaign by the Arab that Jews were being

armed to murder them, though there had been no case of the Haganah exceeding the bounds of pure defence.

After 1933 the Administration continued the policy of refusing to recognise the Haganah or the possession of more than the shotguns; but as the military gradually took over, they co-operated, if not openly, with the Haganah; and even the Administration had to accept some sixteen thousand of them as 'settlement police' when it was evident that the general police and military could not arrive at an attacked settlement in time to save it. In 1937 Captain Orde Wingate (later Major General, and killed in the Burma campaign) organised, with the Haganah and the military, special squads which performed essential services in the rooting out of the Mufti's forces in their hill strongholds. But even then Haganah officially remained illegal.

The bulk of the immigrants of the thirties were urban; for agricultural development is both slower and more expensive. The towns of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa all increased considerably in size, and a number of previously rural settlements, such as Petah Tikvah, Rehovoth or Hadera, assumed urban characteristics and took part in the industrial development of the country. The new industries were as much pioneering as the new agriculture; for while the emigrants from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia brought with them a good deal of technical skill as well as capital, the whole development of industry in a country lacking most raw materials involved a continuous process of trial and error. Actually the largest single industry during these years was inevitably building; and it was perhaps fortunate that this was the industry which involved the closest co-operation between Jews and Arabs. For if the clients and builders were usually Jews, the quarrymen and stone cutters were largely Arab.

It was difficult for political life to keep pace with the new responsibilities created by the immense and rapid growth of the Yishub. The political system within the Jewish community was naturally based on the experience of the Jews who took part in it, and that experience had been almost wholly obtained in eastern Europe. There was a multitude of parties, which continually tended to fragment themselves still further, and their representatives were elected by the list system, so that no man definitely represented any particular geographical

area or interest in the community. There was the additional complication that the majority within Palestine rested with various parties of the left, and the liberal 'General Zionists' had but a small representation, while within the World Zionist Organisation the situation was often reversed. The result of these difficulties was an unstable and often hysterical political activity which considerably widened the breach between the Jews on one side and the British and the Arabs on the other. Though the period urgently demanded a fundamental rethinking from all parties, this fact was not reflected in the majority policies of any. Among the Arabs such moderates as there were were afraid to speak out in view of the Mufti's assassins; among the British they were rendered hopeless by the apparent impossibility of reconciling Jewish and Arab demands. Among the Jews they could not withstand the pressure of the European tragedy which laid on Zionist leaders one duty above all others—that of providing a refuge for as many Jews as by hook or by crook could be brought into the shelter of the National Home. (It was their tragedy that such a policy, in the conditions of the time, only alienated British and Arab opinion.)

The Christian community during this period played but little part in the life of the country. Among the Arab Christians most had supported the Arab Higher Committee, and the same was true among the many Christian Arabs who were employed in the Administration. The Orthodox Church entered into a long period of crisis on the death of the Patriarch Damianus in 1931. The conflict between the Greeks of the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre and the Arab congregations was not resolved; and the election of a new patriarch aroused every existing feud within the community and was protracted year after year almost until the war. In the western Christian circles religion was often involved in politics, Italians supporting Mussolini, Germans supporting Hitler, and both secretly or openly assisting the Arabs in their resistance to the British. The younger members of the Templar colonies were largely won over to Nazi views. Among the Anglicans and British missionaries, linked as they were to native Arab Christian Churches and schools, pro-Arab views were also widely held. Dr. Graham Brown, who became bishop in 1932, tried to mediate between the two communities and preserve an impartial standpoint, but his voice was little

heard amidst the excited passions of Jews and Arabs, and had little influence on the increasingly disillusioned British officials. At bottom it was the British attitude which had rendered the problem insoluble. The Royal Commission in 1937 had truly declared that the mandate had become unworkable, but they had declared it to a world too preoccupied with other affairs to be able to think out seriously what should be done. The menace of war hung over the whole scene; and under that menace British officials had to carry on day by day an administration in which they could take no pride, and which could lead to no solution of their urgent problems. The psychological effects of this miserable situation were increasingly apparent in the years of heightened strain after the outbreak of war.)

THE COLLAPSE AND THE ABANDONMENT
OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

IT IS TOO SOON TO SEE in their full historical perspective the events of the decade from 1939 to 1948. Even more than in previous periods Palestine was involved in the play of world forces, and in the perpetually changing balance of world power. Actions which we can see to have been ignoble or dishonourable in themselves, the future may see to have been inevitable, whether as the result of the general decline of moral standards which accompanies war, or as the result of a shift in world forces of which the unhappy people of Palestine were the plaything. Yet if future history can explain, or even possibly excuse, it cannot deny the unhappy facts to which the terms ignoble and dishonourable are justly applied.

From many standpoints the Middle East was an area of extreme significance in the strategy of both sides during the second world war. It lay across the supply lines of Britain and America with the East; and it contained essential oil resources; but it also lay along the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union and within reach of her oil supplies in the Caucasus, and its acquisition might have enabled Germany to make contact with her eastern ally, Japan. The thrusts of Germany and Italy through the Balkans and along the coast of North Africa were parts of a vast pincer movement which would have enclosed Palestine within the Nazi sphere, had the pincers been able to close. The defence of the Suez Canal, of the oil of Arabia and of the Mediterranean, were the necessary British and American reply to this movement; and brought Palestine into the centre of the middle-eastern picture.

Yet Palestine was only a part of that picture, and its administrators became a small section in an immense web of British officials, military and civilian, spread over the whole of the Arab world; and the conduct of those administrators had to be fitted into a general pattern suitable to the whole area.

A dominant element in that pattern was, inevitably, the conciliation of the local population and the avoidance thereby of any increase in the commitments of the military power, first of France and Britain, then of Britain alone, finally of Britain and America, which was already stretched to the uttermost by the needs of the main theatres of war elsewhere.

Already in the decade before the outbreak of war there had been a swing of the pendulum away from earlier interpretations of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. The naked power politics of the war years immediately increased this movement. Without their needing to make any sacrifices or to commit themselves to the uncertain hazards of supporting one side or the other, the Arab power of pressure was immensely enhanced; whereas, in spite of their terrible needs in Europe and their inevitable loyalty to the anti-Nazi cause, the power of the Jewish community was correspondingly lessened.

Such a situation would, in any case, have made it difficult to meet the enormous increase in real Jewish need, but it unhappily developed on a background of years of tension between the Zionist leaders in Palestine and the British officials, tension which the Arab rebellion had done nothing to diminish, and which the Jewish reaction to the White Paper of 1939 had only increased. It is one of the curiosities of the situation that an event such as the rebellion of the Mufti created little emotional reaction of hostility among officials accustomed to colonial situations, while the campaign of Jewish abuse which had been intensified, though not begun, by the White Paper, appeared to them intolerable and unforgivable. Emotionally they were in the mood for actions ranging from pinpricks to studied insults when the war situation enabled them to rationalise this emotion into a necessary policy in the interests of the Jews themselves, who could only be saved by the defeat of Nazism. To the immense bitterness they caused even amongst the most loyal and moderate elements in the Jewish community they remained indifferent. That they increased extremism, and, in due course, terrorism, they regarded as justifying the behaviour by which they had themselves brought these Frankenstein monsters into existence.

How great was the Jewish need can be understood only by turning from the general considerations of world strategy necessitated by the war to the position of the Jewish people itself. After the peak year of 1935, immigration fell to thirty

thousand, that is less than half, in 1936; and in the three following years averaged only thirteen thousand. The White Paper of 1939 threatened still further to reduce this figure to ten thousand a year, and to seventy-five thousand in all; for no Zionist leader believed that the Arabs would consent to further immigration, or that the British would take any steps to aid them to secure such consent. And yet all the time Jewish need was growing by leaps and bounds (Within a few weeks of the outbreak of war Poland was prostrate and the three million Jews of that country were either under the Nazi heel or fugitives within the Russian zone.) While many tens of thousands were saved from death by the Russians, few of the Polish Jews were communist or desired to become communist, and many set out to try by secret ways to reach Palestine. In the spring of 1940 western Europe was overrun, and flight westwards to the new world was cut off, even had shipping been obtainable. There remained only one possible way out of Europe, through the Balkans into Turkey and thence into Syria. Turkey, herself a poor country, could not undertake to house refugees indefinitely. She could only allow those to enter whom she knew she would be able to pass further on.

The British controlled her south-eastern gateway and kept it bolted.

It is this action, more than any other, that Jewry finds it most difficult to forgive. How many tens of thousands might have been saved it will never be possible to know. But it is natural that every Jew of Palestine, and indeed of all other countries also, must think that those with whom he personally was concerned, his parents, husband, wife, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, might have been among those who could have escaped had that door been allowed to open while it was still possible to reach it.

Since it was impossible to take the short and safe route across the Bosphorus, Jews tried to reach Palestine direct by ship. Actually even before the outbreak of war such ships had tried to reach the Palestinian coast and had been ruthlessly turned back. After the outbreak of war those whom the British caught were interned and released when there were certificates available; but in the autumn of 1940 the Administration announced that any refugees who did arrive would not be allowed to stay in the country. In November a number

were collected on board the *Patria* in Haifa harbour for deportation, and the ship was deliberately sunk by Jewish extremists with the loss of over two hundred and fifty lives. The survivors were allowed to stay in the country, but the succeeding arrivals were sent to Mauritius. In December of the same year a ship laden with refugees, the *Salvador*, sank with great loss of life in the Sea of Marmora; but the greatest shock was caused by the loss of the *Struma* in February 1942. The *Struma* was an unseaworthy Danube steamer on which nearly eight hundred Jews sought to reach Turkey. There was never any question of it being able to make the sea journey to the coast of Palestine. The Turks would not allow the passengers to land without the certainty that the British would allow them to leave Turkey for Syria, and this the British refused to do. Finally the ship put to sea again, and sank with the loss of 763 lives. There was one survivor.

The loss of the *Struma* was the direct cause of the decision of the Extraordinary Zionist Conference, held at the Hotel Biltmore in New York in May, to demand the recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine as an immediate war aim. News of the massacres in eastern Europe had already begun to penetrate to the west, though the Foreign Office dismissed them as hysterical rumours. The Jews took them more seriously and the conviction grew that nothing less than complete control of their own territory would allow them to rescue the survivors of the death-camps of Europe. It was a signal example of the difficulties caused by the different pressures to which the different elements in Palestine were subject. For the Biltmore resolution coincided with the German advance across the frontiers of Egypt, and the quiescence of the Arabs, who had sullenly watched the defeat of Rashid Ali al-Gailani in Iraq the previous year, was again in doubt.

At the end of 1942 the British finally opened the Turkish frontier, when the Germans had obtained complete control of the Balkans and flight had become almost impossible. Nevertheless some six thousand managed to reach Palestine through Turkey between then and the end of the war, as part of the legal quota of immigrants.

In spite of their indignation and grief over the rejection of their pleas for mercy for the victims of Europe, the Jews of Palestine showed, from the very beginning, the utmost eagerness to take an active share in the war. At its outbreak Dr.

Weizmann had assured the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that the Jews were anxious to play their part, and would do nothing to embarrass the British authorities. In Palestine the formula was evolved that 'they would fight the war as if there was no White Paper, and the White Paper as if there was no war.' Such a formula was natural in the circumstances, but it gave the excuse to the local officials to base their conduct more frequently on its second than on its first clause.

There were genuine difficulties about accepting the Zionist offer in the beginning, when the British had far fewer arms than they needed even for their home forces; but these difficulties were supplemented by the Palestine Administration in innumerable ways which could only have the intention of damping down the Jewish desire to serve lest it should throw into too strong relief the Arab indifference. (Jews were first accepted into the army only as labourers and at a low scale of pay which made it necessary for the Agency to raise special funds to pay separation allowances.) Parity had to be maintained with Arab enlistments, and as these were few the number who could serve was small. (Nevertheless Palestinian units were in France before its fall.) At the end of 1940, still on the basis of parity, they were allowed to volunteer for the infantry; but the slowness of Arab enlistment finally led to the abandonment of the principle in 1941. Mixed units were, however, maintained for some time longer, and one, the 51st Middle East Commandos, distinguished itself in the Abyssinian campaign. (During the same year both the army and the navy began training wholly Jewish units for special services, and Jews were engaged in commando work in Syria, Iraq and East Africa.) Later both men and women were trained to be parachuted into Europe. Of these special Jewish groups more than half gave their lives for the cause. (1800 Palestinian pioneers, most of them Jews, were left in Crete when that island had to be evacuated, and were taken prisoner by the Nazis.)

In 1942 mixed units were replaced by wholly Jewish or Arab units. The role of the latter will be mentioned later, but the Jewish units saw much service in the African campaigns, and formed part of the armies which invaded Italy. In 1944 a Jewish brigade group was finally formed and took part in the occupation of Germany. In all almost thirty thousand

Jews served during the war. But the Palestine press was allowed to hear little of their exploits, and even when they were allowed to show the shield of David on their vehicles and shoulder badges on the field of battle, these had to be removed before they could enter the National Home, lest the sight of them should offend Arab feeling.)

While many of the Jews who enlisted in the fighting services were drafted to units where their special qualifications could be best used, the industrial potentiality of the National Home was similarly geared into the war effort. Lack of minerals and other raw materials limited the scope of possible development, but Jewish factories turned out many of the immense range of articles needed for a modern army, and so saved invaluable shipping space.

But the disastrous political background inevitably created another and more sombre side to Jewish activity during the war. While there had been little action on the part of the extremists during the years which culminated in the German pincer movement reaching Stalingrad on the north and Alamcin on the west, the victory of Alamcin on 2 November 1942, the landing of American and British forces six days later in North Africa, and the Russian counter offensive on November 19, all combined to alleviate the danger in Palestine, while at the same time the news from Europe made it ever clearer that the millions of Jews in the hands of Hitler were being systematically exterminated. The result of this double situation was an increase of political intolerance and terrorist activity, of attempts to secure means by which immigrants could reach the shores of Palestine, and of acquiring arms for a subsequent trial of strength with the Arabs and, if need be, the British. In addition Jewish nationalists—particularly among the youth—began to treat disagreement within their own ranks as treachery to be countered with violence and brutality. The attitude of the Agency towards these unwelcome developments was hesitant. While Jewish opinion generally strongly disapproved of terrorism, it was also deeply moved by the European news and the unwillingness of the Administration to make any concession to Jewish needs. It was not until the tragic murder of Lord Moyne in Cairo on 6 November 1944 crowned a whole series of political assassinations that the Agency effectively co-operated with the police for the suppression of the terrorists, and even then the co-operation was

short-lived. For by that time it was too late to affect the general policy of the Administration, which had become set in the lines that anything which might disturb Arab equanimity merited instant and ruthless action. Infamous as such a policy was in terms of human need, it appeared to them to be dictated by the circumstances; but even if history endorses their decision, it remains true that human beings involved in such a policy inflict on themselves psychological scars which impair their judgment and plunge them ever deeper into a tangle of rationalisation, misrepresentation and self-justification which renders them unfit for the responsibilities of government. It is not to be expected that the victims of such a policy would quietly acquiesce; and there resulted a crescendo of repression and police action which turned Palestine in the years after Alamein and still more after the conclusion of the war into a police state, with the corruption and injustice which such a state involves. Perhaps the most disastrous effect of such a police state, and the resistance which it caused, was the intolerable strain it placed on the military and police themselves, constantly called to fight an invisible enemy. But equally regrettable is the emergence of a literature of white-wash. And this also Palestine has witnessed in full measure. Official statements were often petulant and inaccurate, and there can be few subjects on which such a flood of misrepresentation, bias and sterile romanticism has been poured out, largely by people in semi-official positions, as the literature on Palestine and the Middle East which has appeared in England since the war.

Meanwhile the lot of the Arabs was very different from that of the Jews. The immense expenditure of the British and American forces in the Middle East brought to all Arab lands a period of great prosperity. In particular the peasants of Palestine, for the first time in centuries, were able to clear themselves of debts owing to the high prices they obtained for agricultural produce. From the political and military standpoints the Arabs were equally fortunate. Even desert warfare had changed completely since the days of Lawrence, and there was no particular desire on the part of the British for large-scale Arab recruitment, apart from the fact that Arab troops had proved unreliable in the dark days of 1941 and during the rising of Rashid Ali al-Gailani in Iraq. They could therefore follow, without arousing criticism, the policy

which seemed most logical to them of waiting to see which side would win, and joining in at the last possible moment. It was in February 1945 that the Arab countries, including Egypt, officially declared war on the Axis. There were doubtless a number of individual Arab leaders who were sincerely pro-British, and in the early days of the war there was a genuine change of feeling among the majority of the Palestinian Arabs who up to that moment had regarded Britain as an enemy; but in the Middle East in general there was an equal number who were convinced that a German victory would be desirable; and the same was true of the younger generation; there were some who were in favour of 'democracy' as they understood it, and some who favoured the corporate state.

The number of Arabs who actually joined the fighting forces was about twelve thousand, but by no means all of these came from Palestine, and, after the first period few saw any active service. Desertions were frequent, and there were those who joined merely in order to obtain a rifle with which they then decamped. Some, who were taken prisoner by the Germans during the earlier part of the war, were later taken prisoner again by the Americans, having in the meantime joined the German army under the inspiration of the recruiting campaigns of the Mufti. The Mufti was the centre of Axis intrigue in the Middle East, though his concern remained for the Arab future, as he saw it, and not for the advancement of German world hegemony. When it became unsafe for him to remain in Syria, he fled to Iraq; and it is typical of the instability of the 'pro-British' element among the Arab leaders that Nuri Said, the premier of Iraq and a sincere friend of Britain, gave him a state reception and extensive financial support during his stay in that country. When the rising of Rashid al-Gailani failed, he fled first to Iran, and thence made his way to Italy, until he ended in Hitler's headquarters. There he remained until the end of the war, organising Muslim and Arab battalions for the Nazis.

In the fortunate position in which they stood, these activities did no harm to the Arab cause in the eyes of the British, and they were able to continue their political demands without abatement. The only reply which could be expected to the Biltmore programme was the demand for an independent Arab Palestine; and this demand was made with the more

vigour in that the British were concerned not merely to maintain the Arab position but to strengthen it. It was largely at the initiative of Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, that in September 1943 representatives of the Arab states met in Alexandria under Nahas Pasha of Egypt, and in the 'Alexandria Protocol' laid the foundations of the Arab League. It still remains a paper organisation, for politically the Arab world is not easily united—except in its opposition to the claims of the Jewish National Home. Musa Alami, a member of the Husseini faction, took part in the discussions in 1943 on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine. In 1945 the Arab League declared that *de jure* Palestine was already an independent Arab country by virtue of the treaty of Lausanne which had been signed with Turkey in 1923 and had ratified the settlement reached after the first world war.

The British advocacy of the Arab League added still further to the isolation of the Palestine Administration. The whole network of British officials throughout the Middle East were committed to the support of a policy which contained a direct attack on the British mandatory government, and on the recognition of special Jewish rights in Palestine which, however much they may have been reduced, the British were still unwilling to abandon. It is not likely that many British officials in the Middle East took the trouble to oppose Arab expressions of opinion which roundly condemned the policy of the mandate; and it is evident from the outpouring of literature already referred to that many in official or semi-official positions openly endorsed the Arab opinion. Yet, even if to the rest of the Middle East the Palestinian officials appeared to be carrying out a 'pro-Jewish' policy, it could not possibly appear as such to the Jews themselves. In the winter of 1942 they had, when too late, opened the Turkish frontier. But this was the limit of the concessions they made to Jewish feeling. To the end of the war a rigid censorship restricted references to Jewish military services, and continuous police action against not only terrorism but the possession of arms, aroused equally continuous ill-feeling even among the moderates who well knew not only that the Arab traffic in arms was at least as extensive as the Jewish, but that Jewish arms trials were deliberately exploited for the political ends of appeasing the Arabs.

The war ended in Europe in May 1945, but this brought no

relief to Palestine. } For the next two and a half years—until the acceptance of partition by the United Nations on 29 November 1947—the centre of the stage was occupied by the vicious circle created by Jewish terrorism on the one hand and, on the other, the inability, or refusal, of the British to make any gesture which would increase the power of moderate Jewish opinion or enable the Jewish Agency to take effective steps to assist in its suppression.

In the long and tragic history of the Jewish people there is no more sombre incident than the growth of terrorism in Palestine during the decade which followed the Macdonald White Paper of 1939. Its roots lay, not in the political disappointment of the thirties, nor in the intransigence of Arab hostility, but in the horror of Nazi persecution. It was immensely aggravated by the news of the death camps which began to filter through into Palestine in the middle of the war, and it was brought to its culmination by the actual sight of the survivors in Buchenwald or in other camps, coupled with the failure of the rest of the world to do anything practical to find them new homes in which to rebuild their shattered lives. The Yishub in Palestine placed no limits on the sacrifices they were prepared to make in order to receive these shattered remnants of their people. They asked only the opportunity to receive them; and it was because of the consistent refusal of the British to make any gesture which would meet the situation that terrorism not only grew, but enjoyed a toleration from large sections of the community which no political objectives would have accorded it. The consciousness of duty well done during the war, contrasted with the supineness or actual disloyalty of the Arab population, and the knowledge that it was to conciliate Arab feeling that any gesture was refused, served to accentuate a situation already felt to be intolerable. From the Jewish standpoint the moral and legal foundation for British rule in Palestine lay in the mandate, and the mandate embodied the Balfour Declaration. From 1939 onwards the view had become increasingly widespread, especially among the Revisionist elements, that the British rule had ceased to have legal validity. It rested on force alone, and as such, could be challenged by force. The terrorists claimed that they were fighting by the only means available to a weak power to wage war on a strong one. Many of them had fought in the resistance movements in Europe; many

were themselves illegal immigrants who had avoided death at the hands of the Nazis by their own courage and resource. They held that they were at war with the British and, if captured, entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. But political fanaticism, and their belief in their right to turn all Palestine into a Jewish state, was an equally important factor in their outlook, and for this they had no legal foundation either in the Balfour Declaration or the mandate. Hence the basic cause, that of rescuing their brethren in Europe, became overlaid with chauvinist politics; but the issue was so tangled, and tempers so strained, that few possessed a clear enough picture to form a reasoned judgment of the harm terrorism was doing to the Jewish cause.

For the British officials in Palestine concerned with the impartial execution of their routine tasks, and for those in the army and police whose duty it was to maintain order with the minimum use of force, the position was exasperating; and the irritation produced by over-strained nerves showed itself from time to time in a vindictive antisemitism which tended to regard all Jews with equal intolerance and dislike, and in savage outbursts of denunciation or of violence, which alienated the moderates who might have helped them. Terrorism is ever the most difficult and thankless task for any government and its police to meet; and when the government has no policy by which it can hope to win over the general population to its assistance, it opens an unending vista in which frayed nerves arising from the constant sense of unseen danger only increase the evil which they cannot remedy.

(In England the Labour Party, which alone could enunciate a new policy for the Administration to follow, came into power in July 1945, but, in spite of their many pro-Zionist pronouncements in previous years, and indeed, at the party conference in the spring of 1945 itself, they maintained silence for almost six months on the issue. This long delay enabled the situation to worsen considerably. During the summer Arab political activity in Palestine increased; para-military formations came into existence and movements for the formation of a new Higher Committee were initiated. The increase of Arab political activity, as intransigent in character as it had been before the war, stirred Zionist resentment in all quarters. In America strongly anti-British pronouncements were made;

and in August President Truman, in a letter to Mr. Attlee, made his first request that the British would take the first step towards the solution of the problem of European Jewish refugees by admitting 100,000 to Palestine. In view of Labour's frequent denunciations of the 1939 White Paper the request was not surprising, especially as, by the summer, the issue of the homeless Jews of Europe had become the main issue in Zionist policy, whether among the terrorists or the most moderate advocates of Jewish-Arab rapprochement. The certificates still available under the White Paper were coming to an end in September, and the first batches of post-war 'illegal' immigrants were already arriving at the shores of Palestine. But the British showed no signs of acting; and the inevitable consequences followed. The extremists announced that they would take every possible step to aid refugees to enter the country, and the Haganah, with the backing of some at least of the members of the Agency, promised their support for this particular objective, adding that they would make every effort not to destroy life in the process. Attacks were mainly directed at coast-guard stations and at communications, and this stage culminated at the end of October in a general attack on the railways in which many bridges were blown up.

Palestine had previously been regarded as the concern of the Colonial Office, but the Labour Government transferred it to the Foreign Office, which brought it under the control of Mr. Ernest Bevin. Whatever his private sympathies, Mr. Bevin had an unfortunate knack in every speech which he made on the Jewish question of interjecting some remark which showed either an astonishing ignorance—as when he announced that Jews and Arabs had been in conflict for two thousand years—or a complete lack of insight into the Jewish plight—as when he told them not to try to get to the head of the queue for his attention. What discussions went on behind the scenes to delay the new government from announcing its policy has not at the time of writing been fully revealed. Nor can we say what influences of oil or military strategy went to form its decision. But it seems likely that at that time the British, in view of the situation developing in Egypt, were convinced that it was necessary at all costs to retain a foothold in Palestine; and immense sums had, in fact, just been spent on building a modern camp at Gaza far larger than Palestinian

requirements could explain or justify. Moreover in January 1946 Mr. Bevin suddenly announced that Transjordan would become an independent state, and in March a treaty was signed giving the British extensive military facilities, and entirely ignoring the fact that the new state did not even pretend to be independent financially.

The policy of the British government which Mr. Bevin announced on 13 November 1945 was not action, but the association of the United States with Britain in a fresh enquiry into the future of Palestine, as it affected the position of the Jewish refugees in Europe and the National Home. It is at least interesting that it was after the enquiry had been commenced, but before it had completed its work, that he suddenly announced and carried through the independence of Transjordan. The enquiry was to be made by a committee composed of six British and six Americans, with the right to make interim proposals, and with the general task of suggesting a final solution which could then be implemented under a trusteeship of the United Nations. The announcement came during a period of increasing tension. Terrorism was continuing unabated and with the half-hearted support of at least elements in the Haganah and the Agency. The Arab Higher Committee had been reformed under the aegis of the Arab League, and the place of president had been reserved for the ex-Mufti, who was then in French hands. At the beginning of December the Arab League took the further step of declaring a boycott on all Jewish goods, and this was continued with some success throughout the succeeding period.

During the same period the intensity of the Jewish determination to let nothing stand in the way of their efforts to rescue their brethren in Europe—of which terrorism was only a single unbalanced expression—was made still clearer. In December Sir Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner, had formally asked the Agency for its co-operation against the terrorists, and Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Shertok had replied that they could not co-operate with the authorities, for it was not the Jewish people but British policy which had created the movement. Shortly after this exchange the most considerable outrage yet attempted resulted in the blowing up of the police headquarters in Jerusalem. Opinion again hardened on both sides.

Meanwhile the scene shifted to Europe and America.

American Zionists launched a bitter campaign of abuse against the British, and the extreme wing of the movement openly encouraged the terrorists in their resistance, and began an open campaign for funds for their assistance. At the same time information began to accumulate of a wide-flung organisation throughout Europe, largely backed by members of the American forces and endowed with very extensive funds, whose aim was the rescue of homeless Jews and their transfer by secret routes across Europe to Palestine. A badly expressed statement by General Morgan, Director of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Germany, not only exposed this traffic, but suggested that it was mainly in fit young men that the organisation was interested, and that it had political and not humanitarian objectives. The statement caused a wild outcry of rage among Jews in both Britain and America, intensified by the fact that the United States had done nothing herself to act, and that Britain still kept the doors of Palestine shut.

While this shutting of the doors of Palestine constituted the main grievance of the Jews, the unwillingness of the United States to do anything other than ask for their opening, and the failure of that country and the rest of the world to make any alternative provision, was a natural cause of anger to the Arabs. There were, especially among certain members of the Arab League, moderates who sought some solution which would accept the presence in Palestine of the existing Jewish community, and grant it what, in their eyes, would be adequate local autonomy. But none were prepared to recognise that immigration into Palestine should be complacently regarded by the rest of the world as absolving them from all responsibility for, or participation in, a problem which was a world problem, and not, in any interpretation, a problem created by the Palestinian Arabs or the Arab states. It was one of the saddest elements in the whole disastrous complex that there was a gulf which could not be bridged between the willingness of moderate elements among the Arabs to accept the fact of a Jewish community in Palestine and grant it the best they could offer of minority status, and the desire of moderate elements among the Jewish community to reach an accommodation with their Arab neighbours. The minority status envisaged by the Arabs fell far short of anything which would have enabled the Jews of Palestine to take any effective

action to succour their European brethren; but there was also the fact that a minority status under a government entirely lacking in political experience and containing many elements which were not 'moderate', offered the Jews no real guarantee whatever for their future.

In this unhappy atmosphere the Anglo-American Committee started its work. In four months its members visited the main refugee centres in Europe, as well as Palestine and the Arab capitals of the Middle East. Their report, presented at the end of April 1946, showed remarkable insight into the whole problem, in spite of the brief period in which it was prepared. Although there was much discussion behind the scenes and in the press during these months of partition as the only permanent solution, the Committee did not propose the dismemberment of the country, but the continuation of a trusteeship until it was possible for a single government to take over. In striking language the Committee stated:

Recommendation No. 3.

In order to dispose, once and for all, of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine, we regard it as essential that a clear statement of the following principles should be made:—I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. III. That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under International Guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

Thus Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike: and accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government, consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above.

Comment

Throughout the long and bloody struggle of Jew and Arab for dominance in Palestine, each crying fiercely: "This land is mine"—except for the brief reference in the Report of the Royal Commission and the little evidence, written and oral, that we received on this point—the great interest

of the Christian World in Palestine has been completely overlooked, glossed over or brushed aside.

We, therefore, emphatically declare that Palestine is a Holy Land, sacred to Christian, to Jew and to Moslem alike; and because it is a Holy Land, Palestine is not, and can never become, a land which any race or religion can justly claim as its very own.

We further, in the same emphatic way, affirm that the fact that it is the Holy Land, sets Palestine completely apart from other lands, and dedicates it to the precepts and practices of the Brotherhood of Man, not those of narrow nationalism.

They rejected both partition and immediate independence because:

We have reached the conclusion that the hostility between Jews and Arabs and, in particular, the determination of each to achieve domination, if necessary by violence, make it almost certain that, now and for some time to come, any attempt to establish either an independent Palestinian state or independent Palestinian states would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world.

In proposing a continuation of a mandate or trusteeship they emphasised the need for serious efforts to step up the Arab level of economy and education so as to rid the Arabs of their fear of the Jews, but at the same time they considered that continued immigration should be allowed and that the land regulations should be abolished, replaced only by adequate protection for the interests of small holders and tenant cultivators. While these were their long-term proposals, they proposed also the immediate admission of the 100,000 for whom Mr. Truman had several times asked.

The report had an uneasy press with the Jews and was rejected by the Arabs. Mr. Truman announced his support for the immediate immigration programme, but said nothing of the other proposals. But it was killed within forty-eight hours of its publication by Mr. Attlee's pronouncement in parliament that the report would have to be considered as a whole and that no consideration could possibly be given to the admission of the 100,000 until *both sides* had completely disarmed. It is

difficult to believe that the government seriously thought that the Arabs, in their present mood, would disarm in order that 100,000 Jews should be admitted to the country. Nor was it conceivable that the terrorists, with their natural suspicions of the British attitude, would disarm before Britain gave evidence of her intention to admit them. On the other hand it was evident that their admission would not only disarm most of the adherents of terrorism, morally as well as physically, but also deprive the remainder of any sympathy from the rest of the Jewish community. It is still for historians to disclose why Mr. Attlee made this extraordinary pronouncement.

This fresh rebuff to Jewish hopes that they might be permitted to do something substantial for their unhappy brethren still languishing in camps in Europe provoked its inevitable reaction. In America the press campaign against Britain increased in violence. In Palestine the Agency and the moderates became even less willing to co-operate with the Administration. On June 6 the ex-Mufti escaped without difficulty from France and appeared at Cairo, where ten days later the Egyptian government announced that no restrictions would be placed on his movements. Ever since he had been taken by the French in the previous year attempts had been made to persuade the British or French governments to take action against him as a war criminal, but nothing had been done; and his arrival in the Middle East seemed another betrayal to the Jews, and naturally strengthened the hands of Arab extremism.

Announcing that they had evidence of their complicity in illegal and even murderous attacks on the government, the Administration on June 29 suddenly arrested all the Agency leaders and two thousand other Jews, and interned them in detention camps; at the same time arms searches in the settlements were stepped up in severity. The arrest of their leaders did nothing to make the Jews more compliant; and as the Administration found itself in the humiliating position that it could only still further embitter the situation by taking action against them, it contented itself with publishing documents showing the relations of members of the Agency with the terrorists. In the end, after some months, it was compelled to release them untried, and thereby suffered a further loss of prestige for its original action. But these were not the only consequences. If the Agency leaders had had contacts with the

terrorists, they had also sought to exercise a restraining influence upon them. Freed from all restraint, and while the Agency leaders were under detention, the terrorists blew up the wing of the King David's Hotel which housed much of the secretariat and the army headquarters. There were a hundred killed, including nearly half of the senior British officials.

Were it possible for the fanatics who made up the terrorist groups of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang still further to alienate world opinion, this action would have done it. The harm they have done to the Jewish cause is incalculable, if only because it has been those less capable of being impressed by force and more sensitive both to the historical rights of Jewry in Palestine and the claims of the suffering refugees in Europe, who have always been its warmest advocates. Not since the murder of Lord Moyne had there been such a wave of anti-Jewish feeling.

Meanwhile the British government, having buried the findings of the Anglo-American Committee, was engaged in discussions between British and American experts whence, at the end of July, appeared new proposals known as the 'Morrison plan' through being first presented to parliament by Mr. Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council. The plan proposed a federal government with Jewish and Arab provinces, each province to have its own control of immigration; and it suggested the possibility of a large American gift and loan to assist the Arab economy on to its feet.

On a background of continuing intermittent action by the terrorists, and of ineffective police repression, a new conference met in London in September to consider the 'Morrison plan'. Neither the U.S.A. nor the Jews or Arabs of Palestine were present; but there were official discussions with the Arab states, and unofficial discussions with Agency personalities; but they led to no result. The Agency had dropped the Biltmore programme and was prepared to consider partition, but only provided that the British would propose it. They were not prepared to abate their claims sufficiently to propose it themselves. Azzam Pasha, secretary of the Arab League, was prepared to offer the Jews a guaranteed minority position in an Arab state; but neither would discuss the federation plan put forward by the British. The ineffective conference dissolved, nominally to meet again in December; and President Truman

again asked the British to consider the admission of 100,000 from Europe. The German and Austrian camps still contained a quarter of a million Jewish refugees, and these were not all the Jews who desired to leave Europe. The underground movement was still working, and hideously ill-equipped ships carrying loads of immigrants were continually being stopped at the gates of Palestine. Since July they had been transhipped to Cyprus.

At the end of the year the Zionist Congress met, but the situation was too confused for any clear decisions. Most were anxious to find a basis for negotiating with the British, but the latter made no gesture to help them. It was clear that, if the British offered partition, it would be accepted by the majority; but though the Congress issued a strong denunciation of terrorism, it was ineffective since it could not offer whole-hearted co-operation in its eradication. At the end the movement was left without its older leaders, Dr. Weizmann in Palestine and Dr. Wise in America, and with no clear policy for the future. On this unhappy note the year ended.

In January 1947 the conference reopened to examine a modification of the Morrison plan, but could come to no conclusion. But in the meantime there had been a radical change in the situation behind the scenes. In a speech in parliament on 31 January Mr. Churchill, leader of the Opposition, demanded that Britain should abandon the mandate and added that he knew no reason why she should wish to stay in the country. There had been apparently a change of mind on the part of the general staff and a rearrangement of their middle-eastern strategy, for on 18 February Mr. Bevin announced that Britain proposed to hand the whole matter over to the United Nations, but would not herself make any proposals for the future. It was the abandonment in failure and despair of a task which had become impossible. To its own undoing terrorism had achieved its object of driving the British out of the country.

On 25 February the question was officially submitted to the United Nations. On 2 April Britain asked that a special assembly might meet to appoint a fact-finding committee, in order that the full facts might be before the regular meeting in the autumn. The special assembly opened on 28 April, and was preceded by a government announcement that the British would not undertake to assist in carrying out the

decisions of the United Nations if they did not approve of them.

From then onwards the British attitude became more and more self-righteous and hysterical. The Administration in Jerusalem was living behind barbed wire, almost wholly isolated from the subjects it was supposed to govern. The outrages of the terrorists increased in violence, and the Agency found, too late, that it had no power whatever to control or influence them. Denunciation, impotent but sincere, only increased the fanaticism of the extremists, and the misery of the Jewish community almost paralleled that of the British. Yet the Jews, at any rate, could not afford the luxury of despair. All through the post-war period legal immigrants had been coming in and been absorbed into the life of the community; throughout 1947 new agricultural settlements were still planned and carried through; new industries were developed. In the non-political fields sudden generous inter-community actions, affecting Jews and Arabs or Jews and British, would vividly illuminate the world of night-have-been behind the hideousness of the political realities. Nor was all the wealth accumulated by the fellaheen during the war wasted in the political struggle. Though at a pitifully slow rate, new schools in the villages were being built; agricultural improvements and the terracing of more hill-sides were being carried on, and in many parts of the country, among both Jews and Arabs, life could appear almost normal.

When the special assembly met at the end of April the Arab states sought to put on the agenda the immediate termination of the mandate and the establishment of a 'democratic' state in Palestine, but this was refused. The Jews had no legal right to take part in the meeting, but as it was obviously both just and necessary that they should be heard, it was decided that they should be permitted to take part in the meetings of the political committee in which, in fact, all the states present were represented. It was finally decided to set up a fact-finding committee of eleven states, none of the great powers being members. By the middle of June the committee was in Palestine. On 31 August it presented its report. It was not too soon, for the situation was still deteriorating. During the period of the United Nations enquiry two events had shown the barrenness of both the British and the terrorists. During July, in revenge for the execution of three

of their number, the terrorists had kidnapped two British sergeants and hanged them. When the British found their bodies booby-trap bombs had been attached to them which exploded causing further casualties. In the same month a large transport of illegal immigrants had, as usual, been intercepted off the Palestine coast. But instead of their being taken to Cyprus, the British, on the plea that there was no further room on the island—a plea which was not true, for subsequent shiploads were taken there—returned them to Germany and placed them back in the camp life from which they had sought to escape. The tragic events of Palestine during these years are incomprehensible save when it is remembered that the gates of the world were still shut, and that, more than two years after the end of the war, Hitler's unhappy Jewish victims were still outcasts camped in the country of their martyrdom. The emotion caused in the Jewish world, and among humanitarians who were not Jews, by this callous action can easily be imagined. It availed nothing for the British self-righteously to say that the fault lay with those who sought to escape from Europe and those who aided them to do so. A regime so bankrupt had lost the justification for its existence.

It is not surprising that the first, and unanimous, recommendations of the United Nations committee were that the British mandate should be terminated at the earliest possible date and the country become independent. On the nature of that independence the committee were divided. The majority favoured political partition with economic union, and the minority a federal constitution embracing both Jews and Arabs in a single polity. In the former scheme Jerusalem would become a permanent trusteeship.

In the autumn the assembly of the United Nations met, and the future of Palestine was discussed. Partition was accepted, largely on the initiative of the United States but with the agreement of the Soviet Union. An *ad hoc* committee fixed the frontiers, and decided on procedure. To this committee on 13 November Sir Alexander Cadogan, on behalf of the British government, made it clear that the British would give the United Nations no assistance in carrying out their plan, as it had not the agreement of both the Jews and the Arabs. They proposed to withdraw their forces by August 1, 1948, but reserved the right to terminate their administration

at any earlier date which suited them. Until they had so done they would remain responsible for law and order and could not permit outside interference; after that they would only maintain order in the areas which their troops were still occupying and even in those areas they would take no part in the civil administration. Later they announced 15 May 1948 as the day for terminating their administration. The United Nations had meanwhile appointed a committee of five to attend to the details of the transfer of power; but the British refused to allow them to enter the country before May 1. Their whole attitude was as unhelpful as possible, since it was evident that in two weeks it would be impossible for the United Nations to take any effective measures for the future.

The partition scheme adopted by the United Nations was a curious one, and depended for its success entirely on the retention of economic unity between the two new states. The country was divided in a chequer board fashion into six 'squares'. In the north the Jews occupied the eastern square and the Arabs the western; in the centre the situation was reversed—Jews in the western, Arabs in the eastern; and in the south it was once again Jews in the eastern, Arabs in the western. At two points, one at Afulah and the other south of Rehovoth, there were points of intersection. Jerusalem was left as an island, having no control of its road, railway or water supply, all of which passed through the Arab 'square'. Jaffa remained in the Arab state though situated in a Jewish square. The reasons for such a geographical curiosity lay in the distribution of population, and the desire to give the Jews as large an area as possible, while yet containing as few Arabs as could be. Nevertheless, on the existing figures, in the Jewish state the Arab 'minority' almost equalled the Jewish 'majority'. It would contain 498,000 Jews and 407,000 settled Arabs. But, since it covered largely the plains of Palestine which are the areas through which the bedouin mostly wander, it would, at certain seasons, have 90,000 bedouins as well. If these are added there is a difference of only 1,000 between the two communities. It cannot be called other than a desperate solution for a situation which had thus far defied reason. On 29 November 1947 it was adopted by a vote of thirty-three states to thirteen, with ten abstentions, and the committee of five for its implementation was appointed.

The Jews accepted the scheme with thanksgiving, because at last they would be able to act themselves on behalf of the refugees of Europe, of whom over forty thousand were in Cyprus and some hundreds of thousands still scattered throughout that sombre continent. The Arabs replied by a general strike which immediately developed into open war against the Jewish community. The Haganah, at first, confined itself to the defensive; the extremists retaliated on the Arabs aggressively. To describe the resulting conflict is still impossible. It is continuing at the moment of writing. But two facts quickly emerged. The British claim that they would maintain 'law and order' until the conclusion of their administration was almost immediately shown to be vain; they were unable to maintain order even within Jerusalem or secure its access to the sea. Even more serious was the weighting of the scales between the combatants. To what extent this was deliberate and to what extent inevitable, history cannot yet decide. But the fact is clear. The Arabs were from the beginning supported by the Arab League in their resistance; the headquarters of the rebellion was in Damascus, and operations were directed from there without any impediment. Armed forces of other Arab states entered the country from the north and east and nothing was done to stop them. By the beginning of the year some five thousand had entered the country, and were in control of large areas. They were excellently armed, and amply supplied with ammunition. On the other side the Haganah still remained an 'illegal' body, and its soldiers were liable at any time to be stopped and their arms confiscated. Further, as the Jews could only obtain assistance by sea, it was an easy matter to prevent them from receiving either arms or recruits; and they were, in fact, effectively prevented from obtaining either. The British claimed that, had they legalised Haganah and allowed it to obtain arms, the only consequence would have been to make the war general. The justice of this claim can also not yet be examined.

By March the whole country was in disorder, and little 'law and order' was maintained anywhere. An advance party of the United Nations committee was permitted to come to Jerusalem, where they lived with little contact with any one. But they soon became convinced that, unless the United Nations were prepared to supply adequate forces to implement

their decision, it would be impossible to do so. The Jews were prepared to establish their own state; the Arabs refused to make any move to do so, or to accept the existence of a Jewish state. In these conditions, and in view of their unwillingness to supply troops themselves, the United States withdrew its support for partition, and suggested instead a temporary truce and a trusteeship pending a re-examination of the problem. The British replied that they would not oppose a trusteeship, but that they would close their administration on May 15, even if it meant handing over the country to chaos.

No decision about a continued trusteeship was taken and, in spite of the hesitations of the United States, partition remained the only valid international decision when on May 15 the British terminated their Administration. British action, and the armed conflict raging throughout the country, had made it impossible for the United Nations to take over responsibility. No action was taken by the Palestinian Arab leaders to assume responsibility for the areas allotted to the Arab state in the partition plan, but on May 14 the Jewish National Council, meeting in Tel Aviv, formally declared the establishment of a Jewish state, to be called Israel, in the area allotted to the Jews by the United Nations. The provisional Jewish state thus established received immediate *de facto* recognition from the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. followed, granting *de jure* recognition. Some other states also recognised Israel, but the British and the bulk of the members of the United Nations abstained from action. By this time the Palestinian Arabs had almost ceased to count in the conflict, but the Arab League pressed on with military operations, invading the country from all sides. After many failures to secure peace, the United Nations appointed Count Folke Bernadotte as Mediator, and secured an uneasy truce between the combatants. But it was constantly violated, apparently by both sides, and a state of war and uncertainty continued throughout the country which made a return to normal and peaceful occupations impossible for both Jews and Arabs. On this unhappy note this study must terminate.

Responsibility for the present situation must be divided between four parties, the British, the Arabs, the Jews and the Christian Churches. None can take pride in, or avoid responsibility for, the misery which has befallen the country.

Preceding chapters will have shown how many unexpected

difficulties beset the British Administration which opened with so much optimism and enthusiasm after the first world war. But if its failure was in part inevitable, it was in part due to an increasing determination of British policy by unskilful, and in the result, meaningless power politics designed to conciliate the most reactionary elements in the Arab world.

As to the Christian Churches, it is difficult to speak with moderation of the ignominy of the rôle which, with individual exceptions, they have played, or the moral tragedy which has resulted from a confusion of ideas between the spiritual holiness of Holy Places and the visible stones and buildings which commemorate historical events. Their influence has been negligible, because their behaviour has too often lacked not only moral grandeur but even honesty.

It is just that the Arab population, the mass of fellaheen, townsmen and bedouins, should receive sympathy. For they have been the playthings of alien power-politics and of their own unscrupulous and selfish leaders. Politically ignorant, economically backward, and withal fanatically proud, they have lacked both wise leadership and the religious vision which would have enabled them to play a worthy part in the rebuilding of the land. And if its towns and villages have for centuries been their home, still they were also directly responsible for the devastation which had befallen it, and had been the aggressive and selfish beneficiaries of the usurpation of the rights of both Jews and Christians, which obscured the reality of the fact that it had never been wholly either an Arab or a Muslim land.

Finally there are the Jews. After two thousand years an independent Jewish state has been reconstituted in the Promised Land. It will be a matter for profound sorrow to many tens of thousands of Jews who viewed with pride the idealism and passionate sacrifice which rebuilt the National Home that its achievement of political independence has been accompanied by bitter faction fights and by war. If history shows that its emergence is a natural process and not the artificial creation which its enemies pretend, yet the new Israel cannot be simply a repetition of the old. Jewry has to take into account the emergence of Christianity and Islam, as permanent factors in the new picture of the Holy Land, and find a creative relationship with them. That a bi-national state proved impossible was not the fault of the Jews; but there will be no peace in Palestine until there is reconciliation between Jewish and Arab needs.

Military power and the world's inertia may postpone, or even destroy, the real establishment of the present state of Israel, but there would be no permanence in a victory which merely restored the country to the rulers and the religious and national temper responsible for its long decline and dereliction. The land is no longer a backwater that the world can ignore. Spiritually, geographically and economically it lies at the heart of humanity. From all standpoints the words are as true to-day as when the psalmist wrote them nearly three thousand years ago, that men should pray for the peace of Jerusalem; for they shall prosper that love her.

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 - c. Holy Places.
- III. The Muslims:
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 - b. The Local Population.
 - c. Arab Nationalism.

For abbreviations see A, VI and VII.

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| EI | <i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> . |
| EJ | <i>Encyclopaedia Judaica</i> . |
| JE | <i>Jewish Encyclopaedia</i> . |

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- | | |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| JQR.N.S | <i>Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series</i> . |
| JPOS | <i>Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society</i> . |
| MGWJ | <i>Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums</i> . |
| PEFQ | <i>Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly</i> . |
| PPTS | <i>Palestine Pilgrims Texts Society</i> . |
| ROC | <i>Revue de l'Orient chrétien</i> . |
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